Opinion
No. 00-1382-CIV-JORDAN
December 13, 2001
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Doretha Dancy-Pratt sues her employer, the School Board of Miami-Dade County, for age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (Count I), and the Florida Civil Rights Act, Fla. Stat. Ann § 760 et seq. (Count II). Federal jurisdiction over Ms. Dancy-Pratt's ADEA claim exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and there is supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. As I explained below, Ms. Dancy-Pratt has not presented sufficient evidence that the School Board's failure to promote her to a principalship was motivated by age discrimination. Accordingly, the School Board's motion for summary judgment [DE. 19] is GRANTED, and Ms. Dancy-Pratt's motion for summary judgment [D.E. 24] is DENIED.
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A material fact is one that might affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248(1986). Where the non-moving party fails to prove an essential element of its case for which it has the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is warranted. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323(1986); Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. North Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1225(11th Cir. 1999). Thus, the task, with regard to the School Board's motion for summary judgment is to determine whether, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Dancy-Pratt, the non-moving party, there is evidence on which the trier of fact could reasonably find a verdict in her favor. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251; Hilburn, 181 F.3d at 1225; Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997). Likewise, the task with regard to Ms. Dancy-Pratt's summary judgment motion is to determine whether, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the School Board, the non-moving party, there is evidence on which the trier of fact could reasonably find a verdict in its favor. See id.
II. RELEVANT FACTS
Ms. Dancy-Pratt was born on March 17, 1941. See Doretha Dancy-Pratt Statement of Undisputed Facts at 1[D.E. 24]. She has been employed by the School Board since 1969. See id. at 3. She became an assistant principal in 1988. See id. In 1997, she was nominated by another assistant principal as Assistant Principal of the Year. See id. at 2; Deposition of Robert Thomas at 143 [D.E. 26]. During each of her years as an assistant principal, she received overall ratings from her principals of "exceeds," "exemplary," "commendable," or "distinguished." See Dancy-Pratt Statement of Undisputed Facts at 3. In 1994, Ms. Dancy-Pratt completed the Executive Training Program. See id.
A. THE PROMOTION SYSTEM
Vacancies for principal positions within the School Board are filled either through direct appointment by the superintendent or through an interview process. See School Board's Statement of Undisputed Facts at 3 [D.E. 19]. An individual must have taught for three years, gone through the Executive Training Program (though not necessarily finished it), have a master's degree, and received positive reviews from their supervising principals in order to be eligible for consideration as a principal. See Management Selection Procedures Manual of Miami-Dade County Public Schools at 3 [D.E. 39]. Ms. Dancy-Pratt met the qualifications for promotion to a principalship and was on the School Board fist of eligible candidates. See Thomas Deposition at 45, 46.
Initial interviews for principalships are conducted before an interview committee consisting of two teachers, one principal, one regional director, and a district office administrator. See Thomas Deposition at 156. Panel members review the resumes, evaluations and other pertinent documents before interviewing the candidates. See id. Oral interviews are structured so that each candidate is asked the same questions and scored with either a "fair," "good," or "outstanding" rating. See Selection Procedures Manual at 9. Each interview committee convened for a principal position devises its own set of questions, which are then thrown away after the interviews are completed. See Thomas Deposition at 72-74. Candidates who receive an "outstanding" overall assessment by 80% or more of the interview committee are identified as finalists. See id. Finalists appear before a final interview committee comprised of the regional superintendent, the deputy superintendent for school operations, and one teacher. See Thomas Deposition at 6-8. That committee makes a recommendation to the superintendent, who most often follows that recommendation and passes that recommendation on to the School Board. See id.
