Opinion
No. 13-07-439-CV
Opinion delivered and filed February 14, 2008.
On appeal from the 214th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
Before Justices RODRIGUEZ, GARZA, and VELA.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants, John Chavez Corella, Jr. (John), Sylvia Corella, and Tracy A. Weir, complain in this accelerated interlocutory appeal that the trial court erred in denying their special appearance. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 2007); TEX R. APP. P. 28.1. By two issues, appellants contend that the trial court erred because (1) the plaintiffs did not plead facts sufficient to permit the Texas long-arm statute to reach them individually, see TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 1997), and (2) they negated all bases for Texas courts to exercise jurisdiction over them. We reverse and render in part and affirm in part.
I. Background
Appellees, Gary A. Magnuson, April F. Magnuson, John C. M. Thickett, Susan L. Black Thickett, Jesus Valenzuela, Jr., Gary L. Trujillo, Melissa B. Trujillo, and Corella Telecom, L. L. C. (CTL), an Arizona Limited Liability Company, sued appellants alleging that John, Sylvia, and Tracy committed various torts, breached various contracts, and committed statutory violations. John, Sylvia, and Tracy, all Arizona residents, filed a special appearance objecting to the court's exercise of jurisdiction over them. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued its order denying appellants' special appearance. This appeal ensued.
II. Standard of Review
Whether the trial court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question of law. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002). The plaintiff bears the initial burden of pleading "sufficient allegations to bring a nonresident defendant within the provisions of the long-arm statute." Id. at 793. When a special appearance is filed, the nonresident defendant assumes the burden of negating all bases of personal jurisdiction asserted by the plaintiff. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex. 2007); BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 793; El Puerto de Liverpool, S.A. de C.V. v. Servi Mundo Llantero, S.A. de C.V., 82 S.W.3d 622, 628 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. dism'd w.o.j.). The trial court determines the special appearance by referring to the pleadings, any stipulations made by and between the parties, any affidavits and attachments filed by the parties, discovery, and any oral testimony. TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a(3).
If challenged, we may review the trial court's findings of fact for legal and factual sufficiency. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 794. We review a trial court's legal conclusions de novo. Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 574 (citing BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 794). Although an appellant may not challenge the trial court's conclusions of law as factually insufficient, we may "review the trial court's legal conclusions drawn from the facts to determine their correctness." Id.
III. Analysis A. Sufficiency of the Pleadings
By their first issue, appellants contend that the trial court erred in denying their special appearance because appellees failed to carry their initial burden of pleading facts sufficient to permit the Texas long-arm statute to reach them individually. See BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 793; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 1997).
Appellees' petition included, among other jurisdictional allegations, the following acts allegedly committed by John, Sylvia, and Tracy:
We note that appellees' petition also included the following allegation regarding appellants in their representative capacity: "John Corella, Sylvia Corella and Tracy Weir serving as Corella Telecom, L. L. C. (CTL) officers were the stewards over the investment in the Texas asset."
John Corella entered Texas on numerous occasions to develop with the CTL Plaintiffs an investment opportunity with GTE, an Irving, Texas company;
John Corella met with representatives of GTE in Texas to discuss investing in GTE telephone exchanges;
John Corella communicated and met with CTL Plaintiffs in Texas to put together a bid for the GTE assets;
John Corella communicated with the CTL Plaintiffs in Texas regarding CTL business;
John Corella, Sylvia Corella, and Tracy Weir advised CTL Plaintiffs in Texas regarding the Valor Telecommunications stock;
John Corella entered Texas to attend Valor board meetings;
John Corella, Sylvia Corella and Tracy Weir oversaw the handling of the Valor Telecommunications stock; and
The Corella Defendants communicated misrepresentations to CTL Plaintiffs in Texas regarding the holding of the Valor stock, the Kerrville Acquisition and the sale and value of the Valor stock.
Appellants rely on Ramirez v. Hariri, 165 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) and Tang v. Garcia, No. 13-06-00367-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6148, at *15 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi Aug. 2, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.), as support for their contention that appellees failed to plead sufficient facts to bring appellants, individually, within the scope of the long arm statute. However, appellants' reliance on Ramirez and Tang is misplaced.
In Ramirez, the plaintiffs predicated jurisdiction over the individual defendants based on jurisdiction over a corporation. Ramirez, 165 S.W.3d at 916. Under that theory, the claimant must prove that the nonresident is actually the alter ego of the resident corporation. Id. at 916-17. In this case, appellees' jurisdictional allegations are not predicated on jurisdiction over a Texas corporation, but on acts committed by appellants in Texas.
