Opinion
No. 22988-2-III
Filed: April 5, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Spokane County. Docket No. 03-2-04493-2. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 04/08/2004. Judge signing: Hon. Jerome J. Leveque.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Christine M. Weaver, Law Office of Christine M Weaver PS, 9011 E Valleyway Ave, Spokane Valley, WA 99212-2835.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Paul Eric Clay, Stevens Clay Manix PS, 421 W Riverside Ave Ste 1575, Spokane, WA 99201-0409.
John Alfred Manix, Stevens Clay Manix PS, 421 W Riverside Ave Ste 1575, Spokane, WA 99201-0409.
Four tutors filed a declaratory judgment action concerning their continuing contract rights with the school district. The trial court granted summary dismissal, holding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction given that the tutors did not appeal the school district's decision on their contract rights within 30 days as required by RCW 28A.645.010. The tutors appeal, claiming the statute does not apply to them; but even if it does, they substantially complied with it. In the alternative, they argue that the 30-day statute is unconstitutional. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
Mike Bradley, Stuart Dagg, Norma Egger, and Laurel Reilly (the tutors) were hired as tutors by Spokane Public School District No. 81 (the school district) between February 1989 and November 2000. Although each had a teaching certificate, they were not offered continuing contracts. At the start of the 2001-02 school year, the tutors sought to be represented by a union in bargaining the terms of their employment with the school district. Because the tutor position required a teaching certificate, the tutors were accepted into the Spokane Education Association (SEA), a bargaining unit for certificated teachers. Thereafter, SEA representative Caroline McDowell negotiated the terms of the tutors' employment with the school district's assistant superintendent for human resources, Barb Wright.
RCW 28A.405.210 generally requires the school board to make written, renewable (continuing) contracts with certificated teachers designated as employees. Certificated teachers designated as leave replacement teachers are not entitled to continuing contracts. RCW 28A.405.900.
Ms. Wright informed Ms. McDowell in April 2003 that she had designated the tutors as leave replacement employees who would not be entitled to continuing contracts. According to Ms. Wright, on April 2, 2003, during and as part of the collective bargaining process, she notified each of the four tutors that they would be issued one-year-only, noncontinuing contracts due to their leave replacement status. On April 22, three of the four tutors met with counsel for the Washington Education Association (WEA) and were advised that the WEA would not pursue continuing contracts for them.
Although it is unclear from her declaration how she personally is aware of this event or how or where it occurred, Ms. McDowell agrees that the tutors were so informed on April 2, 2003. The tutors all concede that each was `informed of my status as a leave replacement teacher [in] April 2003.' Clerk's Papers at 81, 88, 98, 105.
On May 16, the SEA submitted a proposal to the school district on behalf of the tutors. The proposal included one-year, noncontinuing contracts for each of the tutors as well as other terms and benefits. The parties ultimately agreed to terms for one-year leave replacement contracts for the school year 2002-03, but at higher pay and with greater benefits than the tutors had previously received. The contracts were approved and signed by the school district's board. Each tutor signed a one-year, noncontinuing contract on June 9, 2003. Three signed supplemental contracts; the earliest on July 11 and the latest on August 2.
The tutors filed a declaratory judgment action on July 11. They alleged that the school district violated RCW 28A.405.210 by failing to treat the tutors as employees entitled by state law to written contracts of employment subject to the continuing contact statutes that protect teachers in Washington. They also alleged an action under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. They filed their motion for declaratory judgment on October 15. The trial court ordered additional briefing.
During the supplemental briefing period, the school district filed a motion for summary judgment. It argued that the trial court was deprived of subject matter jurisdiction by operation of RCW 28A.645.010. The court summarily dismissed the action in that the tutors were aggrieving the decision of a school official and failed to challenge that decision within 30 days as required by RCW 28A.645.010. The tutors' motion for reconsideration was also denied. The tutors appeal.
DISCUSSION a. Summary dismissal
We review summary dismissal of an appeal under RCW 28A.645.010 de novo, making the same inquiry as the superior court. Schmidtke v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 69 Wn. App. 174, 177, 848 P.2d 203 (1993). As is the case with any summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and if we determine from the matters on file that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at 177-78.
RCW 28A.645.010 provides in pertinent part:
Any person, or persons, either severally or collectively, aggrieved by any decision or order of any school official or board, within thirty days after the rendition of such decision or order . . . may appeal the same to the superior court of the county in which the school district or part thereof is situated, by filing with the secretary of the school board if the appeal is from board action . . ., otherwise with the proper school official, and filing with the clerk of the superior court, a notice of appeal which shall set forth in a clear and concise manner the errors complained of.
