Opinion
356171
11-23-2021
GREGORY CUETER and METROPOLITAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PATRICIA VAN OVERBEKE, Defendant-Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED
Macomb Circuit Court LC No. 2019-004365-CZ
Before: Swartzle, P.J., and Cavanagh and Gadola, JJ.Per Curiam.
Plaintiffs Gregory Cueter and Metropolitan Property Management, Inc. (MPM), appeal as of right the trial court's opinion and order dismissing plaintiffs' claims because there were "no pending claims that would entitle Plaintiffs to the requested injunctive relief." Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in dismissing their claim for injunctive relief because that claim was exempted from case evaluation under MCR 2.403(A)(3). We disagree and affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant, Patricia Van Overbeke, has resided at 14750 Mulberry Court, part of the Mill Creek Condominium Association, in Shelby Township, Macomb County, Michigan since 2010. At the time of the events leading to this case, Mill Creek was managed by MPM. Cueter is the owner of MPM.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint on October 28, 2019, claiming defendant had "waged a malice-inspired vendetta against Plaintiffs for over a decade" by publishing "false and derogatory materials about Plaintiffs." Plaintiffs listed several different occasions on which defendant had allegedly defamed them, including an April 17, 2017 letter from defendant to other homeowners stating that plaintiffs had "doubled-dip[ped] on bills" and "overcharged" on monthly fees, a July 20, 2018 letter stating that plaintiffs had bullied homeowners and failed to use licensed contractors for work orders, and an August 14, 2016 letter stating plaintiffs were turning Mill Creek "into a mini Detroit ghetto," and claiming plaintiffs had been sued over 29 times for their poor management. Plaintiffs maintained defendant was liable for defamation (libel per se), defamation by implication (libel per se), and invasion of privacy (false light), and requested injunctive relief. In support of the defamation and defamation by implication claims, plaintiffs argued defendant published "unprivileged, false, and derogatory statements concerning Plaintiffs with actual malice . . . ."
Defendant answered plaintiffs' complaint on November 21, 2019. She denied plaintiffs' allegations and requested the trial court dismiss plaintiffs' complaint. Defendant also argued that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted, plaintiffs were advancing a retaliatory action, and other affirmative defenses.
The trial court issued a discovery and case evaluation order on November 22, 2019, stating that case evaluation would occur after the close of discovery. On February 5, 2020, plaintiffs moved the trial court to exempt their claim for equitable relief (the injunction request) from case evaluation. Plaintiffs referenced MCR 2.403(A)(3), which states that "[a] court may exempt claims seeking equitable relief from case evaluation for good cause shown on motion or by stipulation of the parties if the court finds that case evaluation of such claims would be inappropriate." Plaintiffs argued that good cause existed because their claim for injunctive relief, as a claim in equity, should be exempted from the case evaluation because otherwise the case would be resolved financially and "would not make Plaintiffs whole again."
Defendant answered plaintiffs' motion on February 19, 2020. Defendant cited MCR 2.403(K)(3), which states that a case evaluation "may not include a separate award on any claim for equitable relief, but the panel may consider such claims in determining the amount of an award." Therefore, argued defendant, the case evaluation panel could consider plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief in determining the amount of the award, but could not exempt it from case evaluation. Defendant cited CAM Constr v Lake Edgewood Condo Ass'n, 465 Mich. 549; 640 N.W.2d 256 (2002), which states:
As we have explained, this unambiguous language evidences our desire to avoid bifurcation of civil actions submitted to case evaluation. To the extent that Reddam [v Consumer Mtg Corp, 182 Mich.App. 754; 452 N.W.2d 908 (1990), lv den 437 Mich. 955 (1991), overruled in part CAM Constr, 465 Mich. 549 (2002)] and its progeny have been read to suggest that parties may except claims from case evaluation under the current rule, these cases are overruled. If all parties accept the panel's evaluation, the case is over. [CAM Constr, 465 Mich. at 557.]
Defendant argued that CAM Constr meant the case could not be bifurcated as plaintiffs wished. She also pointed to CAM Constr's statement that, under MCR 2.403(A)(1), "it is the civil action, not the claims within the civil action, that is submitted to case evaluation." Id. at 555 n 6. Defendant maintained there was no good cause for exempting the injunctive relief claim from case evaluation because there would be nothing inappropriate about including it in the case evaluation.