Also, relying on our decision in Tang v. Garcia, appellants argue that allegations in appellees' petition are judicial admissions that each appellant was acting in a representative, and not in an individual, capacity and was, therefore, immune from the reach of the trial court's jurisdiction under the fiduciary shield doctrine. Tang, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6148, at *14. In Tang, because the plaintiffs chose to couch their jurisdictional allegations only in fiduciary or representative terms and did not plead any facts raising individual liability against the nonresident defendants, this Court decided that the fiduciary shield doctrine protected the nonresident defendants from jurisdiction in Texas. Id. at *15 ("Garcia's factual allegations and jurisdictional evidence presents an extraordinarily unique set of facts that compels the application of the fiduciary shield doctrine."). Here, however, appellees did not couch their jurisdictional allegations solely in representative terms. Rather, appellees pleaded facts alleging individual liability. Therefore, appellant's argument is not supported by Tang.
In Tuscano v. Osterberg, the court explained that:
[g]enerally, corporate agents and employees are not subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas merely because their employer does business in this state. Sometimes referred to as `the fiduciary shield doctrine,' this principle protects a corporate officer or employee from personal jurisdiction when all the individual's contacts in Texas were on behalf of an employer.
Tuscano v. Osterberg, 82 S.W.3d 457, 466-67 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2002, no writ). In Tang v. Garcia, we explained that "[t]he doctrine shields a nonresident defendant from suit in a forum state when his or her only contacts with that state are in a representative capacity." No. 13-06-00367-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6148, at *12 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi Aug. 2, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Cadle v. Graubart, 990 S.W.2d 469, 473 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1999, no pet.)); see Siskind v. Villa Found. for Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434, 437-38 (Tex. 1982) (speaking in terms of "alter ego").
We, thus, conclude appellees carried their initial burden of pleading facts sufficient to permit the Texas long-arm statute to reach appellants individually, and the trial court did not err in denying appellants' special appearance on that basis. See BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 793. We overrule appellants' first issue.
B. Negating All Bases of Jurisdiction
By their second issue, appellants contend they have negated all bases for the trial court to exercise jurisdiction over them. See Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 574 ("The nonresident defendant then assumes the burden of negating all bases of jurisdiction in [plaintiffs' jurisdictional] allegations.") (citing BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 793).
1. Findings of Fact
The trial court's findings of fact are as follows:
1. Plaintiffs and John Corella teamed up to investigate the purchase of certain rural GTE telephone operation assets located in East Texas and West Texas, much of which investigation took place at or by communications to and from GTE headquarters in Irving, Texas;
2. John Corella purposefully came to Texas on various occasions to meet with GTE representatives and Plaintiffs, performing due diligence on the investment, negotiating his and Texas Plaintiffs Thickett and Magnuson's respective interests in a jointly owned Texas telephone business, and eventually working with Thickett and Magnuson in preparing a bid to purchase the GTE Texas assets;
3. John Corella routinely called, emailed, faxed and otherwise communicated financial, operating, strategic and other information material to the investment decision to Plaintiff Magnuson who was performing due diligence from his office in Nueces County, Texas;
4. The competing purchasers of the Texas GTE assets teamed up and created one Texas-Domiciled company eventually known as Valor Telecommunications Southwest, LLC (hereinafter referred to as "Valor") to hold and own certain GTE telephone operations including the East Texas and West Texas exchanges which Plaintiffs and John Corella previously bid on;
5. In recognition and in exchange principally for the six months of due diligence on the GTE Texas assets performed by Plaintiffs and John Corella as well as a cash contribution, Valor issued stock in the name of John Corella;
Plaintiffs and John Corella agreed that they would jointly own the Valor shares and Plaintiffs and John Corella created Corella Telecom, LLC (hereinafter referred to as "CTL"), to hold their collective and jointly-owned investment in the Valor shares;
Number six was omitted from the trial court's findings of fact.
Number six was omitted from the trial court's findings of fact.
