Opinion
Civil Action No. 20 - 539
06-10-2020
MICHEAL P. CRAWLEY, Plaintiff, v. WESTMORELAND COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS OFFICE, WESTMORELAND COUNTY COURTS, and THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, Defendants.
District Judge Robert J. Colville
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 16) be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). If the Court adopts this Report and Recommendation and Plaintiff subsequently fails to file an amended complaint within the time allowed, then it is recommended that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
II. REPORT
Plaintiff Micheal P. Crawley ("Plaintiff") is a pretrial detainee currently confined at the Westmoreland County Prison. He initiated this action in April 2020 by submitting for filing a pleading titled "Class Action for Injunction Relief". (ECF No. 1.) On May 11, 2020, the Court entered an Order denying in part and deferring in part Plaintiff's "Class Action for Injunction Relief," which the Court construed as a Motion for Injunctive Relief. (ECF Nos. 9-10.) On May 14, 2020, the Court held a telephone conference with the Westmoreland County Solicitor and Plaintiff to clarify whether Plaintiff was also seeking injunctive relief relative to the conditions at the Westmoreland County Prison in that they were failing to protect him from the coronavirus known as Covid-19. (ECF Nos. 11-12.) During the conference, Plaintiff advised that he was not pursuing a conditions of confinement claim and that he believed that the Westmoreland County Prison had put appropriate precautions in place to prevent the spread of the virus. (ECF No. 12.) As such, that part of his Motion that was deferred was denied. Id. Plaintiff also advised that he was attempting to assert a due process claim regarding the fact that he is a pretrial detainee and that his criminal case cannot proceed due to the alleged shut down of the Westmoreland County courts. Id. The Court indicated that it would send Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form that Plaintiff could use to file a complaint setting forth his perceived due process violations. (ECF Nos. 12-13.)
The United Judicial System of Pennsylvania Web Portal reveals that Plaintiff has three active cases pending in the Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas. At CP-65-CR-466-2020, Plaintiff is charged with one count each of Manufacture, Delivery, or Possession with Intent to Manufacture or Deliver; Criminal Use of Communication Facility; and Intentional Possession of Controlled Substances by a Person Not Registered. His bail is set at $25,000. At CP-65-CR-511-2020, Plaintiff is charged with one count each of Manufacture, Delivery, or Possession with Intent to Manufacture or Deliver; Criminal Use of Communication Facility; Intentional Possession of Controlled Substances by a Person Not Registered; and Operation of a Vehicle without Required Financial Responsibility. His bail is set at $100,000. At CP-65-CR-509-2020, Plaintiff is charged with one count each of Manufacture, Delivery, or Possession with Intent to Manufacture or Deliver; Criminal Use of Communication Facility; and Intentional Possession of a Controlled Substance by a Person Not Registered. His bail is set at $25,000.
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on May 29, 2020. (ECF No. 16.) In it, he names as Defendants the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Westmoreland County Courts and Westmoreland County District Attorney's Office, and he alleges violations of Article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (ECF No. 16, p.3.) Specifically, he alleges that by suspending Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 600, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania violated his right to a speedy trial and deprived him of liberty without due process. (ECF No. 16-1, p.1.) He also alleges that the Westmoreland County Courts have failed to comply with Article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and also deprived him of liberty without due process. Id., p.2. He further alleges that the Westmoreland County District Attorney's Office has failed to provide him with notice of "any and all legal proceedings or delays on behalf of the Commonwealth . . . ." Id. All allegations stem from the alleged closure of the Westmoreland County courts and suspension of the speedy trial provisions as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. Id. Plaintiff states that he was scheduled to be arraigned on April 8, 2020, but his arraignment was postponed. Id. He also states that he has a suppression motion he wishes to present to the criminal court, which is also being delayed. Id. He alleges that this loss of time is causing irrevocable damage to other legal issues as well, particularly in the Family Court where his parental rights are being threatened. (ECF No. 16, p.5.) As relief, he seeks only one thing - pretrial release. Id. Because the named Defendants are not subject to suit, the undersigned is recommending that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed without prejudice to his right to amend.
A. The Prison Litigation Reform Act
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)) or seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity (28 U.S.C. § 1915A). The Court is required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis and seeking redress from governmental officers and employees.
B. Standard of Review
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) or § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, a court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 113-14 (3d Cir. 2002).
In reviewing a pro se plaintiff's complaint, the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to the pro se plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2008). A complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above a speculative level." Id. at 555. The court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Additionally, a civil rights claim "must contain specific allegations of fact which indicate a deprivation of constitutional rights; allegations which are nothing more than broad, simple and conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983." Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 1987).
Finally, a court must employ less stringent standards when considering pro se pleadings than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). In a section 1983 action, the court must "apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name." Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.") (citing Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1993)). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996).
