Opinion
Civ. No. 99-2125-GTV.
Filed: May 26, 2000.
PATRICIA CROMWELL, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated plaintiff, pro se.
Patrick J. Stueve, Berkowitz, Feldmiller, Stanton, Brandt, Williams Stueve, LLP, Kansas City, MO. Roger D. Stanton, Berkowitz, Feldmiller, Stanton, Brandt, Williams Stueve, LLP, Prairie Village, KS. Daniel C. Girard, Anthony K. Lee, Gordon M. Fauth, Jr., A.J De Bartolomeo Girard Green, LLP, San Francisco, CA. Thomas T. Tamlyn, Jr., Richard C. Yeskoo, New York, NY., for plaintiff.
Allison M. Murdock, Stephen J Owens, Stinson, Mag Fizzell, P.C., Kansas City, MO. Russell A. Berland, Sprint Communications Company L.P., Law Department, Kansas City, MO., for Sprint Corporation, defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel the Production of Documents and Deposition of Witnesses under Rule 30(b)(6). See doc. 54.
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Plaintiff Patricia Cromwell brings this putative class action under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 151, et seq. ("Communications Act"). Plaintiff contends that Sprint Communications Company L. P.'s ("Sprint") practice of charging subscribers "Casual Caller" rates violates the Communications Act in several ways. In Count I of Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Sprint's practice violates 47 U.S.C. § 201(b), in that the tariff under which Sprint charges its Casual Caller rates is neither clear nor explicit and that Sprint's practice is unjust and unreasonable. In Count II of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Sprint's Casual Caller practice violates 47 U.S.C. § 203. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Sprint has violated 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) by filing and maintaining an unlawful tariff. In addition, Plaintiff claims that Sprint has violated § 203(c) by charging and collecting compensation under rates and conditions not set forth in any lawful tariff and by charging and collecting greater compensation than the charges specified in its tariff.
At the June 23, 1999 Scheduling Conference in this case, Sprint informed Judge Rushfelt of its plan to file a motion to refer the case to the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") and urged Judge Rushfelt to stay all discovery. Judge Rushfelt declined to stay discovery entirely and authorized discovery only on primary jurisdiction and class certification issues. The Parties filed Supplemental Form 35 Reports, and another scheduling conference was held on June 29. Judge Rushfelt again denied Sprint's request to stay all discovery. After hearing the argument of the parties at both scheduling conferences, Judge Rushfelt ruled that the initial disclosures and discovery would "be confined to the following issues, relating to class certification or primary jurisdiction":
1. Whether there is the existence and predominance of common questions of law and fact;
2. Whether plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the proposed class members;
3. Whether plaintiff is an adequate representative of the proposed class;
4. Whether a class action is superior to other means for the fair and efficient adjudication of plaintiff's claims;
5. The criteria and/or circumstances under which customers presubscribed to Sprint are or have been charged Casual Caller rates;
6. The criteria and/or circumstances under which customers presubscribed to Sprint are or have been charged Casual Caller rates and Sprint has subsequently refunded or credited any portion of those Casual Caller rates to the customer;
7. The criteria and/or circumstances under which customers presubscribed to Sprint are or have been "terminated" in accordance with the terms and conditions as set forth in Sections 3.11 and 3.12 of Sprint Tariff F.C.C. No. 1;
8. Customer complaints about Casual Caller billing.
July 6, 1999 Scheduling Order (doc. 26) at 2.
Shortly after the June 29 Scheduling Conference, Sprint filed a motion with the District Court to stay all discovery. See doc. 22. On October 28, 1999, Judge Van Bebber granted in part and denied in part the motion and ruled that, pending the Court's ruling on Sprint's motion to refer the FCC, "discovery is stayed except limited discovery relating to the issue of primary jurisdiction of the FCC." Doc. 50 at 1.
II. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL
A. The Discovery at Issue
On July 2, 1999, Plaintiff served a notice to take the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Sprint. An amended deposition notice was served on July 9, designating the following topics of testimony:
1. The criteria and/or circumstances under which customers pre-subscribed to Sprint are or have been charged Casual Caller rates.
