Opinion
In case an emergency arises which renders a courthouse unsuitable for use, as by reason of its destruction by fire or extensive repairs being made to the building, the court may be lawfully adjourned to another building in the same town, in case one is available. When an earlier and a later statute can be reconciled, it is the duty of the court to so construe them that the latter may not operate as a repeal of the former. The plaintiff was tried and convicted of a crime at a criminal session of the Superior Court in Litchfield County held at the county courthouse in Winchester, the court having been opened at Litchfield and then adjourned to Winchester because extensive repairs of the courthouse in Litchfield made it unusable and there was no other suitable building in that town. A statute concerning court accommodations directs the county commissioners to provide suitable accommodations for the Superior and Common Pleas Courts in their respective counties where there is no suitable place therefor. An Act passed in 1929 provides that criminal sessions of the Superior Court in Litchfield County shall be held in Litchfield but it did not expressly repeal the other statute nor contain any general repealing clause. Held: 1. That there is no repugnancy between the statutes and the 1929 Act did not repeal the Act concerning court accommodations. 2. That under the emergency the adjournment to another courthouse already furnished by the county commissioners in the county was lawful, and the court so held was a legal session of the Superior Court.
Argued April 23d 1931
Decided June 22d 1931.
APPLICATION for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, where the questions of law arising upon the applicant's demurrer to the respondent's return and reply were reserved by the court, Jennings, J., for the advice of this court. Superior Court advised to overrule demurrer to the second defense of respondent's reply.
Francis P. Guilfoile, for the applicant.
Walter Holcomb, State's Attorney, for the respondent.
The application for the writ is made by Joseph Costa, claiming that he is unlawfully imprisoned by the warden of the Connecticut state prison. The warden filed a return, setting forth that the applicant was detained by virtue of a mittimus of commitment dated November 15th, 1929, and issued by order of the Superior Court, then holden in and for Litchfield County, reciting his conviction November 13th, 1929, for the crime of injury by dynamiting, and a sentence of imprisonment in the state prison. To this return, the applicant answered that the warrant of commitment was void because it was issued from an alleged criminal session of the Superior Court, purporting to have been held in the town of Winchester in Litchfield County November 15th, 1929, and that Chapter 232 of the Public Acts of 1929 provides that criminal sessions of the Superior Court for Litchfield County shall be held in the town of Litchfield. The answer further averred that the judge presiding over the September criminal session of the Superior Court in Litchfield adjourned the session from Litchfield to Winchester, and there, assembled with the clerk and other court officials, attempted to try the applicant, and that the Superior Court had no jurisdiction, since it was not held at the place and time authorized by law, namely, the town of Litchfield.
To this answer, the respondent filed a reply, admitting that the September criminal session of the Superior Court for Litchfield County was adjourned from Litchfield to Winchester; and, by way of second defense, alleged the following: On the first Tuesday of September, 1929, the county courthouse at Litchfield, and the Superior Court room therein, were unusable for the purpose of holding court because of extensive repairs then being made, and continued so to December 10th, 1929. There were no places, during this period, suitable, adequate and obtainable in the town of Litchfield for the purpose of holding criminal sessions of the Superior Court. At Winsted, town of Winchester, Litchfield County, there was and is a Superior Court room regularly used for the trial of civil causes and suitable for the trial of criminal cases. On the first Tuesday of September, 1929, at which time the session for the transaction of criminal or civil business was fixed by statute to open, the court was, at the direction of the Honorable Edwin C. Dickenson, judge thereof, assigned to hold the same, opened at Litchfield and adjourned to Winsted, where it was thereafter opened and adjourned from time to time until November 13th, 1929, when the court was open and in session. The State's Attorney for Litchfield County duly gave and sent out notices in writing to parties accused of crime named in the trial list of criminal cases, and to their attorneys to appear before the court in the courthouse at Winsted on Wednesday, October 2d 1929, at ten o'clock in the forenoon, and plead to the information for which they were charged, and make their election of trial to court or jury — a copy of which trial list is annexed to and made part of the second defense. On or about October 21st, 1929, the applicant, with two others, was arrested in Torrington, Connecticut, and held on the charge of attempting to cause injury to the person and property of Thomas J. Wall, and family, in Torrington, by the use of an explosive compound, placed and exploded against his dwelling-house. Later, about October 31st, 1929, the applicant was put to plea in the town of Winchester in Litchfield County in the courthouse in Winsted on this charge, and pleaded not guilty, and elected to be tried by the court. On November 13th, 1929, the applicant was presented in court in the courthouse in Winsted, and trial of the action was started, and evidence was heard and concluded November 15th, 1929. At the conclusion of the trial, the applicant was, by the Superior Court, found guilty as charged in the information, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the Connecticut state prison at Wethersfield for not less than ten nor more than fifteen years. During all of the trial and at the conclusion thereof, Costa was represented by counsel, who cross-examined witnesses for the State, and examined witnesses on behalf of the applicant, who himself took the witness stand and testified. No question or doubt or claim was expressed either by the accused or his attorneys to the Superior Court or the judge thereof, or arose in or during the course of the trial, that the Superior Court was without right, authority or jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the prosecution under the information at Winsted. The crime charged in the information was committed in the town of Torrington in Litchfield County as alleged in the information, and postponement of the trial of the applicant until completion of the courthouse at Litchfield would have deprived him of that speedy trial guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Connecticut. Following the conclusion of the trial and the passing of sentence upon him, the accused, November 19th, 1929, by his attorneys, gave notice of appeal, and filed a draft of a proposed finding. On December 2d 1929, the State's Attorney filed his request for a counter-finding, and December 10th, 1929, the judge of the court filed his finding, a copy of which is annexed to and made a part of the answer. Since that time, no steps have been taken to perfect the appeal.
