Opinion
[17 Ark.App. 95-A] COOPER, Judge.
The appellant's petition for rehearing contends that we misapplied the law when we found a general reservation of jurisdiction sufficient to render Ark.R.Civ.P. 60 inapplicable. 17 Ark.App. 93, 704 S.W.2d 171. We do not agree.
[17 Ark.App. 95-B] The appellant contends that the Supreme Court, in Fullerton v. Fullerton, 230 Ark. 539, 323 S.W.2d 926 (1959), held that a specific identification of reserved issues is necessary to bypass the time limitations for modification of a decree. We do not read Fullerton to so hold. In Fullerton, the Court found that, because the parties had specifically stated in the pleadings that no property rights were at issue in the case and because the decree did not make any disposition of realty, the general reservation of jurisdiction (virtually identical to the one in the case at bar) could not apply to questions concerning real property. The Court went on to point out that the reservation properly reserved the issue of alimony for modification, as it had been raised before the court in the original action. Cf. Fullerton v. Fullerton, 233 Ark. 656, 348 S.W.2d 689 (1961) (holding that the same parties were not barred by res judicata from asserting property rights not adjudicated in the original decree). See also Horn v. Horn, 232 Ark. 723, 339 S.W.2d 852 (1960) (distinguishing Fullerton v. Fullerton, 230 Ark. 539, 323 S.W.2d 926 (1959), when it held that a general reservation of jurisdiction was sufficient to give the original court jurisdiction over an attempt to collect dower awarded in the original divorce decree from property transferred to a third party in a different county).
The other cases cited by the appellant, purporting to approve her definition of the holding of Fullerton, are likewise inapposite. In both Collie v. Collie, 242 Ark. 297, 413 S.W.2d 42 (1967), and Harrison v. Bradford, 9 Ark.App. 156, 655 S.W.2d 466 (1983), Fullerton was cited for the general proposition that a decree may not be modified after the expiration of the "term time" (now ninety days under Ark.R.Civ.P. 60), absent statutory grounds. Neither Collie nor Harrison were concerned with the reservation of jurisdiction by the court. Furthermore, Collie deals with an independent property settlement, which may not be modified by the chancellor even if jurisdiction is retained, and Harrison, like Fullerton, dealt with the disposition of property which was not involved in the original action.
Here, unlike the situations in the above cited cases, the chancellor reserved jurisdiction and had the issue of tax liability before him in the original action. The issue having been originally brought before the chancellor, his general reservation of jurisdiction was sufficient to allow him to modify the decree. Petition denied.
CLONINGER and MAYFIELD, JJ., agree.