Opinion
No. 3750.
June 23, 1938.
Appeal from District Court, Collin County; F. E. Wilcox, Judge.
Suit by the State and others against Mrs. Carrie Hughes, as owner, and the Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank of Dallas and another, as lienholders, to recover state, county, and road district taxes for certain years. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, the Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank of Dallas appeals.
Affirmed.
This is a suit by the State against Mrs. Carrie Hughes, as owner, and the Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank and Mrs. Eula B. Pelster, as lienholders, to recover state, county and road district taxes for the years 1931 and 1935 against a parcel of land situate in Princeton Road District No. 9, a political subdivision of Collin County. The taxes mentioned were paid prior to the trial and no point concerning the same is here presented. Recovery was also sought of the Princeton Road District taxes for the years 1919 to 1930, inclusive. Judgment was rendered establishing the taxes last mentioned as an indebtedness due the plaintiff in the sum of $1,612.14. The tax lien against all defendants was foreclosed against the land. The Bank alone appealed.
It was stipulated upon the trial that the land was situate within the district; no road taxes for the years 1919 to 1930, inclusive, against the land had been paid; "that said tract of land was regularly rendered and assessed for taxes in each year from 1919 to 1930, inclusive, and the valuation placed thereon by the owner of said land, which valuations were approved by the Commissioners' Court, acting as a Board of Equalization, and that said land was carried into the assessor's abstract and assessment book at the following valuations for each year;" (here follow valuations amounts for each of the years stated). It was further agreed the Commissioners' Court each year for the years 1919 to 1930 levied an assessment for road tax purposes against all of the lands lying within the road district, and ordered the tax assessor to assess the road taxes at certain rates for each year stated. It was "further agreed that the tax assessor of Collin County, for each of said years 1919 to 1930, inclusive, computed the annual taxes due against the tract of land involved in this case and placed the same upon the annual tax-rolls of Collin County, Texas, with the exception of the road taxes above set out, which taxes the said assessor failed to calculate and extend on to the annual tax-roll, and which taxes have not been paid by anyone at this time. It is further agreed that said taxes as above set out are still not on the annual tax-rolls or the delinquent rolls of Collin County, and no list has been prepared, showing these taxes to be due upon the property in question."
McCombs, Andress Johnson, of Dallas, for appellant.
H. H. Neilson, Co. Atty., and Dwight Whitwell, Asst. Co. Atty., both of McKinney, for appellees.
Appellant invokes the settled rule that an assessment as provided by law is an indispensable prerequisite to the validity of a tax against an individual and his property, and asserts there has never been a valid assessment of the road taxes for the year 1919 to 1930, because of the failure of the assessor to calculate and extend on the annual tax rolls the amount of the road taxes levied against the parcel of land in question. This phase of the case is controlled by the decision of the Supreme Court in George v. Dean, 47 Tex. 73. In that case George and others sued Dean, the tax collector of Galveston County, to enjoin the collection of a tax levied for the scholastic year ending September 1, 1874 for the purpose of building and repairing school houses, and a special tax levied by the Commissioners' Court of Galveston County to pay interest and create a sinking fund on certain county bonds. In that case it was insisted said taxes had not been legally assessed because the tax rolls failed to show the amount of school tax with which each individual taxpayer was chargeable. In disposing of that insistence Judge Moore said:
"An assessment, however, is an altogether different thing from the tax-roll. By the assessment, the liability of the tax-payer is fixed. It ascertains the facts, and furnishes the data for the proper preparation of the rolls. To make an assessment, the officer or tribunal to whom the duty is committed, is required to ascertain and make an inventory or list of the property upon which the tax has been levied, and to estimate or determine its value. (Cooley on Taxation, 258.) When the property is listed and valued, the amount of tax for which the owner is liable is merely a matter of arithmetical calculation. While this amount should be shown and exhibited by the tax-roll, if properly prepared, it is not an essential part or requisite of the assessment." (Italics ours.)
Under the holding in that case it cannot be said there was not a valid assessment of the road taxes in question simply because the assessor failed to calculate such taxes and extend the same on the annual tax rolls. In this connection, see, also, Hernandez v. City of San Antonio, Tex. Civ. App. 39 S.W. 1022.
Assuming there has never been a valid assessment of such road taxes appellant also asserts the taxes cannot be enforced without a re-assessment and other procedure as provided by Articles 73467349, R.S., inclusive. These articles apply to real property which had been omitted from the tax rolls or where previous assessments on such real property are invalid or have been declared invalid for any reason by any district court in a suit to enforce collection of taxes. These articles have no application to the present suit because the land was not omitted from the tax rolls and the assessments for the years in question are not invalid and have not been so declared by any district court.
Affirmed.