Opinion
No. CV 07 4025324 S
December 10, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS #104
On April 2, 2007, the plaintiff, Paul E. Daniels, on behalf of himself and the estate of Florence O. Daniels, commenced this action by service of process on the defendant, Elizabeth D. Herrscher. The plaintiff filed a thirteen-count complaint against the defendant, both in her individual capacity and as executrix of the estate of Florence O. Daniels. The defendant seeks dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the Superior Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because jurisdiction resides exclusively in the Probate Court.
The plaintiff alleges the following facts in the complaint. The plaintiff and the defendant are the only two children of Florence O. Daniels, the decedent, who executed a will in 1992 that provided for distribution of her estate to her two children equally and for them to serve as co-executors of her estate. Before the decedent died on August 17, 2006, and particularly subsequent to the death of her husband on December 27, 2004, the defendant took advantage of the decedent's mental frailties and a confidential relationship of trust she had with her to wrest control of her finances. Specifically, it is alleged that the defendant, by representing to the decedent that the proceeds would be utilized for the benefit of the creditors and beneficiaries of her estate, procured authorizations from the decedent to enter into joint bank accounts with the defendant and create a joint certificate of deposit (Mortgage CD) with the defendant's son to allow him to pay off a mortgage. The plaintiff alleges that despite these representations to the decedent, the defendant has retained the proceeds and benefits from these accounts, including the right to receive payments from the Mortgage CD, pursuant to her purported right of survivorship.
In addition, the plaintiff alleges that following the decedent's death, the defendant urged and eventually persuaded the plaintiff to decline appointment to serve as an executor of his mother's estate. After the defendant filed an application, the Milford Probate Court admitted the decedent's will and appointed the defendant the sole executor of the estate. Thereafter, the defendant, acting as a fiduciary and pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-341, filed an inventory with the Probate Court that the plaintiff alleges omits cash assets and debts owed to the estate by the defendant with an estimated value in excess of one million dollars.
As to the defendant in her individual capacity, the first seven counts and the ninth count allege undue influence, conversion, statutory and civil theft, unjust enrichment, actual or constructive fraud perpetrated against the decedent, actual or constructive fraud perpetrated against the plaintiff, action for declaratory judgment, and negligence for breach of duty, respectively. Count eight and counts ten through thirteen are brought against the defendant as both an individual and as the executor of the decedent's estate. The eighth count seeks an accounting of the assets of the estate. Counts ten through thirteen allege breach of fiduciary duty by a person in a confidential relationship, breach of fiduciary duty by an executor, violations of General Statutes § 42-110, et seq. (CUTPA), and entitlement to costs and fees incurred to protect the assets of the estate for its creditors and beneficiaries, respectively.
The defendant moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Superior Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action because original jurisdiction resides solely with the Probate Court. In opposition to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argues that the Superior Court has jurisdiction over this matter because the types of claims and relief requested go beyond that which the Probate Court is statutorily authorized to address and provide.
Both parties filed memoranda of law on these issues and the matter was heard at short calendar on October 1, 2007.
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 210-11, 897 A.2d 71 (2006). "Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). "Subject matter jurisdiction [implicates] the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bellman v. West Hartford, 96 Conn.App. 387, 392, 900 A.2d 82 (2006).
"When a . . . court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cox v. Aiken, supra, 278 Conn. 211.
The defendant moves to dismiss the action filed in the Superior Court on the ground that jurisdiction resides in the Probate Court. The defendant contends that all thirteen counts of the complaint relate to the settlement of the decedent's estate and have as a "common thread" the allegation that the inventory of the estate filed in Probate Court by the defendant is incorrect. The defendant points out that General Statutes § 45a-343 requires that objections to an executor's inventory of an estate be filed in the Probate Court that has jurisdiction over the estate. Only after the Probate Court has rendered a decision on the objection may the unsatisfied party appeal to the Superior Court. General Statutes § 45a-186. The defendant argues that because the plaintiff did not comply with statutory procedure by failing to file an objection to the inventory in the Probate Court, this action is premature and the Superior Court has no jurisdiction over it.
General Statutes § 45a-343 provides: "(a) Any interested party may file with the probate court having jurisdiction a written objection to the inventory or appraisal, which shall set forth the basis of the objection. Such objection may be filed at any time between the filing of the inventory and the hearing on the fiduciary's final account.
"(b) Upon the filing of the objections, the court shall order a hearing on the acceptance of the inventory and appraisal to be had within sixty days and not less than fifteen days after the filing of the objections. The court shall cause notice of the time and place of the hearing to be forthwith given to the fiduciary of the estate and to each party in interest.
"(c) The court, upon such hearing, shall hear the objections and may order the fiduciary to amend the inventory or appraisal in any way that it finds proper, and may accept the same as amended."
General Statutes § 45a-186 provides in relevant part: "(a) Any person aggrieved by any order, denial or decree of a court of probate in any matter, unless otherwise specially provided by law, may appeal therefrom to the Superior Court . . ."
