Opinion
No. 87-1781.
December 2, 1987. On Motion for Rehearing or Clarification January 20, 1988.
Appeal from a nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for Collier County; William C. McIver, Judge.
Edward K. Cheffy of Frost Jacobs, Naples, and Patrick J. O'Connor, Anita B. Weinstein, and Michael Minsker of Cozen and O'Connor, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.
O.H. Storey, III, of Hoover, Jacobs Storey, Little Rock, Ark., and Robert E. Doyle, Jr., of Asbell, Hains, Doyle and Pickworth, Naples, and Alice Blackwell White of Broad and Cassel, Maitland, for appellee Savers Federal.
Frank X. Kowalski, Jr., and Patricia A. Thomson of Gillette, Pilon and Richman, P.A., Naples, for appellees Connecticut Sav. Bank, et al.
Appellant Cushman and Wakefield of Pennsylvania, Inc. (Cushman), challenges a nonfinal order denying its motion to dismiss appellee Savers Federal Savings and Loan Association's complaint pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.140(b)(2). The trial court determined that it could exercise personal jurisdiction over Cushman, basing its ruling solely on section 48.193(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1985), since it found Cushman was engaged in service activities in this state.
In Aetna Life and Casualty Co. v. Therm-O-Disc, Inc., 511 So.2d 992 (Fla. 1987), the Florida Supreme Court held that there is no personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(f) arising out of an act committed outside this state where the complained of act caused financial injury within the state but caused no personal injury or physical property damage within the state. Aetna was decided subsequent to the trial judge's order in this case, and it compels reversal of the trial court's order. Therefore we do not reach the merits of Cushman's argument regarding whether or not it had minimum contacts with the State of Florida.
Reversed.
RYDER and FRANK, JJ., concur.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING OR CLARIFICATION
Appellee Savers seeks to have our December 2, 1987, opinion clarified to indicate that we were not ruling that jurisdiction was improper over appellant under each and every provision of Florida's long-arm statute. As stated in our opinion, the trial court's order denying appellant's motion to dismiss appellee's third party complaint could not be based on section 48.193(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1985).
As pointed out in our opinion, the trial judge ruled solely on the basis of section 48.193(1)(f). Therefore, appellee is not barred from seeking a ruling from the trial court concerning such other subsections of the long-arm statute which it previously argued were applicable.
Except as clarified herein, appellee's motion for rehearing is denied.
SCHEB, A.C.J., and RYDER and FRANK, JJ., concur.