Opinion
Case No. CV400-048
October 18, 2000
ORDER
At issue in this case is whether Plaintiff's legal claims are governed by the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) or by admiralty law, specifically the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA) and/or the Public Vessels Act (PVA). The Court finds that Plaintiff's claims are governed by the SAA and/or the PVA (SAA/PVA) and are thus time-barred by the SAA/PVA statute of limitations. Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff's case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
Background
1. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed its complaint on February 22, 2000, suing Defendant because of the actions of Agent Officer William P. Aldridge of the United States Coast Guard, Station Tybee, Tybee Island Georgia. In lieu of an answer to Plaintiff's complaint, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that because the SAA/PVA applied, Plaintiff's claim was time — barred by the statute of limitations. This Court then ordered each side to submit evidence regarding whether the FTCA or the SAA/PVA applied, and the Court also ordered Plaintiff to produce evidence regarding whether administrative remedies had been exhausted as required by the FTCA. These submissions, coupled with the prior pleadings, lead the Court to its conclusions in this order.
2. Relevant Facts
The following facts are relevant and undisputed. On August 18, 1997, at approximately 7:30 P.M., Defendant, Officer William P. Aldridge of the United States Coast Guard, received a phone call from Kevin Hall, who reported that Plaintiff was shooting at dolphins from a boat on Lazaretto Creek. (Plaintiff's Aff.; Det. Ex. A C). In response to this call, Defendant navigated its vessel to the site of Plaintiff's boat, which was at the mouth of Lazaretto Creek, off of Tybee Island, Georgia. (Plaintiff's Aff.; Def. Ex. D). Upon approaching Plaintiff's vessel, Defendant noted that there were three shrimp boats in the general area, one of which was one hundred yards away from Plaintiff's vessel. (Def. Ex. A). Defendant also noted that Plaintiff was reloading "what appeared to be a Taurus semi-automatic pistol." (Def. Ex. A). Defendant and the other agents drew their weapons and ordered Plaintiff and the other passengers on Plaintiff's vessels to drop the guns and put their hands up, which they did. (Plaintiff's Aff.; Def. Ex. A). Upon coming closer to Plaintiff's vessel, Defendant noted that there were six guns, three open beer cans in neoprene insulators, "several empty beer cans" on the floor of the boat, and "several hundred expended shell casings." (Def. Ex. A). Defendant stated that Plaintiff had a "moderate to strong" smell of alcohol on his breath. (Def. Ex. A). Defendant handcuffed Plaintiff and the passengers, and took them to the Lazaretto dock, with the boat in tow. (Def. Ex. D). Once near the dock, all the passengers remained in the Coast Guard vessel except for Plaintiff, who was on the floating dock for a brief period of time, performing sobriety tests and answering questions by an agent of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. (Plaintiff's Aff., Def. Ex. A). At approximately 10:00 P.M., Plaintiff and the other passengers were released. (Plaintiff's Aff. 4. The only charge against Plaintiff is for Boating under the Influence of Alcohol. (Plaintiff's Aff.).
On February 22, 2000, Plaintiff brought suit in this Court, claiming that Defendant deprived him of his liberty without due process, causing Plaintiff to suffer great mental anguish and public humiliation. (Complaint, at ¶ 9). Plaintiff also claimed that the incident caused injury to his good name and reputation. (Id.).
Analysis
The Court finds that Defendant has shown that Plaintiff's claim in this case sounds in Admiralty Law under the SAA/PVA. The Court further finds that because the FTCA is excluded by the SAA/PVA, Plaintiff's FTCA claim is barred. Finally, the Court finds that because Plaintiff filed his claim with this Court more than two years after his claim accrued, Plaintiff's claim is time-barred by the SAA/PVA two-year statute of limitations. Thus, the Court must grant Defendant's motion to dismiss.
To explain why the Court reaches these conclusions, the Court will address three issues: 1) the legal standard for evaluating Defendant's 12(b)(1) factual attack, 2) the standard for deciding whether a claim is governed by admiralty law, and 3) the applicable statute of limitations for SAA/PVA claims.