The trial court considered plaintiffs' motion at a hearing on March 2, 2020. The trial court concluded: "The case evaluator[s] may factor in the request for injunctive relief in their deliberations on a monetary award, but are to make no decision or award with respect to that injunctive relief." The trial court "reserve[d] the ability to issue an injunction," and also clarified that the case evaluators were "to only render a monetary award." In an order dated March 5, 2020, the trial court confirmed that "[t]he case evaluators may factor in Plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief as far as their case evaluation [of] monetary award is concerned. However, the Court ultimately reserves the power to decide whether or not to grant the requested injunctive relief."
After case evaluation was completed, the parties accepted, and defendant paid the case evaluation award of $500 to plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs moved the trial court for a permanent injunction. The trial court concluded it was "without jurisdiction in this case to grant a permanent injunction. Even though the order was previously issued, both sides accepted case evaluation. Case evaluation purports to resolve all claims that the parties have (indiscernible). [Plaintiffs'] motion is denied." The trial court explained:
[B]ecause the order did not expressly exempt any of Plaintiff[]s['] "claims" or "causes of action" and all of Plaintiff's "claims" or "causes of action" were submitted to and resolved at case evaluation, there are no remaining "claims" pending before the Court that may justify injunctive relief. Put differently, the parties' mutual acceptance of the case evaluation award resolved all of Plaintiffs' "claims." As such, there are no pending claims that would entitled Plaintiffs to the requested injunctive relief.
This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review whether to grant or deny an injunction under the abuse of discretion standard. Michigan State AFL-CIO v Michigan Secretary of State, 230 Mich.App. 1, 14; 583 N.W.2d 701 (1998). An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court's decision falls "outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes." Saffian v Simmons, 477 Mich. 8, 12; 727 N.W.2d 132 (2007), citing Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich. 372, 388; 719 N.W.2d 809 (2006).
Whether to award equitable relief is reviewed under the de novo standard of review. Cipri v Bellingham Frozen Foods, Inc, 235 Mich.App. 1, 9; 596 N.W.2d 620 (1999). The de novo standard of review requires us to review the legal issues at hand without deferring to the trial court. Washington v Washington, 283 Mich.App. 667, 671; 770 N.W.2d 908 (2009), citing In re Contempt of Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 243 Mich.App. 697, 714 n 33; 624 N.W.2d 443 (2000). The de novo standard of review also applies to our interpretation of both Michigan statutes and the Michigan Rules of Court. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co v Corby Energy Servs, Inc, 271 Mich.App. 480, 483; 722 N.W.2d 906 (2006); Webb v Holzheuer, 259 Mich.App. 389, 391; 674 N.W.2d 395 (2003). In addition, legal questions are reviewed de novo. In re Estate of Moukalled, 269 Mich.App. 708, 713; 714 N.W.2d 400 (2006), citing Roan v Murray, 219 Mich.App. 562, 565; 556 N.W.2d 893 (1996).
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs assert the trial court erred by dismissing the case because of the case evaluation being accepted by the parties, despite the exemption of plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief from the case evaluation under MCR 2.403(A)(3). We disagree.
Injunctive relief, a remedy that enjoins a party from doing something, "issues only when justice requires, there is not adequate remedy at law, and when there is real and imminent danger of irreparable injury." Dafter Twp v Reid, 159 Mich.App. 149, 163; 406 N.W.2d 255 (1987), quoting Wexford Co Prosecutor v Pranger, 83 Mich.App. 197, 205; 268 N.W.2d 344 (1978) (emphasis in original). There are two kinds of injunctions that Michigan courts can grant. A preliminary injunction is "an extraordinary remedy that is sometimes granted before a case is even decided on the merits." Mich Coalition of State Employee Unions v Mich. Civil Serv Comm, 465 Mich. 212, 219; 634 N.W.2d 692 (2001). "Injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that issues only when justice requires, there is no adequate remedy at law, and there exists a real and imminent danger of irreparable injury." Kernen v Homestead Dev Co, 232 Mich.App. 503, 509; 591 N.W.2d 369 (1998), quoting Jeffrey v Clinton Twp, 195 Mich.App. 260, 263-264; 489 N.W. 2d 211 (1992).
MCR 2.403(A)(3) states: "A court may exempt claims seeking equitable relief from case evaluation for good cause shown on motion or by stipulation of the parties if the court finds that case evaluation of such claims would be inappropriate." MCR 2.403(K)(3) states that a case "evaluation may not include a separate award on any claim for equitable relief, but the panel may consider such claims in determining the amount of an award."