Ms. Dancy-Pratt began interviewing for principal positions in 1993 or 1994, interviewed for two principalships in 2000, and one principalship in 2001, but was not a finalist for any of these positions. See Deposition of Doretha Dancy-Pratt at 77 [D.E. 26]; School Board's Statement of Undisputed Facts at 3. Ms. Dancy-Pratt was aware that she was able to schedule a career counseling conference following notification that she was not a finalist, but never did so. See Dancy-Pratt Deposition at 80. When a direct appointment is made to a principalship, the regional superintendent makes a recommendation to the deputy superintendent for school operations, who then makes a recommendation to the superintendent, who in turns makes a recommendation to the School Board. See Deposition of Nelson Diaz at 21 [D.E. 26]. Robert Thomas has been the regional superintendent for Region 3 since around 1995. See Thomas Deposition at 3. Before making his or her recommendation, the regional superintendent discusses potential candidates with personnel and line directors and with principals for the individual schools. See Thomas Deposition at 19. The number of years that an individual has served as an assistant principal is not a factor when recommendations are made. See Thomas Deposition at 69, 70; Diaz Deposition at 31.
Robert Thomas has been the regional superintendent for Region 3 since around 1995. See Thomas Deposition at 3.
Ms. Dancy-Pratt has not been recommended in discussions between Mr. Thomas and the line directors and principals for a direct appointment to a principalship. See Thomas Deposition at 19, 21. From October of 1998 — the time Ms. Dancy-Pratt alleged discrimination to have occurred against her in her EEOC charge, to April 18, 2000 — the time of the filing of Ms. Dancy-Pratt's complaint, the superintendent directly appointed 23 individuals from assistant principal positions to principalships. See School Board's Statement of Undisputed Facts at 4, 5. Sixteen of those individuals were over the age of 40 at the time of their appointments and eight of those sixteen individuals were 50 or older at the time of their appointments. See id. These individuals had all received exemplary, distinguished, and/or commendable ratings on their evaluations shortly prior to their appointments. See id. Though Ms. Dancy-Pratt was eligible for a principalship, Mr. Thomas testified that he became aware of negative feedback regarding Ms. Dancy-Pratt from Principal Marie Harrison and from Principal Henry Crawford. See Thomas Deposition at 22, 39, 41, 50, 130, 136. The subject matter of that feedback is summarized below.
B. Ms. DANCY-PRATT'S READING OF OTHERS' EVALUATIONS AND FEEDBACK FROM PRINCIPAL CRAWFORD
On March 19, 1999, Ms. Dancy-Pratt, while employed as assistant principal at John I. Smith Elementary School, read Principal Harrison's and another assistant principal's mid-year performance reviews without permission to do so. See Thomas Deposition at 39; Dancy-Pratt Deposition at 108. Following this incident, Ms. Dancy-Pratt received a memorandum from Ms. Harrison that memorialized a meeting held between she and Ms. Dancy-Pratt. See Memorandum in Support of Miami-Dade's Summary Judgment Motion at Exh. F. [D.E. 19]. In that memorandum, Ms. Harrison stated that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the fact that Ms. Dancy-Pratt had taken the mail folder out of a secretary's hands, read the performance reviews, and then shared them with a teacher. See id. The memorandum noted that Ms. Dancy-Pratt stated that she did not take the folder out of the secretary's hand, but that the secretary had handed the folder to her. See id. Ms. Harrison also recounted that during the meeting she told Ms. Dancy-Pratt that she had a written statement from the teacher stating that Ms. Dancy-Pratt had not only given the reviews to the teacher to read, but had directed the teacher to make copies of the reviews and to submit them to Ms. Dancy-Pratt. See id. Noting that Ms. Dancy-Pratt indicated that the written statement from the teacher was untrue, Ms. Harrison reminded Ms. Dancy-Pratt of the Code of Ethics State Board Rule 6B-1-006, FAC #5, and detailed the rule as follows:
. . . the obligation to the profession of education requires that the individual
5a. Shall maintain honesty in all professional dealings;
5c. Shall not interfere with a colleague's exercise of political or civil rights and responsibilities;
5f. Shall not use coercive means or promise special treatment to influence professional judgment of colleagues; and
State Board Rule 6B-1.001.FAC which details the importance of the educator valuing the worth and dignity of every person, the pursuit of truth, devotion to excellence, and the importance of maintaining respect and confidence of one's colleagues, of students, of parents, and of other members of the community, with the educator striving to achieve and sustain the highest degree of ethical conduct.See id. Ms. Harrison also warned Ms. Dancy-Pratt that any further violation of the Code of Ethics would result in additional disciplinary action. See id. A copy of this memorandum was sent to Mr. Thomas and to Ms. Essie Pace, the personnel and line director for the school, and was placed in Ms. Dancy-Pratt's personnel file. See id.
