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holding knowledge of attacks on prisoner approximately ten years earlier insufficient to prove defendants knew he was at risk because "[t]he significant amount of time that has passed since these prior attack lessens the imminence of the threat of their being repeated"
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99 Civ. 1674 (RWS)
September 25, 2000
ROLANDO CORONADO, Plaintiff Pro Se, # 84-B-0698, Sullivan Correctional Facility, Fallsburg, NY
HONORABLE ELIOT SPITZER, Attorney General of the State of New York Attorney for Defendants, New York, NY, By: EFREM Z. FISCHER, ESQ., Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel
OPINION
Plaintiff Rolando Coronado ("Coronado") moves to reinstate his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "failure to protect" complaint now that he has exhausted his administrative remedies pursuant to the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a) ("PLRA"). Defendants Glenn S. Goord ("Goord"), Christopher P. Artuz ("Artuz"), and George Schneider ("Schneider") (the "Green Haven Defendants") and George E. Pataki ("Pataki"), (collectively "Defendants"), move that Plaintiff be required to re-file this action under a new index number. If the complaint is re-filed or reinstated, Defendants move pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., to dismiss for failure to state a claim, lack of personal involvement on the part of the defendants, Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity.
For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's complaint is reinstated, and the Defendants' motions to dismiss are granted in part and denied in part.
The Parties
Plaintiff Coronado is a prisoner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS"). At the time of the incident giving rise to this complaint, Coronado was housed at the Green Haven Correctional Facility ("GHCF") in Stormville, New York. Coronado has since been moved to the Attica Correctional Facility ("Attica") and most recently, to the Sullivan Correctional Facility ("Sullivan") in Fallsburg, New York.
Defendant Goord is the Commissioner of DOCS.
Defendant Artuz is the Superintendent of DOCS.
Defendant Schneider is the Deputy of Security of GHCF.
Defendant Pataki is the Governor of New York.
Prior Proceedings
The prior proceedings in this case were set forth in a former opinion of this Court, which dismissed Coronado's complaint without prejudice for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Coronado v. Goord, No. 99 Civ. 1674 (RWS), 2000 WL 52488 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2000)
Background
The complaint alleges that on June 30, 1997, while Coronado was in the recreation yard at GHCF in Stormville, New York, he was attacked by several inmates while two corrections officers did nothing to prevent the attack. As a result, Coronado was stabbed in the back seven times, sustaining a punctured lung which required hospitalization for several weeks.
Coronado alleges that because the sergeant of security failed to supervise the door to the recreation yard, prisoners were able to smuggle weapons into the yard. Coronado further alleges that the Superintendent and Deputy Superintendent of Security should have installed metal detectors because of alleged ongoing threats of violence. Coronado also claims that Defendants should have classified him as "vulnerable to attacks" because he had been stabbed on October 1, 1986, July 18, 1988, and September 8, 1988. Finally, Coronado claims that Governor George Pataki allowed the prisons in New York State to become overcrowded with prisoners and understaffed by guards.
Coronado seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and damages for violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Defendants' motion to dismiss was filed on July 13, 1999. Answer and reply papers were received through October 13, 1999, at which point the motion was deemed fully submitted. The Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss on January 24, 2000 for Coronado's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Coronado v. Goord, No. 99 Civ. 1674 (RWS), 2000 WL 52488 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2000).
Coronado filed a motion to reinstate the complaint on June 9, 2000, and Defendants moved by letter of June 21, 2000 to bar reinstatement, require re-filing, and dismiss the complaint on all the grounds not reached in the Court's January 24, 2000 opinion. The current motions were deemed fully submitted upon the filing of the Defendants' June 21, 2000 letter.