C. Discussion
1. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the Westmoreland County Courts
Plaintiff has named as Defendants the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the Westmoreland County Courts. These Defendants are part of the "unified judicial system," and are therefore agencies of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. See Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 672 (3d Cir. 2000) ("All courts and agencies of the unified judicial system . . . are part of 'Commonwealth government' and thus are state rather than local agencies.") As such, they are both entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1981) ("The eleventh amendment's bar extends to suits against departments or agencies of the state having no existence apart from the state.") (citing Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)); see also Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the First Judicial District is a state entity and thus entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity).
Westmoreland County is part of the Tenth Judicial District. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 901(a). --------
The Eleventh Amendment bars civil rights suits against a State in federal court by private parties where the State has not consented to such action. Laskaris, 661 F.2d at 25 (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978)). The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently held that "an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974); see also Employees v. Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973). This immunity applies regardless of the relief sought by a party. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (holding Eleventh Amendment immunity applies "regardless of the nature of the relief sought.").
Eleventh Amendment immunity is subject to three exceptions: (1) congressional abrogation, (2) state waiver, and (3) suits against individual state officers for prospective relief to end an ongoing violation of federal law under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). MCI Telecommunication Corp. v. Bell Atlantic Pennsylvania, 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001). However, no exceptions are applicable here. Congress has not expressly abrogated Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity from civil rights suits for damages. See, e.g., Will, 491 U.S. at 66 ("Section 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties, but it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties."); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979); Boykin v. Bloomsburg Univ. of Pa., 893 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that States' immunity has not been abrogated for actions brought under §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986), aff'd, 91 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1996). Additionally, by statute, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has specifically withheld its consent to be sued. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8521(b); 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 2310; see also Laskaris, 661 F.2d at 25. Finally, the Ex parte Young exception does not apply because Plaintiff has not named any individual state officers. See MCI Telecommunication Corp., 271 F.3d at 506 (The Ex parte Young exception applies only in actions against individual state officers and not to state agencies); see also Law Offices of Lucas ex rel. Lucas v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of PA, 128 F. App'x 235, 237 (3d Cir. 2005). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Westmoreland County Courts are subject to dismissal since they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
2. Westmoreland County District Attorney's Office
Plaintiff has also named as a Defendant the Westmoreland County District Attorney's Office. However, a district attorney's office is not a "person" that can be sued within the meaning of § 1983. See Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 1997) (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant district attorney's office because it is not a legal entity for purposes of § 1983 liability). See also Lasko v. Leechburg Police Dep't, No. 12-1421, 2013 WL 2404145, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 31, 2013) (dismissing with prejudice the claims against the District Attorney's Office because it is not a "person" for purposes of § 1983 liability). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against the Westmoreland County District Attorney's Office are subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
3. Relief
Plaintiff states that the only relief he is seeking is pretrial release. However, such relief is not available in a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In this regard, the Supreme Court has held that "when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate or speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 533-34 (2011) (Where a petitioner does not seek an "injunction ordering . . . immediate or speedier release into the community . . . and a favorable judgment would not necessarily imply the invalidity of their convictions or sentence," he or she may "properly invoke[] § 1983."); Wallace v. Fegan, 455 F. App'x 137, 140 (3d Cir. 2011) (The plaintiff's "seeming challenge to pretrial incarceration seeks a remedy available only in habeas"). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot proceed by way of a civil rights action if pretrial release is the only relief he is seeking. See, e.g., Holland v. Rosen, 277 F.Supp.3d 707, 738 (D.N.J. Sept. 21, 2017) (finding that the plaintiff "properly invoked § 1983" because he did "not seek an injunction ordering his immediate or speedier release into the community, but rather an injunction ordering a hearing that conforms to his conception of his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.")
4. Amendment of Complaint
The court must allow amendment by a plaintiff in a civil rights case brought under § 1983 before dismissing for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, irrespective of whether it is requested, unless doing so would be "inequitable or futile." Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (asserting that where a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal pursuant to 12(b)(6), the district court must offer the opportunity to amend unless it would be inequitable or futile). In this case, it is not clear whether allowing for amendment by Plaintiff would necessarily be futile. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed without prejudice to his right to file an amended complaint.
III. CONCLUSION
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 16) be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). If the Court adopts this Report and Recommendation and Plaintiff subsequently fails to file an amended complaint within the time allowed, then it is recommended that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
In accordance with the applicable provisions of the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)&(C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of the service of this report and recommendation to file written objections thereto. Any party opposing such objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date on which the objections are served to file its response. A party's failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of that party's appellate rights.
Dated: June 10, 2020.
BY THE COURT:
/s/_________
LISA PUPO LENIHAN
United States Magistrate Judge Cc: Micheal P. Crawley
156-2020
Westmoreland County Prison
3000 South Grande Blvd.
Greensburg, PA 16501