Opinion
No. 05-19-01164-CV
08-10-2020
DALLAS COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT D/B/A PARKLAND HEALTH & HOSPITAL SYSTEM AND DAVID S. LOPEZ IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER OF DALLAS COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT D/B/A PARKLAND HEALTH & HOSPITAL SYSTEM, Appellants v. FRANCISCO SOSA, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5 Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-19-02681-E
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Schenck, Osborne, and Reichek
Opinion by Justice Schenck
In this accelerated appeal, Dallas County Hospital District d/b/a Parkland Health & Hospital System ("Parkland") and David S. Lopez, in his official capacity as Chief Operating Officer of Parkland, appeal the trial court's orders denying their respective pleas to the jurisdiction and motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We conclude the trial court erred in denying Parkland's plea to the jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and render judgment dismissing Sosa's claims against Parkland. We further conclude the trial court did not err in denying Lopez's plea to the jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm that order. Because all issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
BACKGROUND
On or about June 2, 2018, Francisco Sosa was involved in a car accident and was transported to Parkland's emergency department for medical treatment. Parkland billed Sosa $53,233.81 for the treatment provided, and Sosa's insurer paid $31,877.03 of the invoiced amount.
Parkland subsequently filed a hospital lien pursuant to Section 55.001 of the Texas Property Code "upon any and all rights of action, suits, claims, counterclaims and demands of the following named person on account of personal injuries received." The lien listed Sosa as the injured person, the date of the accident, and Parkland's name and address, and indicated the party or parties alleged to be responsible for damages arising from Sosa's injury to be "unknown." Parkland attached to the lien an affidavit that stated the amount currently unpaid but which Parkland had a right to paid was $6,323.15, as well as an itemized invoice that set forth the total charges, amount paid by Sosa's insurer, adjustments, and the remaining unpaid amount of $6,323.15.
On May 6, 2019, Sosa filed suit against Parkland, seeking a declaratory judgment that Parkland's lien was invalid and an award of attorney's fees. On August 15, Parkland filed its first amended plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, asserting it was a governmental unit entitled to immunity from Sosa's suit that had not been waived such that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. After conducting a hearing, the trial court denied Parkland's plea and motion. Parkland timely appealed that order.
On August 28, Sosa amended his petition to include Lopez as a defendant, asserting Lopez acted without legal or statutory authority by filing the hospital lien "as the lien was not in compliance with Chapter 55 of the Texas Property Code" in several respects. On October 15, Lopez filed his first amended plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. After conducting a hearing, the trial court denied Lopez's plea and motion. Lopez timely appealed that order.
After oral argument on Parkland's appeal, this Court consolidated Lopez's appeal with Parkland's appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Sosa's Claims against Parkland
Parkland argues the trial court erred in denying Parkland's First Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction because Parkland, as a governmental entity, is entitled to governmental immunity against Sosa's claim for a declaratory judgment.
Governmental immunity is a common-law doctrine. City of McKinney v. Hank's Rest. Grp., L.P., 412 S.W.3d 102, 110 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.). It applies to political subdivisions of the State, while the immunity of the State itself is referred to as sovereign immunity. Id. When performing governmental functions, political subdivisions derive governmental immunity from the State's sovereign immunity. Id. Governmental immunity comprises both immunity from liability and immunity from suit. Id. Immunity from liability protects entities from judgment while immunity from suit deprives courts of jurisdiction over suits against entities unless the legislature has expressly consented. Id. Thus, the legislature can waive a political subdivision's governmental immunity. Id. at 110-11.
The Declaratory Judgments Act ("DJA") waives immunity as to certain claims, but it is not a general waiver of immunity. Id. at 111. The DJA waives governmental immunity against claims that a statute or ordinance is invalid. Id. at 112. The Act does not waive immunity against claims seeking a declaration of the claimant's statutory rights or an interpretation of a statute. Id.
In his petition, Sosa seeks a declaratory judgment against Parkland. Specifically, he seeks a judicial declaration that Parkland's hospital lien is invalid pursuant to section 55.002 of the property code because he was not admitted to the hospital and pursuant to section 55.004 because the amount Parkland has received for Sosa's three-hour emergency department visit exceeded the reasonable and regular rate for the services Sosa received.