Ms. Dancy-Pratt responded to this memorandum by writing a memorandum back to Ms. Harrison. See Memorandum in Support of Miami-Dade's Summary Judgment Motion at Exh. G. [D.E. 19]. Ms. Dancy-Pratt did not deny reading the evaluations, but notified Ms. Harrison that she would be requesting a transfer to another school from Mr. Thomas. See id. A copy of this memorandum was sent to Mr. Thomas, and to Ms. Pace, and was placed in Ms. Dancy-Pratt's personnel file. See id.
Principal Crawford testified in his deposition that he might have responded to an inquiry from Mr. Thomas about Ms. Dancy-Pratt becoming a principal by stating that she "needs to work on some things as far as her personal skills, as far as being more sensitive, listening to people." See Deposition of Henry Crawford at 22 [D.E. 30].
C. Ms. DANCY-PRATT'S SCHOOL BOARD RECORD
Ms. Dancy-Pratt received an "exemplary" overall assessment for her work as an assistant principal during the 1992-1993 school year from Euphrates Abbit, the principal at Arcola Lake Elementary School. See Dancy-Pratt Statement of Uncontested Facts at 3. Ms. Abbit wrote that Ms. Pratt "shall continue to develop those skills necessary to be an effective administrator." See id. Ms. Abbit then recommended Ms. Dancy-Pratt for a principalship. See id. Ms. Dancy-Pratt also received an "exemplary" overall assessment for her work as assistant principal during the 1996-1997 school year from Shirley Shatteen, the principal at Van E. Blanton Elementary during that year. See id. at 4. Mr. Shatteen recommended Ms. Dancy-Pratt for a principalship at an elementary school or for "whatever position she qualifies." See id.
Likewise, Ms. Dancy-Pratt received exemplary and exceeds ratings for her work as assistant principal during the 1997-1998 school year at South Hialeah Elementary School from Dr. Julio Carrera, the principal of that school. See id. Dr. Carrera wrote that Ms. Dancy-Pratt motivated "staff to perform at their maximum and encourages teachers to motivate students to perform at their maximum." See id. Dr. Carrera went on to say that Ms. Dancy-Pratt "has provided tremendous support to the principal and the accomplishment of the mission of the school." See id. Dr. Carrera recommended that Ms. Dancy-Pratt be considered for the position of elementary school principal. See id. at 5.
Ms. Dancy-Pratt received the highest rating, "distinguished," for her work as assistant principal during the 1999-2000 school year at Stirrup Elementary from George Thorpe, the principal of that school, in 24 out of 25 assessment categories. See id. at 5. She received the next highest rating, "commendable," in the 25th category. See id. at 6. Mr. Thorpe gave Ms. Dancy-Pratt an overall assessment of "distinguished" for the 2000-2001 school year. See id. Mr. Thorpe, in the narrative portion of the evaluation, wrote that "Doretha Pratt has exhibited a high degree of professionalism and genuine concern for the students, teachers, staff and parents of Stirrup Elementary." See id.
III. AGE DISCRIMINATION
Ms. Dancy-Pratt contends that the decision not to promote her to a principalship was based on a discriminatory scheme to promote people younger than her, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Florida Civil Rights Act. Under the ADEA, it is "unlawful for an employer. . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
Courts consider age discrimination claims brought under the Florida Civil Rights Act within the same framework used to decide claims brought pursuant to the ADEA. See Zaben v. Air Products Chemicals, Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1455 n. 2(11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
When a plaintiff alleges that an employer discriminated on the basis of age, liability depends on whether the employer's decision was actually motivated by age. See Sanderson v. Reeves, 530 U.S. 133,141(2000). In Sanderson, the Supreme Court determined that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework could apply to a claim brought under the ADEA. See id. See also Cofield v. Goldkist, Inc., 267 F.3d 1264, 1267(11th Cir. 2001) (using burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas framework for age and sex discrimination claim); Chapman v. Al Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024(11th Cir. 2000) (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to ADEA claim). Thus, once a plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the plaintiff was rejected for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. "This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it `can involve no credibility assessment.'" See Sanderson, 530 U.S. at 142. Once the employer meets this intermediate burden, the plaintiff has the ultimate burden to show "that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256(1981).
