Opinion
DBDCV196030681S
01-07-2020
Marta Cruz v. Catherine Ceponis
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): D’Andrea, Robert A., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
D’ANDREA, Robert A., J.
The defendant, Catherine Ceponis ("defendant") filed a motion to strike the second and third counts of the plaintiff Marta Cruz’s ("plaintiff") complaint dated March 21, 2019. The second count alleges common-law recklessness, and the third count which alleges statutory recklessness, both of which the defendant contends are legally insufficient. According to the plaintiff, this action involves a motor vehicle accident that occurred at approximately 5:37 p.m. August 26, 2018, on Lake Avenue in Danbury, Connecticut. The plaintiff claims she was injured when the vehicle operated by the defendant suddenly and without warning collided with the motor vehicle operated by her, thereby causing her to suffer the injuries and losses. As to the second and third counts, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant had consumed intoxicating liquor prior to the accident. The second count alleges specific acts of reckless, willful and/or wanton misconduct by the defendant, and that the defendant operated the motor vehicle in a reckless manner, in violation of § 14-222(a) of the General Statutes, in that she knowingly drove while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The third count alleges that the collision was caused by the reckless disregard for the safety of others in violation of General Statute § 14-295. The third count further alleging that the defendant violated § § 14-218a, 14-227a(a)(1), 14-227a(a)(2), and/or 14-222(a), and that the violations were a substantial factor in causing the injuries and losses suffered by the plaintiff. The court has reviewed the plaintiff’s complaint dated March 21, 2019, the defendant’s motion to strike dated May 20, 2019 with supporting memorandum of law, and the plaintiff’s objection to motion to strike dated June 5, 2019 with supporting memorandum of law.
DEFENDANT’S POSITION
In the second count, the plaintiff has essentially re-alleged her first count, simply adding an additional allegation, that she operated the motor vehicle in a reckless manner, in violation of General Statute § 14-222(a) in that she knowingly drove under the influence of intoxicating liquor at a high rate of speed so that she could not control the vehicle. The allegations in this Count do not rise to the level of recklessness, which is defined as follows: "Recklessness is a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one’s acts ... It is more than negligence, more than gross negligence ... The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them ... Wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct ... It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted, ellipsis in original.) Frillici v. Westport, 264 Conn. 266, 277, 823 A.2d 1172 (2003) (quoting Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 342-43, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003)). In order to plead recklessness a plaintiff must allege, "an extreme departure from ordinary care." (Internal citation omitted.) Angiolillo v. Buckmiller, 102 Conn.App. 697, 705, 927 A.2d 312, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 927, 934 A.2d 243 (2007). Language indicating that defendant made, "a conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Begley v. Kohl & Madden Printing Ink Co., 157 Conn. 445, 450-51, 254 A.2d 907 (1969) (quoting Restatement, 2 Torts, § 500, comment g; Rogers v. Doody, 119 Conn. 532, 535, 178 A. 51 (1935)).
The plaintiff fails to plead facts supporting a claim of recklessness. The key paragraph in the recklessness count recapitulates the negligence paragraph, in the first count, adding only a new subparagraph in an effort to satisfy the claim of recklessness. Recall that there is a "wide difference" between these levels of culpability, and further that recklessness is "more than negligence, more than gross negligence." Furthermore, "A plaintiff cannot transform a negligence count into a count for willful and wanton misconduct merely by appending a string of adjectives to allegations that clearly sound in negligence." Brown v. Town of Branford, 12 Conn.App. 106, 110, 529 A.2d 743 (1987). Another important consideration is that "The mere allegation of recklessness in a complaint without specific factual allegations sufficient to support the claim can spawn unnecessary legal and economic consequences." Kotowski v. Lambert, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV08-5006434-5 (July 23, 2008, Gilligan, J.). In order to ensure that these results occur only in the face of serious allegations, a plaintiff must plead particularized facts that when taken as true would show that the defendant was reckless. Id. That he made, "a conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Begley at 450-51.
