Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Napa County Super. Ct. No. 26-22921
STEIN, J.
Background
Joel and Dora Barrios owned several adjoining parcels of land in Napa County. In 1977, the Barrioses obtained a lot line adjustment that reconfigured the parcels. They sold one parcel to Robert and Jean Snider. The title company, First American Title Company, prepared a first grant deed that erroneously described the boundaries of the parcel as extending to the center of a small creek on the north end of the property. After the error was discovered, the Sniders and the Barrioses exchanged grant deeds so that the Sniders’ final deed described the northern boundaries of their land as extending to a point 40 feet south of the center of the creek. The new deeds were recorded and the Sniders built a fence along the agreed-upon lot line. The Sniders later conveyed their lot to the O’Malleys. The grant deed prepared by Western Title Insurance Company in connection with that conveyance, like the earlier grant deed prepared by First American Title Company, erroneously described the lot as extending to the middle of the creek. The O’Malleys later retained Michael Brooks to do a survey. That survey came up with yet another northern boundary to the parcel, describing the lot line as being somewhere between the creek and the fence erected by the Sniders.
The O’Malleys filed suit against Western Title Insurance Company, and ultimately settled their claim for $9,000.
In the meantime, the Barrioses sold another parcel to the Bettinellis, who in 1985 sold it to the D’Ambrosio Brothers Investment Company (DBIC). The Barrioses sold a third parcel to the Kintschers. The Kintscher property includes the 40-foot strip south of the creek. As a part of these sales, the Barrioses also conveyed an access easement to the DBIC property over that strip. In 1990, the Kintschers and DBIC brought an action against the O’Malleys to quiet title to the 40-foot strip and for related relief, alleging the O’Malleys had removed the fence between their property and the creek and had entered onto the land owned by the Kintschers and over which DBIC had an easement. The parties settled their dispute in September 1990. The settlement was incorporated into a judgment entered by the superior court on January 23, 1991. The judgment recited its purpose was “to effectuate the original purpose of Joel and Dora Barrios,” providing in relevant part:
“3. The north boundary of AP 45-25-25 [the O’Malleys’ lot] shall be established, as follows:
“a. The north boundary of AP 45-25-25 shall lie on a line running essentially from east to west, and shall intersect points extending on line, north from the boundaries which currently define the eastern most and western most limits of AP 45-25-25, said eastern and western boundaries being parallel lines, which run in a north-south direction.
“b. Said north boundary line of AP 45-25-25 shall lie at a distance of forty (40) feet south of where said extended, parallel east and west boundaries intersect the center of the small creek, which center of the small creek defines the north boundary of AP 45-25-30 [the Kintschers’ lot—and in particular, the 40-foot strip owned by the Kintschers and across which DBIC has an easement].”
The judgment further ordered the center of the small creek be determined by measurements to be taken by Richard G. Shelton, a surveyor. It reserved to the parties “the right to approve said Shelton survey, said approval not to be unreasonably withheld.” It required the O’Malleys to remove the materials they had placed on the 40-foot strip. It required the parties to share the expenses of the survey to the extent they were not paid by First American Title Company. It provided, “[t]he parties shall request a lot line adjustment to reflect the results of the Shelton Survey be performed by First American Title Insurance Company of Napa. Said lot line adjustment shall be performed at no cost to the parties hereto, First American having committed to pay therefor. A record of survey shall be recorded in concert with the lot line adjustment.”
Richard Shelton performed the survey. First American Title Company paid the costs and fees for a lot line adjustment. The parties requested the adjustment and received preliminary approval of it. However, the parties never approved or disapproved the survey and apparently abandoned further efforts to obtain a lot line adjustment.
In September 2003, DBIC filed the present action against the O’Malleys and the Kintschers, claiming the O’Malleys again were interfering with DBIC’s easement and the Kintschers had failed to prevent that interference. DBIC sought damages and an injunction. The O’Malleys cross-complained against DBIC for trespass. Trial was conducted in two phases so that the question of the preclusive effect of the 1991 judgment would be determined first. On April 11, 2005, the court entered a statement of decision concluding the parties were barred from relitigating the issue of the location of the northern boundary of the O’Malley property, finding, in accordance with the 1991 judgment, the boundary ran 40 feet south of the center of the creek. The court also found that because of the lack of clarity surrounding ownership of the 40-foot strip of land, neither party had sustained its burden of proof as to trespass. The statement of decision ordered judgment be entered in favor of DBIC to the extent its complaint sought an injunction preventing the O’Malleys from interfering with the 40-foot strip, and judgment be entered in favor of each party on the other’s claim for trespass.
Shortly before the court issued the statement of decision, the O’Malleys moved to amend their cross-complaint to add a claim to quiet title to the 40-foot strip. On June 8, 2004, the Kintschers answered the O’Malleys’ amended cross-complaint and filed their own cross-complaint to quiet title. On July 28, 2005, the court issued two judgments. The first reiterated that the 1991 judgment was res judicata as to the location of the northern boundary of the O’Malley property and that no party had met its burden of proof to show a trespass. It enjoined the O’Malleys from interfering with or obstructing the 40-foot strip, and it awarded costs to DBIC as the prevailing party. The second judgment ruled that the northern boundary of the O’Malley parcel was the boundary identified by the Shelton survey. It found the 1991 judgment was res judicata as to the boundary line, and it found the Kintschers were the prevailing parties and therefore entitled to their costs.
