Opinion
Civil Action No. 98-10508-DPW.
August 29, 2005
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff brought this case against prison officials arising out of his transfer to a restrictive housing unit at MCI-Cedar Junction. The case was stayed pending the resolution of a parallel state class action in which plaintiff was a class member. In that action, the representative class members sought only equitable relief. They ultimately prevailed in the state court. On January 4, 2005, I granted defendants' motion for summary judgment in this case, finding that the state court judgment precluded plaintiff from seeking individual damages because they were not sought in connection with the class action.
Plaintiff has filed a motion to amend, vacate, or modify my summary judgment decision, arguing that individual damages actions may be brought following a class action suit. Defendants argue that plaintiff is precluded from doing so and, alternatively, that qualified immunity protects them from a suit for damages. I will deny the plaintiff's motion but on grounds other than the preclusion grounds I relied upon in my January 4, 2005 Memorandum and Order.
I.
As I stated in my January 4 Memorandum and Order, I must "look to the law of the state where the prior judgment was entered to determine the res judicata consequences of that judgment."Reppert v. Marvin Lumber and Cedar Co., Inc., 359 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2004). Upon reconsideration, after review of a subsequent Massachusetts Superior Court decision plaintiff relies upon as to the question, I believe I did not in my January 4, 2005 Memorandum and Order properly apply the Massachusetts law of res judicata applicable to class actions.
Although it is true as a general matter that "[u]nder basic principles of res judicata in Massachusetts, the state judgment resolved all claims that were or could have been raised in that first concluded action," Davila v. Maloney, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181, at *2 (D. Mass., Jan. 4, 2005), class actions present a unique set of circumstances. Taking up this very question in an action for damages brought by one of plaintiff's fellow class members, Judge Billings of the Massachusetts Superior Court noted that "[i]f the doctrine of claim preclusion is well settled in Massachusetts law . . . its application to class actions under Mass. R. Civ. P. 23 is not, owing perhaps to the relative rarity of class actions in our state practice." Longval v. O'Toole, 19 Mass. L. Rep. 308, 2005 Mass. Super. LEXIS 232, at *6 (Mass.Super.Ct., Jan. 28, 2005). For interpretive assistance, Judge Billings relief upon, id. at *9-10, a recent decision by the Supreme Judicial Court arising under Chapter 93(a), Aspinall v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 442 Mass. 381 (2004).
The doctrine [of claim preclusion] is grounded on considerations of fairness and judicial efficiency and would not operate to bar a member of a class certified to proceed, as here, only on an economic theory of damages from future pursuit for personal injury unsuitable for class treatment.Id. at 397 n. 19. The reason such individual damages actions are permissible is that the doctrine "only applies in circumstances where the party to be precluded has had the incentive and opportunity to raise the claim fully in the earlier lawsuit." Id.
I now find that where, as here, the "unique and different experiences of each individual member of the class would require litigation of substantially separate issues and would defeat the commonality of interests in the certified class," id., Massachusetts courts would not bar individual suits for damages brought by a non-representative class member. A narrow reading as to the preclusive effect of a class action judgment on later suits for individual damages is particularly reasonable in Massachusetts where members of the class are not permitted to "opt out." Consequently, Judge Billings's opinion persuades me plaintiff's damages claims may not be resolved by reference to Massachusetts preclusion law.
II.
The defendants also rely upon Judge Billings's Longval opinion, but for the separate proposition that qualified immunity acts as a bar to plaintiff's damages claim at least in so far as plaintiff's claims concern matters resolved by the parallel state action in which he was a class member.
As Judge Billings concluded:
Where the judges of the Commonwealth have not spoken with one voice — or anything approaching it — on an issue, it is difficult to discern . . . a "clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known," . . . such that a governmental official should be held answerable in damages for incorrect prognostication.Longval, 2005 Mass. Super. LEXIS 232, at *30 (citation omitted).
I find this aspect of Judge Billings's opinion persuasive as well. Consequently, I conclude the doctrine of qualified immunity bars plaintiff's damages claims arising out of the subject matter of the state class action.
III.
I have carefully reviewed plaintiff's complaint and continue to adhere to the view I expressed in my September 30, 1999 Memorandum and Order that to the degree claims separate and distinct from those raised in the state class action can be discerned (and it is by no means clear that they can) they must be disposed of adversely to the plaintiff on the basis of governing United States Supreme Court precedent.
Conclusion
For the reasons set more fully above, plaintiff's motion to amend, vacate or modify (No. 52) is DENIED.