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holding that where there was at least arguable probable cause to arrest the plaintiff and where the plaintiff did "not argue that any such facts later came to light," or "that a reasonable person would have made further inquiry based on any post-arrest developments," summary judgment was appropriate "essentially for the same reasons" as the false arrest claim
Summary of this case from Garcia v. Cnty. of WestchesterOpinion
00 Civ. 7330 (GEL)
April 10, 2002
Jonathan Lovett, Lovett Gould, White Plains, NY, for Plaintiff.
David S. Poppick, Epstein Becker Green, P.C., Stamford, CT, for Defendants Glenna Lunn and the County of Westchester.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Javier Corona, a correction officer employed by the Westchester County Department of Correction, brings this action alleging malicious prosecution and false arrest. Defendants Glenna Lunn ("Lunn") and the County of Westchester ("County") now move for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. For the reasons that follow, defendants' motion will be granted.
BACKGROUND
This action arises from Corona's arrest, indictment, and prosecution for third-degree rape and other crimes relating to allegations that Corona had sexual intercourse with a prisoner, defendant Heidi Ross, while she was an inmate in the B-Block of the Westchester County Department of Correction Women's Unit ("Women's Unit") in 1997. Lunn is a detective employed by the County who investigated the charges against Corona. Corona denies any sexual relationship with Ross; he ultimately was acquitted of all charges following a jury trial.
In June 1999, Lunn was assigned to investigate allegations that male corrections officers at the Women's Unit were engaged in sexual misconduct with female inmates. (Lunn Decl. ¶ 2; Lovett Aff. Ex. 2 ("Lunn Dep.") at 9.) In the course of that six-month investigation, Lunn was told by one of the inmates at the Women's Unit, Yezenia Maldonado, that she should speak with Ross and another inmate because they may have been victims of sexual misconduct by correction officers. (Lunn. Dep. at 90; Lovett Aff. Ex 3 ("Lunn Notes") at 26.) Lunn maintains that Maldonado later indicated more definitively that she had been told by Ross that Corona had sexual intercourse with Ross in a broom closet in the B-Block of the Women's Unit, and while that account is not reflected in Lunn's interview notes, it is supported by a written statement given by Maldonado on September 22, 1999, and by testimony from Ross that she did indeed tell Maldonado about the alleged sexual encounter with Corona. (Poppick Decl. Ex. 9 ("Maldonado Statement"); Lovett Aff. Ex. 1 ("Ross Dep.") at 58; Lunn Dep. at 10, 90)
Based on the information provided by Maldonado, Lunn and another investigator, Sergeant Louis Crisci, met with Ross on September 30, 1999. During that interview, Lunn asked Ross if she ever had any problems with certain correction officers. Ross indicated that she had problems with an officer named Downey, but not with any of the other officers previously identified by Lunn as suspects. (Lunn Dep. at 17; Lunn Notes at 27; Lovett Aff. Ex. 1 ("Ross Dep.") at 28-29.) According to Lunn, when Ross then was specifically asked about Corona, she responded by saying, "Oh we used to fly together when I was here last time." (Lunn Dep. at 17-18, 92-93; Lunn Notes at 27.) Ross does not recall making that particular statement. (Ross Dep. at 29-30.) Ross and Lunn agree, however, that when Lunn asked Ross directly whether she had sex with Corona in the broom closet, Ross answered, "No, I think I would remember that," and that when subsequently asked a question about another officer, Ross said "fuck you" and abruptly terminated the interview after less than ten minutes. (Lunn Dep. at 17-18, 93, 169; Lunn Decl. ¶ 4; Lunn Notes at 27-28; Ross Dep. at 11, 18, 30.)
Approximately one month later, Lunn received a letter from Ross apologizing for the "way [she] acted" at the September 1999 interview and indicating that she wished to speak with Lunn in order to "help" with her investigation. (Lunn Dep. at 20, 98; Ross Dep. at 47; Poppick Decl. Ex. 10 ("Ross Letter to Lunn")). A meeting was arranged for November 3, 1999, between Ross and the investigators. At the November 1999 meeting, Ross gave a rather explicit account of the sexual encounter she allegedly had with Corona, indicating that she and Corona had engaged in sexual conversations, kissing, and sexual intercourse, and that these events took place around August 1997 or September 1997. (Lunn Notes at 28; Lunn Dep. at 30-31; Ross Dep. at 21-22.) When asked at that meeting about her previous denial of any sexual relationship with Corona, Ross explained, according to Lunn, that "she was pissed off because she had been arrested and she didn't want to talk to [the investigators] about it." (Lunn Dep. at 40.) Ross repeats that explanation in her deposition in this action, adding that she also was afraid that answering Lunn's questions about Corona truthfully might "get [Corona] in trouble" or expose herself to retaliation from other inmates or other officers in the Women's Unit. (Ross Dep. at 56, 76-77, 79-81.)
