Summary
finding wife had standing to pursue Fourteenth Amendment claim for violation of right to companionship and society of deceased husband
Summary of this case from Ebrown v. LambertOpinion
NO. CIV. S-06-2691 LKK/EFB.
August 20, 2008
ORDER
Plaintiffs Sofia Davila, wife of decedent Guillermo Davila, and his children, have brought the present action alleging that defendants City of Tracy, County of San Joaquin, and Officers Harries, Flores, and Kendrick violated their constitutionally protected familial rights by causing the death of Mr. Davila, which followed his arrest and release from the San Joaquin county jail. Pending before the court are motions for summary judgment filed by the city and county defendants. For the reasons explained below, the court grants the city defendants' motion and grants in part and denies in part the county defendants' motion.
Plaintiffs initially sought damages against other officers Mr. Davila encountered at the San Joaquin county jail, but stipulated to dismiss Andy Coronado, Lupe Garcia, Julie Anema, Ron Coplin, Ronald Zalunardo, and Brian Franks after the present motions for summary judgment were filed.
I. Facts
The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
A. Overview
This case arises from an incident in which plaintiffs' decedent, Mr. Davila, was arrested by Tracy city police officers for public intoxication after he was found in someone else's house. Mr. Davila was booked at the San Joaquin county jail and taken into custody by the county sheriff's department. Early the next morning, the county released Mr. Davila, who walked away from the jail on foot. Two days later, Mr. Davila was found deceased approximately a mile from the jail. Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Davila died as a result of hypothermia, whereas defendants argue that he died as a result of a sudden cardiac event. Plaintiffs have brought federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims for wrongful death.
B. Arrest by Tracy City Police
On March 4, 2006, at approximately 6:00 p.m., Tracy city police officers Steve Flores and James Harries were each notified by dispatch of a 911 call regarding an intruder in a private residence. Depo. of Steve Flores ("Flores Depo.") at 20-21; Depo. of James Harries ("Harries Depo.") at 80-83. Upon arrival, Officers Flores and Harries entered the residence and approached an upstairs bedroom. Flores Depo. at 33-34; Harries Depo. at 90. Approaching the bedroom, the officers heard loud screaming or yelling coming from inside. Flores Depo. at 34; Harries Depo. at 87-88, 91.
Decedent Guillermo Davila, then 71 years old, was inside the bedroom, lying on the bed. Flores Depo. at 41-42. Officer Flores observed that Mr. Davila's eyes were glossed over, his speech was slurred, and that he was unsteady on his feet. Id. at 45-46. Additionally, Officer Flores smelled alcohol on Mr. Davila. Id. at 81.
Mr. Davila was unable to communicate with the officers. Id. at 70. He was making sounds, in what appeared to be an attempt to communicate with the officers, but was not speaking any language that Officer Flores could recognize. Id. at 70, 73.
Mr. Davila's pants were also neatly set over the arm of the couch in the living, and his shoes were placed next to them, indicating to the officers that Mr. Davila believed or was acting as if it was his house. Id. at 58.
The officers determined that Mr. Davila was in violation of California Penal Code sections 602 (trespass) and 647(f) (public intoxication). Id. at 66; Harries Depo. at 110. The officers considered what action to take and decided to release Mr. Davila to a responsible adult family member. Flores Depo. at 66-67. Neighborhood children told one of the officers at the scene that they recognized Mr. Davila and directed them to the house where he lived nearby. Depo. of Miguel Reyna at 24. The officers located Mr. Davila's home, but no one was there. Flores Depo. at 65, 83; Harries Depo. at 108. The officers then decided to arrest Mr. Davila for public intoxication and transported him to the San Joaquin county jail. Flores Depo. at 83-84; Harries Depo. at 110.
At the time of Mr. Davila's arrest, it was the policy of the Tracy police department to follow the penal code with regard to public intoxication offenses. Depo. of John A. Espinoza ("Espinoza Depo.") at 23. Officers were instructed that when the elements of the violation were met, officers could place an individual under arrest if they deemed appropriate. Id. at 23.