In the third count, the plaintiff re-alleges three of the negligence allegations contained in the first count simply replacing the term negligence with the phrase reckless disregard for the safety of others in violation of § 14-295. The plaintiff does add an additional allegation by alleging that the defendant operated the motor vehicle in a reckless manner, in violation of § 14-222(a), in that she not only drove at a high rate of speed so that she could not control her car. The plaintiff’s recklessness claims essentially invokes § 14-295. As a result, one Superior Court has observed: Currently there is a split of authority at the trial court level regarding the requirements to sufficiently plead statutory recklessness. The majority view maintains that a plaintiff, in addition to pleading facts constituting negligence, need only make the general allegations mentioned in § 14-295 that the defendant has deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one of the enumerated statutes, and that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries ... Conversely, a minority of the trial courts have held that a plaintiff is required to plead specific factual allegations that rise above and beyond the facts that need to be pleaded in a negligence case; that such plaintiffs must set out the conduct that is claimed to be reckless in their Complaint, so as to satisfy both the language of § 14-295, as well as the common-law recklessness requirements. (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Defendant subscribes to the minority view, and notes that plaintiff never described the actions that give rise to charges of recklessness. Running afoul of the motor vehicle code is not necessarily reckless. This level of culpability requires an affirmative choice in the face of certain risks, which are either perceived by the tortfeasor or patent. According to the Supreme Court recklessness is, "a conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man." [Internal quotation marks omitted.] Begley at 450-51.
In the case of Martin v. LaQuerue, the complaint relied on § § 14-218a and 14-222, and the court held, "Because neither of the alleged statutory violations claimed by the plaintiff to support his § 14-295 claim is sufficiently stated, the defendant’s motion to strike the fifth count must be granted." Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV13-6017265-3 (December 18, 2013, Cole-Chu, J.). This reasoning is not specific to § § 14-218a and 14-222, but rather applies to statutes which, "prohibit a range of conduct or provide exceptions." Jacobs v. Kripps, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV14-6047281-3 (February 27, 2015, Nazzaro, J.). See also Pulawska v. Kanter, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport (August 5, 2014, Kamp, J.) (granting a motion to strike because, "The allegations that the defendants violated § 14-230 and § 14-222, and the other statutory violations cited by the plaintiff do not adequately inform the defendants as to the conduct alleged"). A nondescript breach of § 14-222 does not meet the pleading standard of recklessness. Therefore, given that the third count fails to provide sufficient facts to support a claim for statutory recklessness it should be stricken.
Accordingly, and as set forth above, counts two and three of the plaintiff’s complaint fail to provide facts sufficient to support allegations of recklessness under either the common law or statutory law. As such, both counts and the associated claims for punitive and exemplary damages, as well as double or treble damages, should be stricken by this Court.
PLAINTIFF’S POSITION
"In reading the complaint, [Connecticut courts] follow the modern trend, which is to construe pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically ... As long as the pleadings provide sufficient notice of the facts claimed and the issues to be tried and do not surprise or prejudice the opposing party, we will not conclude that the complaint is insufficient ..." Edwards v. Tardif, 240 Conn. 610, 620, 692 A.2d 1266 (1997) (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) The Practice Book states that "[e]ach pleading shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies, but not of the evidence by which they are to be proved ..." Practice Book § 10-1. It further requires that the complaint "contain a concise statement of the facts constituting the cause of action ..." Practice Book § 10-20. The defendant is mired in the fact that the allegations of negligence found in the first count employ similar, though not identical, language as the second and third counts, but this argument is unfounded. Under Practice Book § 10-25, "the plaintiff may claim alternative relief, based upon an alternative construction of the cause of action." Connecticut Practice Book § 10-25. The Supreme Court has previously determined that any similarities between a count sounding in negligence and a count sounding in recklessness are irrelevant. See Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 343, 813 A.2d 1103 (2003) (overturned by statute on other grounds). The Supreme Court held that, "a complaint is not deficient so long as it utilizes language explicit enough to inform the court and opposing counsel that both negligence and reckless misconduct are being asserted." Id. at 343. The Supreme Court has described recklessness generally, stating: "Recklessness is a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one’s acts. It is more than negligence, more than gross negligence ... The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them ... Wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct. It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action ..." Frillici at 277.