Our Supreme Court has expressed the "desire to avoid bifurcation of civil actions submitted to case evaluation." CAM Constr v Lake Edgewood Condo Ass'n, 465 Mich. 549, 557; 640 N.W.2d 256 (2002). "[I]t is the civil action, not the claims within the civil action, that is submitted to case evaluation." Id. at 555 n 6. "To the extent that Reddam[v Consumer Mtg Corp, 182 Mich.App. 754; 452 N.W.2d 908 (1990), overruled in part CAM Constr, 465 Mich. 549 (2002)] and its progeny have been read to suggest that parties may except claims from case evaluation under the current rule, these cases are overruled." CAM Constr, 465 Mich. at 557. Therefore, "[i]f all parties accept the panel's evaluation, the case is over." Id.
There were two stages to the trial court's decision in this case. At the first hearing on March 2, 2020, regarding plaintiffs' request to exempt their request for injunctive relief from case evaluation, the trial court concluded the case evaluators could factor in the request for injunctive relief in determining the monetary award, but could not decide whether an injunction should be issued. This conclusion was in line with MCR 2.403(K)(3), which states that a case evaluation "may not include a separate award on any claim for equitable relief, but the panel may consider such claims in determining the amount of an award." The trial court did not grant plaintiffs' request to exempt the injunctive relief requested from the case evaluation; it merely reserved the power to decide whether to grant plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief. The trial court's ruling was in keeping with the text of the applicable court rules. In fact, rather than exempting plaintiffs' equitable claims from case evaluation, the trial court stated that the panel could consider the equitable claims in fashioning its monetary award, but that only the trial court could award equitable relief. Thus, in its March 5, 2020 order, the trial court expressly permitted the case evaluation panel to consider the request for injunctive relief, while also recognizing that only the court could order injunctive relief. It therefore appears on the face of the order that the trial court did not exempt the equitable claim from case evaluation, but instead allowed the panel to consider it.
Plaintiffs conflate the terms "claims" and "relief" throughout their brief on appeal." 'Claim' is relevantly defined as '[t]he assertion of an existing right; any right to payment or to an equitable remedy, even if contingent or provisional' and 'a demand for money, property, or a legal remedy to which one asserts a right; esp., the part of a complaint in a civil action specifying what relief the plaintiff asks for.'" Bauserman v Unemployment Ins Agency, 503 Mich. 169, 182 n 6; 931 N.W.2d 539 (2019), quoting Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed).
After the parties accepted the case evaluation award, defendant paid the award amount, and the trial court held a second hearing on plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction. This time, the trial court stated it lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested permanent injunction and concluded, because the parties accepted the case evaluation award, all claims had been resolved. In coming to this conclusion, the trial court reiterated that it had not exempted any of plaintiffs' claims from case evaluation.
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction. As the trial court recognized in its January 29, 2021 order, it did not exempt plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief from the case evaluation. It merely reserved the authority to decide whether to grant injunctive relief. The trial court's decision was in line with our Supreme Court's stated "desire to avoid bifurcation of civil actions submitted to case evaluation." CAM Constr, 465 Mich. at 557. Plaintiffs' claim that they detrimentally relied on the trial court's grant of their motion to exempt their request for injunctive relief from the case evaluation lacks merit. Because the trial court did not exempt any claims from the case evaluation, but merely indicated it might rule separately on the request for an injunction, there was no basis for plaintiffs' alleged reliance.
The trial court declined to exercise its discretion under MCR 2.403(A)(3) to exempt the equitable claim from case evaluation, which left the equitable claim for the panel's consideration. Furthermore, in stating that it reserved for itself the right to issue injunctive relief, the trial court merely recognized that MCR 2.403(K)(3) does not allow a case evaluation panel to issue a "separate" award of equitable relief, which only the trial court itself may order. As our Supreme Court has stated, "[i]f all parties accept the panel's evaluation, the case is over." Id. In this case, the trial court permitted the case evaluation panel to consider the equitable claim in fashioning its monetary award, as permitted by the court rules, and the parties accepted the case evaluation award. The case was over at that point. All of plaintiffs' claims were submitted to case evaluation and resolved. As the trial court stated, there was no remaining basis on which to grant a permanent injunction.
The trial court stated at the conclusion of the case that it lacked jurisdiction to award equitable relief, as those claims had been submitted to case evaluation and both parties had accepted the award. Whether the court retained jurisdiction to award equitable relief following case evaluation became a moot point once the trial court declined to exempt the equitable claims from case evaluation and both parties accepted the award, which the trial court properly concluded ended the case, leaving nothing more for the court to resolve.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction. Affirmed. Having prevailed in full, defendant may tax costs.
