Opinion
No. 01-07-01108-CV
Opinion issued September 24, 2009.
On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 1, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 898237.
Panel consists of Justices JENNINGS, HIGLEY, and SHARP.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Credigy Receivables, Inc. ("Credigy"), appeals the county court's judgment of dismissal of Credigy's suit against appellee, Kimberly Young. Credigy sued Young to recover on amounts due upon Young's failure to pay an arbitration award in favor of Credigy. The county court, sua sponte, dismissed Credigy's suit against Young for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. We determine whether the county court had valid subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. We reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
No appellate brief has been filed on behalf of Young, who acted pro se in the county court.
Background and Procedural History
Young and a third party, MBNA, had a written agreement under which MBNA would provide a credit account for Young. Credigy later purchased the account from MBNA.
One of the terms of the agreement was that any issues arising out of the agreement would be resolved by arbitration before the National Arbitration Forum. Issues subsequently arose between Credigy and Young regarding payment of the balance due, and the matter was sent to arbitration. On May 30, 2006, an arbitrator found that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") governed the arbitration and, after reviewing the evidence submitted, entered an award in Credigy's favor for the amount of $4,795.57.
Young failed to pay this award, and, on July 11, 2007, Credigy filed suit against Young to enforce such award. On December 13, 2007, Credigy filed a motion in the suit by which it sought to enforce the arbitration award pursuant to the FAA. In its motion, Credigy asserted that the county court had jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration award under the FAA. That same day, the county court considered the motion to enforce the arbitration award and, in open court, sua sponte dismissed the entire cause for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. The county court stated that it had reviewed the brief supporting the enforcement of the arbitration award but found that "it is not within the parameters of a trial court judge to make this finding that is being requested at this time; and so the Court finds that it still does not have jurisdiction in these arbitration awards and therefore I am dismissing this case based upon lack of jurisdiction."
The county court dismissed the suit for want of "prosecution" on December 13, 2007. The reporter's record indicates that the county court dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction, and then, on that same day, Credigy moved for reinstatement to consider its motion for default judgment. The county court granted Credigy's request, reinstated the case, found that it "still did not have jurisdiction of these cases" and then again dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction. The record includes two signed judgments of dismissal — one for want of prosecution and one for want of jurisdiction. The judgment dismissing the cause for want of jurisdiction is identical to the one dismissing the suit for want of prosecution except that the word "prosecution" is crossed out and the word "jurisdiction" is interlineated above it. Because the county court specifically stated that it was dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction, and because appellant specifically appeals from the dismissal for want of jurisdiction, it is that judgment of dismissal that we address.
Discussion
In two issues for review, Credigy argues that the county court erred by dismissing its suit against Young because (1) the FAA preempts the Texas Arbitration Act ("TAA") to the extent that the TAA conflicts with the federal statute, and (2), the county court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case, as it is a civil case involving the confirmation of an arbitration award that does not exceed $100,000.00. We address only the second issue, as it is dispositive of this case.
This case presents issues that are virtually identical to those found in Credigy Receivables, Inc. v. Mahinay, 288 S.W.3d 565 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet. h.).
A. Standard of Review
A trial court's authority to adjudicate a particular issue is a question of subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Scott v. Gallagher, 209 S.W.3d 262, 264 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (stating that "[s]ubject-matter jurisdiction refers to the court's power to hear a particular type of suit"); Metro. Transit Auth. v. Jackson, 212 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (holding that "[l]ack of subject-matter jurisdiction is the absence of power to make any ruling at all"). Whether a trial court has valid subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, Texas Natural Resourse Conservation Commission v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002), and, therefore, we review the question of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. See Texas Dept. of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Under this standard, we "construe the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff and look to the pleader's intent." See Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993) (quoting Huston v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 663 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). Unless the petition affirmatively demonstrates an absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, we will presume that the trial court had valid subject-matter jurisdiction. See French v. Moore, 169 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (citing Lee v. El Paso County, 965 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, pet. denied)). Therefore, in order to defeat subject-matter jurisdiction, the pleadings must show an "incurable jurisdictional defect." Patton v. Jones, 212 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied) (op. on reh'g). Such a jurisdictional defect makes it impossible for any amendment to the petition to confer jurisdiction of the matter on the trial court. See Porretto v. Patterson, 251 S.W.3d 701, 707 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
B. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Texas law provides that Harris County civil courts have jurisdiction over all "civil matters and causes, original and appellate, prescribed by law for county courts." TEX. GOV'T. CODE ANN. § 25.1032(a) (Vernon 2004). The jurisdiction "prescribed by law" is that of "civil cases in which the matter in controversy exceeds $500 but does not exceed $100,000, excluding interest, statutory or punitive damages and penalties, and attorney's fees and costs, as alleged on the face of the petition." Id. at § 25.0003(c)(1) (Vernon 2004); see also Medina v. Benkiser, 262 S.W.3d 25, 27 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (discussing statutory grants of jurisdiction to county courts).
In its petition, Credigy alleged a civil case with an amount in controversy of less than $100,000.00. The pleadings do not contain any "jurisdictional defect" which would bar jurisdiction in the county court. The possible application of the FAA, and the possible preemption of the TAA by the FAA, do not present a jurisdictional defect. The application of federal or state law to the arbitration agreement is immaterial, as state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts to enforce the FAA. In re Palacios, 221 S.W.3d 564, 565 (Tex. 2006) (quoting In re Kellogg Brown Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. 2005)). Because of this concurrent jurisdiction, even if the FAA governs the arbitration award, a question we need not determine, such fact would not be a jurisdictional defect that deprives the county court of subject matter jurisdiction.
The question of whether the TAA is preempted by the FAA and, thus, whether the provisions of the FAA, rather than the TAA, should govern appellant's claim below, is one which relates to the resolution of appellant's claim in the county court, rather than the issue of the county court's jurisdiction to hear the claim.
We likewise need not determine whether the underlying suit is an action to confirm an arbitration award or an action to pursue judgement based on Young's failure to pay the arbitration award, as either would fall within the jurisdiction of the county court. To the extent that the suit might have been an untimely action to confirm an arbitration award as it was filed more than a year after the award's date, see 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2009), the county court would have had the authority to issue a take-nothing judgment in Young's favor on this affirmative defense, but the suit's un timeliness would not be a basis for the dismissal of the suit for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 94; Mauldin v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., No. 02-07-00208-CV, 2008 WL 4779614, at *3-4(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (memo op.).
The county court had valid subject matter jurisdiction over the suit. We sustain appellant's second issue.
Conclusion
We reverse the county court's judgment of dismissal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.