At Lunn's request, Ross documented her account of the sexual encounter with Corona in a written statement dated November 3, 1999, and Lunn and Crisci proceeded to investigate the information Ross had provided. (Poppick Decl. Ex. I I ("Ross Statement"); Lunn. Dep. at 38-39, 43.) That investigation revealed that neither Ross nor Corona were at the B-Block of the Women's Unit in August 1997 or September 1997. Lunn maintains that the investigators became concerned that Ross's story might not be true, and as a result, they held a third meeting with Ross on December 7, 1999, in order to question her further. (Lunn Dep. at 45.) At the December 1999 meeting, Lunn questioned Ross about the inconsistencies in the timing of her account, informing her that Ross had been moved to B-Block on April 13, 1997, and that Corona began working there on April 21, 1997. (Lunn Dep. at 47-48, 107-08; Ross Dep. at 33-35.) Lunn also inquired whether Ross meant to refer to a correction officer named "Carrera," who was working at the Women's Unit in September and October, rather than "Corona." Ross indicated that she knew both Carrera and Corona and was 100 percent certain that her sexual encounters were with Corona. (Lunn Dep. at 44-46, 54.)
Ross then proceeded to provide considerable circumstantial detail in support of her account, drawing for the investigators a detailed map of B-Block and explaining specifically how Corona facilitated her ability to leave her cell and go to the broom closet without being detected. (Lunn Dep. at 69-70.) She described specific events in the days immediately before and after the alleged sexual encounter, noting that she was transferred within B-Block from cell one to another cell shortly after the alleged encounter, and that she was transferred from the Women's Unit to the Bedford Hills Correctional Facility a few days later. Ross also told the investigators that when she was moved from cell one to cell ten or eleven Corona gave her his beeper number, which she wrote in her prison Bible, and that she wrote and sent an intimate letter to Corona upon her transfer to the Bedford Hills facility. The letter subsequently was recovered; the prison Bible was not. (Lunn Dep. at 46, 52-60, 64-66, 69-71; Ross Dep. at 25-27; Poppick Decl. Ex. 7 ("Ross Letter to Corona").) Following this third meeting, Ross prepared an amended statement, dated December 7, 1999, that indicated that these alleged events occurred in April 1997, rather than August 1997 or September 1997 as stated in her first written statement. (Poppick Decl. Ex. 13 ("Ross Amend. Statement"); Lunn Dep. at 107; Ross Dep. at 2 1-22.).
Corona admits having received this letter from Ross, and has testified that he may even have received another letter from her. (Poppick Decl. Ex. 4 ("Corona Dep.") at 174-80.)
Ross has a history of emotional and psychiatric problems, with symptoms including depression, oral and visual hallucinations, and suicidal thoughts. Prior to being interviewed by the investigators, she had been diagnosed as having manic-depressive bipolar disorder, and had received in-patient treatment and medication to treat those problems on several occasions. On at least one occasion while incarcerated in the Women's Unit, Ross was required to wear a "Gucci gown," which is dispensed to inmates who have threatened suicide. (Ross Dep. at 27-28, 41-44, 47-48, 65-66, 83-84, 102-03; Lunn Dep. at 71-75.) Lunn does not deny knowing about Ross's psychiatric history at the time of the investigation, and Ross asserts that she told the investigators about her psychiatric history. It is also undisputed that Lunn was aware of Ross's criminal history and abuse of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and alcohol. Records of Ross's criminal history, which contain a number of references to her psychiatric problems, were in Lunn's possession at the time of the investigation. However, Lunn did not ask Ross for additional details of her psychiatric problems. (Ross Dep. at 7-8, 42, 55, 66; Lunn Dep. at 72-74, 85, 145, 181-83, 198.)