Discussion I. The Complaint is Reinstated
After the complaint was dismissed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) and (e) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Coronado sought and was granted leave for an extension of time within which to file a grievance. On February 4, 2000, Coronado filed Inmate Grievance Complaint No. A-40326-00, which was denied. Coronado appealed that decision to the Superintendent of Attica, where he was then housed, and was denied relief on February 25, 2000. Coronado then appealed to the Central Office Resolution Committee of the DOCS ("CORC"), which denied Coronado's grievance on March 29, 2000. (See Motion to Reinstate Complaint Ex. A.) There is no longer any avenue of relief open to Coronado in the prison system, so he has now exhausted his administrative remedies pursuant to § 1997e(a).
As Coronado has complied with the terms of this Court's dismissal without prejudice, the complaint is hereby reinstated.
II. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must "accept as true the factual allegations of the complaint, and draw all inferences in favor of the pleader." Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1174 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Hermann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1052 (2d Cir. 1993)). A pro se complaint is given liberal construction, particularly where civil rights violations are alleged. See George v. Lorenzo, No. 98 Civ. 0769 (LAP), 1999 WL 397473, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 1999); Cruz v. Jackson, No. 94 Civ. 2600 (RWS), 1997 WL 45348, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1997) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Morgan v. LaVallee, 526 F.2d 221, 224 (2d Cir. 1975)). Dismissal is warranted only when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (footnote omitted). See also Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 1986).
III. The Complaint Fails to State a Claim under the Eighth Amendment A. Legal Standard for § 1983 Failure to Protect Claim
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege conduct, under color of state law, amounting to a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Katz v. Klehammer, 902 F.2d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 1990). A § 1983 complaint "must contain specific allegations of fact which indicate a deprivation of constitutional rights; allegations which are nothing more than broad, simple and conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983." Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 1987). See also Koch v. Yunich, 533 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1976); Powell v. Jarvis, 460 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1972).
Coronado claims that the Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by virtue of the fact that Defendants failed to protect him from serious harm at the hands of other inmates. The Eighth Amendment protects against the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986), and requires prison officials to take "reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates in their custody," Hayes v. New York City Department of Corrections, 84 F.3d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1996). A prison official's negligence alone does not give rise to a § 1983 claim. Id.; Morales v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Services, 842 F.2d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 1988); Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 546 (2d Cir. 1974);Knowles v. New York City Dep't of Corrections, 904 F. Supp. 217, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
Failure to provide an inmate with adequate security may be the basis for a § 1983 claim. In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the Supreme Court has established that a prison official's failure to protect an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are satisfied: "First, the deprivation [of rights] alleged must be, objectively, `sufficiently serious.'" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, there must be an "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," which, in the prison failure-to-protect context, is defined as the defendant's subjective "deliberate indifference" to an inmate's safety. Wilson, 501. U.S. at 297. See Hayes, 84 F.3d at 620-21.
A claim for money damages under § 1983 may not lie unless the defendants were personally involved in the constitutional violation. See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[i]t is well-settled in this circuit that `personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983'") (guoting Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted); Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 196 (2d Cir. 1987). Supervisory officials cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely for the acts of their subordinates. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1034 (2d Cir.) (respondeat superior does not show personal involvement under § 1983), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
B. Serious Harm
Although the Supreme Court did not determine in Farmer the specific level of risk to an inmate that is significant enough to constitute a deprivation of Eighth Amendment rights, see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 n. 3, the Court did state that "[f]or a claim based on a failure to prevent harm, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm." Id.
In this case, Coronado alleges that he suffered seven stab wounds in the back, which punctured his lung and hospitalized him for weeks. The DOC's denial of Coronado's grievance reports that Coronado was eventually transported to a hospital outside the prison for treatment. (See Motion to Reinstate Complaint Ex. A (March 29, 2000 letter).) The documentation of several stab wounds serious enough to justify transporting Coronado to an off-site hospital is evidence that there was a risk of sufficiently serious harm to state a claim for the deprivation of Coronado's Eighth Amendment rights.
Coronado submitted three color photographs of his wounds with his Complaint. Although the date on two of the photographs is cut off, one of them is dated June 30, 1997, the date of the attack at issue here. This photograph shows several long red scars running lengthwise down Coronado's lower back.
