Opinion
No. 96-3343-GTV
January 29, 2001.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff filed this against Frank Goodman and Debra Roberts, members of the staff at the United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas ("USP Leavenworth"); Page True, Warden of USP Leavenworth; Patrick Kane, Regional Director of the Bureau of Prisons; and Kathy Hawk, Director of the Bureau of Prisons. Plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated his constitutional right of access to the courts by failing to provide him with access to state law materials needed in his efforts to obtain post-conviction relief in state court in Wisconsin and Michigan. Plaintiff wished to challenge prior convictions in those states, because the convictions were used to enhance his federal sentence. Plaintiff requests monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief.(2) The case is before the court on Defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment (Doc. 60), Plaintiff's motion to compel the production of documents (Doc. 41), Defendants' motion to stay discovery (Doc. 43), and Plaintiff's motion for an extension of time to respond to Defendants' motions (Doc. 46). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part; Plaintiff's motion to compel the production of documents is granted; Defendants' motion to stay discovery is denied; and Plaintiff's motion for an extension of time to respond to Defendants' motions is denied.
I. Factual Background
The following facts are taken from the summary judgment record and either uncontroverted or viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff's case.
Plaintiff was a prisoner at USP Leavenworth from August 24, 1995 to August 31, 1998.(3) On January 2, 1996, Plaintiff submitted a written letter to Defendant Frank Goodman, Education Technician of USP Leavenworth, requesting access to a complete set of annotated Wisconsin and Michigan statutes, as well as the Wisconsin rules of criminal and civil procedure and the Michigan rules of criminal procedure. Plaintiff explained in his request that he needed the materials to assist him in challenging convictions from those states, because the convictions were used to enhance his federal sentence. Defendant Goodman denied Plaintiff's request, explaining that the prison was not required to provide prisoners with access to state law materials. Defendant Goodman also explained that Plaintiff could meet his alleged need for the Wisconsin and Michigan materials by contacting the Wisconsin and Michigan Departments of Corrections or the University of Kansas School of Law Defender Project. (4)
Unsatisfied with Defendant Goodman's response, Plaintiff filed an informal resolution complaint. Defendant Debra Roberts, Senior Case Manager of USP Leavenworth, responded to the complaint, stating that the prison was not required to provide its prisoners with state law materials.
Plaintiff then filed an internal grievance with the Warden's Office. Defendant Page True, Warden of USP Leavenworth, denied Plaintiff's grievance, again informing Plaintiff that the prison was not required to provide prisoners with state law materials and explaining that Plaintiff had "access to the Kansas University Law School's clinical program, as well as the opportunity to correspond with the Wisconsin and Michigan Department[s] of Corrections for assistance with [his] legal needs."
Plaintiff appealed the denial of his request to the Regional Director's Office. Defendant Patrick R. Kane, Regional Director of the Bureau of Prisons, affirmed the denial, stating that Plaintiff had failed to make his request sufficiently specific and to provide an adequate explanation of why he needed the state materials. Defendant Kane also referred to the University of Kansas Law School's clinical program, stating that the program "may assist [Plaintiff] with post conviction relief issues."
Plaintiff then appealed the denial of his request to the National Inmate Appeals Office. Ed Crosley, Administrator for the Appeals Office, affirmed the denial, stating:
As the Warden noted, you may contact the Department of Corrections of Wisconsin [or] Michigan and request legal materials. Furthermore, you have access to the Kansas University Law School's clinical program. However, . . . [y]our request that you be provided a complete set of Wisconsin and Michigan State statutes and annotations with criminal and civil state law procedures is not reasonable. As you have avenues available to you in which to request state materials, we find that your access to the courts is not being denied and we find no basis for any further relief.
Plaintiff contends that Mr. Crosley acted on behalf of Defendant Kathy Hawk, Director of the Bureau of Prisons, when he affirmed the denial of his request.
Having fully exhausted his administrative avenues, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in federal court.
II. Discussion
A. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment (5)
Defendants first argue that this case should be dismissed with respect to Defendant Kathy Hawk, Director of the Bureau of Prisons, for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court agrees. Due process requires that a defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum State sufficient to guarantee that the assertion of personal jurisdiction does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). For this court to exercise jurisdiction over Defendant Hawk, Plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that Defendant Hawk purposefully availed herself of the privilege of conducting activities within the state of Kansas, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws, and that the claims brought against Defendant Hawk arise out of those contacts. See Kuenzle v. HTM Sport-Und Freizeitgerate AG, 102 F.3d 453, 455 (10th Cir. 1996);see also Johnson v. Rardin, No. 91-1211, 1992 WL 9019, at *1 (10th Cir. Jan. 17, 1992) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)).
Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden. The evidence indicates that Defendant Hawk works in Washington D.C. Plaintiff alleges that, as Director of the Bureau of Prisons, Defendant Hawk "signs and reviews inmate administrative appeals" and "makes policy and signs all Program Statements dealing with the operation of the [Bureau of Prisons]." Plaintiff neither alleges nor presents evidence, however, indicating that Defendant Hawk either performs these activities in Kansas or purposefully directs these activities toward Kansas. Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient for this court to justify exercising personal jurisdiction over Defendant Hawk. Accordingly, the court dismisses Defendant Hawk from the lawsuit. See Johnson, 1992 WL 9019, at *1 (affirming trial court's dismissal of Defendant Hawk for lack of personal jurisdiction where "other than signing the reviews of [the plaintiff's] appeals, [Hawk's] only contacts with the state were to occasionally advise senior staff members and the legal staff of the federal prisons located in Colorado"); Cuoco v. Hurley, No. 98-D-2438, 2000 WL 1375273, at *1 (D.Colo. Sept. 22, 2000) (dismissing Defendant Hawk for lack of personal jurisdiction where other than signing the reviews of the plaintiff's appeals outside of the state, Hawk's only contacts with Colorado were to occasionally advise senior staff members of the federal prisons in Colorado); accord Wright v. Hawk, No. 95-1332, 1996 WL 194629, at *1 (10th Cir. April 19, 1996) (affirming Colorado district court's dismissal of Defendant Hawk for lack of personal jurisdiction where there was no indication Defendant Hawk ever purposefully availed herself of the privilege of conducting activities within Colorado and evidence showed Defendant Hawk resided in Washington D.C.).
Defendants next contend that this case should be dismissed with respect to Defendant Kane, Regional Director of the Bureau of Prisons, because he is deceased. Plaintiff states in his response to Defendants' motion that he "agrees with [Defendants] that Defendant Kane is deceased, and that Defendant Kane should be dismissed from the instant action." The court, therefore, dismisses Defendant Kane from the lawsuit.
Defendants next argue that this case should be dismissed to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages from Defendants in their official capacities. The court agrees. Plaintiff's complaint and subsequent pleadings make clear that he is suing Defendants in both their official and individual capacities. An official capacity claim against a federal official is construed as a suit against the United States. See Laury v. R.C. Greenfield, 87 F. Supp.2d 1210, 1213 (D.Kan. 2000) (citingKentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)). Bivens does not allow a plaintiff to pursue an action for damages against the United States. See Cooper v. True, No. CIV.A.96-3097-GTV, 1998 WL 560044, at *2 (D.Kan. Aug. 14, 1998) (citing Chapoose v. Hodel, 831 F.2d 931, 935 (10th Cir. 1987)). Plaintiff's claims against Defendants in their official capacities, therefore, are dismissed.(6)
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim because it fails to plead sufficiently an "actual injury" that was caused by any alleged inadequacy of the USP Leavenworth prison library. The court disagrees. Plaintiff filed this case on July 9, 1996. The court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint sua sponte on May 16, 1997 for failure to state a claim. The Tenth Circuit reversed the court's dismissal on February 18, 1998. In its written opinion, the Tenth Circuit specifically addressed whether Plaintiff had alleged sufficiently the kind of actual injury required in a claim for denial of access to the courts. See Dahler v. Goodman, No. 97-3177, 1998 WL 67359, at *3 (10th Cir. Feb. 19, 1998). This court will not revisit the issue.
Defendants next contend that they are immune from liability in their individual capacities because of the doctrine of qualified immunity. The court disagrees. Qualified immunity shields an individual government official performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as his or her conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Butler v. City of Prairie Vill., Kan., 172 F.3d 736, 745 (10th Cir. 1999). When the issue is raised at the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff has the burden of coming forward with sufficient facts to show that the defendant's alleged conduct violated a law that was clearly established at the time of the violation. See Howard v. Dickerson, 34 F.3d 978, 981 (10th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); Martin v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 909 F.2d 402, 405 (10th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). The defendant then must demonstrate that no material issues of fact remain as to whether his or her actions were objectively reasonable in light of the existing law and the information that he or she possessed at that time. See Howard, 34 F.3d at 981 (citation omitted); Martin, 909 F.2d at 405 (citation omitted).