The Supreme Court has held that "[w]hether the defendant’s conduct constituted heedless and reckless disregard of the plaintiffs’ rights [is] a question of fact." Id. at 277. It is clear that in making a claim for recklessness, the plaintiff must allege specific facts and must do so by using language which explicitly indicates that the plaintiff is making a claim for recklessness. First, the plaintiff is making a claim for recklessness in the titles of the counts, second count "Common Law Recklessness" and third "Statutory Recklessness." The second and third counts are not simply a recitation of the first count, but provide additional factual pleadings which specifically support claims for common-law and statutory recklessness. The plaintiff further alleges that, prior to the accident, the defendant consumed intoxicating liquor. The second count then continues by outlining the reckless conduct that the defendant engaged in, including the allegation that she was knowingly intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle. The third count identifies that the defendant was in violation of § § 14-218a, 14-227a(a)(1), 14-227a(a)(2), and/or 14-222(a), and that these violations were a substantial factor in causing the injuries and losses sustained by the plaintiff. As pled, the facts allege that the defendant was intoxicated while operating her motor vehicle, and that she was driving at a rate of speed that was faster than what was reasonable. These demonstrate that the defendant consciously chose to engage in a course of action with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable person. If proven, these actions demonstrate that the defendant willfully undertook a high-risk behavior without regard to the consequences or safety of others. Courts have consistently found that similar claims of intoxicated driving were sufficient to support a claim for recklessness under both the common law and General Statutes § 14-295. See Suneja v. Sung, No. FBT-CV 16-6060241-S, 2017 Conn.Super. LEXIS 177 at *3 (January 31, 2017, Krumeich, J.) ("[t]he complaint in this case satisfactorily described reckless conduct, driving at an excessive rate of speed while intoxicated, that would demonstrate intentional, willful or reckless indifference to the safety of others."); DeLorenzo v. Framularo, No. FBT-CV 14-6044051-S, 2015 Conn.Super. LEXIS 2183 at *3 (August 18, 2015, Arnold, J.) ("[a]ccordingly, an allegation that the defendant was operating his motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of § 14-227a(a) is sufficient to reasonably infer recklessness from that type of conduct") The plaintiff clearly raises claims for both negligence and recklessness in three individual counts. The complaint properly separates the recklessness and negligence claims into separate counts by using clear and distinct language which is more than sufficient to inform the defendant and the court of what type of misconduct is being alleged.
The third count properly alleges a claim for Recklessness pursuant to § 14-295. There is a split between judges of the Superior Court of Connecticut as to its proper pleading requirements.
The majority position does not require "the plaintiff to plead with specificity, but require[s] that the plaintiff enumerate the specific statutes that it relies upon." Donner v. Aldrich, No. FST-CV09-6001139-S, 2010 Conn.Super. LEXIS 896 at *7 (April 13, 2010, Brazzel-Massaro, J.). "The minority viewpoint, in contrast, is that a plaintiff must supply the court with specific factual allegations of reckless conduct above and beyond facts constituting mere negligence." Rogers v. Dellop, No. CV 12-6032092-S, 2013 Conn.Super. LEXIS 1043, at *4 (May 7, 2013, Sommers, J.).
As a result of the uncertainty created by the split in judicial opinion, the third count realleged the common-law recklessness claim, but then limits the alleged misconduct only to the conduct prohibited by General Statutes § § 14-218a, 14-227a(a)(1), 14-227a(a)(2), and 14-222(a). This pleading format specifically pleads common-law recklessness (as required by the minority view) and specifically pleads the statutes the plaintiff is relying on to bring his claim under § 14-295 (as required by the majority view). Both counts properly allege common-law recklessness and therefore this analysis is unnecessary. However, if the Court finds that the plaintiff has not properly alleged common-law recklessness, this court should find that the plaintiff has properly raised the statutory recklessness under § 14-295. The majority view best aligns with the clear and unambiguous language of the statute, which states: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property ..." § 14-295. When "the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, [the courts] will not look beyond the words themselves ..." Szczapa v. United Pacel Service, Inc., 56 Conn.App. 325, 329, 743 A.2d 622 (2000). The statute lays out exacting pleading requirements. Under those pleading requirements, the legislature chose not to require the plaintiff to allege common-law recklessness in addition to the specific statutes outlined in § 14-295.
