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holding that the rule announced in Miller constitutes a new rule under the Teague doctrine
Summary of this case from Chambers v. StateOpinion
No. 12-30035
01-04-2013
DALE DWAYNE CRAIG, Petitioner-Appellant v. BURL CAIN, WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY, Respondent-Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, Baton Rouge Before HIGGINBOTHAM, OWEN, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:
A member of this panel previously denied Dale Dwayne Craig's request for a certificate of appealability ("COA") to appeal from the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application. Craig has filed a motion asking this court to reconsider the denial in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). Additionally, Craig argues that his request for a COA was erroneously denied based on this court's application of the waiver doctrine.
In Miller, the Supreme Court held that "the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders." Id. at 2469. Craig was seventeen at the time of his offense. He was originally sentenced to death; however, his sentence was commuted to life without the possibility of parole following the Supreme Court's decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Miller was decided after 1997 when Craig's sentence became final, and Craig now seeks retroactive application of Miller in this collateral attack on his sentence.
A new rule is applied retroactively to cases on collateral review if it (1) "places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe" or (2) "requires the observance of those procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (internal quotations omitted).
A threshold inquiry is whether the rule in question constitutes a "new rule." E.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 411 (2004). "In general . . . a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government." Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. A rule is thus new "if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Id. When Craig's conviction became final, Miller was not dictated by precedent. Instead, Miller established for the first time a requirement of individualized sentencing outside the death penalty context. See 132 S. Ct. at 2470.
To overcome the general bar to retroactivity of new rules on collateral review, Craig must meet one of the two Teague exceptions. Teague, 489 U.S. 307. The first exception extends to "rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense." O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 157 (1997). This exception appears to apply only when a new rule completely removes a particular punishment from the list of punishments that can be constitutionally imposed on a class of defendants, not when a rule addresses the considerations for determining a sentence. For example, we have used Teague's first exception in applying prohibitions on the execution of defendants who are mentally handicapped or juveniles, and sentences of life imprisonment without parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses. Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir. 2002) (retroactively applying Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)); In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Arroyo v. Dretke, 362 F. Supp. 2d 859, 883 (W.D. Tex. 2005)) (Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)); Sparks, 657 F.3d at 262 (Graham v. Bell, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010)).
By contrast, the Supreme Court has denied retroactive application of prohibitions against weighing invalid aggravating circumstances in certain circumstances, imposition of a death sentence by a jury that has been led to believe responsibility for determining the appropriateness of a death sentence rests elsewhere, and capital-sentencing schemes that foreclose a jury from considering all mitigating evidence. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 539 (1997) (foreclosing retroactive application of Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992)); Sawyer v. Smith, 472 U.S. 227, 241 (1990) (Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985)); Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 (2004) (Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988)); see also Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (holding that a new rule prohibiting an antisympathy jury instruction did not fall under Teague's first exception).
The Miller "decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime . . . ." Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471. Miller does not satisfy the test for retroactivity because it does not categorically bar all sentences of life imprisonment for juveniles; Miller bars only those sentences made mandatory by a sentencing scheme. Id. at 2469. Therefore, the first Teague exception does not apply.
The second Teague exception is limited in scope. Beard, 542 U.S. at 417. This exception applies to "watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id.; Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quotation omitted). "In providing guidance as to what might fall within this exception, [the Court has] repeatedly referred to the rule of Gideon v. Wainwright [ ] and only to this rule." Beard, 542 U.S. at 417 (citations omitted). The Court has noted that "it should come as no surprise that we have yet to find a new rule that falls under the second Teague exception." Id.
The Supreme Court's decision in Miller is an outgrowth of the Court's prior decisions that pertain to individualized-sentencing determinations. The holding in Miller does not qualify as a "watershed rule[] of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." Beard, 542 U.S. at 417.
Craig also contends that this court erred in denying his COA based on waiver. At the outset, we note that Craig's COA was not denied based solely on his waiver of certain claims. Instead, it was denied based on his failure to make the requisite showing of "the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nonetheless, the order denying Craig's COA stated: "To the extent that he has not raised his underlying claims that his defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance and that defense counsel's admission of guilt constituted a guilty plea, he has abandoned those unraised issues." Craig failed to brief these issues in his COA motion; therefore, they were appropriately considered waived.
Craig's motion for reconsideration is DENIED. United States Court of Appeals FIFTH CIRCUIT
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
LYLE W. CAYCE CLERK
January 04, 2013 MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES LISTED BELOW: USCA No. 12-30035 Dale Craig v. Burl Cain, Warden
USDC No. 3:10-CV-766 Enclosed is an order entered in this case.
Sincerely,
LYLE W. CAYCE, Clerk
By:/s/_________
Sabrina B. Short, Deputy Clerk
504-310-7817 Mr. Colin Andrew Clark
Mr. John M. Landis