The Tracy Police Department Field Training Manual contained a directive to officers entitled "persons under the influence." Id. at 29; FTO Guide at 58. That directive informed officers to be aware of the "officer's options and prosecution criteria." Espinoza Depo. at 29; FTO Guide at 58. Officers were instructed to discern the degree of intoxication of an individual by observing physical symptoms including the smell of alcohol on an individual's breath or person, the presence of red or watery eyes, an individual's ability to balance, an individual's quality of speech and ability to communicate, and an individual's awareness of his surroundings and orientation. Espinoza Depo. at 30-31. The purpose of discerning an individual's degree of intoxication was to determine the appropriate level of care the individual required, including when medical attention was appropriate. Id. at 30, 49, 59. Thus, for example, where the subject was vomiting, urinating on himself, or having convulsions, then immediate medical attention would be appropriate due to possible alcohol poisoning. Id. at 30.
The City of Tracy had an additional policy of booking all persons arrested on public intoxication offenses at the San Joaquin county jail and not the city facility. Id. at 79-80. The county jail had more medical resources available and was better able to monitor and care for intoxicated individuals. Id. at 79-80, 88.
C. Detention at San Joaquin County Jail
Pursuant to the city's policy, the officers delivered Mr. Davila to the San Joaquin county jail at approximately 6:50 p.m. and transferred his custody to the County Sheriff. Incident Investigation Report, attached as Ex. F to Cassidy Decl. At approximately 7:30 p.m., defendant Officer Thomas Kendrick began Mr. Davila's pre-book process. Depo. of Thomas C. Kendrick ("Kendrick Depo.") at 47-48. Pursuant to the pre-book process, Officer Kendrick submitted Mr. Davila's medical health screening to the on-duty nurse. Kendrick Depo. at 51. The questions attached to the screening are phrased so that if any question is answered "yes," an on-duty nurse will review the screening and determine if further attention is required. Depo. of Ermelinda Patricio ("Patricio Depo."). The screening transmitted by Officer Kendrick indicated that Mr. Davila answered "yes" to a question regarding whether he had been drinking that day. Patricio Depo. at 21. Ms. Patricio, the on-duty nurse, reviewed the information contained in Mr. Davila's screening and determined that Mr. Davila required no further attention, given that there was no notation that he was experiencing withdrawal or other symptoms of alcohol poisoning. Patricio Depo. at 40-41.
Mr. Davila's longtime friend and neighbor, Rosario De Leon, stated that he was last with Mr. Davila before 3:00 p.m. and saw him drink one beer. Depo. of Rosario De Leon ("De Leon Depo.") at 20. The 911 call regarding an intruder was placed around 6:00 p.m.
The questionnaire also contained questions regarding whether Mr. Davila had diabetes, suffered from heart disease, was under the care of a physician, or was presently taking any medications. Pre-Book Screening of Guillermo Davila, attached as Ex. 4 to Widen Decl. The screening indicates that Mr. Davila answered "no" to all these questions, despite the fact that he did have diabetes, did suffer heart disease, was under the care of a physician, and was taking medications. Pre-Book Screening of Guillermo Davila. Mr. De Leon, however, never knew that Mr. Davila had diabetes or high blood pressure, even though they spent a great deal of time together and Mr. De Leon himself had diabetes. De Leon Depo. at 27.
Pursuant to its policy of processing section 647(f) detainees, Mr. Davila was detained for six hours (in order to provide detainees sufficient time to sober up). He spent that entire time in the booking lobby. The booking lobby contains rows of seats, as well as a bank of six telephones for the arrestees' unlimited use, which were free for local calls.
Correctional Officer Guadalupe Garcia, a Spanish-speaking officer, had several interactions with Mr. Davila during this time. Depo. of Guadalupe Garcia at 102-03. When she first observed that he was out of his seat, she told him in English that he needed to sit down. He continued to look at her, so she told him more loudly (as she was about fifteen feet away) and in Spanish, "Sir, you need to have a seat." Id. He complied immediately. Id. On a second occasion, Officer Garcia saw Mr. Davila standing in front of the booking desk; when she told him to please take his seat in Spanish, he responded "okay" and told her in Spanish that he was ready to go home. She checked his booking information and told him he still had four hours to go.Id. at 109-10. Approximately two hours later, Mr. Davila inquired again whether he could leave yet, and Officer Garcia told him he had two more hours to go. Id. at 150-51. Officer Garcia felt that Mr. Davila's behavior was consistent with the behavior of a cooperative arrestee, and that it was not unusual for arrestees to frequently ask the officers if it was time for them to leave yet.
