Summary
affirming denial of new trial for ineffective assistance of counsel
Summary of this case from Crawford v. StateOpinion
No. A03-916.
Filed February 3, 2004.
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. 01006233.
Odell DePriest Crawford, Moose Lake, Mn, (pro se appellant)
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul, Mn and Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael K. Walz, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Mn, (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; and Stoneburner, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant Odell DePriest Crawford challenges the denial of his postconviction petition, arguing that his trial counsel improperly waived his right to a speedy trial, denying him his constitutional rights and effective assistance of counsel. Because these claims were known to appellant at the time of his direct appeal and not raised, we affirm.
DECISION I.
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his postconviction petition because his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated when his attorney waived that right outside his presence and without his knowledge. Appellant argues that this violation of his rights entitles him to a new trial.
Here, appellant had a direct appeal to this court in 2002. State v. Crawford, No. C4-01-2073, 2002 WL 31056664 (Minn. App. Sept. 17, 2002), review denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 2002). In that appeal, he raised challenges to the closure of the courtroom during trial, the admission of DNA test results, and jury instructions, and argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. Where direct appeal has been taken, no matters raised therein or claims known but not raised will be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief. State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976). At the postconviction hearing, appellant's trial counsel testified that the appellate attorney, while preparing appellant's direct appeal, asked him about the continuance "hearing" and he explained to her why the continuance was requested and that appellant had agreed to it. Thus, appellant knew of the speedy trial issue at the time of his direct appeal, but did not raise it in that appeal. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that appellant's claim is procedurally barred under Knaffla.
Moreover, even if appellant's claims were not procedurally barred, testimony at the postconviction hearing showed that appellant was aware that his counsel was requesting a trial continuance and that he agreed to the continuance at the time, thus waiving his right to a speedy trial. In light of this testimony, his counsel's decision to eschew a formal hearing did not amount to a violation of appellant's constitutional rights. And the postconviction court's denial of his petition has support in the record, and was not an abuse of discretion. Dukes v. State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 251 (Minn. 2001); State v. Hooper, 620 N.W.2d 31, 40 (Minn. 2000).