It is clearly established that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). Embodied within this right is a requirement that prison officials assist inmates in filing nonfrivolous legal claims challenging their convictions or conditions of confinement by providing the inmates with "adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Id. at 828; see also Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356; Dahler, 1998 WL 67359, at *2 (citations omitted). In essence, this means that prison officials must provide their inmates with a reasonably adequate opportunity to challenge the conditions of their confinement or to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355-56.
The court determines that Plaintiff has set forth sufficient facts to show that Defendants' alleged conduct violated his constitutional right of access to the courts. To prove a violation, Plaintiff must show that one or more inadequacies of USP Leavenworth's prison library or legal assistance program caused him actual injury by hindering his efforts to challenge the conditions of his confinement or to attack his sentence, directly or collaterally. See id. at 355. Plaintiff has presented evidence showing that USP Leavenworth's prison library did not contain materials containing Wisconsin or Michigan state statutes or rules of criminal and civil procedure. Plaintiff has also presented evidence showing that, due to this inadequacy, Plaintiff was unable to challenge his state convictions in those states and, therefore, unable to attack collaterally his federal sentence which was enhanced by those state convictions. See Petrick v. Maynard, 11 F.3d 991, 993 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding an Oklahoma prisoner's allegation of denial of access to the courts sufficient where he claimed that prison officials had refused to provide him with North Dakota and Minnesota state law materials that were needed to challenge state convictions that had been used to enhance his Oklahoma sentence). (7)
Defendants seem to suggest that, because the USP Leavenworth prison library provides a vast amount of legal materials, Plaintiff was not denied his constitutional right of access to the courts as a matter of law. Regardless of the supply of legal materials provided at the USP Leavenworth library, it is undisputed that the library did not contain the necessary state materials for Plaintiff to file meaningful petitions for post-conviction relief in the state courts of Wisconsin and Michigan. Plaintiff's constitutional right of access to the courts does not guarantee him merely that he will be provided with an expansive collection of legal materials, regardless of the relevancy of those materials to his particular needs; instead, it guarantees him that he will be provided with access to the legal tools required to provide him with a reasonably adequate opportunity to challenge the conditions of his confinement or to attack his sentence, directly or collaterally. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff was not denied access to the courts as a matter of law because he was given the opportunity to seek assistance from the University of Kansas School of Law Defender Project, a clinical aid program providing legal assistance to select prisoners at USP Leavenworth. While the Defender Project may be of benefit to many prisoners at USP Leavenworth, it was of no benefit to Plaintiff in this case. The Defender Project declined to assist Plaintiff in filing petitions for post-conviction relief in the courts of Wisconsin and Michigan.
Defendants further contend that, even if their failure to provide Plaintiff with the requested legal materials somehow infringed upon his constitutional rights, they were justified in doing so because supplying the materials would have imposed too great a financial burden upon USP Leavenworth. "When a [prison] denies an inmate's request for the necessary resources to prepare a petition, and thereby infringes that inmate's constitutional right of access to the courts, [the court] must determine whether the prison's policy is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." See Petrick, 11 F.3d at 994-95 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987) (further citations omitted)). While the cost of providing legal materials to prisoners is a legitimate penological interest, "the cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total denial." Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825.
In sum, the court concludes that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because (1) Plaintiff's constitutional right of access to the courts was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that a reasonable person should have known; (2) Plaintiff has set forth sufficient facts to show that Defendants' alleged conduct violated his constitutional right of access to the courts; and (3) Defendants have failed to show that no material issues of fact remain as to whether their actions were objectively reasonable in light of the existing law and the information that they possessed at the time of the alleged violation.
B. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel the Production of Documents
Plaintiff served a request for production of documents on Defendants in July of 1998. Defendants have not responded to that request. Plaintiff seeks an order from this court compelling Defendants to respond. In their memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff's motion to compel, Defendants admit that they have not responded to Plaintiff's request. Defendants state, "Unfortunately, due to a clerical oversight, a response time to [P]laintiff's request for discovery was not calendared, and counsel apologizes for this error." The court grants Plaintiff's motion to compel and orders Defendants to produce the requested documents promptly.
C. Defendants' Motion to Stay Discovery
Defendants request an order from this court staying discovery "until thirty (30) days from the filing of and a ruling by the court on [D]efendants' motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment." The request is denied. Defendants have already filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in this case, and thus that portion of their motion seeking a stay in discovery until Defendants file such a motion is moot. In addition, upon ruling on Defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in this written order, the court determines no reason to stay discovery for thirty days.