D. Release from San Joaquin County Jail
Mr. Davila was finally released on his own recognizance at approximately 1:21 a.m. San Joaquin County Sheriff Documented Report 06-6645 Supplement No. 26, attached as Ex. 12 to Widen Decl. Through a Spanish interpreter, Mr. Davila was asked if he had any property to be returned. Depo. of Brian Franks ("Franks Depo.") at 51-53. Mr. Davila responded that he had no property and Officer Franks did not check the property bins to verify. Franks Depo. at 53. Mr. Davila did, in fact, have personal property to be returned, including his wallet. Franks Depo. at 53.
Mr. Davila was released from the jail to its "24-hour lobby." San Joaquin County Sheriff Documented Report 06-6645 Supplement No. 26. The lobby is a large, temperature-controlled indoor area with seating, pay phones, vending machines, and restrooms. Id. At the time, he was wearing pants, a sweater, and a long-sleeve undershirt. Id. Outside, the temperature was in the 40s.
Mr. Davila exited the lobby and, a little before 2:00 a.m., encountered Deputy Andy Coronado, who was driving in a sheriff's transportation van on the street outside the jail. Depo. of Andrew Coronado ("Coronado Depo.") at 53-54. Describing himself as "nosy," Deputy Coronado, who did not know that Mr. Davila had been released from jail and thought he might have been a migrant farm worker, asked where Mr. Davila was going. Mr. Davila told him that he was going to Tracy and pointed in the correct direction. Deputy Coronado told Mr. Davila that Tracy was ten miles away and a long way to walk; he therefore told Mr. Davila he should call for a ride, gave Mr. Davila fifty cents, and directed him back to the jail's 24-hour lobby to make a phone call. Id. at 57-74. A jail security videotape shows that Mr. Davila returned to the 24-hour hobby at approximately 2:00 a.m. but it is unknown whether he made any calls or attempted to purchase food from the vending machine. San Joaquin County Sheriff Documented Report 06-6645 Supplement No. 26.
Plaintiffs dispute this fact by simply asserting, ipse dixit, that there is no indication on the videotape that Mr. Davila reentered the building.
E. Cause of Death
On March 7, 2006, Mr. Davila's body was discovered outdoors approximately one mile from the jail. San Joaquin County Sheriff Documented Report 06-6645 Supplement No. 10, attached as Ex. 17 to Widen Decl. An autopsy performed by county pathologist George Bolduc, M.D. concluded that Mr. Davila died as a result of a sudden cardiac event caused by chronic, severe atherosclerotic coronary artery disease. Coroner's Report, attached as Ex. 14 to Widen Decl. Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Terri Haddix, stated that she had nothing to refute this determination. Depo. of Terri Haddix ("Haddix Depo.") at 19. Dr. Haddix stated that someone with a preexisting narrowing of the coronary artery would be more sensitive to the effects of hypothermia. Haddix Depo. at 24-25. Neither expert, however, testified that hypothermia was a likely cause of death.
Of Mr. Davila's three major arteries, one was 90% blocked, one was 60% blocked, and one was 20% blocked. Depo. of George Bolduc ("Bolduc Depo.") at 81.