7. John Corella was the majority owner and member of CTL and Plaintiffs were minority owners and members;
8. John Corella served on the Board of Valor, entering Texas on numerous occasions to attend meetings as well as engaging in further contact with Valor at its Irving, Texas headquarters by phone, email and correspondence;
9. Defendants Sylvia Corella and Tracy Weir engaged in the management and the corporate affairs of CTL and engaged in contacts in Texas with GTE and Plaintiffs Magnuson and Thickett;
10. John Corella, Sylvia Corella and Tracy Weir . . . received information, made representations and took action relating to the Kerrville Acquisition, an opportunity to invest in additional shares of Valor stock to fund the acquisition of certain Kerrville, Texas telephone assets, with each of them [John, Sylvia, and Tracy] communicating with GTE representatives in Irving, Texas;
11. Defendants engaged in telephone calls as well as letters and emails to GTE representatives in Texas relating to the holding of the Valor stock in the name of John Corella individually and the change of that ownership to CTL;
12. Defendants communicated with Valor representatives in the Irving, Texas headquarters, regarding the opportunity to sell the Valor stock;
13. John Corella unilaterally declined to exercise the option to sell Valor stock;
14. After the Valor stock repurchase deadline passed, John Corella attended a telephone meeting and exchanged emails with all the Plaintiffs, some of whom resided in Texas, erroneously communicating to them that the option to sell the Valor stock was still viable and resulting in the Plaintiffs investing additional capital and time in the venture;
15. John Corella engaged in continuous and systematic contacts with Texas in pursuing the opportunity to purchase GTE operations, participating in the business and management of the Texas-based business Valor, traveling to Texas for other business operations and forming, incorporating and operating at least two other businesses in Texas;
16. Sufficient evidence was presented that a substantial portion of Defendants' actions in pursuing business opportunities in Texas were actually conducted in Texas;
17. This Court has an interest in adjudicating this dispute as four of the Plaintiffs are Texas residents and the transactions at issue involve representations, acts and omissions in Texas by Defendants involving the purchase and sale of Texas assets; and
18. Plaintiffs sufficiently pled that the Defendants did business in the State of Texas, had purposeful contacts with Texas, committed tortious and fraudulent activities in Texas and engaged in continuous and systematic contacts with Texas.
Because appellants only complain that specific conclusions of law are erroneous, as discussed below, the above findings of fact are unchallenged on appeal and are therefore binding on this Court "unless the contrary is established as a matter of law, or if there is no evidence to support the finding." Davey v. Shaw, 225 S.W.3d 843, 853 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.); El Puerto, 82 S.W.3d at 630 (citing McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986); see Carter v. Carter, 736 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ) (holding that findings of fact are binding on appellate court unless challenged by point of error) (citing Katz v. Rodriguez, 563 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). After reviewing the record in this case, we cannot conclude that evidence contrary to the findings is established as a matter of law or that there is no evidence to support the findings of the trial court. See Davey, 225 S.W.3d at 853; El Puerto, 82 S.W.3d at 630. Accordingly, the trial court's unchallenged findings of fact are binding on this Court. See id.; see also Katz, 563 S.W.2d at 630 (determining that even if a challenged finding is erroneous, two unchallenged findings "constitute undisputed facts and are binding on the appellant as well as this Court").
2. Applicable Law
A Texas court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if jurisdiction is authorized by the Texas long-arm statute, see TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 1997), which permits Texas courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who are doing business in Texas. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795. Although the Texas long-arm statute lists activities that constitute "doing business," this list is not exclusive, and "section 17.042's broad language extends Texas courts' personal jurisdiction `as far as the federal constitutional requirements of due process will permit.'" BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795 (quoting U-Anchor Adver., Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W. 2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977)). Therefore, "the requirements of the Texas long-arm statute are satisfied if the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with federal due process limitations." CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996).
The Texas long-arm statute, section 17.042, provides as follows:
In addition to other acts that may constitute doing business, a nonresident does business in this state if the nonresident:
(1) contracts by mail or otherwise with a Texas resident and either party is to perform the contract in whole or in part in this state;
(2) commits a tort in whole or in part in this state; or
(3) recruits Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary located in this state, for employment inside or outside this state.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 1997).
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a Texas court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when (1) the nonresident defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum state, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "The exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper when the contacts proximately result from actions of the nonresident defendant which create a substantial connection with the forum state." Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991).
