Opinion
D041049.
11-25-2003
CORONADO POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF CORONADO, Defendant and Respondent.
Coronado Police Officers Association (Plaintiff and Appellant, the Association) appeals from a judgment in favor of the City of Coronado (Defendant and Respondent, the City), in this action for a writ of mandate and for declaratory relief. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1085, 1060.) The Association brought its action under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA), which requires local public agencies to "meet and confer" with representatives of a recognized employee association before making decisions relating to employment conditions that fall within the scope of representation of such an association. (§§ 3504, 3504.5, 3505.)
Government Code sections 3500-3510. All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless noted.
Specifically, the Association sought to compel the City to meet and confer on two issues: The elimination of a police service officer position (the PSO position), with a corresponding addition of a police traffic officer position, and the performance of dispatch duties by police officers on a new computerized system, allegedly without proper training, such that safety issues arose. The trial court ruled against the Association.
On appeal, the Association contends the trial court erred as a matter of law in interpreting the applicable statutes and applying them to the facts. We conclude that the trial court drew appropriate legal conclusions from the conflicting evidence presented, and the decision to deny the requested relief was proper. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Association is an employee representative for the Citys police officers and other police department employees on issues of employment conditions and terms of employment. Under the MMBA, the City is required to meet and confer with the Association regarding policy that affects issues within the scope of bargaining, such as employment conditions.
In April 2000, the Citys police department changed its dispatch system, from a punch card system for keeping track of fellow officers, to a new computerized system showing the whereabouts of officers in the field. Employees working as dispatchers were trained in the use of this system, but police officers who occasionally filled in for the dispatchers did not receive mandatory training. According to the Associations presidents declaration, officers filling in for dispatchers had difficulty and were confused in utilizing the new system, and they became concerned about safety issues for officers in the field. In September 2000, the Associations attorneys wrote to the Citys police chief, Robert Hutton, to object to the mandatory use of police officers as dispatchers or to any mandatory training, due to recent technological changes in the dispatch center. The City stated that it would provide voluntary training to police officers who were assigned to the dispatch center on the use of the new dispatch system. The Association and the City corresponded on the issue for a number of months, discussing whether meeting and conferring was required, while the use of police officers as dispatchers, on a fill-in basis, continued.
In October 2000, the Citys police chief notified the Association that he intended to eliminate a vacant PSO position and replace it with a sworn officer position in traffic enforcement. This would reduce the number of PSOs employed by the City from five to four. The city council had approved the police departments recommendation to increase traffic enforcement and to forego the additional PSOs code enforcement activities and other tasks (school crossing guard, animal control, parking enforcement and facility and equipment repair and maintenance). After the Citys initial offer to meet and confer on the issue, informal discussions took place, but then the City declined to meet and confer with the Association on that personnel matter.
After an extensive exchange of letters with the City on both issues, the Association filed this action for a writ of mandate to compel defendants to meet and confer regarding the Citys elimination of the PSO position and regarding the performance of dispatch duties by police officers, allegedly without proper training in the use of the new computerized system replacing the previous punch card system. A separate cause of action for declaratory relief was pled, alleging the same facts. The correspondence between the parties was lodged as exhibits to the petition, as was the PSO job description.
Originally, this dispute included two other issues, which were additional subjects of the letters and the petition. These were the use of a flat badge and a change in the reporting policy for the use of force by a police officer. However, those issues have been resolved and are not dealt with in the judgment or the appeal.
The Associations president submitted declarations in support of its position, and the City provided responsive declarations. According to the Associations president, Keith James, based on his 17 years of experience as a police officer for the City and his work as the president, the ongoing confusion at the dispatch center because of the inadequate training of officers on the new computer system has caused safety concerns for officers in the field. Dispatchers were provided extensive training, but police officers were not, which caused them to continue to flounder.
Regarding the elimination of the PSO position, the Associations president stated that the reduction of the number of PSOs from five to four greatly impacted the workload of the remaining employees, who were now required to do the work previously performed by the greater number. The four remaining PSOs were now subjected to more regular shuffling of work days and hours than when there were five PSOs. Since the individual who formerly worked as the fifth PSO had also performed other tasks in addition to building maintenance, such as maintaining police vehicles, escorting non-City maintenance people within the police facility, and running errands, it was now the case that the remaining PSOs were required to cover those additional responsibilities.