C. Deliberate Indifference
"An isolated omission to act by a state prison guard does not support a claim under section 1983 absent special circumstances indicating evil intent, recklessness, or at least deliberate indifference to the consequences of his conduct for those under his control and dependent on him." Avers v. Coughlin, 780 F.3d 205, 209 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (citing Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 546 (2d Cir. 1974)). "Deliberate indifference" requires a showing that "the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate safety; the official must both [have been] aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn and that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and he must also [have] draw[n] the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. See Villante v. Dep't of Corr. of City of N.Y., 786 F.2d 516, 519 (2d Cir. 1986); Heisler v. Kralik, 981 F. Supp. 830, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). One way to make out such a claim is to allege that "a substantial risk of inmate attacks was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant official being sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus must have known about it." Id., 511 U.S. at 842-43 (quotations and internal citation omitted).
Coronado's complaint alleges the following omissions by Defendants: (1) the Green Haven Defendants failed to take the precautions of searching prisoners for weapons or installing metal detectors at the entrance to the yard, or assigning guards to "each post" in the recreation area, despite their knowledge of the "constant threat of violence" in that area; (2) the Green Haven Defendants failed to classify Coronado as "vulnerable to attacks" (which would presumably have qualified him for a more protected status) after he was victimized in three prior stabbing incidents; and (3) Governor Pataki failed to alleviate the chronic overcrowding and under-staffing of state prisons, which significantly increased the risk of assaults against Coronado. (Statement of Claim at ¶ 2.) In sum, Coronado alleges that in light of prior attacks against him and the general level of violence in the yard, Defendants' failure to stop this most recent attack evidences their "callous disregard" for his safety in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. (Id.)
1. The GHCF Defendants
The constitutional gravity of the omissions alleged in the complaint depends entirely on whether or not the Green Haven Defendants knew that Coronado was at risk of serious harm in the yard and consciously disregarded it. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d at 66. As the Supreme Court has stated, "it does not matter . . . whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk."Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843. If Defendants did not know of the risk to Coronado — either by receiving notice of prior attacks and a lingering threat against him personally or by their awareness that a substantial risk of attacks in the yard was pervasive and well-documented — then they cannot be held liable for failure to protect him under the Eighth Amendment standard. See Avers, 780 F.2d at 209.
a. Knowledge of a Risk to Coronado in Particular
Although he does not allege that he notified any of the Defendants of a specific threat posed to him, Coronado argues that the "pattern of attacks" against him should have put the Defendants on notice that he was at risk of serious harm. See Statement of Claim at ¶ 2. The attacks Coronado cites took place on 10/1/86, 7/18/88 and 9/8/88, approximately nine and eleven years before the stabbing in question here. The significant amount of time that has passed since these prior attack lessens the imminence of the threat of their being repeated. Furthermore, Coronado has failed to allege where the prior attacks took place and whether the same attackers were in custody at GHCF and had access to him at the time of the 1997 attack. See Hayes, 84 F.3d at 621.
Coronado v. LeFevre, et al., 886 F. Supp. 220 (N.D.N Y 1995), addressed the two prior attacks, both of which took place at the Clinton Correctional Facility ("Clinton"). LeFevre, 886 F. Supp. at 222. Coronado claims that in LeFevre, the court held that he was at substantial risk of serious harm in a case brought on identical claims for attacks on Coronado while he was housed at Clinton Correctional Facility. In fact, that opinion held that Coronado had failed to allege that prison authorities knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to him, and dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim. Id., 886 F. Supp. at 224. In any case, the LeFevre court's holding with regard to Coronado's ability to state a deliberate indifference claim for those attacks has no bearing on this Court's determination of the allegations pleaded in the instant complaint.