In opposition to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argues that because the suit filed in Superior Court is broader than a mere objection to an inventory and seeks relief that the Probate Court is not authorized to provide, it is unnecessary to follow the procedure set forth in § 45a-343. Specifically, the plaintiff characterizes the purpose and function of this action as "protecting [creditors' and beneficiaries'] interests, recovering assets misappropriated by the Defendants and seeking damages for the harm caused by Defendants' tortious conduct towards the Estate, its beneficiaries and creditors, as well as equitable, injunctive and declaratory relief that the Probate Court cannot provide."
"[T]he Superior Court of this state as a court of law is a court of general jurisdiction. It has jurisdiction of all matters expressly committed to it and of all others cognizable by any law court of which the exclusive jurisdiction is not given to some other court. The fact that no other court has exclusive jurisdiction in any matter is sufficient to give the Superior Court jurisdiction over that matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Joshua S., 260 Conn. 182, 215, CT Page 21428 796 A.2d 1141 (2002). The Supreme Court has recognized that "there are three types of actions in which the Superior Court does not exercise original jurisdiction: those involving the custody of a child not the issue of the marriage involved in a divorce, settlement of an executor's or administrator's account, and the question of due execution of a will." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 216.
In contrast to the Superior Court, "[i]t is well established that courts of probate are statutory tribunals that have no common-law jurisdiction . . . Accordingly, [courts of probate] can exercise only such powers as are conferred on them by statute . . . They have jurisdiction only when the facts exist on which the legislature has conditioned the exercise of their power . . . [A] court which exercises a limited and statutory jurisdiction is without jurisdiction to act unless it does so under the precise circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation . . . Ordinarily, therefore, whether a Probate Court has jurisdiction to enter a given order depends upon the interpretation of a statute." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 214. General Statutes § 45a-98 sets forth the general powers of the Probate Court, which includes in subdivision (3) the power to settle estates by determining title or rights to use and possession. General Statutes § 45a-98a(a) provides, however, that "[t]he Probate Court shall have jurisdiction under subdivision (3) . . . of subsection (a) of section 45a-98 only if (1) the matter in dispute is not pending in another court of competent jurisdiction and (2) the Probate Court does not decline jurisdiction."
General Statutes § 45a-98 provides: "(a) Courts of probate in their respective districts shall have the power to (1) grant administration of intestate estates of persons who have died domiciled in their districts and of intestate estates of persons not domiciled in this state which may be granted as provided by section 45a-303; (2) admit wills to probate of persons who have died domiciled in their districts or of nondomiciliaries whose wills may be proved in their districts as provided in section 45a-287; (3) except as provided in section 45a-98a or as limited by an applicable statute of limitations, determine title or rights of possession and use in and to any real, tangible or intangible property that constitutes, or may constitute, all or part of any trust, any decedent's estate, or any estate under control of a guardian or conservator, which trust or estate is otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Probate Court, including the rights and obligations of any beneficiary of the trust or estate and including the rights and obligations of any joint tenant with respect to survivorship property; (4) except as provided in section 45a-98a, construe the meaning and effect of any will or trust agreement if a construction is required in connection with the administration or distribution of a trust or estate otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Probate Court, or, with respect to an inter vivos trust, if that trust is or could be subject to jurisdiction of the court for an accounting pursuant to section 45a-175, provided such an accounting need not be required; (5) except as provided in section 45a-98a, apply the doctrine of cy pres or approximation; (6) to the extent provided for in section 45a-175, call executors, administrators, trustees, guardians, conservators, persons appointed to sell the land of minors, and attorneys-in-fact acting under powers of attorney created in accordance with section 45a-562, to account concerning the estates entrusted to their charge; and (7) make any lawful orders or decrees to carry into effect the power and jurisdiction conferred upon them by the laws of this state.
"(b) The jurisdiction of courts of probate to determine title or rights or to construe instruments or to apply the doctrine of cy pres or approximation pursuant to subsection (a) of this section is concurrent with the jurisdiction of the Superior Court and does not affect the power of the Superior Court as a court of general jurisdiction."
In addition to its express powers, Probate Courts have the power, where such is reasonably implied by statute, to "make any lawful orders or decrees to carry into effect the power and jurisdiction conferred upon them by the laws of this state." General Statutes § 45a-98(a)(7); In re Michaela Lee R., 253 Conn. 570, 581, 589, 756 A.2d 214 (2000). Exercise of these implied powers "must be necessary for the Probate Court to carry out its statutory duties and to exercise the jurisdiction expressly conferred . . . The test of necessity, therefore, is whether the existence of an implied power is necessary for the Probate Court to discharge a duty committed to it by statute." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Michaela Lee R., supra, 589.