1. Motion to Dismiss Standard for a 12(b)(1) factual attack
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), which governs motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Attacks on subject matter jurisdiction under 12(b)(1) come in two forms: facial and factual. See McMaster v. United States, 177 F.3d 936, 940 (11th Cir. 1999). Facial attacks regard the sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint itself. As the Eleventh Circuit holds, "[f]acial attacks on the complaint require the court merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion." Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953, 101 S.Ct. 358, 66 L.Ed.2d 217 (1980)). "Factual attacks, on the other hand, challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits, are considered." Id.
In the case at hand, Defendant does not attack the Court's subject matter jurisdiction because of the sufficiency of the allegations of Plaintiff's complaint. Rather, Defendant argues that even if all the allegations of Plaintiff's complaint are true, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction because this case falls under the SAA/PVA and Plaintiff's claims are thus time-barred. In order for the Court to decide whether or not Defendant's assertions are correct, it had to examine facts beyond the pleadings to reach a conclusion whether the SAA/PVA applied. A 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss regarding the presence of admiralty jurisdiction has been held to be a factual attack upon a plaintiff's claim. See Hatteras of Lauderdale, Inc. v. Gemini Lady, 662 F. Supp. 1525, 1527-28 (S.D.Fla. 1987), aff'd, 853 F.2d 848 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that after considering the affidavits, deposition, and exhibits, admiralty law did not apply). Thus, the Court finds that Defendant's motion to dismiss is a 12(b)(1) factual attack.
Courts have held that a motion to dismiss is inappropriate if a 12(b)(1) factual attack implicates a substantive element of a plaintiff's claim. See, e.g., Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell Associates, 104 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th cir. 1997). However, the court notes that in this case Defendant's factual attack on the subject matter jurisdiction is completely separate from that of Plaintiff's claims for a cause of action. In fact, Defendant never addresses or refutes Plaintiff's substantive claims. Thus, the court does not have to address the issue of whether Defendant's motion to dismiss fails because the subject matter jurisdiction issue is too intertwined with the merits of the case.
The Court's approach to a factual attack is substantially different from the Court's approach to a facial attack. See id. On a facial attack, a plaintiff is afforded safeguards similar to those provided in Opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion — the court must consider the allegations of the complaint to be true. See id.; see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981). In contrast, when the attack is factual, the trial court may proceed as it never could under 12(b)(6) or Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. See Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529. Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court's jurisdiction — its very power to hear the case — there is substantial authority that the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case. See id. In short, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to a plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims. See id.
Therefore, as the Court considers the evidence produced by both sides and decides whether the FTCA or the SAA/PVA applies, it does so without particular favor given to either party in how it examines the facts presented.
2. Admiralty Jurisdiction Test
Before discussing claims of the parties regarding jurisdiction, the Court notes that because the FTCA and SAA/PVA are mutually exclusive, the Court must decide whether the FTCA or the SAA/PVA applies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(d).
Plaintiff brought the present suit under the FTCA. However, Defendant claims that admiralty jurisdiction and the SAA/PVA apply in this case. In order to settle such jurisdictional disputes between parties, the Supreme Court has recently clarified the test for courts to use in deciding whether admiralty law governs a plaintiff's claims. For a tort claim to be cognizable under admiralty jurisdiction, the activity from which the claim arises must satisfy a location test and it must have sufficient connection with maritime activity. See Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534, 115 S.Ct. 1043, 1048 (1995). "A court applying the location test must determine whether the tort occurred on navigable water or whether injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water." Id. The connection test raises two issues. First, the Court must "`assess the general features of the type of accident involved,' to determine whether the incident has `a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce.'" Id. (quoting Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 362-64 n. 2, 110 S.Ct. 2892, 2896-97 n. 2 (1990)). Second, the Court "must determine whether `the general character' of the `activity giving rise to the incident' shows a `substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.'" Id. (quoting Sisson 497 U.S. at 362-64 n. 2, 110 S.Ct. at 2896-97 n. 2). The Court will examine each of the three elements in turn.
The 5AA/PVA govern maritime torts.
