Opinion
Civil Action No. AW-99-3101.
November 28, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Currently pending before the Court is Defendants', Prince George's County, Maryland and Major W. Johnson, joint motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim. This case arises from the suicide of Antonio Cortez while he was detained at the Prince George's County Correctional Center. Violet Cortez, the mother of the deceased, filed this action, individually and as the personal representative of the Estate of Antonio Cortez.
Plaintiff's five-count complaint alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state law negligence claims based upon wrongful death and survival, and violations of Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. In her complaint, Plaintiff, initially, named five defendants: Prince George's County, Maryland; Samuel Saxton (Director, P.G. Dept. of Corrections); Amelia Francis (P.G. County Health Dept.); Ben Yue (P.G. County Health Dept.); and Major W. Johnson (Shift Commander, P.G. Dept. of Corrections). In memorandum opinions dated April 28, 2000 and May 30, 2000, this Court dismissed Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Defendant Yue and dismissed Samuel Saxton and Amelia Francis from the case. As a result, Plaintiff's remaining claims include her pendent state tort claims against Defendant Yue and her federal and state claims against Defendants, Major W. Johnson and Prince George's County.
The County and Defendant Johnson have jointly moved to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims against them for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff failed to file an opposition to the Defendants' 12(b)(6) motion. No hearing is deemed necessary. See Local Rule 105.6. Upon careful consideration of the pleadings and Defendants' motion, the Court shall grant Defendants' motion.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Antonio Cortez was a detainee at the Prince George's County Correctional Center. On October 14, 1996, at approximately 2:00 a.m., he was found hanging in his cell. Allegedly, Mr. Cortez hung himself with his shoelaces from the top of the bunkbed. The medical examiner ruled Mr.Cortez's death to be a suicide. Plaintiff alleges that Antonio Cortez, while he was in the care of prison officials, suffered from a mental illness and was suicidal. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed to properly treat Mr. Cortez's mental condition during his detainment, ultimately leading to his suicide.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court should not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The function of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Neitzeke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989). In determining whether to dismiss the complaint, this Court must view the well-pleaded material allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, with the alleged facts accepted as true. See Chisolm v. TranSouth Financial Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 334 (4th Cir. 1996).
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Counts III (Denial of Medical Care) and IV (Denial of Protection from Harm)
In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, collectively, failed to timely and fully assess the decedent's mental condition, provide him with adequate medical diagnosis and treatment, and adequately train correction officials to be responsive to the decedent's medical needs. According to Plaintiff, these deficiencies constituted deliberate indifference to her son's constitutional rights in violation of § 1983. Defendant Prince George's County contends that Plaintiff has failed to allege a factual basis for imputing liability to the County and Mr. Johnson under § 1983.
1. Liability of Prison Official
Given that prisoners, such as the decedent, are in the custody of the state, the law imputes a duty upon the state and prison officials to provide adequate medical treatment, including psychiatric or psychological therapy. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285 (1976); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977); Stokes v. Hurdle, 393 F. Supp. 757 (D.Md.), aff'd, 535 F.2d 1250 (4th Cir. 1975). In order to state a legally cognizable claim for failure to provide medical care under § 1983, the prison must allege deliberate indifference to his or her medical needs by the state or its prison officials. See Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1990). The Supreme court has defined "deliberate indifference" to mean that the prison official must know of and disregard an excessive risk to the inmate's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). The officer must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Id. at 837. The Fourth Circuit has held that the mere failure of prison officials to provide medical treatment and screening and to remove the belt and shoes of a detainee, who then later committed suicide, did not amount to "deliberate indifference" where no objective evidence existed to indicate that the detainee had a serious need for such attention. Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1990).
