Summary
affirming the trial court’s denial of a motion to compel certain discovery prior to ruling on a motion for summary judgment when the requested discovery was "immaterial" to the disposition of the motion
Summary of this case from Smith v. Northside Hosp., Inc.Opinion
A00A1196.
DECIDED: JULY 19, 2000
Slander, etc. Cherokee Superior Court. Before Judge Langford, Senior Judge.
Douglas J. Davis, for appellant.
Robert M. Dyer, for appellee.
Mark R. Dagel filed a complaint for slander, defamation, and trespass against Emily Lemcke arising out of events that occurred during Ms. Lemcke's successful 1998 campaign for Chair of the Cherokee County Board of Commissioners. The trial court granted summary judgment to Ms. Lemcke on all three counts. Dagel appeals the grant of summary judgment on the first two counts. We affirm.
The record reveals that on the night of August 10, 1998, a Cherokee County deputy sheriff was dispatched to investigate a suspicious vehicle occupied by three men. When the deputy checked inside the car, he noticed campaign signs belonging to Ms. Lemcke and her opponents, Hollis Lathem and Jimmy Long. The driver of the vehicle, "Willy", stated that he had been hired by Dagel, a Cherokee County developer, to put up Lathem's signs and to take down the other signs. The three men were arrested for theft by receiving.
Dagel deposed that Ms. Lemcke's signs had been placed on his property and that he had removed them and placed them in "Willy's" vehicle. Later that day, Lathem asked Dagel for assistance in putting up campaign signs, and Dagel enlisted the services of "Willy" and two of his friends. Dagel further deposed that the charges against the three men were "thrown out."
The sheriff's office notified Ms. Lemcke of the incident, but she declined to prosecute. However, the next day, Lemcke discussed the event with various members of the media, including a reporter from Channel 11 News (WXIA). WXIA broadcast the story that evening. As scenes related to the story appeared on screen, a reporter stated: "[A]ccording to the report, one of the accused said he did it for money . . . [seven] dollars an hour that he claimed was coming from local developer Mark Dagel[, a] man who is an admitted supporter of Lemcke's opponent, current commission chair Hollis Lathem[.]" The segment then shifted to Ms. Lemcke, who uttered the words at the heart of this dispute: "I'm surprised they took this action . . . it's so blatant, and smacks of illegality."
1. Dagel contends genuine issues of material fact remain on his slander and defamation claims. We disagree.
(a) Dagel first argues that Ms. Lemcke's televised remarks imputed to him a crime and thus constituted slander per se under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-4 (a) (1).
To constitute slander per se, . . . the words at issue must charge the commission of a specific crime punishable by law. Where the plain import of the words spoken impute no criminal offense, they cannot have their meaning enlarged by innuendo. Even though [Ms. Lemcke] may have used the term "illegal[ity]," [her] words did not accuse [Dagel] of committing any crime punishable by law.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Parks v. Multimedia Technologies, Inc., 239 Ga. App. 282, 293 (4) ( 520 S.E.2d 517) (1999).
The statement that the action reported by WXIA "smacks of illegality" does not, standing alone, impute the commission of any specific crime to Dagel. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Ms. Lemcke on this ground.
(b) Next, Dagel contends that even if a crime was not imputed, Ms. Lemcke's remarks are actionable under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-4 (a) (4) as disparaging words which caused him to suffer special damages.
This claim is likewise without merit, because Dagel failed to show that any damages he allegedly suffered flowed from the statement. Dagel testified that he lost a contract and was labeled "Public Enemy No. 1" by the local newspaper because he sued Ms. Lemcke. Thus, any alleged damages arose out of Dagel's lawsuit rather than from Ms. Lemcke's comments. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Ms. Lemcke on this claim.
See O.C.G.A. § 51-5-4 (b) (evidence of special damage essential to action for disparaging words under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-4 (a) (4)).
2. Finally, Dagel contends the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider his amended motion to compel answers upon deposition prior to ruling on Ms. Lemcke's motion for summary judgment. Upon the trial court's inquiry, Dagel's counsel stated that the additional discovery concerned possible slander committed by Ms. Lemcke "on other occasions." Consequently, the trial judge held that such discovery was immaterial to the disposition of Ms. Lemcke's motion for summary judgment. "The trial courts have broad discretion to determine what is and what is not discoverable, and this court will not interfere with those decisions absent a clear abuse." Accordingly, the trial court did not err in hearing Ms. Lemcke's motion for summary judgment without authorizing further discovery. Judgment affirmed. Pope, P.J., and Miller, J., concur.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. U-Haul Company Georgia, 225 Ga. App. 356, 357 (1) ( 484 S.E.2d 49) (1997).
Id; See also Miles v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co., 197 Ga. App. 540, 542 (2), 543 ( 398 S.E.2d 772) (1990).
DECIDED JULY 19, 2000.