In response, the police chief declared that the PSO position that had been eliminated had been vacant for approximately two years, but had consisted of police department facility and maintenance responsibilities for the new police department building, but that as those building issues were resolved, the need for such a position diminished, while traffic enforcement needs were increasing. Since PSOs did not carry any particular caseload assignments, the elimination of the vacant position did not change their working hours nor shift their workload. The duties of a PSO and the police officer overlapped in some respects, so that police officers could perform the functions of a PSO. Both were part of the same Association bargaining unit. The police chief interpreted the subject memorandum of understanding as providing that it was a management prerogative to determine what work needs to be performed and what size the department should be. The city council had approved this reorganization for the fiscal year of 2000-2001, as recommended by the police department.
Also according to the police chief, sworn police officers customarily assisted in the dispatch center when public safety or staffing issues so required, such as when an officer is injured and unable to perform regular police duties, or wishes to perform overtime assignments. The police chief stated that the use of properly trained police officers in the dispatch center does not constitute a safety threat to the officers or the public, and he believed that being obligated to meet and confer with a bargaining unit when law enforcement systems were upgraded would unduly slow down the process. He also stated that the Associations members had been given the opportunity to train under the new program, but had declined to discuss the matter. The support services supervisor of the dispatch center stated in her declaration that a trained dispatcher was always available directly or by radio contact at the center.
After issuing a telephonic ruling and holding oral argument, the trial court filed its judgment denying the petition and the request for declaratory relief. The basis of the ruling as to each of these causes of action was the same. With respect to the elimination of the PSO position, the court ruled that the Citys decision to eliminate that vacant position in favor of creating a sworn officer position in traffic enforcement was an organizational decision that did not fall within the scope of representation under section 3504. The evidence established that there was no set caseload or assigned tasks that fell to the remaining PSO employees, such that this decision would materially alter their working conditions. Because the decision to eliminate the position amounted to a policy decision in favor of increased traffic enforcement, by foregoing a PSOs code enforcement activities and other tasks, the matter did not fall within the scope of representation of section 3504. In reaching its decision, evidentiary objections to the Associations presidents declaration and the Citys police chief were overruled.
The trial court also found that the Association had presented insufficient evidence that the practice of utilizing officers as dispatchers within the new computerized system compromised officer safety. The trial court based its finding upon first, evidence of the amount of time that had passed since the computer system was upgraded, approximately two and one half years from April 2000 through the date of judgment, September 2002. Also, there was insufficient evidence presented to show that the new dispatch system adversely affected workplace safety, in part because the Associations members had been offered additional paid training in using the system. The trial court therefore concluded that the policy of utilizing officers as dispatchers did not materially affect working conditions so that the issue would fall within the scope of representation under section 3504.
The Association appeals the judgment.
DISCUSSION
We first set forth the applicable standard of review and outline the applicable principles in the context of an MMBA action to enforce a meet and confer provision. We then turn to the specific arguments raised concerning the PSO position and the dispatch duties using the upgraded computer system.
I
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The parties dispute whether the standard on appeal in this case should be a straightforward independent review of a question of law (the Association), or the substantial evidence test requiring this court to defer to factual findings underlying the trial courts judgment (the City). The Association relies on cases such as Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 544, representing the rule that when a court must determine whether a partys claim falls within the scope of a statute, this interpretation of statutory language is a question of law for the appellate courts independent determination. In contrast, the City argues that these statutory interpretation issues cannot be resolved as questions of law, because they involve a consideration of conflicting evidence, such that the substantial evidence test should apply. (Uniroyal Chemical Co. v. American Vanguard Corp. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 285, 292.)