I will assume, for purposes of the summary judgment motion, as does the School Board, that Ms. Dancy-Pratt has established her prima facie case by showing that (1) at the time of the application for promotion she was a member of the class protected by the ADEA; (2) she was otherwise qualified for the principal position; (3) she was not promoted; and (4) many of the people promoted during the relevant time period were "substantially younger" than her. See Sanderson, 530 U.S. at 142. Likewise, there is no dispute that the School Board has met its intermediate burden of articulating several legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the decision not to promote Ms. Dancy-Pratt: (1) she did not become a finalist during any of her interviews for principalships because she did not achieve a sufficient score from panel members; (2) the School Board selected candidates that it believed were best qualified for the principalships that they were promoted into; (3) she was never directly appointed because Mr. Thomas and others involved in recommending assistant principals for principalships became aware of the incident in which Ms. Dancy-Pratt breached the code of ethics by reading her principal's and co-assistant principal's evaluations; and (4) Mr. Thomas and others involved in recommending assistant principals for principalships became aware of conflicts Ms. Dancy-Pratt had with principals who supervised her, and consequently never recommended her. See School Board's Statement of Uncontested Facts at 6, 7. Thus, Ms. Dancy-Pratt must offer evidence to show that each of these articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons is merely pretext for a decision based on age discrimination in order to survive summary judgment. See Bonham v. Regions Mortg., Inc., 129 F. Supp.2d 1315, 1323 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (to survive summary judgment, plaintiff must proffer sufficient evidence to create genuine issue of material fact regarding whether each of the employer's articulated reasons is pretextual).
There were at least 15 out of 23 people promoted during the relevant time period that arguably could be said to be "sufficiently younger" than Ms. Pratt, i.e. under the age of 50. The Eleventh Circuit has held, however, that a replacement who is only three years younger than a person in a protected class is sufficient to establish a prima facie case. See Carter v. DecisionOne Corp., 122 F.3d 997, 1003(11th Cir. 1997) (holding that plaintiff aged 42, who was replaced by employee aged 39, met the "substantially younger" replacement requirement under ADEA) (citations omitted)). See also Barber v. CSX Distribution Services, 68 F.3d 694, 698(3rd Circuit 1995) (beneficiary of alleged discrimination does not have to be below age 40, but only "sufficiently younger" to permit an inference of age discrimination).
Ms. Dancy-Pratt does not dispute that she never became a finalist during the interviews she participated in for principalships. She focuses, instead, on the fact that many principalships were filled with direct appointments, and argues that she was never directly appointed because of age discrimination. She does not, however, offer any evidence to dispute the fact that those involved with recommending individuals for appointments were aware that she had improperly read the mid-year evaluations for her principal and co-assistant principal while she was assistant principal at John I. Smith Elementary. She therefore presents no evidence that other individuals that were promoted engaged in the same behavior and yet were treated differently. See Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1363(11th Cir. 1999)("work rule" defense arguably pretextual when plaintiff submits evidence (1) that she did not violate the cited work rule, or (2) that if she did violate the rule, other employees outside the protected class, who engaged in similar acts, were not similarly treated)).