D. Plaintiff's Motion For an Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants' Motions
Plaintiff filed a motion seeking an extension of time within which to respond to Defendants' "Motions." After carefully reviewing the record in this case, the court determines that no motion of Defendants exists to which Plaintiff has not filed a response. The court concludes that Plaintiff's motion seeking an extension of time is moot and should be denied.
IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED that Defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment (Doc. 60) is granted with respect to the dismissal of Defendant Hawk for lack of personal jurisdiction; granted with respect to the dismissal of Defendant Kane; granted to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages from Defendants in their official capacities; and denied in all other respects.
IT IS FURTHER BY THE COURT ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to compel the production of documents (Doc. 41) is granted; Defendants' motion to stay discovery (Doc. 43) is denied; and Plaintiff's motion for an extension of time to respond to Defendants' motions (Doc. 46) is denied.
The case is dismissed with respect to Defendant Kathy Hawk and Defendant Patrick R. Kane.
No particular methodology is prescribed by courts for prison officials to follow in assuring inmates their constitutional right to access of the courts. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 831. Instead, prisons are given broad discretion as to the manner and means chosen. Among the possible alternatives are the allowing access to providing an adequate law library are "the training of inmates as paralegal assistants to work under lawyers' supervision, the use of paraprofessionals and law students, either as volunteers or in formal clinical programs, the organization of volunteer attorneys through bar associations or other groups, the hiring of lawyers on a part-time consultant basis, and the use of full-time staff attorneys." See id. Any methods chosen is sufficient providing it ensures that inmates have a "reasonably adequate opportunity to file nonfrivolous legal claims challenging their conviction or conditions of confinement." See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356. Instead, prisons are given broad discretion as to the manner and method of ensuring their prisoners constitutional right. Courts have not prescribed a particular manner in which prison officials are to assure prisoners their constitutional right of access to the courts. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 831. Among the possible alternatives to providing an adequate law library are "the training of inmates as paralegal assistants to work under lawyers' supervision, the use of paraprofessionals and law students, either as volunteers or in formal clinical programs, the organization of volunteer attorneys through bar associations or other groups, the hiring of lawyers on a part-time consultant basis, and the use of full-time staff attorneys." See id. Any particular methodology is sufficient so long as ensures that inmates have a "reasonably adequate opportunity to file nonfrivolous legal claims challenging their conviction or conditions of confinement." See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356.
"`Once an inmate gains access to the court through a properly prepared and filed initial pleading, the court will then be in a position to determine whether the claim has any merit and whether the issues raised are unusually complex.'" Carper v. DeLand, 54 F.3d 613, 617 (10th Cir. 1995) Carper, 54 F.3d at 617 (quoting Bee v. Utah State Prison, 823 F.2d 397, 399 (10th Cir. 1987)).
II. Standards for Judgment
A. Motion to Dismiss
B. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence presented by the parties demonstrates "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A "genuine" issue of fact exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the issue either way. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). An issue of fact is "material" if it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim. See id. (citing same). The court must consider the record, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See id.
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See id. at 670-71 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)). If the moving party will not bear the burden of persuasion at trial, that party "may make its prima facie demonstration simply by pointing out to the court a lack of evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim." Id. at 671 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts from which a reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party. See id.
While prison officials must assist inmates with filing claims challenging their convictions or conditions of confinement, they do not need to assist the prisoners beyond the preparation and filing of the initial pleadings. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. Nor do they need to assist the prisoners in filing any other type of civil action:
[The constitutional right of access to the courts] does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355.
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed as to Defendants Hawk, Kane, and Roberts because it contains no allegations that those defendants were personally involved with the alleged denial of Plaintiff's constitutional right of access to the courts. Having already determined that Defendants Hawk and Kane should be dismissed from this lawsuit for unrelated reasons, the court will only address this argument with respect to Defendant Roberts.
Moreover, Plaintiff's right of access to the courts guarantees him only assistance with the preparation and filing of a petition to challenge his conviction or conditions of confinement. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. "`Once an inmate gains access to the court through a properly prepared and filed initial pleading, the court will then be in a position to determine whether the claim has any merit and whether the issues raised are unusually complex.'" Carper v. DeLand, 54 F.3d 613, 617 (10th Cir. 1995) Carper, 54 F.3d at 617 (quoting Bee v. Utah State Prison, 823 F.2d 397, 399 (10th Cir. 1987)).
The Bivens decision "established that a civilian has a cause of action against a federal official in his individual capacity for damages to the civilian arising out of the federal official's violation of federal constitutional law." Applewhite v. United States Air Force, 995 F.2d 997, 999 n. 8 (10th Cir. 1993).