To this reply of the respondent, the applicant demurred, and the substance of his demurrer is that § 2 of Chapter 232 of the Public Acts of 1929 (appended in the footnote), providing for civil and criminal terms and sessions of the Superior Court, requires that the sessions for criminal business on the first Tuesday of September, January, April and June be held at Litchfield; and that the judge holding the session had no power or authority to open court at Litchfield and then adjourn to Winchester in that county, and there continue the session; and that the judgment of the Superior Court is void because the court was held at Winchester and not at Litchfield as provided by law.
Upon stipulation of the parties, the cause was reserved for the advice of this court and the questions propounded, so far as necessary to be noticed, are as follows: (a) What disposition should the trial court make of the demurrer to the reply? (b) Did the court have jurisdiction to hold a session for the transaction of criminal business at any other place than the town of Litchfield in the county of Litchfield? (c) Under the circumstances shown by the finding, and under the law, was the September, 1929, session of the Superior Court legally held at Winsted?
From the allegations of the second defense of the reply, it appears that on the first Tuesday of September, 1929, at the time the session for the transaction of civil or criminal business was fixed by statute to open, the county courthouse and the Superior Court room therein at Litchfield were unusable for the purpose of holding court because of extensive repairs then being made, which condition continued to December 10th, 1929. It is further alleged that there were no suitable places obtainable in the town of Litchfield for the purpose of holding criminal sessions of the Superior Court; and that at Winsted, there was a Superior Court room regularly used for the trial of civil causes and suitable for the trial of criminal cases. Under these circumstances, the judge was confronted with an unavoidable emergency which made it necessary to hold the court in some building other than the courthouse at Litchfield. We think the better reasoning supports the view that in case an emergency arises which renders a courthouse unsuitable for use, as by reason of its destruction by fire or extensive repairs being made to the building, the court may be lawfully adjourned to another building in the same town, in case one is available. Litchfield Bank v. Church, 29 Conn. 137, 147; Matter of Moran, 203 U.S. 96, 27 Sup. Ct. 25, 26; Brookhaven Lumber Mfg. Co. v. Adams, 132 Miss. 689, 97 So. 484, 485; Beville v. State, 61 Fla. 8, 55 So. 854, 855; Mell v. State, 133 Ark. 197, 202 S.W. 33; Lee v. State, 56 Ark. 4, 19 S.W. 16; Hudspeth v. State, 55 Ark. 323, 18 S.W. 183; Funk v. Carroll County, 96 Iowa 158, 64 N.W. 768; Lane v. State, 59 Tex.Crim. 595, 129 S.W. 353, 360; People v. Thorn, 156 N.Y. 286, 50 N.E. 947, 951; Law v. Falls, 109 Ark. 395, 159 S.W. 1130, 1131; Hamblin v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. 364, 233 P. 337, 43 A. L. R. 1509, 1542.
General Statutes, § 5425, provides: "COURT ACCOMMODATIONS. The county commissioners shall provide suitable quarters and furniture necessary for holding the Superior Court and Court of Common Pleas in their respective counties when there is no suitable place therefor. . . ." This section was in force in 1929. It is to be noted that the Act appended in the footnote repeals a number of statutory provisions, but does not expressly repeal § 5425, nor does it contain any general repealing clause. There is no repugnancy between the statutes; and we think there is no repeal by implication. Such repeals are not favored, and when an earlier and later statute can be reconciled, it is the duty of the court to so construe them that the latter may not operate as a repeal of the former. Fair Haven W. R. Co. v. New Haven, 75 Conn. 442, 447, 53 A. 960; State ex rel. Wallen v. Hatch, 82 Conn. 122, 125, 72 A. 575; Root v. Connecticut Co., 94 Conn. 227, 235, 108 A. 506; Walsh v. Bridgeport, 88 Conn. 528, 534, 91 A. 969; Walgreen Co. v. Industrial Commission, 323 Ill. 194, 153 N.E. 831, 48 A. L. R. 1199, 1201. As there was no building at Litchfield suitable for holding the session of the Superior Court, the judge assigned to hold the same could, under the emergency then existing, lawfully adjourn to another suitable courthouse already provided by the county commissioners in the county. The court so held at Winchester, pursuant to such adjournment, was a legal session of the Superior Court.
To question (a), we answer, the Superior Court is advised to overrule the demurrer to the reply filed March 10th, 1931; to questions (b) and (c), we answer, Yes. As this disposes of the case, it is unnecessary to answer the other questions reserved.