Opinion
No. 08-21-00191-CV
02-09-2023
Robert CROYSDILL, Appellant, v. OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
Robert Croysdill, Pro Se. Shelly W. Rivas, El Paso, for Appellee.
Robert Croysdill, Pro Se.
Shelly W. Rivas, El Paso, for Appellee.
Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.
OPINION
YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Chief Justice
BACKGROUND
This is a workers’ compensation case in which Appellant, Robert Croysdill, was injured while on-the-job. Croysdill appeals a summary judgment and a plea to the jurisdiction granted in favor of Old Republic Insurance Company, and asserts the trial court erred in striking a witness as an expert and in not applying the affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
In October 1997, Croysdill suffered an on-the-job back injury while unloading a water heater from a trailer. At the time of his injury, his employer provided employee workers’ compensation insurance through Old Republic Insurance Company (the Carrier). Disputes arose between Croysdill and the Carrier regarding the scope of his injury and the benefits he was entitled to. The parties attempted to resolve the issues through a benefit review conference, but to no avail. The Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission (the Commission then scheduled a benefit contested case hearing to resolve the remaining issues.
At the hearing, the disputed, unresolved issue was the determination of Croysdill's impairment rating. The benefit review officer recommended Croysdill's impairment rating as nine percent, as assigned by the Commission's appointed and designated physician, Dr. Teresa Rousseau; the Carrier agreed with this impairment rating. Croysdill, however, opted for an impairment rating of twenty-one percent, as assigned by his treating physician, Dr. William Leff. The unresolved issue went before the Commission Hearing Division. The administrative decision adopted the impairment rating of nine percent and decided Croysdill was entitled to impairment income benefits, to be paid in lump sum. Croysdill appealed, and the Commission Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of a nine percent impairment rating. First Lawsuit
Croysdill challenged the impairment rating in Cause No. 2000-3708, filed in the 34th District Court of El Paso County, Texas (the first lawsuit). In 2003, the parties settled the dispute and entered into a "Release of All Claims and Indemnity Agreement" (the Release) in which Dr. Leff's twenty-one percent impairment rating was adopted. Paragraph five of the Release specifically provides:
The Parties do further agree that the 21% impairment rating as diagnosed by Dr. William Leff as resulting from the injury of October 14, 1997 is the impairment rating attributable to the work-related injury of October 14, 1997 and that such impairment rating was made after Robert Croysdill reached maximum medical improvement. The Parties further agree this Release of All Claims and Indemnity Agreement does not limit or terminate Robert Croysdill's right to medical benefits as provided by Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 408.021 (Vernon 1996).
Under the terms of the Release, Croysdill received a lump sum payment of $18,877.98 in compensation benefits. The first lawsuit was then dismissed with prejudice.
2009 MRI
In 2009, twelve years following his work-related injury, Croysdill underwent an MRI upon referral by Dr. Anthony F. Valdez. The 2009 MRI showed eleven new diagnoses: lumbar disc displacement; chronic lumbar radiculitis, chronic sciatica ; Grade 1 spondylolisthesis at LS; bilateral S1 nerve root irritation; anterior disc herniation at LS-S1; a small broad base disc bulge in combination with facet arthropathy contributing to moderate bilateral neural foraminal stenosis at L5-S1; disc desiccation with loss of disc height present at L4-5; a 2mm anterolisthesis of L4 with respect to L5 in combination with sclerotic changes to the pars interarticularis bilaterally; and facet arthropathy in combination with a broad based disc bulge contributing to moderate to severe bilateral neutral foraminal stenosis at L4-5.
In 2011, the Carrier disputed whether Croysdill's ongoing medical treatment and medication was causally related to the 1997 compensable injury by filing a "Notice of Disputed Issue(s) and Refusal to Pay Benefits." In 2012, the Texas Department of Insurance Division of Workers’ Compensation (DWC) conducted a contested case hearing to resolve the following question:
Does the compensable injury sustained on October 14, 1997 extend to and include lumbar disc displacement, chronic lumbar radiculitis, chronic sciatica, Grade I spondylolisthesis at L5, bilateral S1 nerve root irritation, anterior disc herniation at L5-S1, a small broad based disc bulge in combination with facet arthropathy contributing to moderate bilateral neural foraminal stenosis at L5-S1, disc desiccation with loss of disc height present at L4-5, a 2mm anterolisthesis of L4 with respect to L5 in combination with sclerotic changes to the pars interarticularis bilaterally, facet arthropathy in combination with a broad based disc bulge contributing to moderate to severe bilateral neural foraminal stenosis at L4-5?
