Opinion
No. 3-269 / 01-0868
Filed May 29, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Kristin L. Hibbs, Judge.
Petitioner-appellant Adil Daoud appeals the district court's decision affirming the decision of the Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals that Daoud failed to demonstrate good cause for missing an administrative evidentiary hearing. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Adil Daoud, Iowa City, appellant pro se.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Barbara Galloway, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by SACKETT, C.J., and HUITINK and VOGEL, JJ.
Petitioner-appellant Adil Daoud appeals the district court's decision affirming the decision of the Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals (DIA) that Daoud failed to demonstrate good cause for missing his administrative evidentiary hearing on June 14, 2000, and consequently dismissing his administrative appeal regarding his co-payment obligations for child care. On appeal Daoud claims he did have good cause for missing the administrative hearing, and that the decision of the district court therefore was in error. We reverse and remand to the DIA.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Daoud, a native of Sudan, sent his two school-age children to Neighborhood Centers of Johnson County for child care. On approximately May 9, 2000 Daoud was informed that these services were being terminated due to his failure to pay for them. At that time Daoud was required to pay $7.50 per week, plus $5.00 per week on a past due balance for child care from October 1, 1999 to April 30, 2000. Daoud filed an administrative appeal in this matter, dated May 12, 2000. A letter from the DIA dated May 31, 2000 informed him that a June 14, 2000 hearing had been scheduled for his appeal. Daoud did not attend the June 14 hearing, and a proposed decision abandoning his appeal was issued.
In a letter sent to the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS), Daoud explained that he never saw the letter informing him of the June 14 hearing because his wife, who does not speak much English and would not have understood its importance, had taken it and failed to show it to him. He also stated his wife had been recently pregnant, which may have affected her ability to "function in good manner," another factor contributing to his not seeing the letter.
A July 6, 2000 letter from DHS Appeals Liaison Rhoda Harris acknowledged his timely appeal claiming good cause for missing the hearing and voided the final decision automatically issued on the proposed decision.
A proposed decision by the DIA regarding whether Daoud had good cause to miss the hearing, which was adopted as a final decision on August 28, 2000, stated the following:
Good cause for not appearing at a hearing or calling to reschedule is not established where [sic] does not make an effort to receive a hearing in a timely matter [sic] after learning of the date of hearing. Also here the appellant's wife had notice of the hearing. The appellant has not meet [sic] his burden of establishing good cause for abandoning his appeal and the decision dated June 19, 2000 shall remain in effect.
To support this decision, the DIA made the following findings of fact:
1. The appellant missed his hearing on June 14, 2000 and did not call to reschedule.
2. The appellant states that the reason for missing the hearing was his wife never gave him a copy of the notice of hearing until he found it on June 19, 2000.
3. The appellant did not call to reschedule or ask what he could do even after receiving the hearing notice.
4. The appellant faxed an appeal to the abandonment June 19, 2000 decision on June 30, 2000 which is after the ten day period for appeals had run.
The district court affirmed this decision, noting that reasonable minds might disagree as to the DIA's interpretation of "good cause," but that the decision was not based on an "irrationally illogical or wholly unjustified application of the law" and that it was not otherwise "unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion."
II. SCOPE OF REVIEW
Our review of agency decisions is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, Iowa Code chapter 17A. Dico, Inc. v. Iowa Employment Appeal Bd., 576 N.W.2d 352, 354 (Iowa 1998). We will grant relief where substantial rights of a party have been prejudiced because the agency action is in excess of the agency's statutory authority, is unsupported by substantial evidence, is unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, or is affected by other error of law. Id. (referencing Iowa Code section 17A.19(8), which contained the standards of review prior to the 1999 amendments to section 17A.19); see Iowa Code § 17A.19(10) (Supp. 1999). When reviewing the decision of the district court we must determine whether the district court properly applied the law. In reviewing its decision we apply the standards of section 17A.19(10) to the agency action and determine whether our conclusions are the same as the district court's. Litterer v. Judge, 644 N.W.2d 357, 360 (Iowa 2002). An administrative law judge has wide discretion in ruling on "good cause," and we will not disturb that ruling on review absent an abuse of discretion. Purethane, Inc. v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review, 498 N.W.2d 706, 711 (Iowa 1993).
III. ANALYSIS
Although we agree with the district court that we give wide discretion to the DIA in determining "good cause," we are struck that the facts and conclusions of law relied upon by the DIA in reaching the decision that Daoud had not shown good cause were noticeably inaccurate. The third finding of fact, that Daoud did not call to reschedule or ask what he could do after receiving notice of the hearing, is not supported by the evidence. According to Daoud, he immediately made phone inquiries upon discovering the notice of hearing on June 19. He claims he was told to wait for a letter from the administrative law judge's office and to appeal ten days following receipt of that letter. Daoud's appeal was received by the DHS on June 28, and Daoud claims he faxed an additional notice of appeal to the administrative law judge on June 29. On July 6 Rhoda Harris informed him that his appeal was timely and the final decision would be voided.
The fourth finding of fact was that Daoud's appeal was faxed on June 30, exceeding his ten-day appeal period. In fact, the evidence shows Daoud's appeal was made within the required time limits. The proposed decision was issued on June 19. The record shows the DHS received Daoud's fax on June 28 and that Daoud claims he faxed the administrative law judge his notice of appeal on June 29. The record also states, as we said above, that the appeal was deemed timely by Rhoda Harris.
With respect to the conclusions of law, the DIA concluded good cause had not been demonstrated because (1) Daoud made no effort to receive his hearing, and (2) because his wife had notice of the hearing. As we have stated, the evidence refutes the DIA's first reason supporting its conclusion that no "good cause" had been demonstrated. The second reason, however, was accurate: Daoud's wife did receive the letter, and that letter, although in English, nevertheless satisfied the procedural due process requirement of notice. See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding no procedural due process violation where burden of diligence and further inquiry was placed on a non-English-speaking individual served in this country with a notice in English). Additionally, because the letter reached Daoud's residence, the agency fulfilled its notice requirements. See Iowa Admin. Coder. 441-7.10(7); see also Tiano v. Palmer, 621 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Iowa 2001).
In spite of the fact that the notice requirements were satisfied, however, it is still up to the DIA to determine whether Daoud showed good cause in missing his June 14 hearing. Because the DIA relied largely upon several erroneous findings and conclusions in its first determination that no good cause was shown, we remand this issue to the DIA to decide again, based upon the correct facts, whether Daoud had good cause not to attend his June 14, 2000 hearing.