Finally, although the Probate Court has no general equity jurisdiction; id., 593; it is a court of equity as well as law. McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc., 209 Conn. 692, 697-98, 553 A.2d 596 (1989). "Similar to implied powers, probate courts possess only those equitable powers as are necessary for the performance of their statutory duties . . . The equity which the Probate Court administers must grow out of and be inseparably connected with the matter the court is acting upon . . . The situation, therefore, in which the Probate Court may exercise equitable jurisdiction must be one which arises within the framework of a matter already before it, and wherein the application of equity is but a necessary step in the direction of the final determination of the entire matter." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Michaela Lee R., supra, 253 Conn. 593.
The matter before the court obviously does not relate to child custody and although the first count of the complaint alleges undue influence by the defendant, the plaintiff has not challenged the validity of the will itself. The first and third avenues to Probate Court jurisdiction referenced infra, therefore, are unavailable. Accordingly, the Probate Court only has original and exclusive jurisdiction over this action if it is a settlement of an executor's or administrator's account, or if the requested action and relief is within the implied or equitable powers of the Probate Court because it is necessary in order for the Probate Court to discharge its duty to settle the estate.
Jurisdiction over this action does not reside exclusively with the Probate Court and it is properly before the Superior Court because the plaintiff seeks judicial action that is not necessary to settle the estate and relief that the Probate Court is not authorized to provide. The underlying issue, or "common thread" as it is referred to by the defendant, is whether particular finds and rights to payment legally belong to the decedent's estate for the benefit of the estate's creditors and beneficiaries. Although the resolution of this issue is a necessary step towards final settlement of the estate, a duty of the Probate Court, the bulk of the asserted causes of action and corresponding requests for relief are without the authority and powers of the Probate Court and are properly adjudicated by this Court. The plaintiff alleges fraudulent conduct, conversion, unjust enrichment, theft, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty by the defendant in both her individual and representative capacities and seeks, inter alia, compensatory money damages, punitive money damages, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and the imposition of a constructive trust. Resolution of these claims is not "necessary for the Probate Court to discharge a duty committed to it by statute" or a "necessary step in the direction of the final determination of the entire matter" before the Probate Court. Neither are they merely "incidental" to the matter before the Probate Court. Rather, they are independent equitable actions over which the Superior Court may exercise jurisdiction. See, e.g., England v. Coventry, 183 Conn. 362, 364, 439 A.2d 372 (1981) (statutes broadly interpreted to give Superior Court subject matter jurisdiction in any action to declare rights and legal relations despite availability of other legal relief); Brownell v. Union New Haven Trust Co., 143 Conn. 662, 666, 124 A.2d 901 (1956) ("question of title can be attacked later in an independent proceeding in a court properly exercising legal and equitable powers"); Giulietti v. Giulietti, 65 Conn.App. 813, 858, 784 A.2d 905 (2001) (constructive trust is an equitable remedy); id., 847 (power to issue declaratory judgments and injunctions specifically granted to the Superior Court); Bender v. Bender, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV 05 4001704 S (October 12, 2006, Martin, J.) (Probate Court did not have jurisdiction over equitable claim for specific performance that did not arise in framework of matter already before Probate Court). Even if the plaintiff's claims could be considered incidental to the settlement of the decedent's estate, the exercise of jurisdiction by the Superior Court is appropriate for two reasons. First, the plaintiff seeks monetary damages in addition to the return of funds and assets allegedly misappropriated by the defendant. "A court of probate is unable to award damages . . . It would . . . be inappropriate to allow a court to entertain an action in which it is without the power to grant the relief requested." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Palmer v. National Bank Trust Co., 160 Conn. 415, 430, 279 A.2d 726 (1971). Second, courts have concluded that the "Probate Court may not adjudicate complex legal questions which are subject to the broad jurisdiction of a general court of equity." Id. In Palmer, the Supreme Court reasoned that because there is often the need to engage in extensive fact-finding in these types of cases, "the Probate Court lacks essential powers necessary to handle independent equitable actions." Id.
Finally, allowing the Superior Court to exercise jurisdiction over each of these issues is the most efficient path to resolution. Even if the plaintiff were to file an objection to the inventory in the Probate Court and then appeal the Probate Court's decision to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-186, the Superior Court would be unable to grant the monetary and other relief sought here because "[t]he Superior Court, sitting in review of the Probate Court, may not exercise powers beyond those of the Probate Court." Id., 428. Therefore, the plaintiff would have to file an additional action to resolve the issues set forth in this action, followed by an additional appeal. As the Supreme Court stated in Palmer, "[t]o allow such a course would be to favor possible delay and wasted action. The more direct route, a single hearing in a court of general jurisdiction, and a single appeal, both of which would be enforceable, is the appropriate and commendable route." Id., 431.
For the foregoing reasons, when looking at the plaintiff's complaint in the light most favorable to avoiding dismissal, the plaintiff has pleaded causes of action beyond which the Probate Court is equipped to adjudicate and the plaintiff has requested relief that the Probate Court is not empowered to grant. Accordingly, the Superior Court has jurisdiction over this matter and the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is denied.