Opinion
No. 54448-9-I
Filed: May 9, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No: 03-2-12573-3. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 06/11/2004. Judge signing: Hon. Mary E Roberts.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Kevin Blair Hansen, Livengood Fitzgerald Alskog, 121 Third Ave, PO Box 908, Kirkland, WA 98083-0908.
James E. Hurt, Livengood Carter, 121 3rd Ave, PO Box 908, Kirkland, WA 98033-0908.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Magnus Rune Andersson, Hanson Baker Ludlow Drumheller PS, 10777 Main St Ste 300, Bellevue, WA 98004-5963.
In order to reach the merits of a case before it, a court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Absent jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, the trial court is powerless to pass on the merits of a controversy brought before it. Here, neither party disputes that there was no subject matter jurisdiction over the action that Leslie G. Coyle (Leslie) commenced in King County Superior Court. Accordingly, dismissal without prejudice was the limit of what the trial court was authorized to do. The trial court was not authorized to reach the merits of the action. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Proios v. Bokeir, 72 Wn. App. 193, 197, 863 P.2d 1363, 1365 (1993); State v. Swanson, 16 Wn. App. 179, 189, 554 P.2d 364 (1976).
State v. Northwest Magnesite Co., 28 Wn.2d 1, 42, 182 P.2d 643 (1947) (holding dismissal without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction was the limit of the court's power to act); see also Deaconess Hospital v. Washington State Highway Commission, 66 Wn.2d 378, 409, 403 P.2d 54 (1965).
Leslie and Christopher (Chris) Coyle's marriage was ended in August 1977 by decree of the Contra Costa Superior Court of California. The court ordered Chris to pay Leslie $200 per month for spousal support until she died, remarried, or by further order of the court. The orders were never modified by the court, and Leslie has never remarried.
We use the first names of the parties in this opinion for the sake of clarity.
Lael Stroh-Coyle (Lael) married Chris in 1982. Twenty years later, Chris was diagnosed with cancer and died in June 2002. After his death, Lael was appointed notice agent for his estate. No probate was opened.
In April 2003, Leslie obtained a writ of execution from the Contra Costa Superior Court in California based on her claim for spousal support arrearages for $145,986.00 with interest from the date of the writ. Leslie did not register a certified copy of the California judgment in King County before she filed a creditor's claim and this lawsuit.
In May 2004, the trial court granted summary judgment to Lael. The court ruled that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction in the case because Leslie had not yet registered her foreign divorce decree. But the court also held:
(1) Leslie Coyle waived her right to receive spousal support by telling Chris that she did not want to continue to receive the support; (2) Leslie was therefore estopped from enforcing the right to spousal support; (3) Leslie's suit was barred by the doctrine of laches; and (4) enforcement of the spousal support payments was barred by the statute of limitations.
The trial court denied Leslie's motion for reconsideration. Leslie appeals.
After summary dismissal of this suit, Leslie registered the California judgment in King County and commenced a second lawsuit for the same relief she seeks here.
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
While Leslie argues that the King County Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and thus dismissal was proper, she also argues that it did not have the authority to dismiss her lawsuit with prejudice. She further argues that the court had no authority to make any of the other rulings that it did. We agree.
We may affirm an order granting summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review the granting of such motions de novo. Courts have been quite clear in stating that in order to reach the merits of a case before it, a court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and over the parties. Subject matter jurisdiction is `the authority of the court to hear and determine the class of actions to which the case belongs.' Absent jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, the trial court is powerless to pass on the merits of a controversy brought before it. `The rule is well known and universally respected that a court lacking jurisdiction of any matter may do nothing [more] other than enter an order of dismissal.' Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide a case is a question of law that we review de novo.
CR 56(c).
Mains Farm Homeowners Ass'n v. Worthington, 121 Wn.2d 810, 813, 854 P.2d 1072 (1993).
Proios, 72 Wn. App. at 197; Swanson, 16 Wn. App. at 189.
In the Matter of the Adoption of Buehl, 87 Wn.2d 649, 655, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976).