During the hearing, Dr. Leff testified he last treated Croysdill around 2003 and diagnosed him with lumbar disc syndrome, chronic radiculitis, chronic sciatica, and L5 spondylolisthesis. Dr. Leff did not render an opinion as to whether the claimed diagnoses from the 2009 MRI resulted from the 1997 compensable injury. However, his written Subjective Objective Assessment Plan and Prognosis (SOAP) notes were made part of the record and reflect he diagnosed Croysdill with lumbar disc syndrome, chronic radiculitis, chronic sciatica, and L5 spondylolisthesis in 1998.
Dr. Mark A. Doyne, an orthopedic surgeon, testified on behalf of the Carrier. Dr. Doyne testified the 1997 compensable injury was not a producing cause of the 2009 diagnoses. In Dr. Doyne's opinion, the 2009 diagnoses were more likely a result of preexisting degenerative disk disease. The hearing officer found the 1997 compensable injury did not extend to or include the 2009 diagnoses. Croysdill appealed and the Appeals Panel affirmed the hearing officer's finding, making the decision final.
Second Lawsuit
Croysdill then filed suit for judicial review of the hearing officer's decision in the 34th District Court of El Paso County, Texas (the second lawsuit). His pleadings included a common law breach of contract claim—specifically, breach of the Release. Croysdill argued the Release foreclosed the Carrier's ability to contest whether the 2009 diagnoses extended from the 1997 injury. In response, the Carrier filed a motion for summary judgment alleging the hearing officer's decision was supported by substantial evidence and Croysdill failed to offer expert testimony to prove the disputed diagnoses were caused by the 1997 compensable injury. Croysdill responded to the Carrier's motion and moved for summary judgment on his judicial review and common law claims. The Carrier did not move for summary judgment on Croysdill's common law claims, but at the summary judgment hearing, it argued the claims were not viable because the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) provides the exclusive remedy. The trial court ultimately granted the Carrier's motion for summary judgment in its entirety, affirmed the decision of the DWC, and denied Croysdill's motion for summary judgment. Croysdill appealed.
2016 Appeal before the Eighth Court of Appeals
On appeal, Croysdill alleged six issues for review. Croysdill v. Old Republic Ins. Co. , 490 S.W.3d 287, 292 n.4 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.). As a threshold matter, this Court held that contrary to the Carrier's contention, Croysdill did not have the burden to prove the DWC decision was not supported by substantial evidence; rather, it held Croysdill had the burden to produce more than a scintilla of evidence to support each element of his claims—i.e., modified de novo review standard. Id. at 293. Under this standard, this Court found a fact issue existed to preclude the granting of summary judgment as to the diagnosis of chronic lumbar radiculitis. Id. at 295.
Due to overlap, this Court grouped the issues where it deemed necessary and addressed them out of order.
Croysdill challenged the granting of summary judgment in favor of the Carrier on the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Id. More specifically, Croysdill argued the Carrier's extent of injury dispute was barred by the parties’ agreement that the Release would not terminate or limit Croysdill's right to medical benefits as provided by the Texas Labor Code. Id. This Court held the trial court did not err by denying Croysdill's motion for summary judgment on the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Id.
Lastly, Croysdill claimed the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Carrier on his breach of the Release claim, to which the Carrier responded the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 296. This Court concluded the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the breach of the Release claim. Id.
In sum, this Court reversed and remanded the portion of the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the Carrier on the judicial review claim to the extent it granted summary judgment on whether the 1997 compensable injury extended to and included chronic lumbar radiculitis, and on the breach of the Release claim. Id. at 296-97. It overruled the remaining issues. Id. at 297.
On Remand
On remand, Croysdill amended his pleadings to add numerous causes of action—some sounding in tort (fraud, fraudulent inducement, and tortious interference), some alleging violations of statutory duties (under the Texas Insurance Code, the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the Texas Labor Code, and the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code), and another sounding in criminal liability (theft of services).