Section 55.002 of the property code provides, "A hospital has a lien on a cause of action or claim of an individual who receives hospital services for injuries caused by an accident that is attributed to the negligence of another person." TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 55.002(a). For the lien to attach, the individual must be admitted to a hospital not later than 72 hours after the accident. Id. Section 55.004 provides for the amount of a hospital lien: "the amount of the hospital's charges for services provided to the injured individual . . . ." See id. § 55.004(b). That section states a hospital lien described by section 55.002(a) may include "the amount of a physician's reasonable and necessary charges for emergency hospital care services provided to the injured individual" but does not cover charges "for other services that exceed a reasonable and regular rate for the services." See id. § 55.004(c), (d)(1).
The Legislature recently amended this statute to limit a hospital lien under Section 55.002(a) to be the lesser of:
(1) the amount of the hospital's charges for services provided to the injured individual during the first 100 days of the injured individual's hospitalization; orSee PROP. § 55.004(b). Those amendments became effective in June 2019 after Sosa filed this suit. Act of May 24, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S. ch. 728, § 23.001(79), 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 2318, amended by Act of May 22, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 862, § 2, 2019 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (H.B. 2929).
(2) 50 percent of all amounts recovered by the injured individual through a cause of action, judgment, or settlement described by Section 55.003(a).
Because Sosa's claims against Parkland seek to declare the hospital lien, but not the statute providing for the hospital lien, invalid, the DJA does not waive immunity for Sosa's claims against Parkland. See City of McKinney, 412 S.W.3d at 112.
Sosa argues that in filing the hospital lien, Parkland was a municipal corporation performing a proprietary function such that immunity was not waived. Municipal corporations exercise their broad powers through two different roles; proprietary and governmental. Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 559 S.W.3d 142, 146 (Tex. 2018). The governmental/proprietary dichotomy recognizes that immunity protects a governmental unit from suits based on its performance of a governmental function but not a proprietary function. See id.
Even assuming Parkland were a municipal corporation, filing a hospital lien would be a governmental function. A city or municipality in maintaining or operating a hospital exercises a governmental power. See City of Dallas v. Smith, 130 Tex. 225, 227 (Comm'n App. 1937) ("It is our opinion, assuming the truth of all of the facts alleged in the petition and indulging every reasonable intendment arising upon the petition, that the city in the maintenance and operation of the hospital was exercising a governmental power and was not acting in its proprietary capacity."); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.0215(a)(8) (listing hospitals as governmental functions exercised by municipalities). The Texas Legislature passed the Hospital Lien Statute to provide hospitals an additional method of securing payment for medical services, thus encouraging the prompt and adequate treatment of accident victims and reducing hospital costs. McAllen Hosps., L.P. v. State Farm Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. of Tex., 433 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Tex. 2014). Accordingly, filing a hospital lien is part of the operation of a hospital. See id.
Parkland was created under the authority of Section 281.021 of the Texas Health and Safety Code and Article 9, Section 4 of the Texas constitution. See DALLAS COUNTY, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES §2-223.
We conclude the trial court erred in denying Parkland's plea to the jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and render judgment dismissing Sosa's claims against Parkland.
II. Sosa's Claims against Lopez
We now address Lopez's appeal of the trial court's order denying his First Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Lopez argues as a government official, he is entitled to immunity from Sosa's claim against him and that governmental immunity is not waived for declaratory actions like the one Sosa asserts against him. Lopez further asserts that Sosa failed to assert a viable ultra vires claim against him such that Sosa's claim against Lopez should be dismissed.
As discussed above, the DJA waives governmental immunity against claims that a statute is invalid but does not waive immunity against claims seeking a declaration of the claimant's statutory rights. See Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2011); City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 373 n.6 (Tex. 2009). Additionally, immunity does not bar a suit for prospective injunctive relief remedies in official-capacity suits against government actors who violate statutory or constitutional provisions. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373-77. Suits to require state officials to comply with a statutory or constitutional provision are not prohibited by sovereign immunity, even if a declaration to that effect compels the payment of money. Id.; Tex. Dep't of Ins. v. Reconveyance Servs., Inc., 306 S.W.3d 256, 258 (Tex. 2010) (citing Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372)). This is known as the ultra vires exception to immunity. Reconveyance Servs., 306 S.W.3d at 258. This rule "derives from the premise that the acts of officials which are not lawfully authorized are not acts of the State." Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373 (quoting Cobb v. Harrington, 190 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex. 1945)).