In this case, Plaintiff's complaint alleges that the decedent "exhibited specific symptomatogly which warranted full psychiatric assessment and treatment . . .", but fails to cite any behavior by Mr. Cortez that "would have indicated to the officers that he posed a risk of suicide or that they should take any additional action." Likewise, the complaint fails to assert facts indicating that Mr. Johnson or other prison officials had any reason to know that Mr. Cortez was suicidal. Even under the liberal system of "notice pleading" of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the claimant must still "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . .claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 163 (1993) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.Ct. at 103). The law simply does not recognize "an absolute right to be protected from committing suicide or from other sorts of harm while incarcerated . . . [where] the officers have [no] reason to know that such harm was likely to occur." Belcher, 898 F.2d at 36. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Defendant Johnson must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
2. Municipal Liability of Prince George's County
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "to establish liability on behalf of the entity, it must be shown that the actions of the officers were unconstitutional and were taken pursuant to a custom or policy of the entity." Giancola v. State of W. Va. Dept. of Public Safety, 830 F.2d 547, 550 (4th Cir. 1987 ). Nevertheless, a claim of "inadequate training of personnel at the jail is unavailing where there has been no underlying constitutional infraction." Belcher, 898 F.2d at 36; see also Lytle v. Brewer, 77 F. Supp.2d 730, 743 (E.D.Va. 1999) ("[S]ingle assertion that all of the acts alleged in the Complaint occurred pursuant to the City's custom, etc., is not sufficient to put the a municipal defendant on notice of the claims alleged."). Here, Plaintiff only asserts that the County's custom and policy led to Mr. Cortez's death. As discussed above, Plaintiff has not plead sufficient facts to give rise to a constitutional deprivation under § 1983. In the absence of an underlying constitutional deprivation, Plaintiff's complaint reveals no basis for imputing liability to the municipality, Prince George's County. See Giancola, 830 F.2d at 550. Therefore, the Court grants Prince George's County's motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff's § 1983 claims.
C. Counts I (Survival Action and II (Wrongful Death) — Negligence
Even though the Court has dismissed Plaintiff's federal claims, "[t]he doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction indicates that federal courts generally have discretion to retain or dismiss state law claims when the federal basis for an action drops away." Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 109 (4th Cir. 1995). In its prior memorandum opinions, this Court stated that it will exercise supplement jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). In exercising its power of supplemental jurisdiction, the Court applies the substantive laws of the forum state, Maryland. See, e.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges the decedent's suicide was the result of Defendants' negligence in failing to properly hire, train and supervise correctional employees and take certain precautionary measures to prevent the decedent's suicide. Defendants Johnson and Prince George's County assert that, under Maryland law, they enjoy qualified immunity against such negligence actions absent a showing of malice.
Under Maryland law, governmental immunity extends to all nonmalicious acts of public officials acting in a discretionary capacity. See James v. Prince George's County, 288 Md. 315, 418 A.2d 1173 (1980); Williams v. Prince George's County, 112 Md. App. 526, 685 A.2d 884 (1996). Section 5-507(b)(1) of Md. Code Ann., Cts. Jud. Proc. specifically states that
an official of a municipal corporation while acting in a discretionary capacity, without malice, and within the scope of the official's employment or authority shall be immune as an official or individual from any civil liability for the performance of the action.