2. The criteria and/or circumstances under which customers pre-subscribed to Sprint are or have been charged Casual Caller rates and Sprint has subsequently refunded or credited any portion of the Casual Caller rates to the customer.
3. The criteria and/or circumstances under which accounts of customers pre-subscribed to Sprint are or have been "terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions as set forth in [various Sprint tariffs].
4. The extent, degree and nature of complaints communicated to Sprint about charging casual caller rates (within the meaning of [various provisions of a Sprint tariff] and casual caller surcharges (within the meaning of [various provisions of a Sprint tariff]) to customers whose lines are pre-subscribed to Sprint.
5. The methods, procedures and processes by which calls are identified as subject to Casual Caller Rates and Surcharges, and the methods, procedures and processes used to record and prepare billing records for the charges assessed for such calls.
6. The evolution of Sprint's practice of charging Casual Caller Rates to customers whose lines are presubscribed to Sprint.
July 9, 1999 Amended Deposition Notice (bracketed information added).
Sprint objected to producing a witness to testify on these topics, except to the extent that such testimony related to Sprint's tariff. Sprint objected on the basis that the testimony sought is not relevant to the issue of whether the FCC has primary jurisdiction over this case.
Plaintiff also served requests for production on Sprint. Plaintiff moves to compel answers to First Request Nos. 3-9. Request No. 3 seeks all complaints "about Sprint's practice of charging Casual Caller Rates with respect to lines pre[-]subscribed to Sprint which were communicated to Sprint from March 19, 1997 to the present." Request No. 4 seeks documents that "describe, depict or discuss the criteria under which customers pre-subscribed to Sprint are or have been charged Casual Caller Rates." Request No. 5 seeks documents that "describe, depict or discuss the actual circumstances under which customers pre-subscribed to Sprint are or have been charged Casual Caller Rates." Request No. 6 seeks documents that "describe or discuss the evolution of Sprint's practice of charging Casual Caller Rates to customers whose lines are pre[-]subscribed to Sprint." Request No. 7 seeks documents that "describe, depict or discuss the criteria under which customers pre-subscribed to Sprint are or have been charged Casual Caller Rates and Sprint has subsequently refunded or credited any portion of those Casual Caller Rates to the customer." Request No. 8 seeks documents that "describe, depict or discuss the actual circumstances under which customers pre-subscribed to Sprint are or have been charged Casual Caller Rates and Sprint has subsequently refunded or credited any portion of those Casual Caller rates to the customer." Finally, Request No. 9 seeks documents that "describe, depict or discuss the criteria and/or circumstances under which accounts pre[-]subscribed to Sprint are or have been terminated `in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in Sections 3.11 and 3.12 [of Sprint Tariff F.C.C. No. 1]' within the meaning of sprint Tariff F.C.C. No. 1, other Sprint tariff provision with the same or comparable language." (Bracketed information in original.)
Sprint objected to each of these requests on the basis that they are "not designed to discover information relevant to the issue of primary jurisdiction." It also asserted a general objection that the requests are "vague, overly broad, unduly burdensome, not reasonably limited in scope or by time period or geographic location, and therefore are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." It more specifically objected to Request Nos. 4, 5, and 7-9 on the basis that certain phrases and/or terms contained therein are vague, ambiguous, undefined and susceptible to varying interpretations.
In addition, Sprint asserted a general objection to all of the requests "to the extent they seek information protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and/or the litigation work product doctrine." It also asserted a general objection to all of the requests on the basis that they "seek trade secrets and other confidential and proprietary information, the disclosure of which would put Sprint at a competitive disadvantage and would harm sprint in the marketplace." It more specifically objected to Request Nos. 3, 5, 8, and 9 as requesting confidential information regarding its customers.