As this court stated in Saathoff v. City of San Diego (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 697, "In reviewing the trial courts ruling on a writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085), the appellate court is ordinarily confined to an inquiry as to whether the findings and judgment of the trial court are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] However, the appellate court may make its own determination when the case involves resolution of questions of law where the facts are undisputed." (Saathoff, supra, at p. 700.) In other cases, even where the pertinent facts are essentially undisputed, if the resolution of an issue would require the drawing of inferences from the presented facts, then more than a pure question of law is presented. In such a case, a reviewing court must apply the substantial evidence test, giving deference to the inferences in support of an underlying finding of fact that leads to the statutory interpretation or other legal issue presented. (Id. at p. 701; also see Service Employees International Union v. County of Los Angeles (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 761, 771-772 [where the trial courts findings are based on conflicting evidence, the reviewing court will employ the substantial evidence rule to uphold those findings, which are the starting point of its interpretation of the statute involved].)
This approach is the correct one for this record, in which conflicting declarations were submitted and interpretation of the documentary exhibits was required. Accordingly, to review the ruling on both the petition for writ of mandate and the declaratory relief request, we look to the respective declarations and exhibits to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the trial courts resolution of factual issues on whether the elimination of the PSO position and/or the imposition of the dispatch duties should properly have fallen within the scope of representation under section 3504.
II
MMBA PROVISIONS
The MMBA obligates employers to bargain with employee representatives about matters that fall within the "scope of representation" (§§ 3504, 3504.5, 3505). (Santa Clara County Counsel Attorneys Assn. v. Woodside (1994) 7 Cal.4th 525, 536; Building Material & Construction Teamsters Union v. Farrell (1986) 41 Cal.3d 651, 657 (Building Material).) "Specifically, section 3504.5 provides that public agencies must give employee organizations reasonable written notice of any proposed ordinance, rule, resolution, or regulation directly relating to matters within the scope of representation; section 3505 provides that representatives of public agencies and employee organizations shall have the mutual obligation personally to meet and confer promptly upon request by either party . . . and to endeavor to reach agreement on matters within the scope of representation" prior to the public agencys determination of policy or a course of action. (Building Material, supra, at p. 657.)
To define matters within the "scope of representation," section 3504 includes "all matters relating to employment conditions and employer-employee relations, including, but not limited to, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, except, however, that the scope of representation shall not include consideration of the merits, necessity, or organization of any service or activity provided by law or executive order." (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 658.) The first of these italicized terms was explained in Building Material, supra, based on federal precedents:
"For an action by an employer to fall within the scope of representation, and thus be subject to the mandatory bargaining requirements of the MMBA, it must have a significant effect on the wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment of the bargaining-unit employees. [Citations.] It is clear that the permanent transfer of work away from a bargaining unit often has a significant effect on the wages, hours, and working conditions of bargaining-unit employees. [Citations.] . . . [¶] The employer is required to bargain, however, only if the work transfer adversely affects the bargaining unit in question. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 659.)
With regard to the second of these italicized terms as explained in Building Material, supra, i.e., "the merits, necessity, or organization of any service," the Supreme Court said:
"Even when the action of an employer has a significant and adverse effect on the wages, hours, or working conditions of the bargaining-unit employees, the employer may yet be excepted from the duty to bargain under the merits, necessity, or organization language of section 3504. If an action is taken pursuant to a fundamental managerial or policy decision, it is within the scope of representation only if the employers need for unencumbered decisionmaking in managing its operations is outweighed by the benefit to employer-employee relations of bargaining about the action in question. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 660; italics added.)
To determine which category a particular employment-related issue falls into, for purposes of interpreting the meet and confer requirement, the Supreme Court has taught that a factual foundation may be required for "the moulding and resolution of the issues." (Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608, 611, 620-621 (Fire Fighters Union).) For example, the facts developed in arbitration will provide assistance in defining and applying statutory terms in context. (Id. at p. 615.) Thus, where the parties made widely divergent characterizations of a particular staffing proposal, and either one could be considered accurate, "we believe the proper course must be to submit the issue to the arbitrators so that a factual record may be established. The nature of the evidence presented to the arbitrators should largely disclose whether the manpower issue primarily involves the workload and safety of the men ( wages, hours and working conditions) or the policy of fire prevention of the city (merits, necessity or organization of any governmental service). On the basis of such a record, the arbitrators can properly determine in the first instance whether or not, and to what extent, the present manpower proposal is arbitrable." (Id. at pp. 620-621.)