The statutes Croysdill specifically asserts under the Texas Insurance Code are in chapter 541—Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices—and are as follows: § 541.001 (Purpose), § 541.061 (Misrepresentation of Insurance Policy), § 541.151 (Private Action for Damages Authorized), § 541.152 (Damages, Attorney's Fees, and Other Relief). TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 541.001, 541.061, 541.151, 541.152. As for the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, which is chapter 17 of the code, Croysdill specifically asserts: § 17.50(b)(4) (Relief for Consumers). TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(4). As for the Texas Labor Code, Croysdill specifically alleges: § 408.006 (Mental Trauma Injuries), which is in chapter 408—Workers’ Compensation Benefits. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.006. The statutes Croysdill asserts as to the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code are as follows: § 41.001–41.014, which are found in chapter 41—Damages. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 41.001 – 41.014.
The Carrier filed a plea to the jurisdiction and renewed motion for summary judgment. In its plea to the jurisdiction, the Carrier challenged Croysdill's newly pleaded causes of action. As to its renewed motion for summary judgment, the Carrier argued because this Court previously held that carriers are not precluded from disputing extent of injury after an impairment rating finding, it was within its statutory right to dispute extent of injury. The Carrier also claimed Croysdill failed to establish that chronic lumbar radiculitis was causally related to the 1997 injury.
The trial court granted the Carrier's motion for summary judgment in part. It granted the motion on Croysdill's breach of the Release claim, and it denied the motion as to Croysdill's judicial review of the hearing officer's 2012 final order. The trial court further ordered that the only remaining justiciable issue for consideration was whether the 1997 injury extended to and caused Croysdill chronic lumbar radiculitis. The trial court also granted the plea to the jurisdiction in favor of the Carrier, holding it lacked jurisdiction over Croysdill's newly asserted claims alleging fraud, fraudulent inducement, Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) and Texas Insurance Code violations, and theft of services; it thereby dismissed the claims.
Bench Trial
A bench trial was held in April of 2021. The only issue before the trial court was whether chronic lumbar radiculitis extended from and was causally related to the 1997 injury. The trial court found chronic lumbar radiculitis did extend from and was causally related to his 1997 injury and ordered the Carrier to pay Croysdill $15,678.50 in damages. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
In five issues, Croysdill challenges the granting of a summary judgment as to the dismissal of his breach of the Release claim, the granting of a plea to the jurisdiction, and the striking of a witness as an expert. He also asserts the trial court erred by not applying the affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Croysdill's five issues overlap; we therefore consolidate them into four issues and address them where we deem necessary.
Summary Judgment
In Issues One and Five, Croysdill challenges the granting of a summary judgment against him, which dismissed his breach of the Release claim.
This Court did not decide whether there was a fact issue relating to the breach of the Release claim because it found that it had not been raised by the Carrier in its motion for summary judgment and therefore could not form the basis for the trial court's judgment. Croysdill , 490 S.W.3d at 296 ("In any event, Old Republic did not move for summary judgment on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction of this claim. It is well-settled that a party may not be granted judgment as a matter of law on a cause of action not addressed in a summary judgment motion."). The Carrier maintained the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction of this claim because Croysdill had not exhausted his administrative remedies. Id. This Court disagreed. Id. It found Croysdill had exhausted his administrative remedies and concluded the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on the breach of the Release claim. Id. This was the basis of this Court's decision to reverse and remand on the issue of breach of the Release.
We review the grant or denial of a summary judgment de novo. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding , 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). The evidence presented in the motion and response is reviewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Id. The movant bears the burden of showing no genuine issue of material fact exists and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c) ). When, as here, both sides moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted one and denied the other, we review the summary judgment evidence presented by both sides and determine all questions presented. Id.
Analysis
Croysdill's breach of contract claim is premised on his assertion that the Carrier breached the Release. As discussed earlier, the Release resolved the dispute of the impairment rating of the 1997 injury. Croysdill argues the Carrier breached the Release by later challenging whether the diagnoses from the 2009 MRI extended from the 1997 injury—i.e., Croysdill wants this Court to find that the Release barred the Carrier from later initiating an extent of injury dispute.
However, this issue has already been answered. This Court explained, "we understand Croysdill to argue that, because his impairment rating was determined in the prior lawsuit, Old Republic is precluded from disputing the extent of injury in the present action. Impairment rating and extent of injury are distinct issues, however. " Croysdill , 490 S.W.3d at 296 (emphasis added). This Court further held, "Consequently, settlement of the impairment rating issue does not preclude a carrier from later disputing extent of injury. " Id. (emphasis added). To reiterate, the Carrier challenged whether the eleven diagnoses from the 2009 MRI extended from the 1997 injury. The parties’ agreement that the Release would not terminate or limit Croysdill's right to medical benefits pursuant to the Texas Labor Code did not bar the Carrier from later initiating an extent of injury dispute.