The plaintiff must still prove that the defendant was reckless. Even if the plaintiff does carry her burden, the finder of fact may still exercise their discretion and not award the additional damages. Therefore, because the plain language of the statute is unambiguous and the pleading requirements do not introduce any element of surprise or unfairness, the court should follow the majority view of the pleading requirements under § 14-295. The second and third counts of the complaint allege facts which clearly demonstrate that the defendant engaged in reckless conduct as described by the common law. Further, the third count properly raises a claim for statutory recklessness under § 14-295. As such, the second and third counts are legally sufficient to survive a motion to strike, and the plaintiff is entitled to seek double or treble damages under General Statutes § 14-295. The plaintiff respectfully requests that the court sustain her objection to the defendant’s motion to strike.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ... the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ... to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).
"[A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court ... [The court] construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency ... Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied ... Moreover, [the court notes] that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged ... It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant’s motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted ... Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coppola Construction Co. v. Hoffman Enterprises Ltd. Partnership, 309 Conn. 342, 350, 71 A.3d 480 (2013). "If any facts provable under the express and implied allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint support a cause of action ... the complaint is not vulnerable to a motion to strike." Bouchard v. People’s Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991). On the other hand, "[a] motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).
"[T]here is no specific appellate guidance regarding how to plead a claim [of recklessness] under § 14-295, and a Superior Court split exists on this issue. The split has often been described as falling into two groups." Martin v. LaQuerrre, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-13-6017265-S (December 18, 2013, Cole-Chu, J.). The majority view holds that a claim for statutory recklessness is legally sufficient so long as it alleges the language of General Statutes § 14-295, to wit, that the defendant deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one of the specific statutes enumerated within § 14-295, and further asserts that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries. Martin v. LaQuerrre, supra . The majority view is based upon the notion that § 14-295 establishes a standard for recklessness by listing, within it, specific statutory violations that, if committed, rise to recklessness. See Hand v. Moore, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV-05-2BJ-4003873-S (September 26, 2005, Jennings, J.) (40 Conn.L.Rptr. 83); Estate of Chung v. Place Motors, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV560074-S (February 11, 2003, Hurley, J.T.R.) (34 Conn.L.Rptr. 140).
In contrast, the minority view requires the plaintiff to plead specific factual allegations above and beyond the facts that were pleaded in the negligence count. Colon v. SNET, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-01-0385673-S (May 22, 2002, Gallagher, J.); see Hopwood v. Sciarretta, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV-01-0075934-S (July 11, 2002, Lager, J.) (32 Conn.L.Rptr. 474). "The reasoning of the minority view is that there is a wide difference between negligence and a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, and a complaint should employ language explicit enough to clearly inform the court and opposing counsel that reckless misconduct is relied on." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Martin v. LaQuerrre, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-13-6017265-S. This court finds the majority view more persuasive.
In Switek v. Fournier, 1 Conn. Ops. 839 (July 31, 1995), the Honorable Walter M Pickett, Jr., in denying a similar motion to strike by held that a plaintiff claiming double or treble damages for injuries arising out of the reckless operation of a motor vehicle need only allege a statutory violation as set forth in General Statutes § 14-295 and need not plead facts that would support a claim for common-law reckless conduct. All that is clearly required under § 14-295 is that if the plaintiff pleads that another party has operated a motor vehicle deliberately or with reckless disregard in violation of certain statutory sections, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages. The statute does not require the same specifications of pleading as under common law which is required to support a cause of action predicted on recklessness. The Supreme Court in Frillici held that, "a complaint is not deficient so long as it utilizes language explicit enough to inform the court and opposing counsel that both negligence and reckless misconduct are being asserted." Id. at 343. The Supreme Court has described recklessness generally, stating: "Recklessness is a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one’s acts. It is more than negligence, more than gross negligence ... The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them ... Wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct. It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action ..." Frillici at 277.