B. Analysis of Sprint's Objections
1. Primary jurisdiction
The Court is not persuaded by Sprint's arguments that the requested discovery will not elicit information relevant to the issue of primary jurisdiction. The Court finds that the noticed Rule 30(b)(6) deposition and requests for production fall within the parameters of discovery relating to primary jurisdiction set forth by Judge Rushfelt in the July 6, 1999 Scheduling Order. Paragraphs c.5 through c.7 of that Scheduling Order indicate that discovery may be had relating to the criteria and/or circumstances under which customers pre-subscribed to Sprint (1) are or have been charged Casual Caller Rates, (2) have been given refunds or credits of any portion of Casual Caller rates charged, and (3) have been terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in Sections 3.11 and 3.12 of Sprint Tariff F.C.C. No. 1. Paragraph c.8 of the Scheduling Order allows for discovery relating to customer complaints about Casual Caller billing.There is no basis for the Court to find that Judge Van Bebber's October 28, 1999 Order limiting discovery to the issue of primary jurisdiction overruled those provisions of the Scheduling Order. Furthermore, the Court is persuaded by Plaintiff's arguments that the requested discovery is relevant and may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence relating to Plaintiff's claim that Sprint has violated 47 U.S.C. § 203(c) by charging and collecting compensation under rates and conditions not set forth in lawful tariffs and by charging and collecting greater compensation than the charges specified in its own tariff. See Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint. As Plaintiffs point out, "primary jurisdiction does not apply to cases involving the enforcement of a tariff, as opposed to the reasonableness of a tariff." National Communications Ass'n, Inc. v. American Tele. and Tele., 46 F.3d 220, 223 (2d Cir. 1995). Accord Bruss Co. v. Allnet Communication Serv., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 401, 409 (N.D.Ill. 1985) (holding doctrine of primary jurisdiction inapplicable where plaintiffs alleged that defendant had overcharged its long distance customers in violation of its tariff and noting the court need not decide the "reasonableness" of the tariff but rather "need only decide whether the tariffs were in fact violated, a matter clearly within the province of the federal courts.").
In light of the above, the Court overrules Sprint's objection to both the deposition notice and the requests for production and finds that the requested discovery is relevant to the issue of whether the FCC has primary jurisdiction over this matter. Because Sprint makes no other objections to the deposition notice, the deposition may proceed once it is rescheduled. Sprint does assert other objections to the requests for production, and they are discussed in detail below.
2. Attorney-client privilege and work product protection
Sprint generally objects to each request "to the extent" the documents are protected by the attorney-client privilege or work product immunity. Sprint, as the party asserting the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity, has the burden of establishing that the privilege/immunity applies. Boyer v. Board of County Comm'rs, 162 F.R.D. 687, 688 (D. Kan 1995). To carry that burden, Sprint must make a "clear showing" that the asserted objection applies. Ali v. Douglas Cable Communications, Ltd. Partnership, 890 F. Supp. 993, 944 (D.Kan. 1995). Sprint must also "describe in detail" the documents or information sought to be protected and provide "precise reasons" for the objection to discovery. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Midland Bancor, Inc., 159 F.R.D. 562, 567 (D.Kan. 1994). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5) provides that when a party withholds documents or other information based on a privilege or work product immunity, the "party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection."
As the party asserting the privilege/work product objection, Sprint must also provide sufficient information to enable the court to determine whether each element of the asserted objection is satisfied. Jones v. Boeing Co., 163 F.R.D. 15, 17 (D.Kan. 1995). A "blanket claim" as to the applicability of the privilege/work product doctrine does not satisfy the burden of proof. Marten v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., No. 96-2013-GTV, 1998 WL 13244, at *4 (D.Kan. Jan. 6, 1998); Kelling v Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 496, 497 (D.Kan. 1994). A party's failure to meet this burden when the trial court is asked to rule upon the existence of the privilege/immunity is not excused because the document is later shown to be one that would have been privileged if a timely showing had been made. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Co. v. West, 748 F.2d 540, 542 (10th Cir. 1984).