Cavanagh J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the trial court's opinion and order denying plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction-without consideration of its merits-after concluding that plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief was disposed of by the parties' mutual acceptance of the case evaluation award. I would remand this matter for consideration of the merits of plaintiffs' claim of entitlement to a permanent injunction.
In October 2019, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant claiming entitlement to monetary damages for defamation, defamation by implication, and invasion of privacy because defendant had "waged a malice-inspired vendetta" by making false and disparaging remarks about plaintiffs for over a decade. Plaintiffs also claimed they were entitled to a permanent injunction ordering defendant to remove the defamatory statements and to stop making such statements. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a motion under MCR 2.403(A)(3) to exempt their claim for equitable relief (the permanent injunction) from case evaluation, arguing that a monetary award would be inadequate and would not make plaintiffs whole. Defendant opposed the motion, citing MCR 2.403(K)(3) and arguing that the case evaluation panel could consider the claim for equitable relief in determining any monetary award, but could not include a separate award for that claim. The trial court held that the case evaluation panel could factor the request for injunctive relief into their deliberations on a monetary award, but the court "ultimately reserves the power to decide whether or not to grant the requested injunctive relief." After case evaluation was completed, both parties accepted-and defendant paid-the case evaluation award in favor of plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs then moved in the trial court for a permanent injunction, requesting that defendant be ordered to: remove all published false and defamatory statements she made about plaintiffs on the internet, publish a retraction, and stop making such statements. Defendant opposed the motion, arguing that she did not disseminate false or defamatory statements about plaintiffs on the internet.
The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion, concluding that the mutual acceptance of the case evaluation award resolved all "claims," and thus, the court was without jurisdiction to grant a permanent injunction. The trial court never considered the actual merits of plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief. The court noted that it had made a mistake in deciding plaintiffs' motion to exempt their request for injunctive relief (as opposed to their request for monetary relief) from case evaluation because MCR 2.403(A)(3) did not permit the court to reserve "the power to decide whether or not to grant the requested injunctive relief." The court noted that MCR 2.403(A)(3) only allows for the exemption of "claims seeking equitable relief" but injunctions are equitable remedies, not "claims" or independent causes of actions. Plaintiffs' claims were for defamation, defamation by implication, and invasion of privacy which were all submitted to and resolved by case evaluation. Therefore, no pending "claims" existed which would entitle plaintiffs to injunctive relief. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion was denied and the case was dismissed. That decision is challenged on appeal.
MCR 2.403(A)(1) provides that any civil action seeking primarily money damages may be submitted to case evaluation. However, a court may exempt from case evaluation claims seeking equitable relief for good cause shown if the court finds that case evaluation of such claims would be inappropriate. MCR 2.403(A)(3). In this case, plaintiffs claimed entitlement to monetary damages for defamation, defamation by implication, and invasion of privacy. Consequently, the trial court properly submitted this civil action to case evaluation. However, plaintiffs also claimed entitlement to a permanent injunction and filed a motion to have that claim for equitable relief exempted from the case evaluation under MCR 2.403(A)(3).
As plaintiffs contend, while not the model of clarity, the trial court did grant plaintiffs' motion to exempt their equitable claim for injunctive relief from the case evaluation. At the hearing on the motion, the court held: "The case evaluator may factor in the request for injunctive relief in their deliberations on a monetary award, but are to make no decision or award with respect to that injunctive relief." In other words, the trial court held, "The case evaluator is to only render a monetary award." Then the trial court entered an order which states in its title: "Reserving Court's Decision Regarding Injunctive Relief Prayer Irrespective of Case Evaluation Acceptance." The order specifically provides that the trial court reserved "the power to decide whether or not to grant the requested injunctive relief."
After case evaluation was conducted, plaintiffs and defendant accepted the panel's evaluation. MCR 2.403(M)(1) provides:
If all the parties accept the panel's evaluation, judgment will be entered in accordance with the evaluation, unless the amount of the award is paid within 28 days after notification of the acceptances, in which case the court shall dismiss the action with prejudice. The judgment or dismissal shall be deemed to dispose of all claims in the action and includes all fees, costs, and interest to the date it is entered . . . .
However, MCR 2.403(M)(2) expressly pertains to equitable claims that have been specifically exempted from case evaluation, and states:
If only a part of an action has been submitted to case evaluation pursuant to subrule (A)(3) and all of the parties accept the panel's evaluation, the court shall enter an order disposing of only those claims. [Footnote added.]