"Maryland case law has affirmatively established that, while performing their duties, law enforcement officers are public officials and, thus, fall within the scope of qualified immunity as to their discretionary acts." Williams v. Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 138, 753 A.2d 41 (2000). One Maryland court has determined that prison guards are public officials for purposes of qualified immunity. Carder v. Steiner, 170 A.2d 220, 221 (Md. 1961) (proof of malice required to establish assault and battery against prison guard), overruled on other grounds, James v. Prince George's County, 288 Md. 315, 418 A.2d 1173 (Md. 1980); see generally, Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 98 S.Ct. 855, 862 (1978) (finding prison officials ere entitled to qualified immunity for alleged civil rights violations); Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399, 411, 412 (5th Cir. 1978). Thus, as a supervisory corrections officer, Defendant Johnson enjoys qualified immunity for his discretionary acts. The alleged failure of Defendant Johnson to supervise the attending correctional officers and attend to Mr.Cortez during his detainment are acts invoking Mr. Johnson's personal judgment and, thus, fall within the ambit of his discretionary powers as shift commander of the Department of Corrections
For purposes of qualified immunity, Maryland courts define malice as "an act without legal justification or excuse, but with an evil or rancorous motive influenced by hate, the purpose being to deliberately and wilfully injure the plaintiff." Thomas v. City of Annapolis, 113 Md. App. 440, 455, 688 A.2d 448, 455 (1997) (quoting Leese v. Baltimore County, 64 Md. App. 442, 480, 497 A.2d 159 (1985)). The complaint before the Court avers no acts by Mr. Johnson by which the Court could infer malicious intent, but merely alleges negligence in the failure to take sufficient actions to prevent Mr. Cortez's suicide. Therefore, Plaintiff's negligence claims against Defendant Johnson must be dismissed.
Under § 5-303(e) of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA), the local governmental entity may assert any common law or statutory defense or immunity possessed by its employees. Md. Code Ann., Cts Jud.Proc. § 5-303(e) (1998); see Thomas, 113 Md. App. at 440. Therefore, Prince George's County may assert Defendant Johnson's qualified immunity defense. Accord Williams v. Prince George's County, 112 Md. App. 526, 685 A.2d 884 (1996). Accordingly, the Court grants Prince George's County motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff's state negligence claims.
D. Count V — Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
"In Maryland, qualified immunity does not apply to constitutional claims." Williams, 112 Md. App. at 546, 685 A.2d 884 at 894. Nevertheless, "it is settled beyond dispute that Maryland's Article [24] protects the same interests as the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore § 1983." Davidson v. Koerber, 454 F. Supp. 1256, 1260 (D.Md. 1978). Likewise, Article 26 of the Maryland Constitution is in pari materia with the prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures embodied in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the federal constitution. Bass v. State, 182 Md. 496, 35 A.2d 155 (1943) Therefore, the factual deficiencies that supported dismissal of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims apply with equal force to the claims brought pursuant to Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Plaintiff's complaint does not allege any inappropriate searches or contest the validity of Mr. Cortez's detainment. Plaintiff simply has not alleged conduct on the part of Mr. Johnson in the suicide of Mr. Cortez that supports a deprivation of Mr. Cortez's constitutional rights under the federal or state constitutions. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff's Maryland constitutional claims.
III. SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
Given this Court's current disposition, Plaintiff's only remaining claims consisted of the state tort claims against Defendant Ben Yue. In its previous memorandum opinion dated August 8, 2000, the Court opted to exercised its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state claims against Defendant Yue given the pendency of her federal and state claims against Defendants Johnson and the County. As the claims against Defendants Johnson and the County are now dismissed, the Court finds the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the state tort claims against a single non-diverse defendant to be unnecessary. The Court believes that such actions are properly brought before the appropriate state tribunal. Therefore, the Court shall dismiss Plaintiff's existing negligence action against Defendant Yue without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss as to all of Plaintiff's federal and state claims against Prince George's County and Major W. Johnson. In the absence of a federal question, the Court declines to exercise supplement jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state claims against Defendant Yue. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the claims against Defendant Yue without prejudice and grants Plaintiff leave to file her state claims against Defendant Yue in state court. An Order consistent with this Opinion will follow.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion dated November _____, 2000, IT IS this ____ day of November, 2000, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, hereby ORDERED:
1. That Defendants' Major W. Johnson and Prince George's County Motion to Dismiss [23- 1] BE, and the same hereby IS, GRANTED;
2. That Plaintiff's state tort claims against Defendant Ben Yue BE, and the same hereby IS, DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
3. That Plaintiff may file her state tort claims against Defendant Ben Yue in state court;
4. That this Case BE CLOSED; and
5. That the Clerk of the Court mail copies of this order to all counsel of record.