Opinion
No. 36558.
October 27, 1947.
1. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
A receipt stating that defendant received $400 from complainant "as payment on the place on which he now lives" was an insufficient memorandum under statute of frauds, and did not warrant confirmation of title in complainant on payment of balance alleged to be due on purchase price (Code 1942, sec. 264).
2. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
A complainant who in good faith occupied and improved land but who was not entitled to confirmation of title on payment of balance alleged to be due on purchase price because of insufficiency of memorandum under statute of frauds was entitled to adjustment of mutual accounts involving value of improvements and mesne rents (Code 1942, sec. 264).
APPEAL from the chancery court of Covington county. HON. LESTER CLARK, Chancellor.
W.W. Dent, of Collins, for appellant.
The memorandum agreement, dated March 20, 1943, in the following words, "Received from Z.D. Chain the sum of $400.00 as payment on the place on which he now lives," is not sufficient, under Section 264, Code of 1942, being the statute of frauds.
Sturm v. Dent, 141 Miss. 648, 107 So. 277; Paine v. Mikell, 187 Miss. 125, 192 So. 15; Nickerson v. Fithian Land Co., 118 Miss. 722, 80 So. 1; Taylor v. Sayle, 163 Miss. 822, 142 So. 3; Kervin v. Biglane, 144 Miss. 666, 110 So. 232; Fisher v. Kuhn, 54 Miss. 480; McGuire v. Stevens, 42 Miss. 724; Queen City Hoop Co. v. Barnett, 127 Miss. 66, 89 So. 819; 27 C.J.S. 383; 37 C.J.S. 680-685, 746; 6 Ann. Cas. 189; 9 Ann. Cas. 700; 18 Ann. Cas. 914.
An expectancy of title to certain property is not sufficient color of title to give the occupant thereunder a right to compensation for improvements.
Pritchett v. Stevens, 126 Miss. 221, 88 So. 627; Wilie v. Brooks, 45 Miss. 542; Thomas v. Thomas, 69 Miss. 564, 13 So. 666; Code of 1942, Sec. 825; 42 C.J.S. 439, 441 et seq.
W.U. Corley, of Collins, for appellee.
In the event the state of frauds is to prevail, the appellee is entitled to an accounting and the value of the improvements.
Bill was filed by Chain to confirm title to certain lands alleged to have been purchased from Culpepper. Prayer for cancellation of subsequent deeds by Culpepper to third parties has been nullified by reconveyance by such grantees, and the action remained as a suit for confirmation as against Culpepper.
Complainant alleges that he "offered and agreed to pay the defendant Clarence Culpepper the sum of $650 for" the property. It is further alleged that Chain made a substantial cash payment for which Culpepper executed a receipt. It is stated that "a deed was to be executed therefor." No deed was ever in fact executed. Chain moved on the land and made some improvements.
The receipt referred to is in the following form: "March 20, 1943. Received from Z.D. Chain the sum of $400 as payment on the place on which he now lives. Clarence Culpepper." We are compelled to disagree with the learned chancellor's view that this was a sufficient memorandum under our Statute of Frauds, Code 1942, Section 264. The record is much enlarged by oral testimony to explain its meaning, thus exemplifying the very uncertainties which the statute was designed to preclude. The memorandum which should stand alone, falls for lack of that support which the statute denies to it. Its insufficiency is attested by its need for extrinsic aid. Introduction of such testimony was objected to by defendant without avail.
The trial court decreed title in Chain upon payment of the balance alleged to be due upon the purchase price. There was further adjudication of the good faith of Chain in making substantial improvements upon the land, but in view of the award of title the extent thereof was not adjudicated.
We are of the opinion that there was no sufficient conveyance of the title by Culpepper, and that the prayer of the bill ought to have been denied. In view of the adjudication of good faith on the part of Chain in occupying and improving the land, the cause is reversed and remanded for such further proceedings as appellee may be advised is requisite to adjust the mutual accounts involving value of improvements and mesne rents, as to which we make no adjudication.
Reversed and remanded.