Opinion
03-cv-16 (JMR/FLN).
May 28, 2003
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and on plaintiff's motion for default judgment or, alternatively, summary judgment.
I. Background
Pro se plaintiff, Alice David, is a legal resident alien seeking unemployment benefits from the State of New York. Mrs. David worked as a formally trained nurse prior to her arrival in the United States. When she arrived in the United States, she applied to the New York State Board of Nursing for a temporary LPN nurse's license. Her temporary license was granted on a one-year basis, from July, 1999, to July, 2000. During this time, she worked as an LPN at the United Hebrew Geriatric Center.
Because she held a temporary license, plaintiff took the New York LPN licensing examination, but did not pass. Having failed to obtain her permanent license, she was no longer eligible to work as a nurse, and lost her job in July, 2000. Following her termination, plaintiff applied for unemployment benefits with the Nassau County Department of Labor, State of New York.
The Department of Labor found plaintiff ineligible for benefits because she was unavailable for employment in her preferred field and had not indicated that she was ready, willing, and able to work in any other field. After receiving notice of the denial, plaintiff requested, and was granted, an administrative hearing.
The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") determined plaintiff was ineligible for unemployment benefits. She appealed this decision to the administrative appeals board, and subsequently obtained judicial review in the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department. At each stage of her appeal, the denial of benefits was affirmed. Ultimately, the Appellate Division, by Order dated June 19, 2002, denied plaintiff's motion to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. Plaintiff then moved to Minnesota and filed this case.
II. Discussion
A. Eleventh Amendment
Plaintiff seeks "to recover unemployment benefits from the Commissioner of Labor, State of New York." Pl. Compl. at ¶ 1. Although New York's Commissioner of Labor is the named defendant in this litigation, she is not sued in her individual capacity. The Court must consider this case as a suit against the State of New York, because it will directly pay any award of damages. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963) ("The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration, or if the effect of the judgment would be to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.") (citations omitted);Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945).
A close reading of both the complaint and plaintiff's briefs indicates this suit is one where the State of New York is the real party in interest. Because plaintiff seeks only retroactive payment of unemployment benefits, it is a suit against the Commissioner in her official capacity. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991).
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution states, "[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State. . . ." Under longstanding Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, a private citizen may not sue a state in federal court absent express state consent to the federal court's jurisdiction. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
Here, there is no showing that New York has waived Eleventh Amendment immunity for suits to recover unemployment benefits. Immunity is waived "only where stated `by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the test as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.'"Florida Dept. of Health Rehab. Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Admin., 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1981)).
To the contrary, rather than waiving sovereign immunity, New York has prescribed a detailed mechanism to challenge the denial of unemployment benefits, designating the state venue as the appropriate forum. Article 18, Title 8 of New York Labor Law codifies the hearings and appeals process for New York's unemployment insurance program and allows any claimant "dissatisfied with an initial determination of his or her claim for benefits" to request a hearing with an ALJ. N.Y. Labor Law § 620. Adverse decisions by the ALJ may be appealed to the New York Employment Insurance Appeal Board. N.Y. Labor Law § 621. Sections 624 and 626 provide the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, with exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the Appeal Board. N.Y. Labor Law § 626 ("The procedure herein provided . . . shall be the sole and exclusive procedure. . . ."). In adopting this review process, the New York legislature enacted a waiver of immunity expressly limited to its own administrative and court systems. New York in no way consented to such suits in federal court.See Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 n. 9 (1984) ("a state's waiver of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh Amendment immunity in the federal courts").
Absent a waiver of immunity, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal suit against a state which seeks to recover unemployment benefits. See Daigle v. Gult State Util. Co., Local Union No. 2286, 794 F.2d 974, 980 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding Eleventh Amendment bars federal consideration of a suit for unemployment benefits against Texas); Esparza v. Valdez, 862 F.2d 788, 794-95 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding Eleventh Amendment denied jurisdiction over claim against Colorado for unemployment benefits); Fincher v. Florida Dep't of Labor and Employment Sec., 798 F.2d 1371 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding federal court lacked jurisdiction under Eleventh Amendment to consider suit alleging deprivation of unemployment benefits in violation of due process and equal protection).
Applying this law, it is clear plaintiff's case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
B. Plaintiff's Suit is Precluded by the New York Judgment
Defendant claims the doctrines of res judicata and full faith and credit preclude this Court from considering this suit. The position is well-taken.
