Opinion
00 CIV. 6634 (SAS)
October 24, 2000
Steve Cummings, Yorktown Heights, NY, For Plaintiff (pro se).
Frances Sands, Esq., Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of New York Law Department, New York, NY, For Defendants Rudolph Giuliani and Henry Stern.
Ari Abramson, New York, NY, For Defendant Ari Abramson (pro se).
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Steve Cummings, appearing pro se and having paid the requisite filing fee, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 alleging numerous violations of his civil rights. Plaintiff also asserts numerous state law tort claims. Plaintiff seeks compensatory, treble and punitive damages, in unspecified amounts, as well as an order granting plaintiff a full-time residential permit for the 79th Street Boat Basin (the "Boat Basin") in New York City.
Plaintiff also asserts 31 pages of claims alleging violations of hundreds of statutes and constitutional provisions, including, for example, copyright law, see Complaint at 48, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, see id. at 54, and interference with contract rights, see id. at 55. However, when a plaintiff has failed to set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a court may dismiss those claims sua sponte. See Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1995). The Complaint merely lists the statutes and constitutional provisions allegedly violated, and thus, fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 8. Accordingly, the claims listed on pages 44 through 75 of the Complaint are hereby dismissed.
Plaintiff asserts claims of assault and battery, see Complaint ¶¶ 56-61, false arrest and false imprisonment, see id. ¶¶ 62-71, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, see id. ¶¶ 72-78, negligent failure to care and protect, see id. ¶¶ 79-83, making false, injurious, or fraudulent statements, see id. ¶¶ 84-87, gross negligence and negligence, see id. ¶¶ 88-90, and respondeat superior, see id. ¶¶ 91-93.
Plaintiff now seeks to amend his Complaint to include the City of New York, Office of the Mayor, New York City Department of Parks and Recreation, and the Criminal Court of the City of New York as defendants. Plaintiff also seeks to strike defendant Abramson's answer "as being an attempt to defraud this Plaintiff, this Court, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit" or, in the alternative, to dismiss Abramson as a defendant so that plaintiff may sue him in a separate action. For the following reasons, plaintiff's motions are denied and the Complaint is dismissed sua sponte.
Plaintiff does not identify Ari Abramson.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is no stranger to the judicial system. He filed an Article 78 proceeding in New York state court, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of a "seasonal dockage permit" at the Boat Basin. Apparently, plaintiff was removed from the waiting list for a dockage permit because he had failed to remove his vessel which was fully submerged in the mooring field. On April 9, 1999, plaintiff's request was denied. See In re Cummings, No. 116877-98 (Sup.Ct. N.Y. Co. Apr. 9, 1999).
In his decision denying plaintiff's request, Justice James A. Yates found that in December 1994 "one of petitioner's vessels sank during a storm while attached to its mooring" at the 79th Street Boat Basin. See In re Cummings, No. 116877-98 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Apr. 9, 1999).
Plaintiff then filed an action in this Court. On March 30, 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint against Abramson, Boudreau, and Giuliani, among other defendants, alleging a widespread conspiracy to cover-up the death of Nadia Frey and to conceal the City's liability for crimes committed by Andrew Cunanan and his accomplice Ron Boudreau. See Complaint in Cummings v. Abramson, et al., No. 00 Civ. 2414. The complaint alleged an unspecified "criminal sexual assault committed by [Abramson]". See id. ¶ 21. On March 30, 2000, Chief Judge Michael B. Mukasey sua sponte dismissed that action for failing to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Further, Judge Mukasey certified, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), that any appeal would not be taken in good faith. See Order of Dismissal in Cummings v. Abramson, et al., No. 00 Civ. 2414 (S.D.N.Y. March 30, 2000).
Plaintiff also sued Suzanne Harvey, Michael Eisner, Steven Spielberg, A.B.C. Television Network, Andrew Cunanan, and Rebecca Shore.
On September 5, 2000, plaintiff filed this voluminous 123-page handwritten Complaint, alleging a litany of civil rights violations arising from what he claims is "a six year unlawful campaign committed by the defendants". Complaint ¶ 1A. While the Complaint is nearly incomprehensible, plaintiff appears to allege that in or about January 1995, while he was in a vessel stationed at the Boat Basin, he was drugged with a sleeping agent and anally sodomized. See id. ¶¶ 9, 30. Plaintiff claims that defendant Ronald Boudreau, who was the "Chief Dockmaster", "exert[ed] influence on [defendant] Abramson to sexually assault [plaintiff]," id. ¶ 12, and that this was done within the scope of Boudreau's employment. Plaintiff also alleges a widespread conspiracy by defendants to cover up this sexual assault, including an allegedly false statement — that plaintiff's injuries were the result of his vessel sinking during a storm — by defendant Henry Stern. See id. ¶ 10. Further, plaintiff alleges that defendants conspired to falsely arrest him. See id.