We will use this approach to examine the record to determine if the trial court had an adequate basis to conclude that neither of the two specific issues raised was properly within the scope of representation, such that meeting and conferring would have been required under section 3504.
III
PSO POSITION
Meeting and conferring would be required under section 3504 on the elimination of the PSO position if it properly fell within the scope of representation, as a matter relating to employment conditions and employer-employee relations, "including, but not limited to, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . . . ." (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 658.) However, meeting and conferring would not be required if this issue required "consideration of the merits, necessity, or organization of any service or activity provided by law or executive order." (Ibid.) As explained in Fire Fighters Union, supra, 12 Cal.3d 608, 620-621, when deciding if an issue is subject to meeting and conferring, the finder of fact must consider the nature of the evidence presented to determine if the issue presented "primarily" involves the workload and safety of the employees ("wages, hours and working conditions") or a more general managerial policy ("merits, necessity or organization of any governmental service"). (Ibid.) Where an issue appears to be primarily a fundamental managerial or policy decision, it can still be brought within the scope of representation, but "only if the employers need for unencumbered decisionmaking in managing its operations is outweighed by the benefit to employer-employee relations of bargaining about the action in question. [Citations.]" (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 660.) Where there is conflicting evidence, this determination may involve weighing of the evidence by the finder of fact. (Fire Fighters Union, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 619-621.)
Based on the evidence, the trial court found that this decision was an organizational one, rather than a bargainable issue, chiefly due to the fact that there was no set caseload or assigned tasks which the remaining PSO officers inherited, so as to materially alter their working conditions. (See Los Angeles County Employees Assn. v. County of Los Angeles. (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 1, 5-8 [where workers are assigned a specific number of cases to handle, there is a direct relationship between the number of cases and their working conditions].) This represented an evaluation of all the evidence to determine the primary nature and effect of the employment decision, for purposes of determining if it fell within the scope of representation.
The trial courts conclusion that no meeting and conferring was required is well supported by the evidence. The conflicting declarations and the exhibits presented a factual scenario against which to interpret the statutory terms. The PSO position that was eliminated had been vacant for approximately two years, and its previous occupant had performed duties that the City did not believe were still required, because previously existing new building maintenance issues had been straightened out. The police chiefs declaration established that a sworn police officer can, as needed, perform the duties of the PSO. Although the PSO job description included a number of duties, and the Associations presidents declaration outlined other similar ones that were routinely performed, there was no showing that the four remaining PSO employees had actually experienced a materially altered workload, as opposed to a conclusory declaration by the Associations president that they must have done so. The elimination of the PSO position and the creation of another traffic officer position in response to current conditions did not amount to a layoff that would directly affect working conditions. (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 658.)
It is not enough for the Association to argue on appeal that common sense shows there must now be more work for the remaining PSOs. Nor is it dispositive that the police chief made an initial offer to meet and confer on the issue, but only informal discussions followed. The burden was on the Association as the petitioner to make a factual showing that it was entitled to the relief sought. It has failed to show that the reduction of the PSO position and the addition of the traffic officer position significantly and adversely affected the Associations members conditions of employment, in light of the contrary showing by the City about the other various factors that affected the workload of the position category. (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 659-660.) For example, the duties of a PSO and the police officer overlapped in some respects, so that police officers could perform the functions of a PSO, and the number of employees in the same Association bargaining unit did not change. However, the perceived needs of the City for law enforcement staffing had changed in favor of traffic control. The police chief interpreted the subject memorandum of understanding as providing that it was a management prerogative to determine what work needs to be performed and what size the department should be. The city council adopted his recommendation. Accordingly, the trial court could reasonably conclude from the evidence that this action was taken to implement a fundamental managerial policy decision about the nature of the essential work to be performed and by what type of employees. That decision related to the "merits, necessity, or organization of any service," which falls outside of the statutorily defined scope of representation. (§ 3504; Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 660.)
On this issue, the trial court evaluated the conflicting declarations to determine the predominant nature of the employment-related decision and then to apply the statutory language. Here, as in Service Employees International Union v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d 761, 771-772, those factual findings were the starting point of the trial courts interpretation of the statute involved, and were based on conflicting evidence. It is incumbent on us as a reviewing court to employ the substantial evidence rule and uphold the ruling because it is well supported by the evidence.