Courts have consistently found that similar claims of intoxicated driving were sufficient to support a claim for recklessness under both the common law and General Statutes § 14-295. First, a review of the allegations plead by the plaintiff is necessary for a complete analysis of the second and third counts. As to the second count (Common-Law Recklessness), in paragraph 4, the plaintiff alleges that "At some time prior to 5:37pm on August 26, 2018, the defendant, Catherine Ceponis, consumed intoxicating liquor," and in paragraph 5 alleges that "The collision was caused by the reckless, willful and/or wanton misconduct of the defendant in one or more of the following ways: ... g) she operated at a rate of speed greater than reasonable, having due regard to the width, traffic, and use of the highway ... in violation of § 14-218a of the Connecticut General Statutes; h) she followed the motor vehicle operated by the plaintiff ... more closely than was reasonable given the circumstances in violation of § 14-240a of the Connecticut General Statutes; i) she operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, in violation of § 14-227a(a)(1) of the Connecticut General Statutes; j) she operated the vehicle with an elevated blood alcohol level in violation of § 14-227a(a)(1) of the Connecticut General Statutes; k) she operated the motor vehicle in a reckless manner, in violation of § 14-222(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes, in that she knowingly drove while under the influence of intoxicating liquors at a high rate of speed so that she could not control the vehicle," and in paragraph 6 she ‘alleges that "As a result of the reckless, willful and wanton misconduct of the defendant ... the plaintiff ... suffered the following injuries ..."
As to the third count (Statutory Recklessness), in paragraph 4, the plaintiff alleges that "At some time prior to 5:37 p.m. on August 26, 2018, the defendant, Catherine Ceponis, consumed intoxicating liquor," and in paragraph 5 alleges that "The collision was caused by the reckless disregard of the safety of others in violation of § 14-295 of the Connecticut General Statutes by the defendant ... in one or more of the following ways: a) she operated at a rate of speed greater than reasonable, having due regard to the width, traffic, and use of the highway ... in violation of § 14-218a of the Connecticut General Statutes; b) she operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, in violation of § 14-227a(a)(1) of the Connecticut General Statutes; c) she operated the motor vehicle with an elevated blood alcohol level in violation of § 14-227a(a)(1) of the Connecticut General Statutes; d) she operated the motor vehicle in a reckless manner, in violation of § 14-222(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes, in that she knowingly drove at a high rate of speed so that she could not control her car"; and in paragraph 7 she alleges that "As a result of the reckless disregard for the safety of others in violation of § 14-295 of the Connecticut General Statutes by the defendant ... the plaintiff suffered the following injuries ..."
A similar set of allegations is found in the case of Andrade v. Tradition Golf Club at Wallingford, LLC. In Andrade, the defendant moved to strike the common-law recklessness count claiming that the plaintiff’s allegations that the defendant operated a vehicle under the influence of alcohol and at a high rate of speed did not satisfy the pleading requirements for common-law recklessness. The plaintiff, however, alleged that the defendant acted knowingly, deliberately, and with reckless disregard for the consequences of his actions when he operated the vehicle at a greater rate of speed than the circumstances warranted; he turned the vehicle unreasonably sharply under the circumstances; and that he operated the vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquors. All of which created a sufficient claim for common-law recklessness. The court stated that "[T]aken as a whole, the allegations ... set forth sufficient facts to infer that the actions of defendant involved an extreme departure from ordinary care, and therefore constitute a claim for common-law recklessness." Id. at 2.* The allegations in this case, when examined in the light of Andrade, are more than sufficient to constitute a valid claim for common-law recklessness.
The Andrade then examined the next count for statutory recklessness. In addition to the allegations stated in the common-law recklessness count, the plaintiff further alleged "that the defendant, "deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in one or more of the following ways: (a) [h]e operated his vehicle at a greater rate of speed than the circumstances warranted in violation of C.G.S. § 14-218a; (b) [h]e operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquors in violation of C.G.S. § 14-227a; and (c) [h]e operated a motor vehicle recklessly or with reckless disregard to the width and conditions of the roadway in violation of C.G.S. § 14-222." The plaintiff further states that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the physical injuries that he suffered. Andrade at 4.* The court made short work of the defendant’s motion to strike stating "[A]lthough these allegations do not verbatim track the language of the enumerated statutes, read broadly, they are legally sufficient under the majority view and the continuing view of this court." Id. at 4.*