To fall within the ultra vires exception, a suit must not complain of a government officer's exercise of discretion, but rather must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372. In this context, ministerial acts are those "where the law prescribes and defines the duties to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment." City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex. 1994); see Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Emmett, 459 S.W.3d 578, 587 (Tex. 2015). On the other hand, discretionary acts require the exercise of judgment and personal deliberation. See Emmett, 459 S.W.3d at 587; Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417, 425 (Tex. 2004). In an ultra vires action, a plaintiff may not seek money damages, and further, the plaintiff may seek only "prospective" rather than "retrospective" remedies. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373-74.
In his amended petition, Sosa alleges Lopez authorized Med-Data, Incorporated, to act as agent for Parkland and authorized employees of Parkland to provide information to Med-Data for the purpose of filing hospital liens such as the one filed in this matter. He further alleges Lopez acted without legal or statutory authority by filing said lien, asserting the lien was not in compliance with Chapter 55 of the Texas Property Code in the following respects:
1. Sosa was not admitted to Parkland but only seen in the emergency department;
2. the amount billed Sosa, $53,233.81, was excessive;
3. the amount paid by Sosa's health insurer $31,877.03 exceeded the regular and reasonable rate customarily charged for services rendered to Sosa; and
4. the amount received by Parkland on Sosa's behalf, was more than 50% of Sosa's third-party settlement.
As noted supra, the 50% restriction came into effect after Sosa filed suit.
Lopez raises multiple arguments why he is immune in his official capacity and why Sosa's claims against him fail, which we address below.
A. Sosa Asserts a Proper Declaratory Judgment Claim
Lopez begins by challenging whether a declaratory judgment claim may be raised against a governmental official where that claim is not challenging the validity or constitutionality of a statute or ordinance. He relies on authority limiting waiver of immunity against governmental entities. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.006; Patel v. Tex. Dep't of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 76 (Tex. 2015); Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep't v. Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex. 2011); Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373 n.6. Sosa does not challenge the validity or constitutionality of any statute or ordinance. Instead, he asserts an ultra vires suit against Lopez. And, as noted above, ultra vires suits allege the acts of officials not lawfully authorized are not acts of the State, and such suits are not prohibited by sovereign immunity. See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373-77.
Lopez also urges that Sosa's claims seek to determine whether Parkland's charges were reasonable and whether he was admitted to Parkland, fact issues for which a declaratory judgment action is not the proper vehicle. Lopez relies on an opinion from another court of appeals granting a plea to the jurisdiction in a case in which the patient sought a determination that she should only be charged a reasonable rate by the hospital that treated her and that the set rates the hospital used were not reasonable. See Shahin v. Mem'l Hermann Health Sys., 527 S.W.3d 484, 486 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). But Shahin is distinguishable from this case because it was not a hospital lien case and did not assert the actor acted without legal authority.
Here, in addition to claiming the amount paid by Sosa's health insurer exceeded the regular and reasonable rate customarily charged and that he was not admitted to Parkland, Sosa alleges that Lopez acted "without legal authority" when he authorized the hospital lien because the property code does not authorize a hospital lien for an amount of services in excess of a reasonable and regular rate and because the property code requires the patient be admitted to the hospital. See PROP. §§ 55.002(a), 55.004(d). Accordingly, Shahin does not compel the result Lopez urges, and on its face, Sosa's pleading asserts an ultra vires claim. See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372.
B. Sosa Asserts Proper Ultra Vires Claims against Lopez
Lopez argues Sosa cannot assert an ultra vires claim against him because he is not the proper party. "[A]n ultra vires suit must lie against the 'allegedly responsible government actor in his official capacity,' not a nominal, apex representative who has nothing to do with the allegedly ultra vires actions." Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 240 (Tex. 2017).