Sprint has made no attempt whatsoever to identify any documents that it claims are privileged or protected by work product immunity. Nor has Sprint made any attempt to provide any information that would allow Plaintiff or the Court to determine whether each element of the claimed privilege or immunity has been satisfied. Because Sprint has wholly failed to meet its burden to show that these documents are privileged attorney-client communications or protected work product, the Court will overrule these objections.
3. Unduly Burdensome
The Court also overrules Sprint's general objection that the requests are unduly burdensome. Again, Sprint has the burden to support this objection. See Snowden v. Connaught Lab., Inc., 137 F.R.D. 325, 332 (D.Kan. 1991). Sprint has the burden to show not only "undue burden or expense," but also to show that the burden or expense is unreasonable in light of the benefits to be secured from the discovery. Id. Thus, even where the production of documents would cause great labor and expense or even considerable hardship and the possibility of injury to its business, Sprint must still establish that the hardship would be undue and disproportionate to the benefits Plaintiff would gain from the document production. See id.
Sprint makes only a conclusory statement in its response to the Motion to Compel that it would be required to "pore through hundreds of thousands of documents maintained at several locations to determine which may relate to `Casual Caller complaints,' `criteria' or `actual circumstances' of other customers." Doc. 59 at 13. Such conclusory, unsupported allegations are insufficient to meet Sprint's burden. The Court therefore overrules this objection.
4. Confidentiality
The Court also overrules Sprint's general objection that these requests seek trade secret and other confidential and proprietary information, "the disclosure of which would [allegedly] put Sprint at a competitive disadvantage and would harm sprint in the marketplace." It also overrules Sprint's more specific objections to Request Nos. 3, 5, 8, and 9 that those requests seek confidential information regarding its customers.
It is well settled that confidentiality does not act as a bar to discovery and is not grounds to withhold documents from discovery. See, e.g., Daneshvar v. Graphic Technology, Inc., No. 97-2304-JWL, 1998 WL 726091, at *6 (D.Kan. Oct. 9, 1998); Mackey v. IBP, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 186, 196 (D.Kan. 1996). Sprint's bald assertions of confidentiality do not suffice to shield the documents from discovery. See Daneshvar, 1998 WL 726091, at *6 (defendant's bald assertions that requested personnel filles were confidential not grounds to preclude discovery).
The Court notes that in some situations, a protective order may be entered to protect the confidentiality of the documents. Mackey, 167 F.R.D. at 196. The decision whether to enter a protective order is within the court's discretion. Thomas v. International Bus. Mach., 48 F.3d 478, 482 (10th Cir. 1995). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) provides that upon a showing of good cause, a court "may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment oppression, or undue burden or expense." The party seeking a protective order has the burden to demonstrate good cause. Sentry Ins. v. Shivers, 164 F.R.D. 255, 256 (D. Kan. 1996). In determining whether good cause exists to issue a protective order that prohibits the dissemination of documents or other materials obtained in discovery, "the initial inquiry is whether the moving party has shown that disclosure of the information will result in a `clearly defined and very serious injury.'" Zapata v. IBP, Inc., 160 F.R.D. 625, 627 (D.Kan. 1995) (quoting Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F. R. D. 471, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)) (internal quotations omitted). The moving party must also make "a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements." Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n. 16, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981).
Here, Sprint has not yet requested or even suggested that a protective order be entered in the event the Court overrules its confidentiality objections. The Court will allow Sprint ten days from the date of the filing of this Memorandum and Order to move for such an order, and Plaintiff shall have five days thereafter to respond. If the burden described above is met, a protective order will be entered. If no motion for protective order is filed, or if the burden is not met, disclosure will be required without the protection of any such order, as set forth herein.