Corona contends that Lunn induced Ross to fabricate the story about her alleged sexual encounters with Corona and subsequently to alter that story to conform the timing of those allegations to the time frame within which she and Corona were present in B-Block of the Women's Unit. (Compl. ¶¶ 10-20; Pl. Mem. in Opp. at 14.) He notes that at some point during the October 1999 meeting, an assistant district attorney working with the investigators, Barbara Egenhauser, offered to have Ross transferred from Rikers Island and placed into a residential program instead. Ross was ultimately placed in that program; Egenhauser also interceded on Ross's behalf upon learning that Ross was not being provided with necessary psychiatric medication while at Rikers Island, writing a letter to prison officials informing them of her need for the medication. (Ross Dep. at 22-25.)
Nevertheless, Lunn maintains that she perceived Ross to be "coherent, logical, able to reason clearly, confident and credible" at their third meeting in December 1999. (Lunn Decl. ¶ 12; Lunn Dep. at 97.) According to Lunn, she did not ask Ross about her psychiatric history — or otherwise investigate the nature of her psychiatric problems — at least in part because Ross did not exhibit any outward signs of any problems during any of their interviews. (Lunn Dep. at 73, 96-97, 183-85, 197.) While Ross abruptly and angrily terminated their first meeting, Lunn did not find Ross's angry denial to be particularly unusual for a victim of sexual misconduct. (Lunn Decl. ¶ 11.)
Over the course of their investigation, Lunn and Crisci were able to corroborate a number of the details provided by Ross, based on their review of records and an actual inspection of the Women's Unit. Prison records revealed that Ross was housed at B-Block from April 21 through April 25, 1997, and that she was transferred to the Bedford Hills Correctional Facility on April 29, 1997. The investigators did not find any witnesses of the alleged events and or Ross's prison Bible, but their examination of B-Block did corroborate Ross's account of how the cell doors were operated and how an inmate could move from Cell I, the cell in which Ross was housed, to the broom closet without being detected. (Lunn Decl. ¶ 10.) In addition, Lunn obtained a statement from another inmate, Diane Harris, stating that she too had sexual intercourse with Corona, while incarcerated at the Women's Unit in February 1994. (Lunn Decl. ¶ 13; Poppick Decl. Ex. 14 ("Harris Statement")). Corona asserts that the corroborating statement of Diane Harris was fabricated and induced by Lunn, who Corona claims to have been aware of a 1994 incident in which Harris allegedly threatened falsely to accuse Corona of having sexual intercourse with her if he did not credit her commissary account with $100. (Pl. Mem. in Opp. at 11; Lovett Aff. Ex. 9.)
Lunn prepared a felony complaint against Corona charging him with rape in the third degree and other crimes, and a warrant for Corona's arrest was signed on January 25, 2000. (Lunn Decl. ¶ 14; Poppick Decl. Ex. 15 ("Felony Compl."); Poppick Decl. Ex. 16 ("Arrest Warrant")). Upon learning by telephone that he was to be arrested, Corona presented himself to the Westchester County Department of Public Safety on January 26, 2000, where he was arrested and handcuffed by an unidentified officer. ("Corona Dep." at 174-80.) Corona pleaded not guilty to all charges and was released on bail. He was indicted by a Westchester County grand jury on March 21, 2000, on charges of rape in the third degree, sexual abuse in the second degree, and two counts of official misconduct. (Corona Dep. at 190; Poppick Decl. Ex. 17.) His motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of probable cause was denied on June 12, 2000, upon the Court's review of the minutes of the grand jury proceedings, but Corona ultimately was acquitted of all charges following a jury trial. While Corona had been suspended without pay from his job as a corrections officer, he was reinstated after his acquittal and paid all salary that had been withheld during the period of his suspension. (Corona Dep. at 194-96.) Corona filed the instant action on September 27, 2000. a few weeks after his acquittal, claiming false arrest and malicious prosecution by Lunn, Tabacchi. and the County in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and claiming malicious prosecution by Ross in violation of New York law. The action was voluntarily discontinued against Tabacchi on April 2, 2001. Lunn and the County moved for summary judgment on June 1, 2001. Notwithstanding that motion and the fact that discovery had closed several weeks earlier, Corona requested leave to amend his complaint, proposing to drop Ross from the lawsuit and modify the claims asserted against Lunn and the County. Pl. Mem. in Opp. at 2-4. That motion was denied on June 26, 2001.
