Opinion
36457.
DECIDED JANUARY 30, 1957. REHEARING DENIED FEBRUARY 14, 1957.
Workmen's compensation. Before Judge Harrison. Chatham Superior Court. August 22, 1956.
McGowan McGowan, for plaintiff in error.
Connerat, Dunn, Hunter, Cubbedge Houlihan, contra.
The Superior Court of Chatham County erred in sustaining the award of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation, and the case is remanded to the board for a de novo proceeding regarding the facts relative to the alleged claim.
DECIDED JANUARY 30, 1957 — REHEARING DENIED FEBRUARY 14, 1957.
This case arose under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. On March 17, 1955, Elliott P. Coulter filed a claim against his employer and its insurance carrier, in which he stated that he was injured March 22, 1954, by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and was thereby compelled to quit work on March 22, 1954, because of a severe back sprain and ruptured disc; that by reason of this alleged disability he had been unable to work since March 22, 1954, and would very likely be disabled for approximately 52 weeks from the date of the application and that he had been unable to reach an agreement with his employer.
The case was called for a hearing on December 5, 1955, by a single director, who found against the claimant. The case was appealed to the full board and resulted in an affirmance of the finding of facts and award of the single director against the claimant. The single director found facts as follows: "From the stipulations made and the evidence presented at the hearing, I find as a matter of fact that Elliott P. Coulter was an employee of the Steel Products Company on or about March 22, 1954, at an average weekly wage of $43.55. Claimant contends that he is totally disabled as a result of an accidental injury which arose out of and in the course of this employment on said date. The evidence shows that the claimant returned to work on March 22, 1954, after having been operated on for appendicitis. The evidence further shows that the claimant worked only one hour on said date. The claimant contends that during that hour he was stacking lumber and felt a sharp pain in his back and for that reason he was compelled to quit work. The claimant admits that he did not report this injury to his foreman or any person in supervisory authority at the Steel Products Company. Contention of the employer in this case is that the claimant stopped work on March 22, because he was still unable physically to do the work because of his appendicitis operation and subsequent to March 22 he was paid under the group insurance policy the compensation he was entitled to for sick benefits.
"Section 114-303 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides that an injured employee or his representative shall immediately report the occurrence of any accident occurring while the employee is on the job. The act provides that if such notice can not be given immediately it should be given as soon as it is practicable and if such notice is not given within thirty days, written notice is required. The act further provides that no compensation is payable unless such notice is given within thirty days after the occurrence of an accident.
"From all evidence presented at the hearing, I find as a matter of fact that the claimant herein failed to comply with § 114-303 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and because of such noncompliance is not entitled to compensation benefits."
The award reads as follows: "Wherefore, based on the above finding of fact, the claim of Elliott P. Coulter against the Steel Products Company and/or Royal Indemnity Company, carrier, is hereby denied." The claimant appealed the case to the Superior Court of Chatham County. That court affirmed the finding of facts and award of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation and the case is here for review.
For the requirements as to notice of accident, see Code §§ 114-303 and 114-304. Counsel for the claimant contends that notice as required by law was given and that therefore the award was based on an erroneous finding of fact and conclusion which was not sustained by evidence or law. The evidence shows that, immediately after the accident in question the claimant's foreman got the claimant's time card and sent the claimant to the personnel office to be checked out; that the personnel officer was in a meeting and was contacted by telephone by his secretary; that the secretary was told to tell the claimant to get a doctor's certificate, without further direction; that the claimant left immediately and consulted a doctor connected with the Veterans Administration and was hospitalized for a long length of time. The claimant testified that his wife went to the personnel office two days after the accident and reported the accident. D. S. Powell, a witness for the claimant, who worked along with the claimant, testified that Mr. Vickery, the claimant's immediate supervisor, told the claimant to go up a ladder, which he did. The supervisor then told the claimant to pile some 36 to 40 lengths of two-by-four lumber; that when the claimant piled the lumber he "caught his back"; that Mr. Vickery called the claimant to tell him to go to the personnel office. A witness for the employer and insurance carrier stated that the claimant's wife came in two days after the accident to get some insurance forms or pick up compensation check and in the conversation she stated that the claimant was hurt, but the witness testified that the claimant's wife denied that the claimant was hurt on the job.