Lopez attached an affidavit and the job description for Chief Operating Officer of Parkland to his first amended plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Lopez relies on statements in that affidavit and job description to assert that his responsibilities as Chief Operating Officer of Parkland do not encompass the actions alleged by Sosa; he does not have any role in determining or approving the amount charged for the services and treatment provided by Parkland; he is not involved with the billing for services rendered to Parkland's patients; is not involved with the filing or authorizing of hospital liens on Parkland's behalf; he did not have any role in providing treatment to Sosa; did not have communications with MedData, Parkland's lien filing agent in this matter; and did not have a role in authorizing MedData to file the hospital lien at issue.
The standard of review for a jurisdictional plea based on evidence generally mirrors that of a summary judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c). Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v.Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004); City of Dallas v. Prado, 373 S.W.3d 848, 852 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). We take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the nonmovant's favor. Prado, 373 S.W.3d at 852-53. The burden is the movant to meet the standard of proof. Id. If the evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction, and the fact issue will be resolved by the factfinder. Id. However, if the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law. Id.
In reviewing Lopez's affidavit and job description, we agree that he has denied any role in the instant lien and in general determining amounts of charges or filing or authorizing the filing of hospital liens on Parkland's behalf. However, the focus of an ultra vires claim is on an official who has allegedly exceeded his granted authority to interpret and apply a law. See Hall, 508 S.W.3d at 241. Lopez's affidavit broadly claims responsibility for "managerial oversight of the operations division" as COO of Parkland. However, nowhere in his affidavit or job description does Lopez deny the legal authority to file or authorize the filing of hospital liens, to determine charges for services and treatments provided by Parkland, to cause other employees to confirm that charges for services are "reasonable and regular," or direct employees to file, release or reform a lien. On the contrary, his broad statement regarding his responsibility for Parkland's operations seems to underscore that he does in fact have the legal authority to authorize the above actions.
Lopez describes his job responsibilities as follows:
In my role as COO of Parkland, I am responsible for oversight of Parkland's daily operations. My responsibilities include managerial oversight of the operations division which includes the following broad categories of services: 1) clinical (professional) support, 2) administrative support, 3) transitional and post-acute, 4) operations administration, 5) internal audit, 6) Parkland Community Health Plan, and 7) other areas as assigned. A true and correct copy of my job description is attached to this affidavit at Tab A.
Lopez also argues Sosa failed to properly plead ultra vires claims by failing to identify what legal duty or purely ministerial act Lopez failed to perform or what clearly defined legal authority Lopez failed to abide. Lopez cites the "fair notice" standard of pleading in support of this argument, noting that the question he poses by his suit is whether the lien filed as to him reflects a charge that is both "reasonable and regular." See Neff v. Brady, 527 S.W.3d 511, 527 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (citing Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tex. 2007)). At this stage of the proceedings, we have Sosa's allegation that the charge is neither regular or reasonable and neither a denial as to either or a mandate to reach and resolve any such merits dispute. For jurisdictional purposes, we are, instead, obliged to take unchallenged factual assertions as true and focus instead on whether Lopez or some other official the proper party to whom the requested relief could be directed. See Prado, 373 S.W.3d at 852-53.
Thus, Sosa's allegation that the amount charged is both excessive and unique to him must be taken as true, leaving only the question of whether there is a defendant who might be brought to court to respond to it. As governmental entities, like corporations, are non-corporeal entities, they can only act through their officers, directors and employees. See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373 (citing Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 844 (Tex.2007) ("It is fundamental that a suit against a state official is merely 'another way of pleading an action against the entity of which [the official] is an agent.'")). The entire purpose of an ultra vires action is to pursue an official with the authority to constrain the entity's actions to the law of the state that created it. See id. Lopez's argument here could be construed to require the aggrieved citizen to divine the individual officer who filed the claim or approved of the amount it reflects, rather than an official with the authority (and hence responsibility) to assure that both actions are consistent with the law of the state that creates the entity.
Although governmental immunity justifiably provides broad protection to the government and its agents, it does not protect every act by a government officer that requires some exercise of judgment—a government officer with some discretion to interpret and apply a law may nonetheless act "without legal authority," and thus ultra vires, if he exceeds the bounds of his granted authority or if his acts conflict with the law itself. Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154, 158 (Tex. 2016) (emphasis added). In his amended petition, Sosa alleges Lopez, among other things, acted without legal or statutory authority by filing, or authorizing a third party to file on Parkland's behalf, a hospital lien that Sosa asserts was not in compliance with Chapter 55 of the Texas Property Code in multiple respects. Accordingly, we conclude Sosa's petition properly pleads ultra vires claims. See id.