DISCUSSION
When adjudicating a motion for summary judgment, all ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, although "the nonmoving party may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation." Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998). The court "is not to weigh the evidence but is instead required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and to eschew credibility assessments." Wevant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 854 (2d Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is then appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
To establish a genuine issue of material fact, the plaintiff "`must produce specific facts indicating' that a genuine factual issue exists."Scotto, 143 F.3d at 114 (quoting Wright v. Coughlin, 132 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "If the evidence [produced by the nonmoving party] is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (internal citations omitted). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Pocchia v. NYNEX Corp., 81 F.3d 275, 277 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252).
I. Municipal and Official Capacity Liability
Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a municipality, or against state officials acting in their official capacities, must show that the entity's "policy or custom . . . played a part in the violation of federal law." Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Here, the complaint alleges no such role by policy or custom of the County in the alleged violations, and Corona concedes that "discovery did not yield an evidentiary basis" to hold the County liable under federal law. Pl. Mem. in Opp. at 4. Summary judgment therefore will be granted in favor of the County, and since claims against state officers acting in their official capacities "generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent," Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)), summary judgment also will be granted in favor of Lunn on the official capacity claims asserted against her. We therefore turn to the two claims asserted against Lunn in her individual capacity.
II. False Arrest
To establish a claim for false arrest under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendants intended to confine the plaintiff (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement; and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged. Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118-19 (2d Cir. 1995). While the first three of these elements are not in dispute here, Lunn argues that she is entitled to summary judgment because Corona's arrest was supported by probable cause.
It is clear that "[t]here can be no federal civil rights claim for false arrest where the arresting officer had probable cause." Id.; Wevant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996) ("The existence of probable cause to arrest . . . `is a complete defense to an action for false arrest.'" (quoting Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994))). Probable cause to arrest exists whenever an "arresting officer has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested." Singer, 63 F.3d at 119 (quotingO'Neill v. Town of Babylon, 986 F.2d 646, 650 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, probable cause may "exist even where it is based on mistaken information, so long as the arresting officer acted reasonably and in good faith in relying on that information." Bernard, 25 F.3d at 102.
"An arresting officer advised of a crime by a person who claims to be the victim, and who has signed a complaint or information charging someone with the crime, has probable cause to effect an arrest absent circumstances that raise doubts as to the victim's veracity." Lee v. Sandburg, 136 F.3d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Singer, 63 F.3d at 119); see also Carson v. Lewis, 35 F. Supp.2d 250, 259 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("An officer's arrest based on a victim's positive identification is presumptively valid."). Corona attempts to rebut this presumption of probable cause based on Ross's testimony by (1) arguing that Lunn induced Ross to fabricate the entire story and (2) speculating that Ross's allegations may have been the product of hallucination or a "drug induced fantasy." Pl. Mem. in Opp. at 15. Corona also asserts without evidentiary support that Lunn suborned false statements by Maldonado, to whom Ross independently claims that she told her story, and Harris, the other inmate claiming a sexual encounter with Corona.
Corona's speculations about the source of Ross's accusations do not advance his cause. Since whether Corona had sex with Ross is a disputed fact, we assume for purposes of this motion that Ross's accusations were false; whether, if false, they were the product of hallucination, fantasy, or intentional malice — a matter on which Corona's allegations are purely speculative — is irrelevant. The question here is not whether Corona was in fact guilty, but whether Lunn had probable cause to believe he was. If Ross's allegations, under all the circumstances, warranted a reasonable belief that Corona had committed a crime, Lunn had probable cause, even if Ross turned out in the end to be deluded or deceitful.
If, on the other hand, Lunn suborned Ross and Maldonado to make accusations that Lunn knew were false, she could not claim to have probable cause. Corona's conclusory and speculative allegations that this was so, however, lack any evidentiary support and are therefore insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Scotto, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998) ("conclusory allegations" and "unsubstantiated speculation" are not sufficient to create genuine issue of material fact sufficient to survive motion for summary judgment). While it is undisputed that Egenhauser interceded on Ross's behalf by writing Rikers Island officials regarding Ross's need for psychiatric medication and facilitating Ross's transfer from Rikers Island into a residential treatment program, no reasonable factfinder would conclude from those facts alone that Lunn encouraged or induced Ross to fabricate her claims about Corona. There is no evidence connecting Egenhauser's decision to intercede on Ross's behalf to Ross's decision to cooperate with the investigators — let alone any evidence connecting Egenhauser's intervention to any actions undertaken by Lunn. The record contains no evidence at all from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Lunn deliberately encouraged Ross or Maldonado to make statements she knew were false.