MCR 2.403(A)(3) provides: "A court may exempt claims seeking equitable relief from case evaluation for good cause shown on motion or by stipulation of the parties if the court finds that case evaluation of such claims would be inappropriate."
Plaintiffs argue that their equitable claim for injunctive relief-which was exempted from case evaluation-was not "disposed of" by the parties' acceptance of the case evaluation award. Only plaintiffs' claim for monetary damages was "disposed of" with respect to plaintiffs' allegations of defamation, defamation by implication, and invasion of privacy.
In denying plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction the trial court interpreted MCR 2.403(A)(3)-which allows the trial court to "exempt claims seeking equitable relief from case evaluation"-to mean only "causes of action" may be exempted. I do not agree. If that were so, the court rule would have specifically stated that the trial court could "exempt causes of action seeking equitable relief from case evaluation." But it does not; instead, the court rule uses the word "claims." The same principles that govern the interpretation of statutes also govern the interpretation of court rules. In re McCarrick/Lamoreaux, 307 Mich.App. 436, 446; 861 N.W.2d 303 (2014). Our purpose is to effectuate the intent of the Michigan Supreme Court which is discerned by considering the language of the court rule. Id. Generally, every word and phrase of a rule is accorded its plain and ordinary meaning but a word that has acquired a unique or peculiar meaning in the law is construed according to such legal meaning. Id.
As recognized by our Supreme Court in Bauserman v Unemployment Ins Agency, 503 Mich. 169; 931 N.W.2d 539 (2019), the word "claim" has acquired a unique or peculiar meaning at law:
"Claim" is relevantly defined as "[t]he assertion of an existing right; any right to payment or to an equitable remedy, even if contingent or provisional" and "a demand for money, property, or a legal remedy to which one asserts a right; esp., the part of a complaint in a civil action specifying what relief the plaintiff asks for." Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed.). [Id. at 182 n 6.]
A permanent injunction is an equitable remedy recognized at law and when a plaintiff asserts a right or entitlement to a permanent injunction, such assertion is considered a "claim" that may be exempt for purposes of MCR 2.403(A)(3). If that were not so a plaintiff who asserts a right or entitlement to injunctive relief-in addition to monetary damages-would be required to reject the case evaluation award in order to preserve the claim for injunctive relief. Injunctive relief cannot be "awarded" by case evaluators; case evaluators may only consider claims of entitlement to monetary damages. Therefore, such a claim of entitlement to injunctive relief may be exempted from case evaluation under MCR 2.403(A)(3). This conclusion is consistent with MCR 2.403(K)(3), which states that a case evaluation "may not include a separate award on any claim for equitable relief, but the panel may consider such claims in determining the amount of an award."
See Terlecki v Stewart, 278 Mich.App. 644, 663; 754 N.W.2d 899 (2008) ("It is well settled that an injunction is an equitable remedy, not an independent cause of action.").
And I agree with plaintiffs that our Supreme Court's decision in CAM Const v Lake Edgewood Condo Ass'n, 465 Mich. 549; 640 N.W.2d 256 (2002), is factually distinguishable. In that case, one count of the plaintiff's four-count complaint was dismissed by summary disposition. Id. at 551. Subsequently, the case was submitted to case evaluation and both parties accepted the case evaluation award. Id. at 551-552. When the defendant requested an order dismissing the entire case, the plaintiff objected and argued that it had reserved its right to appeal the summary disposition of the one count of its complaint. Id. at 552. Our Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's argument as contrary to the plain language of MCR 2.403(M)(1). The Court noted, "The language of MCR 2.403(M)(1) could not be more clear that accepting a case evaluation means that all claims in the action, even those summarily disposed, are dismissed." Id. at 555. However, that case did not involve MCR 2.403(M)(2) which specifically states: "If only a part of an action has been submitted to case evaluation pursuant to subrule (A)(3)," only those claims actually submitted to case evaluation are disposed of upon acceptance by the parties of the award. A claim of entitlement to injunctive relief that has been specifically exempted from case evaluation by the trial court under MCR 2.403(A)(3) cannot be considered disposed of by the case evaluation.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's holding addressed the problem of a party claiming that certain claims were not actually submitted to case evaluation; here, the trial court specifically exempted from the case evaluation, by court order, plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction. See CAM Const, 465 Mich. at 556-557.
Therefore, I would conclude that the trial court erroneously refused to consider plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction following the parties' acceptance of the case evaluation award. Plaintiffs are entitled to a decision on the merits of their claim of entitlement to a permanent injunction. Accordingly, the matter should be remanded for a decision in that regard.