Northwest Magnesite Co., 28 Wn.2d at 42; Deaconess Hospital, 66 Wn.2d at 409.
Deschenes v. King County, 83 Wn.2d 714, 716, 521 P.2d 1181 (1974).
Bour v. Johnson, 80 Wn. App. 643, 647, 910 P.2d 548 (1996).
There are no material disputed facts here. Thus, the question of the scope of relief the court granted in this case is one of law.
Like many other states, Washington enacted the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), RCW 26.21. Washington courts recognize the continuing and exclusive jurisdiction of another state's court over a support order issued under laws similar to the laws of our state. Under UIFSA, a person seeking to enforce a support order issued by another state must first register it here. Absent registration, there can be no subject matter jurisdiction under UIFSA to pursue this lawsuit.
In re Marriage of Erickson, 98 Wn. App. 892, 896, 991 P.2d .
RCW 26.21.115(4).
RCW 26.21.500 states:
(1) A support order or income-withholding order issued in another state is registered when the order is filed in the registering tribunal of this state.
(2) A registered order issued in another state is enforceable in the same manner and is subject to the same procedures as an order issued by a tribunal of this state.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in this article, a tribunal of this state shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify, a registered order if the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction.
RCW 26.21.490 describes the procedure to register a support order issued by another state; RCW 26.21.560.
Here, Leslie admits that she did not register the divorce decree in Washington before starting this suit. Thus, there was no subject matter jurisdiction under UIFSA for our courts to act other than to dismiss this case.
Leslie's situation is similar to that of the former wife in In re the Marriage of Erickson. In that case, the former wife and the parties' children moved to Washington from California following the divorce and petitioned a Washington court to modify the child and spousal support orders entered in California. There, the Washington court held that it did not assume subject matter jurisdiction over the enforcement of the California child support order where the mother did not register the order in Washington.
Similarly, in Scanlon v. Witrak the court held that a Washington order for support arrearage infringed on continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of a foreign state's courts in connection with matters relating to child support. After a Washington court awarded the arrearage, the former husband filed a CR 60(b) motion based in part on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The former husband resided out-of-state and neither former spouse registered their out-of-state decree in Washington, as required by UIFSA. The court concluded that Washington did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case because of the unregistered out-of-state decree and reversed the trial court's denial of the appellant's 60(b) motion. Lael submitted Escude ex rel. Escude v. King County Public Hosp. Dist. No. 2 to this court as additional authority that the trial court correctly dismissed Leslie's case with prejudice. However, Escude involved a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal under CR 41 where the court had jurisdiction, but the statute of limitations had run.
110 Wn. App. 682, 42 P.3d 447, review denied, 147 Wn.2d 1024 (2002).
RCW 26.21.490; Scanlon, 110 Wn. App. at 682.
117 Wn. App. 183, 69 P.3d 895 (2003).
Here, Leslie did not move to voluntarily dismiss her lawsuit. Since the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, dismissal with prejudice was not appropriate.
Moreover, case authority makes clear that the absence of subject matter jurisdiction precludes the court from making any further rulings, as it did here.
In State v. Northwest Magnesite, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants and therefore `had no power to pass upon the merits of the state's case as against those parties' and could only dismiss the case without prejudice. Similarly, because the trial court here lacks power to pass on the merits of this case, it is also precluded from making any substantive rulings other than dismissal without prejudice.
We conclude the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting the motion to dismiss with prejudice.
ATTORNEY FEES
Leslie asserts she is entitled to attorney fees on appeal based on RCW 11.96A.150. It provides that `[e]ither the superior court or the court on appeal may, in its discretion, order costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, to be awarded to any party: (a) From any party to the proceedings in such amount and in such manner as the court determines to be equitable.' We exercise our discretion and deny Leslie's request for relief under this statute.
We affirm the summary judgment of dismissal but reverse the determination that the dismissal is with prejudice as well as the other substantive determinations of the order.
KENNEDY and APPELWICK, JJ., concur.