5. Vagueness and ambiguity
Sprint asserts a general objection of vagueness to each of the requests. Sprint also makes specific objections to various terms and phrases used in the requests. It specifically objects to Request Nos. 4, 5, and 7-9 on the basis that the phrase "describe, depict or discuss" is vague, ambiguous, undefined and susceptible to varying interpretations." It objects on the same grounds to the term "complaints" and the phrase "Sprint's practice of charging Casual Caller Rates" as used in Request No. 3. It objects on the same grounds to the phrase "the actual circumstances under which customers pre-subscribed to Sprint are or have been charged Casual Caller Rates" as used in Request Nos. 5 and 8; the phrase "the evolution of Sprint's practice of charging Casual Caller Rates to customers whose lines are presubscribed to Sprint" as used in Request No. 6; and the terms "criteria and/or circumstances" and "comparable language" as used in Request No. 9.
Sprint, as the party objecting to discovery as vague or ambiguous, has the burden to show such vagueness or ambiguity. See McCoo v. Denny's Inc., No. 98-2458-RDR, ___ F.R.D. ___, 2000 WL 553893, at *20 (D.Kan. April 18, 2000); Pulsecard, Inc. v. Discover Card Serv., Inc., 168 F.R.D. 295, 310 (D.Kan. 1996). A party responding to discovery requests "should exercise reason and common sense to attribute ordinary definitions to terms and phrases utilized in interrogatories." McCoo, 2000 WL 553893, at *20 (quoting Pulsecard, 168 F.R.D. at 310). Where necessary to clarify its answers, the responding party may include any reasonable definition of the term or phrase at issue. McCoo, 2000 WL 553893, at *20; Pulsecard, 168 F.R.D. at 310.
Without question, Sprint has failed to carry its burden to support its general objection of vagueness. It has also failed to carry its burden with respect to its specific objections to the phrase "describe, depict or discuss," and the terms "complaints" and "criteria and/or circumstances." The ordinary meaning of those words should be clear to Sprint. These objections are therefore overruled.
Sprint has also failed to carry its burden to support its objection to the phrase "evolution of Sprint's practice . . ." used in Request No. 6. The term "evolution" is defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary as "progressive development," "process of change," or "process of working out or developing . . . an idea, design, or theme." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 789 (1986). Sprint should have attributed such a meaning when used in Request No. 6, and, thus, the Court will also overrule this objection.
The Court will also overrule Sprint's objection to the term "comparable language" as used in Request No. 9. See McCoo v. Denny's, Inc., No. 98-2458-RDR, ___ F.R.D. ___, 2000 WL 553893, at *20 (D.Kan. April 18, 2000) (term "similar agency" neither vague or ambiguous); Frankford Trust Co. v. Advest, Inc., 1996 WL 571793, at *2 (E.D.Pa.) (term "similar design" neither vague or ambiguous); Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 148 F.R.D. 362, 366 (S.D.Ga. 1991) (term "substantially similar" neither vague nor ambiguous).
The Court also finds that the other phrases to which Sprint objects are not so vague or ambiguous when used in the context of this case as to render them objectionable. The Court therefore overrules all of Sprints objections as to vagueness and ambiguity.
6. Overly broad in scope
The Court will next turn to Sprint's general objection that the requests are overly broad and "not reasonably limited in scope or by time period or geographic location." Unless the Court finds that these requests are overly broad on their face, Sprint, as the party resisting discovery, has the burden to support these objections. See Etienne v. Wolverine Tube, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 653, 656 (D.Kan. 1999); Daneshvar v. Graphic Technology, Inc., No. 97-2304-JWL, 1998 WL 726091, at *1 (D.Kan. Oct. 9, 1998); Hilt v. SFC, Inc., 170 F.R.D. 182, 186 (D.Kan. 1997). This rule applies to any objection to the temporal or geographic scope of the request. Daneshvar, 1998 WL 726091, at *1; Hilt, 170 F.R.D. at 186.
Sprint does not explain why it believes the requests are overly broad except (1) to reassert its "foremost objection" that the requested discovery falls outside Judge Van Bebber's October 28, 1999 Order limiting discovery to the issue of primary jurisdiction, and (2) to argue that "[d]iscovery objections are intended to alert parties to the objection, not to provide a mechanism for procedural machinations." Sprint's Response (doc. 59) at 17. Sprint does not suggest a more narrow time period or geographic limitation that it believes would be proper. Plaintiff fails to specifically address this issue in her briefs.