A. Whether the alleged tort occurred on navigable water or whether in-jury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water
The Court finds that because the alleged tort took place on navigable waters, Defendant has demonstrated that the locality test of admiralty jurisdiction has been satisfied. "If [a] waterway is capable of being used in commerce" then that is enough to satisfy the locality test.Richardson v. Foremost Insurance Co., 641 F.2d 314, 316 (5th Cir. 1981);see also The Lucky Lindy Dragon v. United States, 76 F.2d 561, 563 (5th Cir. 1935) (holding that waters navigable in fact for trade or commerce, including canals and other waters privately owned or claimed, are in law navigable waters for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction). Defendant has produced evidence that Lazaretto Creek, where the majority of the alleged tort took place, is a navigable waterway. Plaintiff was at the mouth of the creek, in his vessel, when Defendant approached in its own vessel. Moreover, there were three shrimp boats in the general area, one only a hundred yards from Plaintiff's vessel. This demonstrates that the Lazaretto Creek is navigable in fact. Thus, boats could use the creek in commerce. See Lucky Lindy, 76 F.2d at 563.
Plaintiff offers no argument that Lazaretto Creek is not a navigable waterway. Rather, Plaintiff seems to make two other arguments for why the locality test may not be met. First, Plaintiff asserts that vessel navigation is not involved. However, the evidence produced by both Plaintiff and Defendant directly refutes this assertion. Plaintiff was on his vessel at the mouth of Lazaretto Creek when arrested by Defendant. Though Plaintiff may not have been navigating at the point Defendant approached his boat, the location test asks whether the incident took place on navigable waters, not whether the incident took place while navigating on navigable waters. Thus, Plaintiff's first argument fails.
Plaintiff does not ever address the three factor test laid out inGrubart. Rather, Plaintiff merely asserts a variety of arguments that this court places in the framework set out in the Grubart case. The court does so solely for the sake of clarity and organization, and notes that it gave careful consideration to Plaintiff's arguments both inside and outside of the Grubart framework.
Second, Plaintiff asserts that because part of Defendant's arrest procedures took place on the Lazaretto Creek floating dock, this case cannot be governed by admiralty law. In support of his argument, Plaintiff cites Cook v. Belden Concrete Products, Inc., 472 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1973). However, in that case, the court only addresses the question of whether or not floating docks could be considered vessels for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction, a consideration that is not necessary under present law. See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534. The Cook case does not address whether a dock satisfies the locality test by being on navigable waters. In fact, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a dock on a navigable waterway is not an extension of land, but instead is a part of navigable waters. See Sea Vessel v. Reyes, 23 F.3d 345, 349 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that a dry dock on navigable waters was on "navigable waters" for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction); see also Pellegrin v. M M Boats Inc., 1994 WL 577387, *2 (E.D. La. 1994) (holding that a floating dock was on navigable waters). In this case, the only place Plaintiff was during the incident, other than the vessel, was on the Lazaretto Creek floating dock. Thus, under Sea Vessel, the Lazaretto dock is considered part of navigable waters.
Plaintiff also cites Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625, 7 S.Ct. 336 (1887) and Keller v. Dravo Corp., 441 F.2d 1239 (5th cir. 1971). However, those cases do not involve questions of admiralty jurisdiction.
The court notes, however, that it does not believe that all injuries on floating docks would fall under the ambit of admiralty law. A party would still have to show that there was a sufficient connection with maritime activity. See generally, Sea Vessel v. Reves, 23 F.3d 345, 349 (11th Cir. 1994).
Under the law and in light of the evidence Plaintiff and Defendant have produced, the Court finds that the entire incident took place on navigable waters. Thus, the Court concludes that the incident satisfies the locality test set out in Grubart.
B. Whether the general features of the incident has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce
The Court finds that Defendant's alleged unlawful arrest of Plaintiff was an incident that had a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce. When examining the impact upon maritime commerce, the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have stated that this Court should describe the alleged incident "at an intermediate level of possible generality." Alderman v. Pacific Northern Victor, Inc., 95 F.3d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Grubart, 513 U.S. at 538, 115 S.Ct. at 1051). As an example of a general description, the Court notes that in the Alderman case, which involved a carpenter who slipped in codfish oil while repairing an elevator in a boat, the court described the incident as "an onboard injury which occurred during the repair, maintenance or conversion of a vessel." Id. Following the Eleventh Circuit's example, and having no suggestion from either Plaintiff or Defendant on this point, this Court will characterize the contested incident as thus: Defendant's alleged unlawful arrest of Plaintiff for allegedly shooting at dolphins and boating under the influence of alcohol.