Dr. Bolduc stated in his deposition that, assuming the temperature was in fact in the 40s that night, the weather "would make it likely that hypothermia was a factor in causing — in pushing his cardiac disease to the point where he suffered a cardiac event and death." Bolduc Depo. at 145. Earlier, however, Dr. Bolduc stated that in order to determine whether hypothermia was a "contributing factor," id. at 121, he would first "have to know how soon . . . did [Mr. Davila] die after leaving the facility," because if it was relatively soon thereafter, the cause of death could have been independent of the weather, id. at 122. He also emphasized throughout his deposition that in order to make a more definite opinion about hypothermia as a contributing factor to Mr. Davila's death, he would need more information such as whether or not Mr. Davila was exposed to rain, the wind chill, and the amount of time that Mr. Davila spent outside. Dr. Haddix agreed that there were many unknown variables that would determine whether Mr. Davila experienced hypothermia. Haddix Depo. at 26-29.
Dr. Bolduc's hesitation to make a firm statement on this issue was clear. See Bolduc Depo. at 48 ("Q. Did you make a finding that environmental stress factors did push him over the edge in terms of his coronary artery disease? . . . A. Well, there are possible stress factors. It's all I can say. I can't say that they definitely, you know, triggered the cardiac event, but . . . it's a possibility."); id. at 55 ("All of these things [rain, wind] could, if they occurred, could put stress on the heart. This individual has heart disease, a bad coronary, so it could be contributory. But I'd have to have more evidence of that."); id. at 115 ("there's certainly indication that he could have . . . suffered hypothermia. But as I indicated, I don't have specific or reasonable ballpark numbers to confirm that.").
II. Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Secor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1995). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party
[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the `pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id. at 323.
If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist.Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); see also First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Secor Ltd., 51 F.3d at 853.
In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n. 11; see also First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1998). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Ass'n of Western Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,Anderson, 477 U.S. 248-49; see also Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng'g Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).
In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial."First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 290; see also T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to `pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments); see also Int'l Union of Bricklayers Allied Craftsman Local Union No. 20 v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).
In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule 56(c); see also In re Citric Acid Litigation, 191 F.3d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)); see also Headwaters Forest Def. v. County of Humboldt, 211 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987).
Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'"Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).
III. Analysis
A. Standing to Bring Federal Claims
As a threshold matter, defendants argue that plaintiffs cannot assert Mr. Davila's constitutional claims for the simple reason that "constitutional claims are personal and cannot be asserted vicariously." Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997). The estate of the decedent is not a party to this action, and plaintiffs have not brought this action as personal representatives or successors-in-interest.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs may redress violations of their constitutionally protected right to the companionship and society of Mr. Davila pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment's due process protections. See Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987) (recognizing the right of companionship and society for close family members). Thus, so long as the violation of plaintiffs' due process rights (i.e., the loss of Mr. Davila's companionship and society) was proximately caused by violations of Mr. Davila's own constitutional rights, plaintiffs may properly assert those latter violations in pursing their own constitutional claims.
Indeed, the approach urged by defendant has been expressly rejected by Ninth Circuit. In Ward v. City of San Jose, 967 F.2d 280, 284 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit rejected the requirement, adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Trujillo v. Board of County Commissioners, 768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1985), that family members must "prove a wrongful intent directed specifically at them." See also Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F. 2d 195, 207-08 (7th Cir. 1987) (rejecting Trujillo). That said, plaintiffs must still prove that government officials acted with deliberate indifference to their familial rights. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 685-86 (9th Cir. 2001); Byrd v. Guess, 137 F.3d 1126, 1134 (9th Cir. 1998) ("to prove their Fourteenth Amendment claim, [plaintiffs] had to prove that the Officers acted with deliberate indifference to [their] rights of familial relationship."). Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiffs have standing to assert their own Fourteenth Amendment claims.
B. City Defendants
As noted above, it was the city defendants who arrested Mr. Davila and transported him to the jail, whereas it was the county defendants who were responsible for Mr. Davila during his detention and who made the decision to release him. The court therefore analyzes their liabilities separately.
1. Federal Claims
a. Officers Harries and Flores
Plaintiffs contend that Officers Harries and Flores (the officers who found and arrested Mr. Davila) were deliberately indifferent to Mr. Davila's serious medical needs by arresting him and taking him to the county jail instead of directly to a medical facility. A prisoner's right not to have officials remain deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs usually stems from the Eighth Amendment's bar on cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). When the individual alleging deliberate indifference is merely a detainee and has not been convicted of any crime, however, that right stems instead from the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiffs contend that the officers must have known from the fact that Mr. Davila was unable to communicate that he was in serious need of medical attention and that the county jail would be unable to attend to that need. Plaintiffs further reason that had Mr. Davila been taken into a medical facility rather than the jail, he would not have been released from the jail at 1:20 a.m. into adverse weather conditions.