Alternatively, and more persuasively, Corona's allegations could be read to claim that Lunn could not reasonably have relied on Ross's complaint, given her status as a prisoner and her history of psychiatric problems and substance abuse. Although these facts about Ross's background were certainly sufficient to call her veracity into question, they do not create a factual issue as to whether probable cause existed for Corona's arrest.
The fact that questions may exist about an informant's testimony does not automatically defeat probable cause. Cf. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72 (1978) (where a warrant is based on an affidavit that omits material information, court will decide whether probable cause would still be found if omitted information had been disclosed). In reviewing warrants obtained despite the non-disclosure of impeaching facts about an informant, the Second Circuit has frequently found probable cause to exist even after discounting the informant's testimony because of criminal records see, e.g., United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713, 720 (2d Cir. 2000) ("the corroboration of significant portions of CI-1's statements demonstrates that Cl-i was truthful in this instance, regardless of CI-1's criminal past"); United States v. Fermin, 32 F.3d 674, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1994), or psychiatric problems, See, e.g.,United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir. 1985). The question is whether a person of reasonable caution, taking into account the potential questions about Ross's veracity, would be warranted "in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested."Singer, 63 F.3d at 119. That standard is met here.
Lunn and her fellow investigators — who were aware of Ross's background — did not merely take her account at face value, but explicitly questioned Ross in follow-up interviews about her initial denial of any sexual encounter with Corona and other apparent discrepancies in her story. The investigators independently sought to corroborate the essential details of her story by examining prison records maintained by the Department of Correction, inspecting the premises of the Women's Unit, and interviewing other witnesses. That investigation revealed that Ross accurately had described the specific details of how an inmate could move from the cell in which Ross had been housed, without being detected, to the broom closet where she allegedly engaged in sexual intercourse with Corona; that a second inmate claimed to have been told by Ross that she had sex with Corona in the B-Block broom closet; and that a third inmate testified that she herself had sexual intercourse with Corona while incarcerated at the Women's Unit.
Given these corroborating facts, and Ross's insistence (despite her initial, rationally explained, denial) that she had been victimized in the manner charged, the information available to Lunn was sufficient, as a matter of law, taking into account all of the impeaching material relevant to assessing Ross's credibility, to support the arrest of Corona. At any rate, even if the facts known to Lunn were held insufficient to provide probable cause for Corona's arrest, summary judgment would still be justified on grounds of qualified immunity. "[I]n the context of allegations of false arrest, . . . [a]n arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a suit for damages on a claim for arrest without probable cause if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met." Lee, 136 F 3d at 102 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While the Court concludes, for the reasons set forth above, that probable cause existed, summary judgment would be required even if that conclusion were incorrect, based on Lunn's reasonable, subjective conclusion that probable cause existed for Corona's arrest. Lunn has testified that she understood Ross's initial denial in the September 1999 interview of any sexual encounter with Corona to be a "typical first response" by a victim of sexual misconduct, and that she deemed Ross credible and coherent in their November 1999 and December 1999 interviews. (Lunn Decl. ¶ 11.) While Ross's recollection of specific dates was inaccurate, Lunn concluded, based on the factual detail provided by Ross and the investigators' independent corroboration of some of those facts, that Ross had been truthful in both her recollection of events and the sequence of those events. (Lunn Decl. ¶ 10.) Because a reasonable officer could have reached the same conclusion as Lunn, Lunn would be entitled to qualified immunity even in the absence of probable cause for Corona's arrest.
To the extent that Corona means to argue that Lunn should have disclosed more information about Ross's psychological history and the inconsistencies in her testimony to the judge who issued the warrant for Corona's arrest or to the grand jury, that argument is unavailing. A plaintiff may demonstrate a violation of his right not to be arrested without probable cause where (1) the officer "knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made a false statement . . . or omitted material information," and (2) "such false or omitted information was `necessary to the finding of probable cause.'"Smith v. Edwards, 175 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1999); Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870-71 (2d Cir. 1991). While it might have been better practice to disclose more of this information to the judge considering the warrant or to the grand jury, no constitutional claim is made out. The omission of impeaching information about an informant only presents a constitutional issue if disclosure would have defeated a finding of probable cause, see Smith, 175 F.3d at 105; Soares v. Connecticut, 8 F.3d 917, 920 (1993); as held above, probable cause for Corona's arrest would have existed even if all the information about Ross's background had been disclosed. And there is no constitutional obligation, even in federal cases where a grand jury is constitutionally required, to disclose exculpatory information to the grand jury. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 55 (1992).