Res judicata bars a party from relitigating issues that were or could have been decided in an earlier proceeding. See United Sates v. Utah Constr. Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966);Parker v. Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 712 N.E.2d 647, 649-50, 690 N.Y.S.2d 478, 481 (1999). Full faith and credit requires federal courts to give state court decisions the full preclusive effect they would have in the state rendering the original judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 ("The . . . judicial proceedings of any court of any such State . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State . . . from which they are taken.). "Section 1738 does not permit federal courts to apply their own rules to determine the effect of state court judgments, but instead mandates that a federal court implement the preclusion rules of the state from which the judgment originated." Lommen v. City of East Grand Forks, 97 F.3d 272, 274 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982)).
As directed by these cases, the Court looks to New York law and finds a final valid judgment bars future actions between the same parties based upon the same operative facts. Parker, 712 N.E.2d at 481, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 649. "[O]nce a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy."O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 429 N.E.2d 1158, 445 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1981). New York also extends conclusive effect to quasi-judicial decisions by administrative agencies. See Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (1984). "Such determinations, when final, become conclusive and binding on the courts." Id. (citations omitted).
This is a case where all of the res judicata requirements have been met. New York has rendered a final determination denying plaintiff unemployment benefits. See N.Y. Labor Law §§ 620-626. Although plaintiff offers a number of additional legal theories to support her case, her claim is ultimately based on the same set of operative facts (her denial of unemployment benefits and allegations that similarly situated applicants received benefits) and seeks the same relief (payment of those benefits). See Parker, 712 N.E.2d at 650, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 481. At each stage of the administrative and judicial process, plaintiff received a full and fair opportunity to present her case. She received a written decision explaining the decision to deny benefits. See In the Matter of Alice David, ALJ Case No. 000-20240 (New York Employment Insurance Appeal Board, Dec. 5, 2000); In the Matter of Alice David, Appeal Board No. 498692 (New York Employment Insurance Appeal Board, Feb. 12, 2001); In the Matter of the Claim of Alice David, 741 N.Y.S.2d 296, 297 (N.Y.App.Div. 2002) (considering plaintiff's claim that similarly situated nurses received benefits and finding plaintiff ineligible for benefits). Plaintiff's request to appeal the decision of the Appellate Court was denied, thereby rendering its decision final. Because a party may not relitigate a previously unsuccessful claim with a new legal theory, plaintiff's case is barred by res judicata.See O'Brien, 429 N.E.2d at 1159, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 688.
Plaintiff charges defendant with violating 26 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq. (Federal Unemployment Tax), 42 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (Employment Security), 26 C.F.R. Part 3 (I.R.S. Capital Construction Fund), Public Law 91-373 Sec. 106(a) (amending tax code to include hospital workers as employees), New York Labor Law § 591(2) et seq. (eligibility for unemployment benefits), and New York Labor Law § 511(2) (definitions for unemployment benefits). See Pl. Complaint. ¶ 3.
For these reasons, this Court is barred by principles of comity and federalism from reconsidering issues decided by the State of New York. If it were to allow plaintiff to proceed, it would inappropriately give her two bites at the apple. Because this case presents no new issues for consideration, defendant's motion to dismiss is granted, and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied.
C. Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default Judgment
As part of plaintiff's opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss, she has asked that both a default and default judgment be entered against the defendant. Plaintiff makes this request claiming defendant failed to file an answer within 20 days. Her request, however, is based on a misunderstanding of the applicable law and must be denied. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2). Rule 55 provides, "When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules . . . the clerk shall enter the party's default." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a).
Here, defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12. Rule 12(b) allows a defendant to file either a Rule 12 motion or an answer. See id. When a motion to dismiss has been filed, the defendant need not file an answer until 10 days following the ruling on the motion. See Northland Ins. Co. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp.2d 1108, 1115-16 (Minn. 2000); Rudnicki v. Sullivan, 189 F. Supp. 714, 715 (Mass. 1960). While this defendant did not file an "answer," the Court finds the motion to dismiss complied with the Rules. Plaintiff's motion is therefore denied.
D. Request for Appointment of Counsel
Lastly, plaintiff asks the Court to appoint counsel to represent her in this matter. Because there are no claims upon which relief could be granted, the Court declines to do so.
III. Conclusion
Longstanding notions of federalism and the plain text of the Eleventh Amendment prevent a federal court from hearing claims for money damages against a state without that state's consent. Where, as here, there is no such consent, this Court cannot hear a private citizen's claims. The courts of the State of New York have ruled on plaintiff's substantive claim, and all appeals are concluded; this Court must give full faith and credit to that decision.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Defendant's motion to dismiss [Docket No. 3] is granted.
2. Plaintiff's motion for default judgment [Docket No. 8] is denied as moot.
3. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [Docket No. 7] is denied.