Because the Carrier was within its statutory right to dispute extent of injury, it cannot be liable for breach of the Release for exercising that right. Issues One and Five are overruled.
Plea to the Jurisdiction
In Issues Two and Five, Croysdill challenges the granting of a plea to the jurisdiction against him, which dismissed his newly added claims.
Standard of Review
A plea to the jurisdiction challenges a court's authority to decide a case. Heckman v. Williamson Cty. , 369 S.W.3d 137, 149 (Tex. 2012). It is a dilatory plea that serves to defeat a cause of action without regard to whether the asserted claims have merit. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue , 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). In other words, the plea should be decided without delving into the merits of the case. Id. The burden is on the plaintiff to affirmatively establish the trial court's jurisdiction. Heckman , 369 S.W.3d at 150. We assess the live pleadings and evidence submitted to negate the existence of jurisdiction, and we must consider such evidence when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issue. Id. We must ultimately grant the plea if the plaintiff's pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction. Id.
Analysis
On remand from this Court, Croysdill amended his pleadings to add the following new causes of action in which he alleged fraud, fraudulent inducement, tortious interference, violations of statutory duties under the Texas Insurance Code (§§ 541.001, 541.061, 541.151, 541.152 ), the DTPA ( § 17.50(b)(4) ), the Texas Labor Code (§ 408.006 ), and the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (§§ 41.001 – 41.014.), and theft of services ( TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.04 ). These claims were not raised during the administrative proceedings. In its plea to the jurisdiction, the Carrier challenged Croysdill's newly pleaded causes of action and sought dismissal of all claims not part of the initial administrative review. The trial court granted the plea in favor of the Carrier, holding it lacked jurisdiction over Croysdill's claims alleging fraud, fraudulent inducement, violations under the DTPA and the Texas Insurance Code, and theft of services, and thereby dismissed those claims.
We find In re Crawford & Co. instructive here. In that case, disputes arose between the workers’ compensation claimant and the carrier over entitlement of benefits, which led to a benefit review conference. 458 S.W.3d 920, 921-22 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam). Meanwhile, and separate from the administrative proceedings, the claimant and his wife (plaintiffs) pled numerous causes of action against the carrier, including various torts, fraud, fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, and violations of statutory duties under the Texas Insurance Code and the DTPA. Id. at 922. The plaintiffs argued the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act did not require them to pursue their claims through its administrative procedure or otherwise exhaust administrative remedies. Id. The carrier filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion for summary judgment claiming the DWC has exclusive jurisdiction over the claims. Id. at 922-23. The carrier ultimately sought mandamus with the Texas Supreme Court. Id. at 923.
The Texas Supreme Court agreed with the carrier, holding the DWC has exclusive jurisdiction over the claims and the Workers’ Compensation Act provides their exclusive remedies. Id. at 923. According to the Court, "the Act bars the [plaintiffs’] claims for negligence, gross negligence, breach of contract, quantum meruit, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and statutory violations." Id. at 926. It further held, "We reach the same conclusion regarding all of the [plaintiffs’] common law and statutory causes of action based on allegations of deception, fraud, and misrepresentation." Id. The Court thereby dismissed the claims alleging fraud, fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, and violations of statutory duties under the Texas Insurance Code and the DTPA. Id. at 926-29.
We likewise find Croysdill's common law and statutory claims alleging fraud, fraudulent inducement, violations under the Texas Insurance Code (§§ 541.001, 541.061, 541.151, 541.152 ) and the DTPA ( § 17.50(b)(4) ), and theft of services ( TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.04 ), were properly dismissed as the Act does not afford remedies outside of its statutory scheme. , Davis v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa. , No. 07-13-00190-CV, 2014 WL 2553379, at *2-4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 4, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (precluding claims for breach of contract, Insurance Code and DTPA violations, because the claims "arise out of [the carrier's] handling of [the] workers’ compensation claim"). We construe Croysdill's live pleadings to allege his newly pleaded claims arise from the Carrier's investigation, handling and settling of his workman's compensation claim. Consequently, we find his claims arise out of the "investigation, handling, and settling" of his claims for workers’ compensation benefits, and therefore, "the Act provides the exclusive procedures and remedies for these claims." Crawford , 458 S.W.3d at 926-27. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting the Carrier's plea to the jurisdiction as to these claims. In our review of the live pleadings and evidence submitted to negate the existence of jurisdiction, we conclude the trial court did not err and dismissal of Croysdill's claims alleging fraud, fraudulent inducement, violations under the Texas Insurance Code (§§ 541.001, 541.061, 541.151, 541.152 ) and the DTPA ( § 17.50(b)(4) ), and theft of services ( TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.04 ), was proper. Issues Two and Five are overruled.