Plaintiff alleges that Boudreau died in 1997.
Not only are the named defendants implicated in the conspiracy, but other parties not named as defendants are allegedly involved in the conspiracy. Plaintiff maintains that the Corporation Counsel for the City of New York is "acting as 'house council' to a criminal enterprise as defined by the R.I.C.O statutes." Id. ¶ 97. Further, the Civil Branch of the Supreme Court of the State of New York is implicated because the judges have "actively sought to delay or deny completion of [plaintiff's] cases, in a favorable way to [plaintiff]." Id. ¶ 100. Plaintiff contends that Pat Cummings has acted "willingly, and knowingly as a spy/aggitator [sic] for various parties acting on behalf of extremist (Israeli/Jewish interests) and (extremist fundamentalist causes) in the U.S., and/or Rudolph Giuliani." Id. ¶ 102. Further, plaintiff alleges a homosexual conspiracy as the reason for defendants' "fetish for focussing [sic] attention on specific body parts." Id. ¶ 111.
Plaintiff does not identify Pat Cummings.
II. DISCUSSION
Ordinarily, sua sponte dismissal of a plaintiff's claim is disfavored. See Hernandez v. United States Supreme Court of New York County, No. 96 Civ. 4160, 1997 WL 266973, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1997) (citing Lewis v. New York, 547 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1976)). However, even when the pro se plaintiff has paid the filing fee, a district court may dismiss the complaint sua sponte if it is frivolous or includes fantastic and delusional claims. See Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that appeals court has "inherent authority . . . to dismiss an appeal or petition for review as frivolous when . . . [it] presents no arguably meritorious issue for . . . consideration"); McAllan v. Malatzky, No. 97 Civ. 8291, 1998 WL 24369, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1998) ("A district court in the Second Circuit may sua sponte dismiss a frivolous complaint even if the plaintiff has paid the filing fee."), aff'd, 173 F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 1999); Pourzandvakil v. Humphry, No. 94 Civ. 1594, 1995 WL 316935, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. May 23, 1995) (same); Tyler v. Carter, 151 F.R.D. 537, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (dismissing sua sponte delusional plaintiff's complaint alleging conspiracy to enslave and oppress), aff'd, 41 F.3d 1500 (2d Cir. 1994).
Interpreting this pro se Complaint to raise the strongest arguments that it suggests, see McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999), plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed. First, plaintiff's claims that Abramson sexually assaulted him are time barred. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983, and 1985 are governed by New York State's residual three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Butts v. City of New York Dep't of Hous. Preservation and Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 1412 (2d Cir. 1993) (section 1981); Ormiston v. Nelson, 117 F.3d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1997) (section 1983); Hernandez-Avila v. Averill, 725 F.2d 25, 27 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1984) (section 1985). Plaintiff alleges that the sexual assault occurred in or about January 1995, but his Complaint was filed on September 5, 2000. As plaintiff's injuries occurred more than five years prior to the filing of this action, these claims are well outside the applicable three-year limitations period and must be dismissed. See Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1995) (sua sponte dismissal of section 1983 claim based on statute of limitations is "especially appropriate where . . . the injuries complained of [by the pro se plaintiff] occurred more than five years before the filing of the Complaint").
Second, plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to support a claim that there was a conspiracy to deprive him of federally protected rights. "[U]nsupported allegations, which fail to specify in detail the factual basis necessary to enable appellees intelligently to prepare their defense, will not suffice to sustain a claim of governmental conspiracy to deprive [plaintiff] of [his] constitutional rights." Ostrer v. Aronwald, 567 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Brown v. City of Oneonta, 106 F.3d 1125, 1133 (2d Cir. 1997) ("A complaint containing only conclusory, vague, or general allegations of conspiracy to deprive a person of constitutional rights cannot withstand a motion to dismiss."); Polur v. Raffe, 912 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[Plaintiff] relies on vague, prolix allegations of a conspiracy without pleading any overt acts or providing a basis in fact for his claim. It is incumbent on a plaintiff to state more than conclusory allegations to avoid dismissal of a claim predicated on a conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights.").