C. Sosa's Allegations Support Ultra Vires Claims
Lopez argues Sosa's allegations cannot support ultra vires claims because they do not identify any purely ministerial acts Lopez failed to perform. Lopez urges the allegation that Lopez erred in authorizing a hospital lien to be filed claiming amounts under a statutory lien that were not reasonable and regular and for treatment that was provided to Sosa in the emergency room does not amount to an allegation of an ultra vires act. Lopez urges that this allegation merely alleges he made one or more erroneous decisions while staying within his authority.
The supreme court has identified two general means of proving an ultra vires claim: (1) an action "without legal authority" or (2) failure to "perform a purely ministerial act." Hall, 508 S.W.3d at 241 (quoting Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372). To act without legal authority in the context of a particular type of ultra vires claim means an allegation that an official has exceeded his or her granted authority to "interpret and apply a law." See id. A public officer generally lacks discretion or authority to misinterpret the law. Id. In order to act without legal authority in carrying out a duty to interpret and apply the law, Lopez must have exercised discretion without reference to or in conflict with the constraints of the law authorizing him to act. Id. at 242.
To be sure, Lopez, according to his affidavit, did not set the amount of the charge or personally file the lien. He appears to equate this lack of direct personal involvement in the facts giving rise to the suit to a lack of authority to address the question or direct the relief the court is being asked to provide. According to Hall and the many parallel federal authorities it mirrors, the object here is the "'allegedly responsible government actor in his official capacity,' not a nominal, apex representative who has nothing to do with the allegedly ultra vires actions." Hall, 508 S.W.3d at 240 (emphasis added); see also Osterback v. Scott, 782 Fed. App'x 856 (11th Cir. 2019) (proper defendant in federal Ex Parte Young action is a state officer who has "some connection" with the enforcement of the provision at issue).
Thus, suing the Governor for any action taken by an official acting as an agent of the executive branch of the state is generally improper. Hall, 508 S.W.3d at 240. On the other hand, where, as here, the defendant is alleged to have authority over a decision that is challenged as unlawful, the assertion that he or she did not personally direct it does not amount to a "nominal" connection or conclusively establish that he or she had "nothing" to do with it. Cf. Id.
Section 55.004 of the property code provides a hospital lien may include "the amount of a physician's reasonable and necessary charges for emergency hospital care services provided to the injured individual" but does not cover charges "for other services that exceed a reasonable and regular rate for the services." See PROP. § 55.004(c), (d)(1). The statute does not identify any particular official as having the responsibility for assuring compliance with its directives. Thus, Sosa's allegation that Lopez erred in authorizing a hospital lien to be filed based on rates that were not the reasonable and regular rates customarily charged amounts to an allegation that Lopez acted in conflict with the constraints of the law authorizing him to act.
Cf. City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 2019) (discussing and distinguishing Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740, 742 (5th Cir. 2014) (dismissing Governor as defendant where statute made specific agency responsible).
As a brief reminder, in his amended petition, Sosa alleges Lopez acted without legal or statutory authority by filing a hospital lien that was not in compliance with Chapter 55 of the Texas Property Code in the following respects:
1. Sosa was not admitted to Parkland but only seen in the emergency department;
2. the amount billed Sosa, $53,233.81, was excessive;
3. the amount paid by Sosa's health insurer $31,877.03 exceeded the regular and reasonable rate customarily charged for services rendered to Sosa; and
4. the amount received by Parkland on Sosa's behalf, was more than 50% of Sosa's third-party settlement.
As neither the statute brought to bear nor Lopez's affidavit suggests that Lopez lacks the authority to address and resolve any irregularity in the charges—or indicates that someone other than Lopez has that exclusive authority—we are presented with no basis for concluding that he is a "nominal, apex representative" having "nothing to do with the alleged ultra vires actions." Because these allegations support an ultra vires claim, we need not address whether the allegation that Lopez erred in authorizing a hospital lien for treatment that was provided to Sosa in the emergency room supports an ultra vires claim. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
Similarly, we need not address Lopez's arguments that (1) Sosa's pleadings negate his assertion that he was not admitted to Parkland because those pleadings allege Sosa was seen in Parkland's emergency department; (2) a hospital lien filed without an asserted amount cannot be excessive as a matter of law; and (3) a hospital lien is filed before the amount of a patient's personal injury is determined, so a lien exceeding 50% of a patient's personal injury recovery cannot be filed as a matter of law.