Croysdill's claim for theft of services particularly fails, as it is not a cognizable civil claim. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.04.
Furthermore, as to Croysdill's claim for misrepresentation of an insurance policy under section 541.061 of the Texas Insurance Code, we are aware the Supreme Court has previously ruled the Act does not bar the claim because section 541.061 does not specify misrepresentations made regarding settling claims for benefits. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger , 381 S.W.3d 430, 446 (Tex. 2012) ; Crawford , 458 S.W.3d at 926. However, later in Crawford , the Court addressed whether the DWC has exclusive jurisdiction over a claim for "misrepresentation of an insurance policy" when the alleged misrepresentation occurs within the claims-settlement context. 458 S.W.3d at 927. The Supreme Court held that it does, and because all of the plaintiffs’ misrepresentation-based claims alleged misrepresentations the carrier allegedly made during its investigation, handling, and settling of the claims for workers’ compensation benefits, the Act had exclusive jurisdiction over those claims, including the section 541.061 claim. Id. Likewise, we hold because the substance of Croysdill's claims allege fraud and misrepresentations the Carrier allegedly made during its investigation, handling, and settling of his claims for workers’ compensation benefits, the Act had exclusive jurisdiction over those claims, to include his section 541.061 claim.
The trial court's order did not address Croysdill's remaining claims alleging tortious interference and violations of the Texas Labor Code and Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Consequently, we do not address Croysdill's claims alleging tortious interference and violations under the Texas Labor Code (§ 408.006 ) and the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (§§ 41.001 – 41.014 ).
Expert Witness
In Issue Three, Croysdill challenges the trial court's striking of his witness as an expert on life care planning.
Standard of Review & Applicable Law
Whether an expert is qualified is a preliminary question to be decided by the trial court. TEX. R. EVID. 104. Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Evidence permits a witness to testify on technical, specialized subjects if the testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact issue. TEX. R. EVID. 702. The party offering the expert bears the burden to prove the witness is qualified under rule 702. Broders v. Heise , 924 S.W.2d 148, 151 (Tex. 1996). The qualification of a witness as an expert is within the trial court's discretion and we will not disturb the trial court's decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id. The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Id.
Analysis
Croysdill offered Lois Hawkins as an expert on life care planning to testify on a life care plan she prepared on behalf of Croysdill. The life care plan consisted of an assessment of Croysdill's possible future medical and rehabilitation care needs. The Carrier filed a motion to strike Hawkins as an expert witness. In response, Croysdill offered Hawkins’ resume. A Daubert hearing was held.
At the hearing, the Carrier contested Hawkins’ qualifications and argued her opinion is only relevant to Croysdill's future medical treatment, which has no bearing on the issue before the court—whether chronic lumbar radiculitis extended from and was a result of the 1997 injury. The Carrier further contested her qualifications by arguing because she is only a registered nurse, she is unable to prescribe or treat Croysdill's conditions and thus, her testimony would not assist the trier of fact in answering the issue before the court.
In Croysdill's response to the Carrier's motion to strike, Croysdill claimed Hawkins’ report was relevant. Croysdill specifically argued:
Since Defendant has fraudulently defrauded plaintiff who better to explain the future medical than an expert in that field. Her report has relevance since Plaintiff would be eligible for the diagnosis in the impairment rating as agreed by both parties since the Defendant has defrauded plaintiff out of those diagnosis and her report is what is reasonable and necessary under the current standards of which Plaintiff knows nothing.
Croysdill did not offer Hawkins as an expert on the specific issue before the trial court. The report, a life care plan of Croysdill's future medical and rehabilitation care needs, had no bearing on the issue before the trial court—whether chronic lumbar radiculitis extended from and was a result of the 1997 injury. Assuming, arguendo , that the life care plan was a medical record, medical reports and records being offered as expert opinions must also qualify under the same principles as expert testimony. State Off. of Risk Mgmt. v. Adkins , 347 S.W.3d 394, 402 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) ("If medical records are to be considered expert testimony, they must be evaluated applying the same principles used to evaluate the opinion of an expert."). This was not achieved by Croysdill.