As an initial matter, plaintiffs have tendered no evidence as to what medical or mental condition would have caused Mr. Davila to be unable to communicate and that the officers should have reasonably recognized. Equally important, there is no evidence that this undefined medical or mental condition was linked to either of the possible causes of death (hypothermia or a sudden cardiac event). The fact that a trip to the hospital to treat an unrelated medical condition would have fortuitously put him in a different location at 1:20 a.m. on March 5, 2008 is not sufficient to establish proximate causation. Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[A] plaintiff must do more than merely demonstrate that `defendant's action triggered a series of other events that led to the alleged injury'"). If, for example, Mr. Davila had his broken arm, but the officers ignored this fact and instead transported him to the jail rather than a hospital, their action would not be the legal cause of a hypothermia-induced death the next day.
Assuming, for example, that Mr. Davila had had a stroke, which caused him to temporarily lose the ability to communicate — a possibility that plaintiffs have not argued in their briefs — this would not necessarily have been related to his ultimate cause of death. See Bolduc Depo. 85-86.
The medical causation issues are addressed further below.
Moreover, no reasonable jury could conclude that, based on the actions that Officers Harries and Flories took, they knowingly disregarded an excessive risk to Mr. Davila's safety. The record reflects that Officers Harries and Flores did in fact consider the risks faced by Mr. Davila when deciding the proper course of action. Flores Depo. at 66-67. The officers first attempted to take Mr. Davila home and leave him in the care of a responsible adult. Id. Only after determining that no one was home to receive him did the officers place Mr. Davila under arrest and transport him to the county jail. Id. at 83-84; Harris Depo. at 110.
Pursuant to city policy, the officers brought Mr. Davila to the county facility because the city jail did not have the resources available to monitor the medical needs of intoxicated individuals. Espinoza Depo. at 79-80, 88. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to suppose that if Mr. Davila was in need of medical attention, that determination was more likely to have been made by the medical staff at the county jail than at the city jail.
The undisputed facts also show that the officers did not observe Mr. Davila blacking out, unconscious, falling down, bleeding, vomiting, or having urinated on himself. Instead, they observed that Mr. Davila had bloodshot eyes, unsteady gait, and the odor of alcohol on his person. In other words, Mr. Davila appeared intoxicated — but there was no indication of alcohol poisoning. Particularly where the officers took the action of transporting Mr. Davila to a facility equipped to monitor the medical needs of intoxicated individuals, it would be unreasonable for a jury to conclude that the officers were deliberately indifferent to an excessive risk of harm.
Accordingly, Officers Harries and Flores are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' § 1983 claim.
b. City of Tracy
Municipalities may be held liable pursuant to § 1983 where: (1) an individual suffers a constitutional injury; (2) defendant municipality has a custom or policy that amounts to deliberate indifference to that individual's constitutional rights; and (3) the custom or policy is the driving force behind the violation.Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (citingCity of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-91 (1989)). Because plaintiffs cannot satisfy the first element, the city likewise cannot be held liable. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (stating that no authority "authorizes the award of damages against a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when [it has been] concluded that the officer inflicted no constitutional harm"). Accordingly, the City of Tracy is entitled to summary judgment.
Plaintiffs' claim that the city follows an inexorable rule of booking anyone arrested for public intoxication into jail, without the possibility of seeking medical treatment, is without foundation. In fact, plaintiffs admit at one point in their brief that "officers may consider" seeking such medical treatment. Pls.' Opp'n at 18.
2. State Claims
Plaintiffs also assert state law negligence claims against Officers Flores and Harries. In addition, plaintiffs argue that the city itself may be held liable based upon respondeat superior liability. The same proximate causation problems inherent in plaintiffs' federal claims are equally fatal to plaintiffs' state law claims. As noted above, the failure to take Mr. Davila to the hospital for a purported medical condition unrelated to his actual cause of death cannot serve as the basis for a tort (constitutional or otherwise).