IV
DISPATCH DUTIES
The issue here is whether the trial court should have found that the imposition of the dispatch duties in an environment of updated technology should properly have fallen within the scope of representation under section 3504, as a matter "relating to employment conditions and employer-employee relations, including, but not limited to, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." (Ibid., italics added.) Conversely, we inquire if the record supports an interpretation of the statute concluding that this employment-related decision is outside the scope of representation, as requiring a consideration "of the merits, necessity, or organization of any service or activity provided by law or executive order." (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 658.) The trial court found the Association had presented insufficient evidence to show that the new dispatch system adversely affected workplace safety, in light of the two and one-half years that the upgraded system had been in place, and in light of the Associations lack of interest in discussing training options for the use of the new system, instead requesting after five months that formal meeting and conferring take place.
In addition to the factors considered by the trial court, the record reflects that police officers could volunteer for dispatch duties or could perform them when required to perform different duties, for example, due to injuries received. Since September 2000, the Association had consistently objected to the mandatory use of police officers as dispatchers or to mandatory training, due to the technological changes in the dispatch center. The Citys support services supervisor stated that a trained dispatcher was available at the dispatch center or by radio contact at all times to assist in utilizing the system properly. This was apparently an effort by the City to ensure that there were safeguards provided to promote officers safety in the field.
Safety rules are ordinarily proper subjects of meeting and conferring, because they normally have an important impact on the conditions of employment. (Solano County Employees Association v. County of Solano (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 256, 261.) Here, however, the Associations showing that there were significant safety concerns was only provided by the Associations presidents declaration that he was aware that some officers were floundering when required to performed dispatch services, due to the computer system that had replaced the more familiar punch card system. The City rebutted this showing by establishing that training on the system had been offered, safeguards were provided in the form of availability of a trained dispatcher, and it could reasonably be inferred from the passage of time since the new system was put into place in April of 2000 that the users of the new system were becoming more familiar with it. The police chiefs declaration stated that new officers are given initial training that includes the basic duties of dispatch, and are paid when they perform these duties. The chief stated that other public safety concerns could arise if the department had to stop using police officers to perform dispatch services while the meet and confer process took place.
As we discussed above (pt. III, ante), the trial court was required to evaluate the nature of the evidence to decide whether this dispatch center assignment "primarily" involved the workload and safety of the employees ("wages, hours and working conditions") or a general policy of implementing technological upgrades where appropriate ("merits, necessity or organization of any governmental service"). (Fire Fighters Union, supra, 12 Cal.3d 608, 620-621.) An action taken pursuant to a fundamental managerial or policy decision will remain within the scope of representation "only if the employers need for unencumbered decisionmaking in managing its operations is outweighed by the benefit to employer-employee relations of bargaining about the action in question. [Citations.]" (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 660.)
From all of the evidence, the trial court had a sufficient basis to conclude that this employment-related decision fell outside the scope of representation, because it required a consideration "of the merits, necessity, or organization of any service or activity," as opposed to primarily affecting the conditions of employment of either those officers performing dispatch duties or those in the field. (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 658.) Also, the City made an adequate showing of its need to improve public service by making technological upgrades where appropriate, and by staffing the dispatch center without further delay. The Association did not show how any greater or more significant benefit would accrue to employer-employee relations from bargaining about the action in question. (Id. at p. 660.)
Because the trial courts statutory interpretation of the scope of representation was based upon the presented facts, and the resolution of the issues required the drawing of inferences from those facts, more than a pure question of law was presented by this record. Here, as in Saathoff v. City of San Diego, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th 697, we as a reviewing court must apply the substantial evidence test, giving deference to the inferences in support of the underlying findings of fact that led to the statutory interpretation of section 3504, regarding these decisions as primarily managerial or policy-making in nature. The record amply supports denial of the petition for writ of mandate and the request for declaratory relief regarding any obligation to meet and confer on these issues.
DISPOSITION
Each party shall bear its own costs.
WE CONCUR: NARES, J. and McDONALD, J.