Ross has testified that she initially denied having sexual intercourse with Corona because she was angry and did not want to talk to the police, and because she did not want to get Corona or herself in trouble. (Ross Dep. at 56, 76-77, 79-81.) That explanation is consistent with what Lunn claims to have been told by Ross in their November 1999 and December 1999 meetings. (Lunn Dec. ¶ 11.)
The purpose of qualified immunity is to protect officers making in exactly the sort of discretionary decision at issue here concerning the credibility of a complainant. See Lee 136 F.3d at 101 (qualified immunity protects government officials from "harassing litigation [that] will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties" (quotingAnderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987))). It cannot be the case that simply because the victim of an alleged crime has a criminal history or psychiatric problems, an officer who acts on her complaint after careful investigation is nevertheless stripped of immunity. While it is appropriate for officers to investigate carefully before acting on a complaint from a putative victim of questionable credibility, Lunn did exactly that. If her decision to credit the complaint, after full investigation, were deemed insufficiently reasonable to deprive her of immunity, because the complainant had a criminal record or psychiatric history, officers would fear to act on the testimony of those who might be the most vulnerable victims of crimes. That Ross's testimony ultimately proved insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt — or even that it was ultimately conclusively proved false — does not mean that it was unreasonable for Lunn, on the entire record of this case, to have believed that it established probable cause to arrest.
Summary judgment in favor of Lunn on Corona's false arrest claim is therefore appropriate, and will be granted.
III. Malicious Prosecution
To establish a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, a plaintiff must show "that the defendant maliciously commenced or continued against the plaintiff a criminal proceeding that ended in the plaintiffs favor, and that there was no probable cause for the proceeding." Green v. Montgomery, 219 F.3d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 2000); see Posr v. Court Officer Shield No. 707, 180 F.3d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 1999). While the question of whether probable cause exists to prosecute a defendant is distinct from the question of whether probable cause exists to arrest, Posr, 180 F.3d at 417; Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 571 (2d Cir. 1996), an initial finding of probable cause to arrest usually defeats a malicious prosecution claim. "In order for probable cause to dissipate" after the arrest, "the groundless nature of the charges must be made apparent by some intervening fact." Lowth, 82 F.3d at 571; see Dukes, 879 F. Supp. at 342 ("A finding of probable cause supporting an arrest defeats a malicious prosecution claim unless plaintiff can demonstrate that at some point subsequent to the arrest, additional facts came to light that negated probable cause.").
Here, Corona does not argue that any such facts later came to light; nor does he argue that a reasonable person would have made further inquiry based on any post-arrest developments. No evidence supports either conclusion in any event; nor is there any evidence that commencement or continuation of Corona's prosecution was founded in malice or bad faith. Lunn therefore is entitled to summary judgment on Corona's malicious prosecution claim essentially for the same reasons that defeat his false arrest claim.
IV. Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Corona's State Law Claim
Corona asserts a final claim against Ross herself for malicious prosecution under New York law. (Compl. ¶¶ 28-29.) Having concluded that Lunn and the County are entitled to summary judgment on all the federal claims over which the Court has jurisdiction, the Court may exercise its discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). "When all bases for federal jurisdiction have been eliminated from a case so that only the pendent state claims remain, the federal court should ordinarily dismiss the state claims." Baylis v. Marriott Corp., 843 F.2d 658, 665 (2d Cir. 1988); see United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) ("Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well"). This case does not present facts that take it out of the "ordinar[y]" and warrant asserting federal jurisdiction over a state tort claim against a private person. On the contrary, in his unsuccessful motion to amend his complaint, Corona himself sought to discontinue this claim against Ross. (Pl. Mem. in Opp. at 3.) Accordingly, the Court exercises its discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over this claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion of defendants Glenna Lunn and the County of Westchester for summary judgment is granted, and the claim against defendant Heidi Ross is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Clerk is respectfully directed to enter judgment for the defendants accordingly, and, since this order disposes of all remaining claims, to close the case.