Inasmuch as the award of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation was based in its entirety on alleged lack of notice, we will deal with this point only. The award does not question benefits due or not due. We concede, as counsel for the employer and/or insurance carrier aver, that an award made on finding of facts, supported by any evidence, must be affirmed by this court. This has been uniformly held by the appellate courts of Georgia. It has also been held equally consistently, that the Workmen's Compensation Act is remedial in its nature and must be liberally construed to effect its beneficent purpose although it is in derogation of common law. See Davis v. Bibb Mfg. Co., 75 Ga. App. 515 ( 43 S.E.2d 780), wherein it is held that a liberal construction must be given to the Workmen's Compensation Act to effectuate the humane purposes for which it was enacted. See also Lumbermen's Mutual Cas. Co. v. Griggs, 190 Ga. 277, 287 ( 9 S.E.2d 84). In the Davis case the court said at page 519: "In order to render any finding of fact demanded as a matter of law, not only must there be no controversy in the evidence material to the issue involved, but the implications and inferences which logically and properly arise from the evidence must necessarily lead to only the one conclusion." In Davison-Paxon Co. v. Ford, 88 Ga. App. 890, 892 ( 788 S.E.2d 257), it is held also: "No defect or inaccuracy in the notice shall be a bar to compensation unless the employer shall prove that his interest was prejudiced thereby, and then only to the extent of the prejudice." James v. Fite, 38 Ga. App. 759 ( 145 S.E. 536) is not applicable to the facts of the instant case inasmuch as there was no dispute as to notice in that case. Not so in the instant case. In Railway Express Agency v. Harper, 70 Ga. App. 795 (1) ( 29 S.E.2d 434), the court said: "The evidence authorized the finding that the notice of injury given by the employee to one of his superiors, was sufficient." Also on page 796 of the same case the court held: "The board was authorized to find from the evidence that the employee notified Mr. Cain immediately that he thought he had hurt himself. The employer concedes that Mr. Cain was the employee's superior. The evidence is conflicting on the question whether Mr. Cain referred the employee to another of his superiors, and also as to whether Mr. Cain reported to the other superior what the employee had told him. . . We do not understand that the notice of an injury must be given with a view to a claim of compensation at the time it is given. We think a notice is sufficient which will put the employer on notice of the injury so that he may make an investigation if he sees fit to do so. An employee should not be penalized because he did not consider his injury serious enough to contend immediately that he was entitled to compensation." See Armour Co. v. Little, 83 Ga. App. 762 ( 64 S.E.2d 707), wherein the court said: "Where the question is one of fact, the award will be affirmed if there is any competent evidence to sustain it . . . or if the evidence, construed in its light most favorable to the employer, would authorize the award ( Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Sockwell, 58 Ga. App. 111, 114, 197 S.E. 647; Merry Bros. v. Holmes, supra [ 57 Ga. App. 281, 195 S.E. 223]). But where the award is based upon an erroneous conclusion drawn from the facts and the law applicable thereto, then it is proper for the judge of the superior court to reverse the award and to enter the proper judgment under the law and the facts of the case. Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Clark, 75 Ga. App. 453 ( 43 S.E.2d 752); Hall v. Kendall, 81 Ga. App. 592 (1), 59 S.E.2d 421)."
Let us remember the testimony of the claimant and the claimant's wife that she gave notice to the employer. She was definitely a representative of the claimant. It is to be remembered also that a fellow employee testified that the employer had notice by knowing of the injury. It is remembered also that the foreman got the claimant's time card and sent the claimant to the personnel office to be checked out, and the personnel officer through his agent (his secretary) gave instructions for the claimant to get a doctor's certificate; that the employer prepared a defense and appearance was made to defend the interest of the employer and/or the insurance carrier; that the employer and/or the insurance carrier had the claimant examined by two doctors, i.e., Dr. Rabun and Dr. Amburge; that the insurance carrier took a statement from V. S. Powell, a fellow worker of the claimant, and that numerous personnel of the employer testified at the hearing. This shows diligence on the part of the employer and the insurance carrier to defend the claim. There is no evidence that their interests were prejudiced. The record shows that the claimant and his wife were ignorant regarding the Workmen's Compensation Act and the possible benefits to be derived therefrom, and in view of this it is our opinion that the act must be construed to take care of this humane element particularly in view of the fact that the claimant and his wife did very well indeed in giving notice. It has been held that where a claimant is uneducated and did not understand the difference between insurance and workmen's compensation he would not be estopped from receiving benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act. See Georgia Marble Co. v. McBee, 90 Ga. App. 406 ( 83 S.E.2d 253). And the record in the instant case shows that the claimant and his wife did not know of such difference.
In view of all the record in this case it is our opinion that the Superior Court of Chatham County erred in affirming the award of the full board of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation, such an award being the affirmance of the award of the single director, and the case should be remanded to the State Board of Workmen's Compensation as a de novo proceeding, to produce an award based on facts concerning the alleged injury and to make an award on said facts as the facts might authorize.
Judgment reversed and remanded with direction. Townsend and Carlisle, JJ., concur.