The Court does not find that the requests are overly broad on their face, at least with respect to their geographical and overall scope. Thus, Sprint has the burden to support these objections. Sprint has not met that burden. As noted above, the Court has already held that the requests are relevant to the issue of primary jurisdiction. Moreover, nothing in the pleadings indicates that there is any basis for the Court to limit the requests to any particular geographical area.
With respect to the temporal scope of the requests, the Court also finds that Request Nos. 3 and 6 are not overly broad on their face and that Sprint has not met its burden to support this objection. Plaintiff has already limited Request No. 3 to complaints communicated to Sprint during the time period March 19, 1997 to the present. Although Plaintiff does not explain why she has so limited that request, the Court finds the time period reasonable given the Communications Act's two-year statute of limitations for the recovery of damages or overcharges. See 47 U.S.C. § 415. (Plaintiff's Complaint was filed on March 19, 1999, and, thus, the March 19, 1997 date represents the beginning of the limitations period.) The Court will therefore overrule Sprint's objection to the temporal scope of Request No. 3.
The Court will also overrule Sprint's objection to the temporal scope of Request No. 6, which seeks documents describing or discussing the evolution of Sprint's practice of charging Casual Caller rates to pre-subscribed customers. Because the request seeks information regarding the historical development of the practice, limiting the request to a specific time period would be pointless.
In contrast, the Court does find that the remaining requests are overly broad on their face in terms of temporal scope. The Court further finds that Plaintiff has failed to justify their unlimited temporal scope. The Court holds that the same time limitation Plaintiff imposed on Request No. 3 should also be imposed on Request Nos. 4, 5, and 7-9. In other words, those requests will be limited to the time period March 19, 1997 to the present.
In sum, the Court holds that Sprint has failed to support its general overly broad objection and its objection to the unlimited geographical scope of these requests. The Court also holds that Sprint has failed to support its objection to the temporal scope of Request Nos. 3 and 6. The Court will therefore overrule those objections. The Court will, however, uphold Sprint's objections to the unlimited temporal scope of Request Nos. 4, 5, and 7-9, and will limit those requests to the time period March 17, 1997 to the present.
III. SANCTIONS
Plaintiff has not moved for sanctions in connection with her Motion to Compel. The Court, however, may, in its discretion, award sanctions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4)(C). That rule provides that the Court may, "after affording an opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion among the parties and persons in a just manner." Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4)(C). The Court believes that sanctions should be awarded here inasmuch as the majority of Sprint's objections were unsupported.
The Court notes that because Plaintiff did not request sanctions, neither party has had an opportunity to be heard on this issue. The Court therefore sets the following briefing schedule on this issue. Within ten days of the filing of this Memorandum and Order , Plaintiff's counsel shall submit an affidavit itemizing the expenses, including attorney fees, that Plaintiff incurred in bringing this Motion, and, if Plaintiff desires, file a pleading setting forth Plaintiff's suggestions as to how said expenses should be apportioned. Sprint's counsel shall have ten days thereafter to respond to the affidavit and to set forth its position regarding the imposition and apportionment of sanctions.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff's Motion to Compel the Production of Documents and Deposition of Witness Under Rule 30(b)(6) (doc. 54). The Rule 30(b)(6) deposition noticed by Plaintiff shall be allowed to proceed, at a time agreed upon by the Parties. Within ten days of the date of the filing of this Memorandum and Order , Sprint may move for a protective order to address its confidentiality concerns. Plaintiff shall have five days thereafter to file a response to any such motion. Within thirty days of the date of the filing of this Memorandum and Order , Sprint shall produce the documents responsive to Plaintiff's First Request for Production Nos. 3-9, with Request Nos. 4, 5, and 7-9 modified as set forth herein. Such production shall take place at the offices of Plaintiff's counsel or at any other location agreed upon by the Parties.
The Parties are directed to follow the briefing scheduling set forth herein regarding the issue of sanctions.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated in Kansas City, Kansas on this 26th day of 2000.