Because plaintiff's conspiracy claims under sections 1983 and 1985, see Complaint ¶¶ 6-10, 27-34, 45-47, are dismissed, plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 — alleging that defendants neglected to prevent the conspiracy — must also be dismissed. See Dangler v. New York City Off Track Betting Corp., No. 95 Civ. 8495, 1998 WL 599711, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1998) ("Thus, as Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable conspiracy claim under § 1985, it necessarily follows that his corresponding § 1986 claim must also be dismissed."), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 193 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 1999).
Third, plaintiff's conspiracy allegations appear to be delusional. "A plaintiff asserting fantastic or delusional claims should not, by payment of a filing fee, obtain a license to consume limited judicial resources and put defendants to effort and expense." Tyler, 151 F.R.D. at 540. Dismissal of such grandiose claims of conspiracy is particularly appropriate here because Cummings is a litigious plaintiff and has brought similar actions in this court against the same defendants. See Hernandez, 1997 WL 266973, at *2 (dismissing pro se complaint sua sponte where plaintiff is litigious and suit "is arguably a frivolous and malicious attempt on the part of a frustrated plaintiff to harass defendants with multiple lawsuits").
Fourth, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review a state court judgment. Review of such judgments can only be obtained in the Supreme Court. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). Plaintiff is primarily seeking to review the resolution of his state court action. This is apparent from plaintiff's request that this Court award him a permit at the Boat Basin; a request denied by Justice Yates in the state action; and his allegation that the state court judges are involved in a conspiracy against him.
Fifth, plaintiff's suit is barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Under that doctrine, a final judgment on the merits "'precludes religating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.'" See Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981)). "[W]hile the doctrine of claim preclusion serves the interest of society and litigants in assuring the finality of judgments, it also fosters judicial economy and protects the parties from vexatious and expensive litigation." Curtis, 226 F.3d at 138. Plaintiff's prior action was dismissed by Chief Judge Mukasey for failure to state a claim, which is a final judgment on the merits. See Federated Dep't Stores, 452 U.S. at 399 n. 3. The prior federal action involved the same principal defendants as in this suit, was filed after Abramson's alleged sexual assault of plaintiff, and briefly mentioned a criminal sexual assault committed by Abramson. Because "facts essential to the second suit were present in the first suit," Curtis, 226 F.3d at 139, dismissal of plaintiff's prior federal action has a preclusive effect on this lawsuit.
The defendants who are alleged to have conspired to sexually assault plaintiff — Boudreau and Abramson — were defendants in the prior federal action. The fact that the instant suit includes a defendant, Henry Stern, who was not involved in the prior action is irrelevant for res judicata purposes because Cummings was the plaintiff in both suits and he cannot defeat the preclusive effect of the prior dismissal by including additional parties as defendants. Furthermore, the fact that the focus of this suit is a conspiracy to cover-up a sexual assault, whereas the focus of the prior suit was a conspiracy to cover-up a death, does not release plaintiff from the res judicata effect of the prior dismissal. See Waldman v. Village of Kiryas Joel, 207 F.3d 105, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[O]ur cases consistently hold that the facts essential to the barred second suit need not be the same as the facts that were necessary to the first suit.").
Finally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." Because plaintiff's federal claims cannot survive dismissal, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining state law tort claims. See Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 636 (2d Cir. 2000) (directing dismissal of supplemental state law claims where no federal claims remained).
Because this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims, it is unnecessary to reach the merits of those claims.
III. Leave to Amend
Plaintiff has moved to amend the Complaint to add additional defendants. Although the Court generally permits pro-se plaintiffs leave to amend before dismissing the case sua sponte, this case is an exception. First, plaintiff's proposed Amended Complaint demonstrates that plaintiff does not seek to correct the deficiencies in the Complaint, but merely to enlarge the conspiracy by adding additional defendants to his suit. Second, plaintiff has presented no arguably meritorious claim and amendment would prove futile. See Marchi v. Board of Coop. Educ. Servs. of Albany, 173 F.3d 469, 478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 169 (1999) (holding that "futility" provides a solid ground on which to deny leave to amend).III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff's motion to strike defendant Abramson's answer or to dismiss him as a defendant is denied as moot. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.
SO ORDERED