A decision or order under RCW 28A.645.010 need not be formal. Derrey v. Toppenish Sch. Dist. No. 202, 69 Wn. App. 610, 613, 849 P.2d 699 (1993). It does not necessarily have to be in writing. See Trammel v. Riverview Sch. Dist. No. 407, 51 Wn. App. 221, 224, 752 P.2d 951 (1988) (holding that a written response was required for the school board's decision to be `rendered' for the purposes of 30-day appeal statute but the writing requirement was based on the parties' collective bargaining agreement rather than the statute). The statute applies to all decisions, be they judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative. Haynes v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 111 Wn.2d 250, 254-55, 758 P.2d 7 (1988).
The tutors claim that the decision categorizing them as leave replacement teachers was irrelevant to their action. Because they had no rights before the decision to deny those rights, the decision was a nonevent. Therefore, the statute does not apply. Rather, they claim, their action was based on a right to a continuing contract under Washington law. This is a distinction without a difference. The determination of the tutors' entitlement to a contract is grounded in their categorization. Simply put, if they are categorized as employees, they are entitled to a continuing contract. RCW 28A.405.210. If they are categorized as leave replacement teachers, they are not. RCW 28A.405.900. Therefore, the decision to categorize them established their contract rights under the statute. Further, this court has specifically held that RCW 28A.405.010 applies to actions styled as declaratory judgment suits in which the litigant seeks a favorable construction of statutory terms involving their employment benefits. Clark v. Selah Sch. Dist. No. 119, 53 Wn. App. 832, 770 P.2d 1062 (1989). `Merely changing the name of the action will not be sufficient to permit plaintiffs to change the forum and consequently avoid the time limit for appeal.' Benson v. Roberts, 35 Wn. App. 362, 368, 666 P.2d 947 (1983).
Here, the tutors' statutory interpretation claim does not address issues that are substantively different from the school district's decision to categorize them as leave replacement teachers. Therefore, that action is not severable from the appeal of the school district's decision. Id. The appeal under RCW 28A.645.010 is the exclusive remedy available to the tutors. Id.
Ms. Wright claims, and the tutors' union representative agrees, that the decision to categorize the tutors as leave replacement teachers was communicated to them on April 2, 2003. The tutors all concede that each was so informed in April 2003. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the tutors as the nonmoving party, the tutors were, at the latest, orally informed by Ms. Wright on April 30; the 30 days would then expire on May 30.
The tutors note that the board president and board secretary are shown to have signed the contracts with the tutors. That shows, they claim, that it was the board and not Ms. Wright that had the authority to make the decision to categorize them; therefore, the date of each contract was the date of the decision. The school district argues that Ms. Wright was fully authorized to make the categorization decision as superintendent of human resources. However, even if we consider the date of the contracts as the trigger for the 30-day period under RCW 28A.645.010, the filing was still untimely. The contracts were signed on June 9, 2003; the 30 days would expire on July 9. Therefore, the tutors' filing on July 11, 2003 was untimely.
The tutors argue that their status as leave replacement employees was still under negotiation until the final contracts were signed in July and August 2003. However, this claim is negated by the declaration of Ms. McDowell, the tutors' own bargaining unit agent, in which she advised that the union's state legal representative advised them on April 22, 2003, that the union would not seek a continuing contract on their behalf.
Not all claims against the school district must comply with the 30-day appeal requirement of RCW 28A.645.010. Generally, the statute does not apply in cases that do not involve the school district as an employer or when there is no school policy at issue. See Derrey, 69 Wn. App. at 615 (asserting tort claim for negligent misrepresentation); Mountain View Sch. v. Issaquah Sch. Dist. No. 411, 58 Wn. App. 630, 634, 794 P.2d 560 (1990) (alleging infringement upon a private school's trade name); State St. Office Bldg. v. Sedro Woolley Sch. Dist. No. 101, 57 Wn. App. 657, 661, 789 P.2d 781 (1990) (deciding school district's statutory powers to enter into lease agreement).
Additionally, a second paragraph to RCW 28A.645.010 provides:
Appeals by teachers . . . or other certificated employees from the actions of school boards with respect to discharge or other action adversely affecting their contract status, or failure to renew their contracts for the next ensuring term shall be governed by the appeal provisions of chapters 28A.400 and 28A.405 RCW therefor and in all other cases shall be governed by chapter 28A.645 RCW.
The tutors claim that the second paragraph of RCW 28A.645.010 applies to them. They argue that if the second paragraph applies to them, the 30-day appeal time does not. Under the clear language of this paragraph, that would be so only if another time limit applies in chapters 28A.400 and 28A.405 RCW. The only provision the tutors cite to is RCW 28A.405.210. That entire chapter applies only to certificated employees. The tutors concede that they are not certificated employees; that is the very basis of their action. Further, RCW 28A.405.210 involves 10 days' notice for the nonrenewal of a contract. That obviously does not apply here.
b. Constitutionality of RCW 28A.645.010
Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law, which we review de novo. State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 135 Wn.2d 618, 623, 957 P.2d 691 (1998). A `statute is presumed constitutional and the burden is on the party challenging the statute to prove its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.' Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wn.2d 201, 220, 5 P.3d 691 (2000).