Despite the court's grant of summary judgment as to Officer Flores and Harries and the City of Tracy on plaintiffs' federal claims, the court retains pendent party jurisdiction over the state law claims against these same defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) ("district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to the claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution"); Briarpatch Ltd. L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 308 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that a state law claim forms part of the controversy if it and the federal claim derive from a common nucleus of operative fact, "even if the state law claim is asserted against a party different from the one named in the federal claim."). As noted below, plaintiffs' federal claim against Officer Kendrick and the county may proceed.
Moreover, plaintiffs' claims are barred by the immunity for discretionary decisions conferred by California Government Code section 820.2, which provides that "a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the discretion vested in him." Plaintiffs respond that the decision to take Mr. Davila to jail and not to the hospital was not a discretionary one, but rather was a ministerial act made in accordance with city policy. Plaintiff's contention belies the facts surrounding Mr. Davila's arrest and the city's policy.
Officer Flores asserts that when the officers encountered Mr. Davila, they considered what was the best course of action to take. Flores Depo. at 66-67. Their initial decision was to leave Mr. Davila with a responsible family member who could care for him if such a family member could be found. Id. To that end, the officers went to Mr. Davila's residence but found no one home. Id. at 65, 83; Harries Depo. at 108. It was only at that point that the officers chose to take Mr. Davila to the San Joaquin County Jail. Flores Depo. at 83-84; Harries Depo. at 110.
The decision made by the officers was based upon the information that was available to them and included their own physical observations of Mr. Davila. Flores Depo. at 97; Harries Depo. at 108. As such, it was made pursuant to and in accordance with the city's policy for treating individuals suspected of being intoxicated. Espinoza Depo. at 23-24.
The actions of the officers cannot reasonably be construed as ministerial. They balanced the facts and options known to them and made a decision about how to best care for Mr. Davila. The plaintiffs are correct in asserting that California has not established a clear guideline for what may be properly labeled "discretionary" under section 820.2. See Burgdorf v. Fender, 246 Cal. App. 2d. 443, 449 (1996). But, in this instance, there can be no doubt that the actions of the officers were discretionary and that a reasonable jury could not conclude otherwise. Accordingly, the individual officers are entitled to immunity from plaintiffs' state law negligence claims.
As Officers Harries and Flores are entitled to immunity, the City of Tracy is likewise immune. See Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2(a) ("A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment"). Accordingly, Officers Harries, Flores, and the City of Tracy are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' state law claims.
C. County Defendants
a. Officer Kendrick
1. Federal Claims
Plaintiffs contend that Officer Kendrick was deliberately indifferent to Mr. Davila's serious medical needs by failing to perform a mandated medical screening. Despite the documented evidence that Officer Kendrick submitted a completed medical questionnaire for Mr. Davila, plaintiffs assert that there is circumstantial evidence to suggest that Officer Kendrick submitted the questionnaire without ever asking the questions it contained.
Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs' at the time of his arrest (approximately 6:00 p.m.), Mr. Davila was unable to form words or communicate with the arresting officers. Flores Depo. at 70, 73. It is also undisputed that, two hours into his detention at the jail, he was able to speak with Officer Garcia, as evidenced by his inquiry into when he would be permitted to leave. Thus, it is clear that at some point during the evening, Mr. Davila regained his ability to communicate (assuming, of course, that he had lost it in the first place). What is unclear, however, is at what point that happened.
It would also be reasonable to infer that the unsuccessful attempts to verbally communicate with Mr. Davila could be explained by other reasons, such as refusal or unwillingness to communicate, language barriers, or simply the result of being intoxicated.
Plaintiffs argue that the fact that many of the responses purportedly provided by Mr. Davila are incorrect creates the inference that the questions were never asked. Defendants respond that patients often deny having medical conditions to jail staff because they do not wish to reveal their health status to a stranger. Depo. of James C. Sida at 28-29. In addition, defendants contend that Mr. Davila never revealed to his own friend that he suffered from diabetes or had high blood pressure, indicating that concealment of medical conditions was not uncommon for Mr. Davila. De Leon Depo. at 27.