At the hearing on the summary judgment motions, Ms. Dancy-Pratt's counsel suggested that this behavior was simply a "de minimis" infraction and should not have been a basis for not promoting Ms. Dancy-Pratt. I do not agree. Ms. Dancy-Pratt's supervisors considered her actions to rise to the level of a violation of the ethics code and placed written documentation of that fact in her personnel file. Mr. Thomas, a key decision maker for principal promotions, was copied on both the memorandum from Ms. Harrison to Ms. Dancy-Pratt and Ms. Dancy-Pratt's response, and it is undisputed that he was aware of the incident. Whether it was fair or prudent for those making direct appointment recommendations to the School Board to have considered this incident or given it weight is not the issue. Ms. Dancy-Pratt has failed to demonstrate (sufficiently to create a jury issue) that these decision makers were really considering her age and not this incident when deciding who should be recommended for direct appointments. See Damon, 196 F.3d at 1361 ("We are not in the business of adjudging whether employment decisions are prudent or fair. Instead, our sole concern is whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a challenged employment decision.").
Similarly, in her response to the School Board's summary judgment motion, Ms. Dancy-Pratt points to positive evaluations from some of her principals, but does not sufficiently rebut the School Board's reliance on the comments of Dr. Crawford. Ms. Dancy-Pratt points to the fact that Mr. Crawford gave her overall ratings of "exceeds performance expectations," did not criticize any aspect of her performance in the narrative portion of those evaluations, and denied in his deposition that he ever told Mr. Thomas anything that refuted these evaluations. See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 [D.E. 28]. Mr. Crawford's testimony, however, is not quite what Ms. Dancy-Pratt characterizes it to be. Mr. Crawford was asked if anything in his evaluation of Ms. Dancy-Pratt "conflicted" with any information he gave Mr. Thomas, to which he replied "no," i.e., there was nothing conflicting. See Crawford Deposition at 24. In fact, there is nothing inherently conflicting in believing that someone "needs to work on personal skills, as far as being more sensitive, and listening to people," and believing that an appropriate evaluation should be "exceeds expectations." Thus, Ms. Dancy-Pratt fails to demonstrate that Mr. Thomas and other decision makers were really considering her age and not Mr. Crawford's comments when deciding who should be recommended for direct appointments. See Garcia-Cabrera v. Cohen, 81 F. Supp.2d 1272, 1280-81 (M.D. Ala.) ("it is beyond question that an inability to get along with co-workers and demonstrated caustic or rude behavior is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for [adverse] employment decision"), affirmed, 237 F.3d 636 (11th Cir. 2000).
Ms. Dancy-Pratt argues that the School Board's reasons for not promoting her were based on age discrimination, but she testified at her deposition that no one ever told her she was being passed over for principalships because of her age. See Dancy-Pratt Deposition at 94. She contends that no one needed to tell her that because she "was shown in so many ways that they're dealing with the younger people now." See id. Ms. Dancy-Pratt, however, must produce more than mere speculation or conclusory allegations to satisfy her burden on pretext. See Gaston v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 129 F. Supp.2d 1355, 1368 (S.D. Fla. 2001) ("plaintiff's mere belief, speculation, or conclusory accusation that he was subject to discrimination will not create an inference of discrimination or satisfy his burden when responding to a properly supported motion for summary judgment"). I note that Ms. Dancy-Pratt never specifically complained to Mr. Thomas that she was being discriminated against due to her age. See Dancy-Pratt Deposition at 44. She never complained to the School Board's Equal Educational and Employment Opportunity Office, though she was aware that the office existed. See id. at 60, 62. She did not tell her regional directors that she believed she was being discriminated against on the basis of age. See id. at 62, 63.
Nor can Ms. Dancy-Pratt show pretext merely by proving that she was better qualified for the position than those promoted. See Cofield, 267 F.3d at 1269 (holding that qualifications must be so superior that a reasonable fact-finder would conclude reason given for hiring another was pretextual). Ms. Dancy-Pratt has suggested that some of the individuals promoted to principalships were not as qualified as she was because they did not have as many years of experience in the school system, did not have as many years as an assistant principal as she did, or lacked master's degrees or master's degrees in the right subjects. See Dancy-Pratt's Statement of Uncontested Facts at 9. Disparities in qualifications alone will not, in and of themselves, be enough to demonstrate discriminatory intent unless "those disparities are so apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the face." See Deinies v. Texas Dept. of Protective and Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 1999). In Deines, the Fifth Circuit explained that this standard "should be understood to mean that disparities in qualifications must be of such weight and significance that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in question." See id. at 280-281. In other words, a plaintiff must do more than question the wisdom of the employer's reasons, "where those reasons might motivate a reasonable employer." See Combs it. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1543 (11th Cir. 1997).