Equal Protection. Federal equal protection standards require that "persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment." Guardianship Estate of Keffeler v. Dep't of Soc. Health Servs., 151 Wn.2d 331, 339-40, 88 P.3d 949 (2004) (quoting State v. Schaaf, 109 Wn.2d 1, 17, 743 P.2d 240 (1987)). In order to show that RCW 28A.645.010 violates these equal protection standards, the tutors must first establish that the statute "treats unequally two similarly situated classes of people." Fell v. Spokane Transit Auth., 128 Wn.2d 618, 635, 911 P.2d 1319 (1996) (quoting Cosro, Inc. v. Liquor Control Bd., 107 Wn.2d 754, 760, 733 P.2d 539 (1987)).
The tutors' equal protect claim does not involve a suspect classification. There is no fundamental property interest in public employment. Olson v. Univ. of Wash., 89 Wn.2d 558, 564, 573 P.2d 1308 (1978); Meyers v. Newport Consol. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 56-415, 31 Wn. App. 145, 150, 639 P.2d 853 (1982). `Absent a suspect classification or infringement of a fundamental interest, however, a classification which is rationally related to a legitimate state interest is not violative of a person's right to equal protection.' Marquez v. Univ. of Wash., 32 Wn. App. 302, 308, 648 P.2d 94 (1982). `Under the rational basis test, the statute must be rationally related to achieve a legitimate state interest and will be upheld unless the classification rests on grounds that are wholly irrelevant to achieving the state interest.' Schoonover v. State, 116 Wn. App. 171, 182, 64 P.3d 677 (2003) (citing DeYoung v. Providence Med. Ctr., 136 Wn.2d 136, 144, 960 P.2d 919 (1998)).
Here, the tutors contend that the statute requires school district employees to commence suit within 30 days while similarly situated nonemployees are not required to do so. RCW 28A.645.010 does not treat district employees and nonemployees differently. By its terms it is limited to appeals of decisions and orders of school district officials or the board. RCW 28A.645.010. The statute sets forth the time limits for the appeal of any such administrative, judicial, or quasi-judicial decision or order. See Haynes, 111 Wn.2d at 253-55. Therefore, it is not unlike any appellate rule that limits the time for appeal. See, e.g., RAP 5.2(a) (providing that notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the entry of the decision of the trial court). RCW 28A.645.010 does not impose any disadvantage upon employees not inflicted upon nonemployees under similar circumstances.
The tutors rely on Hunter v. North Mason High School School District No. 403, 85 Wn.2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975). In Hunter, the Washington Supreme Court applied the rational basis test and held that `nonclaim' statutes that required the victims of governmental torts to seek legal advice and act to preserve their claims within 120 days of their injury violated equal protection guaranties because other victims of personal injury were allowed a three-year statute of limitation. Id. at 818-19. Hunter is inapposite. It involves lawsuits. RCW 28A.645.010 does not restrain an employee or nonemployee from filing a lawsuit against the school district. See Derrey, 69 Wn. App. 610; Mountain View, 58 Wn. App. 630; State St. Office Bldg., 57 Wn. App. 657. RCW 28A.645.010 involves appeals of `any decision or order of any school official or board.' It is an appellate rule.
Due Process. The tutors contend they were denied due process because they were not informed they were required to file an appeal within a 30-day statutory time period. Because RCW 28A.645.010 does not require notification, they contend, the statute is constitutionally defective. This issue is raised for the first time on appeal. Because it is a claim of manifest error affecting a constitutional right, it may be considered. RAP 2.5(a); Conner v. Universal Utils., 105 Wn.2d 168, 171, 712 P.2d 849 (1986).
"[D]ue process requires, at a minimum, that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard' before being deprived of any significant property interest.' Wenatchee Reclamation Dist. v. Mustell, 35 Wn. App. 113, 117, 665 P.2d 909 (1983) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377, 91 S. Ct. 780, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1971)), aff'd, 102 Wn.2d 721, 684 P.2d 1275 (1984). As previously noted, the tutors have no property interest at stake. See Olson, 89 Wn.2d at 564; Meyers, 31 Wn. App. at 150. Although the legislature granted the tutors a right to appeal the school district's decision, it did not provide a specific right to have notice of the appeal requirements of RCW 28A.645.010. The school district's failure to notify them that they must appeal its decision within the 30-day period required by RCW 28A.645.010 did not violate due process.
CONCLUSION
RCW 28A.645.010 applies to the tutors' appeal of the school district's decision and is the exclusive remedy available to them. The tutors did not file their appeal within 30 days as required by the statute. The trial court properly dismissed the tutors' action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. RCW 28A.645.010 does not violate equal protection or due process standards. Accordingly, we affirm.
A majority of the panel has determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
SWEENEY, A.C.J. and BROWN, J., Concur.