Most importantly, Coronado has failed to allege that any of the Defendants — who were either employed in supervisory positions at GHCF or in state-level administrative positions — actually knew of the prior attacks on him at Clinton. For example, he has introduced nothing to suggest that he either sought protection from any of the Defendants while at GHCF or notified them of the Clinton attacks. The mere fact that Coronado had been attacked 10 years before at another correctional facility is not sufficient to prove that the Defendants knew he was at risk at Green Haven. If the Green Haven Defendants did not know that Coronado was in fact "vulnerable to attack" in 1998, they cannot be held responsible for failing to so classify him. See, e.g., Pippion v. Peters, 1994 WL 530801, *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29. 1994).
Furthermore, even if Coronado could allege facts showing that correctional officers working in the yard on June 30, 1997 had knowledge of the risk to him, this knowledge would not be attributable to any of the named Defendants under a respondeat superior theory. Al-Jundi v. Estate of Rockefeller, 885 F.2d 1060, 1065 (2d Cir. 1989); Ayers, 780 F.2d at 210. Coronado must allege "a tangible connection between the acts of [each] defendant and the injuries suffered." Bass, 790 F.2d at 263. That the Defendants "should have known" is not enough. Absent a showing that Defendants Goord, Artuz and Schneider actually knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to Coronado in 1998, he cannot make out a § 1983 claim against them for failure to protect. See, e.g., Hazelwood v. Monroe, et al., No. 95 Civ. 3648, 1996 WL 312355, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 1996).
b. Knowledcre of a High Level of Risk to Inmates in the GHCF Yard in General
Coronado also claims that the Green Haven Defendants had "knowledge of the level of violence and of the numerous attacks in the GHCF recreation area." Statement of Claim at ¶ 2. As stated above, Coronado need not show a particularized risk to him personally; it is sufficient underFarmer that prison conditions posed a generalized threat to the safety of all inmates. However, "allegations which are nothing more than broad, simple and conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983." Alfaro Motors, 814 F.2d at 887. See Yunich, 533 F.2d at 85 (2d Cir. 1976).
In order to make out a claim under the theory of failure to protect against the general threat of harm, Coronado must plead facts stating every one of the following elements: (1) there were numerous other inmate-on-inmate attacks in the GHCF yard; (2) these attacks posed a substantial risk of serious harm to inmates; (3) the Defendants knew about these prior attacks; (3) despite their knowledge of the prior attacks, Defendants failed to take steps to reduce the risk of harm to inmates; (4) the prior attacks and the stabbing of Coronado were similar enough that any steps Defendants could have taken to alleviate the danger posed by the other attacks would also have reduced the risk to Coronado; and (5) if Defendant had taken such steps, Coronado would not have been stabbed in the yard on June 30, 1997.
The complaint is missing several links in this logical chain. Coronado has not alleged the nature of the other attacks in the GHCF yard, for example whether they were perpetrated with knives or fists, by individuals or gangs, or provided any estimate as to the number of such incidents during the period he was incarcerated at Green Haven. This information is necessary to determine what the level of violence was, and whether it was similar enough to the attack on Coronado to put the Defendants on notice that he was at risk of being stabbed. For example, if the other attacks did not involve sharp weapons, then Defendants would have had no reason to install metal detectors, the prior attacks would not have given the Defendants notice that Coronado was in danger of being stabbed, and any remedial measures that might in fact have been taken might not have protected Coronado.
2. Governor Pataki
The thrust of the claim against Governor Pataki is apparently that he knew that New York state prisons were overcrowded but failed to alleviate the problem, which heightened the generalized risk to the prison population and "caused and subjected" Coronado to the 1998 attack. (Statement of Claim at ¶ 2.) Prison overcrowding is properly the subject of an Eighth Amendment claim only if the plaintiff can show that overcrowding caused the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment against him personally. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981); 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (a)(1) ("A Federal court shall not hold prison or jail crowding unconstitutional under the eighth amendment except to the extent that an individual plaintiff inmate proves that the crowding causes the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment of that inmate.").