D. Sosa's Standing and His Claims' Ripeness
Lopez contests Sosa's standing and the ripeness of his claims, arguing that because Sosa's pleadings do not allege that he has been paid any proceeds pursuant to a settlement or judgment, he has not adequately alleged standing or ripeness.
When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the cause. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiffs and look to the pleaders' intent. Id.
Section 55.003(a)(3) of the property code provides a hospital lien attaches to
the proceeds of a settlement of a cause of action or a claim by the injured individual or another person entitled to make the claim, arising from an injury for which the injured individual is admitted to the hospital or receives emergency medical services.See PROP. § 55.003. Lopez relies on a prior holding from this Court that a "hospital's cause of action does not accrue until funds are paid in settlement or by judgment." Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Borders, 581 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (examining prior version of this statute for whether hospital lien was invalid because statute of limitations had run).
Sosa's amended petition alleges the amount received by Parkland on Sosa's behalf, was more than 50% of Sosa's third-party settlement. Construing Sosa's pleadings liberally, we conclude he has alleged a settlement to which the hospital lien has attached. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226.
E. Redundant Remedies Doctrine Does Not Preclude Sosa's Claims
Lopez asserts that because Sosa could challenge the validity of Parkland's hospital lien in any action Parkland chose to file to recover amounts under its lien, the redundant remedies doctrine negates his ultra vires claim.
Under the redundant remedies doctrine, courts will not entertain an action brought under the DJA when the same claim could be pursued through different channels. Patel v. Tex. Dep't of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 79 (Tex. 2015). The focus of the doctrine is on the initiation of the case, that is, whether the legislature created a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity that permits the parties to raise their claims through some avenue other than the DJA. Id. Lopez does not point us to—nor have we found—any avenue provided by the legislature that would permit Sosa to raise his claims. Accordingly, we conclude the redundant remedies doctrine does not bar Sosa's claims.
F. Sosa's Claims Seek Prospective Relief
In addition to the arguments set forth above, Lopez contends that Sosa's ultra vires claim fails to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction because Sosa seeks ultra vires relief for alleged acts that have already been committed and therefore impermissibly seeks retrospective relief.
In an ultra vires action, a plaintiff may not seek money damages, and further, the plaintiff may seek only "prospective" rather than "retrospective" remedies. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373-74. Here, Sosa seeks a declaration that the hospital lien is invalid and attorney's fees. Lopez argues that by seeking to invalidate an already filed lien, Sosa seeks relief for an act that has already been committed and thus seeks retrospective relief. We disagree. The nature of the relief Sosa seeks is to invalidate the hospital lien such that Parkland cannot thereafter file an action to recover amounts under its lien. Thus, the relief Sosa seeks is prospective. Lopez further argues that by seeking his attorney's fees, Sosa impermissibly seeks to recover money damages. However, Lopez does not support this argument with any authority establishing attorney's fees are money damages, and we have found none. See Wineinger v. Z Bar A Ranch, LP, No. 05-15-01104-CV, 2016 WL 3971560, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 22, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("[S]uits to require state officials to comply with statutory or constitutional provisions are not prohibited by sovereign immunity, even if a declaration to that effect compels the payment of money.").
CONCLUSION
We conclude the trial court erred in denying Parkland's plea to the jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and render judgment dismissing Sosa's claims against Parkland. We further conclude the trial court did not err in denying Lopez's plea to the jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm that order.
/David J. Schenck/
DAVID J. SCHENCK
JUSTICE 191164F.P05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-19-02681-E.
Opinion delivered by Justice Schenck. Justices Osborne and Reichek participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, we REVERSE the trial court's September 5, 2019 Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. We AFFIRM the trial court's December 13, 2019 Order Denying Defendant David S. Lopez's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. We REMAND this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal. Judgment entered this 10th day of August, 2020.