In her motion for summary judgment, Ms. Dancy-Pratt refers to several individuals who were appointed to principalships in 2001, whom she alleges did not meet the School Board's educational requirements. Ms. Dancy-Pratt's complaint was filed in April of 2000, however, and therefore, the individuals that were appointed in 2001 are irrelevant to the summary judgment record for Ms. Dancy-Pratt's discrimination claims.
The issue is not whether Ms. Dancy-Pratt was more qualified than those individuals offered principalships, but whether there was such a disparity between Ms. Dancy-Pratt and those promoted that no reasonable fact-finder could believe that the other individuals should have been promoted instead of Ms. Dancy-Pratt. See Cofield, 267 F.3d at 1268. Ms. Dancy-Pratt stated several times that she believed she was more qualified than the individuals promoted to principalships because she was older than them and had been in the school system longer than them. See Dancy-Pratt Deposition at 9-12, 15-18, 24-26, 32. For example, when asked about an individual by the name of Avis Bembry, Ms. Dancy-Pratt stated that she had not seen his qualifications but "this person is younger, so I feel I should be more qualified than this person." See id. at 11, 12. When asked about the qualifications of Nicholas Emmanuel, Ms. Dancy-Pratt stated "I don't know his qualifications. . . [but] looking at his age I feel that he would be. . . less qualified." See id. at 9. When asked again later about Mr. Emmanuel, Ms. Dancy-Pratt stated that she didn't believe that he had the "work time experience." See id. at 15, 16.
It is undisputed that the School Board did not take into account the number of years an individual had taught in the schools, or years they had been an assistant principal. See Diaz Deposition at 31, 32; Thomas Deposition at 68-70. It is also undisputed that all of the individuals promoted to principalships received "exemplary," "distinguished," and/or "commendable" ratings on their evaluations shortly prior to their appointments. See School Board's Statement of Undisputed Facts at 5. While Ms. Dancy-Pratt believes that it is discriminatory that the School Board does not take years of experience into account in their promotion decisions, she offers nothing to show that this is the case. Ms. Dancy-Pratt herself received an earlier promotion to assistant principal based on the same system. Furthermore, there is nothing that requires an employer to consider experience in their hiring and promotion decisions. See Chapman v. Al Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) ("[F]ederal courts `do not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity's business decisions.'") (quoting Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991)).
Ms. Dancy-Pratt further alleges that it is necessary for all individuals promoted to the position of a principalship to have a master's degree in administration and supervision. See Dancy-Pratt Statement of Uncontested Facts at 2. She bases this claim on the testimony of Angela Macrina, the District Director for Management Training. See id. The record is unclear on this matter, however, because the Miami-Dade County Public Schools Management Selection Procedures Manual only specifies a master's degree without limitation, along with certification in educational leadership, or administration/supervision. Furthermore, it is unclear whether all the individuals promoted to principalships during the relevant time period had master's degrees at the time they were promoted. If they did not have master's degrees, absent any other legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Ms. Dancy-Pratt's non-promotion, an issue of material fact concerning qualifications and pretext would be in dispute. The School Board, however, has articulated at least two other legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons why Ms. Dancy-Pratt was not promoted — Ms. Dancy-Pratt's improper reading of the evaluations and Mr. Crawford's response to Mr. Thomas' inquiry. Resolving all doubts against the School Board and drawing all inferences from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Dancy-Pratt, she has not presented sufficient evidence of pretext on these articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the School Board's decision not to promote her to a principalship.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the School Board's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and Ms. Dancy-Pratt's motion for summary judgment is DENIED. A final judgment will issue by separate order.
DONE and ORDERED in chambers in Miami, Florida.