As alleged, the overcrowding allegation against Governor Pataki fails to state a claim. Coronado has failed to allege — in more than a conclusory fashion — a causal relationship between overcrowding/understaffing and the attack against him. Even if Coronado made this showing, he would still have to address the subjective knowledge element discussed above, in this context whether Governor Pataki knew that the combination of overcrowding and understaffing posed a risk to inmate safety, and was deliberately indifferent to it. See, e.g., Houston v. Sheahan, 62 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 1995); Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
It is the rare case when a plaintiff can make out a claim that his injuries were caused by overcrowding. See, e.g., Bert v. Essex County, N.J. Hall of Records, 986 F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1993) (jail officials not responsible for attack by one prisoner on another based on fact that jail overcrowded); Marsh v. Barry, 824 F.2d 1139, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("The underlying rate of . . . random acts of violence may rise with overcrowding, to be sure, but it would still be the unusual case in which a specific act could be attributed to the effects of overcrowding.");Waldo v. Goord, No. 97-CV-1385 LEK DRH, 1998 WL 713809, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1998) Based upon a liberal construction of the facts alleged, this is not one of those rare cases.
The Court finds that there is no set of facts by which Coronado could prove that Governor Pataki knew of and deliberately disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to inmates that may have been caused by the combination of overcrowding and understaffing at GHCF. The complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim on these grounds and will be dismissed as against Governor Pataki.
IV. Failure to State a Claim under the Fourteenth Amendment
Coronado also claims that the Green Haven Defendants' "gross negligence" and "callous disregard" in failing to protect him deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment liberty and due process rights. (See Plaintiff's Reply Mem. at 11.) The Supreme Court has not yet established a specific standard for level of culpability required to find a deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment rights in the context of failure to protect inmates. City of Canton. Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 n. 8 (1989); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. at 334 n. 3.
The Court has specified that "the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (holding that prison officials did not violate prisoner's due process rights where the prisoner alleged only that the officials "negligently failed to protect him from another inmate"); Bryant v. Maffuci, 923 F.2d 979, 984 (2d Cir.) ("simple negligence is not enough"), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849 (1991).
This Circuit recognizes that the same standard for proving an Eighth Amendment claim also applies to the Fourteenth: "[a]n inmate who is injured as a result of a prison official's deliberate indifference to his safety may maintain a damage action for the deprivation of his civil rights under the . . . Fourteenth Amendment." Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Stubbs v. Dudley, 849 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1988)). In Dylag, the Second Circuit reversed a district court's dismissal of an inmate's complaint alleging that a prison guard had acted with "deliberate indifference" and violated the plaintiff inmate's Fourteenth Amendment rights by declaring "open season" on the plaintiff in front of other inmates. 188 F.3d at 56.
As discussed above with regard to the Eighth Amendment claim, Coronado has not alleged facts to suggest that the Green Haven Defendants knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to inmates and deliberately disregarded it. Coronado has therefore failed to state a claim for deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment rights.
V. Defendants' Personal Involvement
A claim for money damages under § 1983 may not lie unless the Defendants were personally involved in the constitutional violation.Colon, 58 F.3d at 873. A supervisory official's personal involvement in a constitutional violation may be shown in any one of five ways: (1) direct participation, (2) failure to remedy a wrong after learning of it, (3) creation or maintenance of a policy under which unconstitutional violations occurred, (4) gross negligence in managing subordinates who committed the unconstitutional acts, and (5) deliberate indifference by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional violations were occurring. Colon, 58 F.3d at 873. "The bare fact that [a defendant] occupies a high position in the New York prison hierarchy is insufficient to sustain [a] claim." Id, 58 F.3d at 874. See also Gill, 824 F.2d at 196 ("[d]ismissal of a section 1983 claim is proper where, as here, the plaintiff `does no more than allege that [defendant] was in charge of the prison'"). (citation omitted).