As the Eleventh Circuit notes, "[t]he correct inquiry is not whether there was an effect on maritime activity, but rather whether there `potentially' could have been. This distinction is crucial." Alderman v. Pacific Northern Victor, Inc., 95 F.3d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Grubart, 513 U.S. at 538, 115 S.Ct. at 1051). In making this assessment, the Court must look to "whether the incident could be seen within a class of incidents that posed more than a fanciful risk to commercial shipping." Id. (citations omitted). In Alderman, the court found that plaintiff's injury while helping to install an elevator on a boat could potentially affect maritime commerce because a delay taken to install an elevator disrupts maritime commerce. See id.
In this case, whether the arrest was unlawful or not, Defendant arrested Plaintiff while investigating a citizen's report that Plaintiff was shooting at dolphins. This arrest led to a boating under the influence of alcohol charge against Plaintiff. Plaintiff's shooting of firearms in navigable waters, even if Plaintiff was not shooting at dolphins, could have affected maritime commerce. The evidence indicates that shrimp boats were in the area of Plaintiff's boat, one of which was approximately one hundred yards away, and if one of the bullets shot from Plaintiff's boat had hit the shrimp boats or their passengers, that would have affected maritime commerce. Moreover, Plaintiff's boating under the influence of alcohol also could have affected maritime commerce as it could have lead to a range of accidents. See, e.g. In re Exxon Valdez, 1995 WL 527988, *4 (D. Alaska 1995) (finding boat pilot's alcohol use and subsequent grounding of boat to have a significant financial effect).
In addition, while Defendant was allegedly unlawfully arresting Plaintiff, maritime commerce could have been affected while other vessels had to wait for Defendant's help while Defendant was investigating Plaintiff's conduct. Furthermore, the resources that Defendant spent during the time of Defendant's alleged unlawful detention of Plaintiff could have instead gone towards other activities that helped maritime commerce.
Therefore, given the potential implications of the incident, and given that Plaintiff has offered no arguments that the incident would not potentially disrupt maritime commerce, the Court finds that this incident on Lazaretto Creek had a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce.
C. Whether the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity
The Court finds that Defendant's arrest of Plaintiff shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. Courts have held that in considering this issue, the important question is whether a tortfeasor's activity, commercial or noncommercial, on navigable waters is so closely related to activity traditionally subject to admiralty law that the reasons for applying special admiralty rules would apply. See Alderman, 95 F.3d at 1065 (holding that in considering whether an incident has a substantial relationship to a traditional maritime activity it was appropriate to examine the tortfeasor's activity, and finding that the case came within admiralty jurisdiction). The Court's examination of the torfeasor's activity should be given a broad perspective. See id. (citing Sisson, 497 U.S. at 366-67, 110 S.Ct. at 2898).
Courts have held that Coast Guard activities have a substantial relationship to maritime activities. See Kelly v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144, 1147 (2nd Cir. 1976) (holding that the operations of the Coast Guard "conducted on navigable waters do in fact bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activities for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction."); see also Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Technologies Corp., 722 F. Supp. 942, 946 (D. Conn. 1989) ("Flights by a coast guard aircraft in preparation for or connected with marine rescue and patrol operations clearly bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activities for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction."). Also, it should be noted that the very purpose of the United States Coast Guard is to promote the safety of life and property on the navigable waters of the United States. See 14 U.S.C. § 2. Thus, Officer Aldridge's activities in this case, performed while acting as an agent of the United States Coast Guard, are substantially related to traditional maritime activities.
Because Defendant has shown that the activity from which the claim arises has satisfied a location test and has sufficient connection with maritime activity, the Court finds that Plaintiff's claim is cognizable under admiralty jurisdiction. Therefore, because the FTCA and the SAA/PVA are mutually exclusive, the Court finds that Plaintiff's claim is governed solely by the SAA/PVA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (d).
3. The statute of limitations under the SAA/PVA
The Court finds that Plaintiff's claim is time — barred under the SAA/PVA two-year statute of limitations. An SAA/PVA suit may be brought only within two years after the cause of action arises. See 46 U.S.C. § 745; See also Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1477 (11th Cir. 1993) ("The statute of limitations for PVA/SAA actions is two years."), Miller v. United States, 725 F.2d 1311, 1315 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that SAA suits can only be brought for two years after the cause of action arises). Plaintiff claims that the cause of action arose on August 18, 1997. Plaintiff filed its claim with this court on February 22, 2000. Based on these facts, it is clear that Plaintiff filed its claim six months after the SAA/PVA statute of limitations expired. Thus, Plaintiff's claim is time barred. See id.