It is not clear that the O’Malleys in fact amended their complaint. Their motion to amend was granted and the Kintschers responded to it, but the amended cross-complaint is not a part of the superior court’s file.
The court later denied the O’Malleys’ motion for a new trial. This appeal followed.
Discussion
The O’Malleys contend the trial court erred in determining the 1991 judgment was res judicata as to the issue of the northern boundary of the O’Malleys’ parcel.
“Under the doctrine of res judicata, ‘parties to a prior proceeding are precluded from relitigating issues determined in the prior proceeding. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A prior judgment ‘ “. . . ‘operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The doctrine ‘rests upon the ground that the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated, or had an opportunity to litigate the same matter in a former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again to the harassment and vexation of his opponent. Public policy and the interest of litigants alike require that there be an end to litigation.’ [Citations.]” (Dunkin v. Boskey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 171, 180-181.)
The O’Malleys point out, correctly, that only final judgments have a res judicata effect. A judgment that is interlocutory as to substance and effect is not “final,” and is not res judicata on later proceedings. (City of San Diego v. Alpha Securities Corp. (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 246, 249.) It follows, for example, that the opinion of a judge or an order for judgment that merely indicates the court’s intention has no preclusive effect. (Grable v. Grable (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 353, 358.) The O’Malleys, citing cases such as Bloom v. Bloom (1929) 207 Cal. 70 (Bloom) and Degnan v. Morrow (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 358 (Degnan), contend the 1991 judgment was interlocutory, and not final, because it contemplated a survey would be done, approved and recorded, the parties would request a lot line adjustment and the adjustment would be performed at no cost to the parties.
The cited cases establish a judgment is not final when the issues it addresses cannot be finally determined without further judicial action. In Bloom, the defendant had conveyed title to parcels of real property to the plaintiff to hold as security for certain loans and advances, upon an agreement the plaintiff would reconvey the property to the defendant when the loans and advances were repaid. (Bloom, supra, 207 Cal. at p. 71.) The defendant did not pay the plaintiff, and the plaintiff filed a complaint to quiet title to the property. The trial court entered a judgment ordering the plaintiff to execute a deed conveying title to the defendant upon payment to the plaintiff of the amount due, leaving it to the parties to determine that amount by agreement. (Id. at pp. 71-72.) In reversing the judgment, the Supreme Court pointed out, “[i]f the judgment be permitted to stand, the plaintiff’s title is not quieted, notwithstanding the defendant may never pay the amount found to be due. On the other hand, the defendant may wait indefinitely and gamble on the increase or decrease in the value of the property. In any event, further litigation would seem to be inevitable unless this controversy be settled in this action.” (Id. at p. 72.) Similarly, in Degnan, an action to dissolve a partnership, this division found a judgment to be interlocutory because “[i]t contemplates a later judicial resolution of disputed matters involved in the partnership accounting, a report and proceedings for confirmation thereof, and dissolution of the partnership, as well as further action in partition of the jointly owned real property based upon an agreement of the parties or a sale under the direction of the court.” (Degnan, supra, 2 Cal.App.3d at p. 362.)
Here, in contrast to Bloom, supra, 207 Cal. 70, Degnan, supra, 2 Cal.App.3d 358, and the other cases cited by the O’Malleys, the judgment left nothing further for the trial court to decide or order. As a general test, where something “further in the nature of judicial action on the part of the court is essential to a final determination of the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory.” (Lyon v. Goss (1942) 19 Cal.2d 659, 670.) However, “where no issue is left for future consideration except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the terms of the first decree, that decree is final.” (Ibid.) In Bloom and Degnan the judgments in question did not finally determine the parties’ rights, which would need to be further defined by later judicial action. Here, the 1991 judgment left nothing for a court to determine in a later action. It is true that the judgment ordered the parties to take action to create a public record of the boundary, but their actions could not and would not alter the location of the northern boundary to the O’Malleys’ parcel nor create or define any additional rights between the parties. All that was left, if anything, was to determine whether the parties had complied with the court’s orders.
Finally, the current judgment does not violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers simply because the 1991 judgment contemplated the parties would request a lot line adjustment or obtain one at no cost to themselves. The Legislature has conferred jurisdiction on the courts to quiet title to property. (Code Civ. Proc., § 760.040.) The judgment at issue here simply quieted title in the 40-foot strip. It does not require the county to issue a lot line adjustment or to do anything at all. Indeed, the 1991 judgment required only that the parties request a lot line adjustment and ordered that the survey be filed in concert with the adjustment. Again, it did not require the county to do anything.
Conclusion
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MARCHIANO, P. J., MARGULIES, J.