Coronado does not allege that the Defendants were actively involved in the attack against him, but rather claims that they deliberately disregarded the high risk of harm to him, which qualifies as "personal involvement" under the fifth approach described above. See id. As discussed above, however, Coronado's allegation that the Green Haven Defendants knew of "numerous attacks" in the GHCF yard is not sufficient to support a finding of deliberate indifference. As such, Coronado has not shown that the Green Haven Defendants were personally Involved in causing his injuries.
In addition, there is no allegation that Governor Pataki had any knowledge of the risk to inmates due to overcrowding. Coronado has therefore not shown Pataki's personal involvement either.
VI. Immunity
Although the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a constitutional claim against all of the Defendants, the question of immunity will be addressed here for purposes of judicial economy in the event that plaintiff seeks and the Court grants permission to re-file or reinstate the complaint.
All of the Defendants are employees of the State of New York. The complaint does not specify whether the Defendants are charged in their personal or official capacities. Allowing this pro se Plaintiff some latitude in pleading, the Court will construe his complaint as pleading a cause of action against Defendants in both their official and personal capacities.
A. Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment bars suit in federal court against an unconsenting state. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). To the extent that this action brings claims against Defendants in their official capacities, the State is the "real party in interest." Id., 465 U.S. at 101. Under the Eleventh Amendment, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear claims for money damages against a state that would require the payment of funds from the state treasury. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986) (Eleventh Amendment prohibits the award of damages against state officials sued in their official capacity); Sevarino v. Negron, 996 F.2d 1439, 1441 (2d Cir. 1993) (Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits for monetary damages against DOCS officials sued in their official capacities).
Furthermore, state officials acting in their official capacities are not "persons" for the purpose of § 1983 actions, "and thus are not subject to liability for deprivations of constitutional rights thereunder." Dube v. State University of New York, 900 F.2d 587, 595 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211 (1991) (citing Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1990)); Young v. Patrice, 832 F. Supp. 721, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). To the extent that the Defendants are sued in their official capacities, then, they are not "persons" as defined by § 1983. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 163 (1985); see Papasan, 478 U.S. at 278.
Accordingly, the cause of action against the Defendants in their official capacities cannot be sustained. Furthermore, because only state authorities acting in their official capacities have the power to implement forward-looking equitable relief, Coronado's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief also fail.
B. Qualified Immunity
Defendants claim that they are subject to qualified immunity from liability for civil damages because "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Ceccere v. City of New York, 967 F.2d 826, 829 (2d Cir. 1992).
Defendants argue that their actions (or omissions) were not "clearly established" to constitute deprivations of Coronado's constitutional rights. The test in this Circuit is whether "in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [of defendants' actions] was apparent." Piesco v. City of New York, 933 F.2d 1149, 1160 (2d Cir. 1992). It is well established that the failure to protect an inmate from attacks at the hands of another inmate is a deprivation of the victim's constitutional rights if prison authorities knew of and deliberately disregarded the substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. There is no doubt that "having stripped [prisoners] of virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the government and its officials are not free to let the state of nature take its course." Id., 511 U.S. at 833.
However, Defendants argue that the Court must also decide that a constitutional violation in fact occurred before deciding whether they are entitled to qualified immunity. Seigert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991); Calhoun v. New York State Div. of Parole, 999 F.2d 647, 652 (2d Cir. 1993). However, given the procedural posture of this case, this inquiry is premature. There has been no discovery, and whether or not a constitutional violation took place in this case would be a fact-dependent determination. At this juncture, Coronado has not pleaded facts sufficient to state a claim against the Green Haven Defendants for depriving him of his Eighth Amendment right to be free of "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," Albers, 475 U.S. at 320, by deliberately disregarding a serious risk of harm to him.
Accordingly, the Court will not decide the hypothetical question of whether or not qualified immunity would apply to the Defendants if Coronado were able to state a constitutional claim.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Coronado's motion to reinstate the complaint is granted. Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint is granted for failure to state a claim and upon Eleventh Amendment immunity for Defendants in their official capacities. However, Coronado is granted leave to replead in accordance with this opinion.
It is so ordered.