Furthermore, not every licensed physician is automatically qualified to testify on every medical question. Id. As such, the proffered expert must have knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the specific issue before the court to qualify the expert to give an opinion on that particular subject. Id. (quoting Broders , 924 S.W.2d at 153-54 ).
At the hearing, Croysdill did not call Hawkins to testify, and he did not offer any deposition testimony or affidavits. In fact, Hawkins did not appear at all, and the trial court was unable to verify her qualifications, expertise, or the reliability of her conclusions. See id. at 402-03 ("In the medical context, expert testimony that is not based on reasonable medical probability, but relies instead on possibility, speculation, or surmise, does not assist the jury and cannot support a judgment."). Moreover, Hawkins was not shown to be a medical professional who possessed expertise on the very diagnosis at issue—chronic lumbar radiculitis. The trial court was merely presented with Hawkins’ resume and her life care plan, without explanation or basis as to how she reached her conclusions. Her report was relevant to future life care planning, which was not at issue or relevant to whether chronic lumbar radiculitis extended from and was a result of the 1997 injury.
We conclude Croysdill failed to establish Hawkins was qualified and that she possessed the knowledge, skill, experience, training or education regarding the specific issue before the trial court. See Adkins , 347 S.W.3d at 402. Accordingly, Hawkins’ testimony would not have assisted the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact issue. TEX. R. EVID. 702. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking Hawkins as an expert witness. Issue Three is overruled.
Res Judicata & Collateral Estoppel
In Issue Four, Croysdill challenges the trial court's refusal to apply res judicata and collateral estoppel to the Carrier's motion for summary judgment. However, this Court has already resolved this matter. See Croysdill , 490 S.W.3d at 295-96.
Analysis
In the former appeal before this Court, Croysdill challenged the order granting summary judgment in favor of the Carrier and denial of his summary judgment motion, on the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Id. More specifically, he claimed the Carrier's extent of injury dispute was barred by the parties’ agreement that the Release did not terminate or limit his right to medical benefits pursuant to the Texas Labor Code. Id. The following is this Court's analysis and holding on this matter:
Res Judicata
The party asserting an affirmative defense has the burden of pleading and proving its elements. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars the relitigation of claims that have been finally adjudicated or that could have been litigated in the prior action. For res judicata to apply, the defendant must prove: (1) there is a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the parties in the second action are the same or in privity with those in the first action; and (3) the second action is based on claims that were or could have been raised in the first action. The summary judgment evidence does not include any
pleadings from the prior impairment-rating lawsuit, or any evidence of a judgment on the merits that would support a claim of res judicata. Rather, Croysdill based his res judicata argument entirely on the Release entered into by the parties in 2003. While the summary judgment evidence shows that the parties entered into the Release which resolved the dispute over the impairment rating, Croysdill failed to show that the extent of injury dispute at issue in the present case was or could have been resolved in the prior suit. Consequently, the trial court did not err by denying Croysdill's motion for summary judgment on the res judicata ground.
Collateral Estoppel
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents relitigation of particular issues already resolved in a prior suit. The elements of collateral estoppel are: (1) the facts sought to be litigated in the second action were fully and fairly litigated in the prior action; (2) those facts were essential to the judgment in the first action; and (3) the parties were cast as adversaries in the first action.
As was the case with his res judicata argument, Croysdill relies exclusively on the Release to establish the applicability of collateral estoppel. There is no evidence that the facts pertinent to the current extent of injury dispute were fully and fairly litigated in the prior impairment rating lawsuit. Further, we understand Croysdill to argue that, because his impairment rating was determined in the prior lawsuit, Old Republic is precluded from disputing the extent of injury in the present action. Impairment rating and extent of injury are distinct issues, however. Consequently, settlement of the impairment rating issue does not preclude a carrier from later disputing extent of injury. We overrule Issues Two, Three, and Four.
Id. at 295-96 (internal citations omitted).
The remand from this Court did not include these claims, and the trial court did not address them on remand. As such, Croysdill cannot collaterally attack this Court's prior ruling. In any event, declining to apply res judicata and collateral estoppel was proper given that the issue in the first lawsuit—impairment—is separate and distinct from the issue in the second lawsuit—extent of injury. Croysdill , 490 S.W.3d at 292, 296 (finding the present case is an appeal of an extent of injury dispute and not a contest of Croysdill's impairment rating and "[i]mpairment rating and extent of injury are distinct issues"). Accordingly, Issue Four is overruled.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we affirm.