The court is obliged to draw all reasonable inferences based on the evidence submitted in favor of the nonmoving party.Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. It would not be unreasonable for a jury to infer that because plaintiff apparently was unable to communicate when he was first booked, and many of the answers recorded in Mr. Davila's medical questionnaire are wrong, the questions were never posed. As such, it appears that the plaintiffs have shown that a genuine issue of fact exists with regard to the whether the medical screening purportedly conducted by Officer Kendrick was in fact performed.
The dispute is material because if the medical screening had been performed, and if Mr. Davila had answered the questions honestly, it is at least possible that this information would have (or should have) changed the county's decision to release Mr. Davila in light of the weather conditions and/or without first determining that Mr. Davila had secured transportation (or had secured such transportation on his behalf). A jury could therefore reasonably conclude that Kendrick violated Mr. Davila's rights to personal security under the Fourteenth Amendment (and, by extension, plaintiffs' rights to his companionship and society). Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1991).
b. San Joaquin County
As noted above, there is a genuine dispute as to whether Mr. Davila suffered a constitutional injury at the hands of Officer Kendrick. While the county may not be held liable for Kendrick's alleged failure to ask the medical screening questions (because such a failure would not have been in accord with county custom or policy), a reasonable jury could hold the county liable for its policy of releasing individuals with a history of medical problems, such as heart disease, into inclement weather conditions without first determining that transportation had been arranged or was available. While both Kendrick and the county would share liability, a reasonable jury could nevertheless conclude that the county's policy was "`so closely related as to be the moving force causing the ultimate injury.'" Oviatt, 954 F.2d at 1481.
The county did have in place prohibitions on the release of detainees who had sufficiently serious medical or psychological issues or were still under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Depo. of Janet Allen at 35. With regard to the first category, the county's policy did not take into account the effect of weather on a detainee's medical condition. With regard to the second category, there is insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Mr. Davila was still so intoxicated at the time of his release (approximately seven hours after Officers Harries and Flores encountered Mr. Davila) that he should have been detained on this basis.
Plaintiffs also argue that the county should be held liable on other bases, such as the failure to instruct detainees that they are free to stay in the 24-hour lobby as long as they wish. Because Mr. Davila voluntarily chose to leave the 24-hour lobby (even after his exchange with Deputy Coronado), however, the only theory of liability on which plaintiffs may proceed is that the county should have involuntarily detained Mr. Davila. See Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 837 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Ninth Circuit has looked to "[t]raditional tort law" to define "intervening causes that break the chain of proximate causation" in § 1983 actions). The Supreme Court has noted that in "virtually every instance where a person has had his or her constitutional rights violated by a [municipal] employee, a § 1983 plaintiff will be able to point to something the city `could have done' to prevent the unfortunate incident."City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 392. Accordingly, the court grants in part and denies in part the county's motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs' federal claims.
This fact distinguishes the present case from others in which the state affirmatively placed the plaintiff in a position of danger, without any means of avoiding the danger. In Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), for example, the officers arrested a female driver for drunk driving and impounded her vehicle, leaving her on the side of the road in a high crime area. She accepted a ride from a stranger, who drove to a secluded area and raped her. Similarly distinguishable is Munger v. City of Glasgow Police Dep't, 227 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000), in which police officers ejected an intoxicated patron from a bar, wearing only a t-shirt and jeans, into a 20-25 degree weather. Here, plaintiff was in a safe and secure location, but voluntarily chose to leave it.
2. State Law Claims
Assuming that Kendrick in fact failed to conduct the medical screening, a jury could find both him and the county liable for this omission under state law. California Government Code section 844.6 establishes the general rule that "a public entity is not liable for . . . an injury to any prisoner," but it creates several exceptions, including where liability is created under section 845.6. That latter section creates liability against both the public employee and public entity where "the employee knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care." Thus, to the extent that Kendrick is liable under state law, San Joaquin County is also liable under state law. See also Cal. Gov't Code § 815.2 ("a public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment . . .").