In DeLorenzo v. Framularo, the court dealt with another similar set of allegations, and the court provided a detailed analysis of just what constitutes recklessness in a Common-Law Recklessness claim. "[R]ecklessness requires a conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man, and the actor must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater ... than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent ... More recently, we have described recklessness as a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one’s acts ... It is more than negligence, more than gross negligence ... The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them ... Wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct ... It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action. The result is that [wilful], wanton, or reckless conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent ... It is at least clear ... that such aggravated negligence must be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simply inattention ..." (Internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted.). Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, 317 Conn. 357, 382-83 (2015). DeLorenzo at 3.*
In DeLorenzo, the plaintiff claimed that the injuries suffered were caused by the decedent’s reckless conduct in that: he violated § 14-218a(a) in operating his automobile at a rate of speed than is reasonable having regard to the width, traffic and use of the roadway; and b. he violated § 14-227a(a) of the General Statutes in operating his automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. The court stated: "[T]he state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them. Mooney v. Wabrek, 129 Conn. 302, 308, 27 A.2d 631 (1942). Wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct. Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 107 Conn. 197, 199, 139 A. 698 (1928). ‘It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action.’ Craig v. Driscoll, 64 Conn.App. 699, 728, 781 A.2d 440 (2001). This court finds it persuasive that our state’s public policy, as manifested in numerous relevant civil and criminal statutes, reflect a continuing concern over the consumption of alcohol by those who then operate a motor vehicle. [W]e are mindful of the horrors that result from drinking and driving, horrors to which we unfortunately have grown more accustomed ... Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 337, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003). *5. Accordingly, an allegation that the defendant was operating his motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of § 14-227a(a) is sufficient to reasonably infer recklessness from that type of conduct. ‘[A] complaint is not deficient so long as it utilizes language explicit enough to inform the court and opposing counsel that both negligence and reckless misconduct are being asserted.’ Id., at 343-44. The plaintiffs’ complaint adequately alleges conduct that constitutes an extreme departure from ordinary care in a situation that involves a high degree of danger." Id. at *4-5.
Finally, as to the Statutory Recklessness count, the plaintiff pleaded that the defendant/decedent was operating a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 14-218a and § 14-227a, and that these statutory violations and the decedent’s reckless conduct were substantial factors in causing the plaintiff’s injuries. The court states that "[T]his court continues to adopt the position that all that is required under General Statutes § 14-295 is that the plaintiff pleads another party has operated a motor vehicle deliberately or with a reckless disregard in violation of certain statutory sections. Sections 14-218a and § 14-227a are among those enumerated statutory violations set forth in General Statutes § 14-295. A violation of § 14-295, if proven, allows the award of double or treble damages." Id. at 3.*
Finally, in Suneja v. Sung, the author of the opinion, Krumeich, J. is a subscriber to the minority position as it applies to recklessness, unlike this court. The defendants had moved to strike the two Counts on the ground that plaintiff has failed to allege conduct that would satisfy the pleading requirements under both common-law recklessness, and statutory recklessness under § 14-295. The court denied the motion to strike both counts reasoning that "[t]he ‘minority view, ’ is based on the necessity of fact-pleading under our rules P.B. 10-1 and holds ‘the plaintiff must plead particularized facts that when taken as true would show that the defendant acted with reckless disregard. The facts must show that the defendant consciously chose a course of action despite the fact that the defendant did know, or reasonably should have known, that the action posed serious danger to others.’ Reddick, 2016 WL 3266120 *3 (citations omitted). *2. In my opinion the ‘minority review’ is most consistent with the plain language of Section 14-295 and its legislative history; the fact-pleading rule under Practice Book § 10-1 should apply to pleading statutory and common-law recklessness. The complaint in this case satisfactorily described reckless conduct, driving at an excessive rate of speed while intoxicated, that would demonstrate intentional, willful or reckless indifference to the safety of others. Jack, 4 Conn.App. at 455. Compare State v. Miller, 122 Conn.App. 631, 635 (2010); State v. Sandra Q., 51 Conn.App. 463, 467-68 (1999) (’[w]hile speed alone may be insufficient to warrant a conviction for reckless driving, it may be taken into consideration to show a reckless disregard of consequences’). See generally, Bishop v. Kelly, 206 Conn. 608, 614-15 (1988)." 2-3.* The court denied the motion to strike both counts.
CONCLUSION
This court is persuaded, based on the case law above and legal reasoning contained therein, that the plaintiff has alleged both a common-law recklessness claim in the second count, and statutory recklessness claim in the third count, which are legally sufficient. Therefore, based on the analysis above, the defendant’s motion to strike the second and third counts of the plaintiff’s complaint dated March 21, 2019 is DENIED, and the objection to the motion to strike is SUSTAINED.