Opinion
June 3, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Wood, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
"Public policy favors a determination on the merits * * * and the sound discretion of Special Term is to be given some latitude in determining what is an excusable default" (Krystofic v Rapisardi, 112 A.D.2d 196, 197; see also, Sawh v Bridges, 120 A.D.2d 74, 77-78). While it is true that the delay in serving a bill of particulars was lengthy (approximately two years), under the particular circumstances of this case it was not an improvident exercise of discretion to relieve the plaintiff of his default (see, Davis v Sapa, 107 A.D.2d 1005; Batista v St. Luke's Hosp., 46 A.D.2d 806). The plaintiff established a reasonable excuse for the delay (see, Juers v Barry, 114 A.D.2d 1009; Davis v Sapa, supra), and the verified bill of particulars indicated the merits of the action (see, Wilenski v Auricchio Monuments, 102 A.D.2d 824). Moreover, we note from the record herein that the appellant was not prejudiced by the delay and that there is no indication that the plaintiff ever intended to abandon the action (see, Wilenski v Auricchio Monuments, supra; Batista v St. Luke's Hosp., supra).
We have considered the appellant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Balletta, J.P., Miller, O'Brien and Ritter, JJ., concur.