Kendrick may have summoned medical care (i.e., the nurse), but a jury might infer that he did not take "reasonable action" to summon medical care in light of the alleged failure to conduct the medical screening.
With respect to any other grounds for a state law claim, the county argues it would be barred by section 844.6 immunity for injuries to prisoners. The question is whether Mr. Davila was still a prisoner while the putative wrongful conduct occurred. To the extent that plaintiffs argue that the county should have involuntarily detained Mr. Davila (even after the 6-hour period had expired) before releasing him, that conduct (or, more precisely, that omission of conduct) would have occurred while Mr. Davila was still a prisoner. Accordingly, the immunity would still apply.
The court declines to find immunity on the alternate grounds urged by the county, California Government Code section 845.8, which provides that "neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for (a) any injury resulting from the determining whether to parole or release a prisoner or from determining the terms and conditions of his parole or release."See also Ladd v. County of San Mateo, 12 Cal. 4th 913 (1996) (immunity extends to injuries inflicted by the prisoner himself). The text of this provision suggest that it was intended to immunize municipalities from injuries caused by recidivist parolees and released prisoners. The court is unpersuaded that this immunity pertaining to the "conditions of . . . release" should be read so literally as to encompass, for example, the weather conditions at the time of release.
To the extent that plaintiffs argue that the county should have taken additional steps after his release, such as expressly communicating to him that he could stay in the 24-hour lobby, the interaction between Mr. Davila and Deputy Coronado, and Mr. Davila's apparent voluntary choice to leave the lobby after reentering it, breaks the chain of causation for any of the county's alleged misconduct. Finally, once the county released Mr. Davila, their duty to him also ended, and plaintiffs' have not pointed to an alternate basis for statutory liability. Cal. Gov't Code § 815 ("Except as otherwise provided by statute . . . [a] public entity is not liable for an injury.").
Moreover, that the county did not expressly tell Mr. Davila at the time of release that he could stay in the lobby is clearly a discretionary policy decision, rather than, as plaintiff characterizes it, a ministerial implementation of a policy. The county would therefore also be entitled to discretionary immunity under section 820.2.
Accordingly, the court finds that the county may only be held liable on the state law claims, if at all, based on Officer Kendrick's liability.
C. Medical Causation
For any claim to proceed against either Office Kendrick or the county, plaintiffs must also show a genuine dispute that the actions of defendants caused the alleged injuries to plaintiffs and to Mr. Davila. Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007) (detailing the causation requirements of a § 1983 claim); Jones v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 163 Cal. App. 3d 396, 460-61 (1985) (detailing the causation requirements of California negligence claim).
As noted above, Dr. Bolduc stated in his deposition that, assuming the temperature was in fact in the 40s that night, the weather "would make it likely that hypothermia was a factor in causing — in pushing his cardiac disease to the point where he suffered a cardiac event and death." Bolduc Depo. at 145. While he was far more equivocal at other points in his deposition — noting that he would also need to know whether it was raining, what the wind chill was, and how much time Mr. Davila had spent outside before reaching a firm conclusion — this particular statement is sufficient to create a genuine dispute that the cold weather was "likely" a factor in causing Mr. Davila to suffer a cardiac event. Accordingly, the court finds there is a genuine dispute as to whether Mr. Davila's exposure to the elements was a substantial factor in causing his cardiac event.
It is noteworthy that plaintiffs' original theory of liability was that Mr. Davila died of hypothermia, and his heart disease made him more prone to hypothermia, rather than the reverse: that Mr. Davila's exposure to cold temperatures was a substantial factor in causing the cardiac event. With regard to the former theory, plaintiffs have not put forward sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute. Not even plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Haddix, was willing to opine that Mr. Davila's likely cause of death was hypothermia based on the information available.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, defendants Flores, Harries, and the City of Tracy's motion for summary judgment (Dock. No. 63) is GRANTED in full. Defendant Kendrick and San Joaquin County's motion for summary judgment (Dock. No. 60) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
IT IS SO ORDERED.