Summary
holding that "because plaintiff unambiguously agreed to waive the claims asserted in this case [in a general release] and does not raise any legitimate defense, defendant is entitled to summary judgment"
Summary of this case from Valdiviezo v. GreerOpinion
13 CV 3321 (VB)
03-21-2014
DIMAS CUADRADO, Plaintiff, v. CORRECTION OFFICER ZITO, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION :
Pro se plaintiff Dimas Cuadrado brings this Section 1983 action alleging defendant Correction Officer Zito used excessive force against him when plaintiff was an inmate at the George R. Vierno Center on Rikers Island. The incident allegedly occurred on April 30, 2013.
Before the Court is defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Doc. #26). For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed.
On June 20, 2012, plaintiff filed a lawsuit in this Court against the City of New York and a correction officer who allegedly used excessive force against him while he was being held at the Anna M. Kross Center, another Rikers Island jail. (Cuadrado v. Doe, 12 CV 4895 (PAE)) ("Cuadrado I").
On May 14, 2013, plaintiff commenced the instant action. (Doc. #2).
In September 2013, plaintiff agreed to settle Cuadrado I for $850. Plaintiff signed a General Release in which he agreed to "release and discharge the defendants City and Officer Carentz . . . and all past and present officials, employees, representatives, and agents of the City of New York or any entity represented by the Office of the Corporation Counsel . . . from any and all liability, claims, or rights of action alleging a violation of [plaintiff's] civil rights and any and all related state law claims, from the beginning of the world to the date of this General Release." (Doc. #27-4). By letter dated March 14, 2014, plaintiff informed the Court he had received his settlement check. (Doc. #40).
In November 2013, defendant moved for summary judgment, contending the General Release precluded plaintiff from bringing this case. (Doc. #26).
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment Standard
The Court must grant a motion for summary judgment if the pleadings, discovery materials before the Court, and any affidavits show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A fact is material when it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. . . . Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary" are not material and thus cannot preclude summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
A dispute about a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. See id. The Court "is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are any factual issues to be tried." Wilson v. Nw. Mut. Ins. Co., 625 F.3d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). It is the moving party's burden to establish the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Zalaski v. City of Bridgeport Police Dep't, 613 F.3d 336, 340 (2d Cir. 2010).
If the non-moving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case on which he has the burden of proof, then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323. If the non-moving party submits "merely colorable" evidence, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 249-50. The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, and may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation." Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is likewise insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for him. Dawson v. Cnty. of Westchester, 373 F.3d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 2004).
On summary judgment, the Court construes the facts, resolves all ambiguities, and draws all permissible factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., 352 F.3d 775, 780 (2d Cir. 2003). If there is any evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the non-moving party on the issue on which summary judgment is sought, summary judgment is improper. See Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2004).
In contract cases, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if the terms of the contract are unambiguous." Fischer & Mandell, LLP v. Citibank, N.A., 632 F.3d 793, 799 (2d Cir. 2011).
II. Analysis
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment because the General Release unambiguously bars plaintiff from bringing this action.
"[G]eneral releases are governed by principles of contract law." Albany Savings Bank, FSB v. Halpin, 117 F.3d 669, 672 (2d Cir. 1997). This rule applies even in cases involving pro se plaintiffs. Duran v. J.C. Refinishing Contracting Corp., 421 F. App'x 20, 21 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order). Under New York contract law, "[w]here the language of a release is clear, effect must be given to the intent of the parties as indicated by the language employed." Tromp v. City of New York, 465 F. App'x 50, 51 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, "a release is binding on the parties absent a showing of fraud, duress, undue influence, or some other valid legal defense." Davis & Assocs., Inc. v. Health Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Here, plaintiff agreed to release "all past and present officials, employees, representatives, and agents of the City of New York . . . from any and all liability, claims, or rights of action alleging a violation of [his] civil rights and any and all state law claims, from the beginning of the world to the date of this General Release," which was September 18, 2013. (Doc. #27-4 (emphasis added)).
This language is unambiguous. See Tromp, 465 F. App'x at 52 (similarly worded release was "plain and unambiguous"). Correction Officer Zito falls within "all past and present . . . employees . . . of the City of New York"; this action certainly includes "claims . . . alleging a violation of [plaintiff's] civil rights"; and these claims accrued between "the beginning of the world" and September 18, 2013.
Although plaintiff contends he intended to release only his claims in Cuadrado I, not his claims in this case, "[w]ith unambiguous contracts, a party's subjective intent and understanding of the terms is irrelevant." HOP Energy, L.L.C. v. Local 553 Pension Fund, 678 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2012). And plaintiff does not allege "fraud, duress, undue influence, or some other valid legal defense." Davis & Assocs., Inc. v. Health Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d at 113.
Accordingly, because plaintiff unambiguously agreed to waive the claims asserted in this case and does not raise any legitimate defense, defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. #26) is GRANTED.
The Clerk is instructed to terminate the motion and close this case.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). Dated: March 21, 2014
White Plains, NY
SO ORDERED:
/s/_________
Vincent L. Briccetti
United States District Judge