A nonresident establishes minimum contacts with Texas by purposefully availing itself of the privileges and benefits inherent in conducting business in the state. Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575 ("a defendant must seek some benefit, advantage or profit by `availing' itself of the jurisdiction") (quoting Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 785 (2005)); Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 784 ("For half a century, the touchstone of jurisdictional due process has been `purposeful availment.'"); see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75 (1985). There are three parts to the purposeful availment inquiry. Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 785. First, only the nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum are considered and not the acts of a third person or another party. Id. (quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475 ("This `purposeful availment' requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of . . . the `unilateral activity of another party or a third person.'")). Second, the contacts must be purposeful and not "random, isolated, or fortuitous." Id. Finally, the nonresident defendant "must seek some benefit, advantage, or profit by `availing' itself of the jurisdiction." Id.
Minimum contacts with the forum may establish either specific or general jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). Specific jurisdiction exists if the nonresident defendant purposefully directed his activities at residents of Texas and the litigation arose from or related to those contacts. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472; Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414; Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 227. In other words, there must be a substantial connection between the nonresident defendant's contacts and the operative facts of the litigation. Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585 (Tex. 2007). The forum exercises general jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant when the defendant's contacts in the forum are continuous and systematic, therefore allowing the forum to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant "even if the cause of action did not arise from or relate to activities conducted within the forum state." BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 796.
3. Sylvia and Tracy
Sylvia and Tracy challenge the trial court's conclusion of law that it had specific jurisdiction over them by asserting that they have not established minimum contacts with Texas because they have not purposefully availed themselves of the benefits and protections of Texas law. We agree.
The trial court concluded that it "has specific jurisdiction over [Sylvia and Tracy] because [they] had contacts with Texas that were purposeful and Plaintiffs' causes of action arise from or relate to those contacts." The trial court based this conclusion on its findings that Sylvia and Tracy
engaged in the management and the corporate affairs of CTL and engaged in contacts in Texas with GTE and Plaintiffs Magnuson and Thickett; received information, made representations and took action relating to the Kerrville Acquisition . . . with each of them communicating with GTE representatives in Irving, Texas; engaged in telephone calls as well as letters and emails to GTE representatives in Texas relating to the holding of the Valor stock in the name of John Corella individually and the change of that ownership to CTL, and; communicated with Valor representatives in the Irving, Texas headquarters, regarding the opportunity to sell the Valor stock.
Finally, the trial court found that "sufficient evidence was presented that a substantial portion of [Sylvia's and Tracy's] actions in pursuing business opportunities in Texas were actually conducted in Texas."
Based on our de novo review of the trial court's legal conclusion that it had specific jurisdiction over Sylvia and Tracy, we cannot agree that Sylvia and Tracy purposefully availed themselves of Texas law. There is no finding of fact, and we find no evidence in the record to support a finding, that Sylvia and Tracy sought some benefit, advantage, or profit by availing themselves of this jurisdiction, the second prong of a purposeful availment analysis. See Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 785. We, accordingly, conclude that Sylvia and Tracy did not purposefully avail themselves of the benefits and protection of Texas law. Thus, Sylvia and Tracy lack the necessary minimum contacts sufficient to allow Texas courts to assert specific jurisdiction over them, and, the trial court erred by ruling otherwise. See Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575; Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 784.
Having so concluded, we need not address the portion of the trial court's conclusion that it had specific jurisdiction over Sylvia and Tracy because plaintiffs' causes of action arose from or related to those contacts. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
We next address the trial court's conclusion of law that it also had general jurisdiction over Sylvia and Tracy "because [Sylvia and Tracy] each made continuous and systematic contacts with Texas." Because the minimum contacts inquiry is broader and more demanding when general jurisdiction is alleged, a showing of substantial activities in the forum state is required. Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. 1990). General jurisdiction is premised on the nonresident having consented to jurisdiction through its continuous contact invoking the benefits and protections of Texas. Am. Type Culture Collection v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 807 (Tex. 2002). This analysis focuses on the nature and quality of the contacts, as opposed to the quantity. Id. The contacts under general jurisdiction "should be such as to justify categorizing the defendant as a resident of this State." Schexnayder v. Daniels, 187 S.W.3d 238, 243 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. dism'd w.o.j.).
Based on our de novo review, we conclude that Sylvia's and Tracy's activities, as described above, in Texas were not substantial enough to be systematic and continuous thus subjecting them to general jurisdiction in Texas. See id. Additionally, the evidence does not establish that their contacts invoked any benefits and protections of the state of Texas, see Coleman, 83 S.W.3d at 807, or that their contacts justified categorizing them as residents of Texas. See Schexnayder, 187 S.W.3d at 243.
Accordingly, we conclude that Sylvia and Tracy have negated all bases for an assertion of specific and general jurisdiction. We sustain the second issue as to Sylvia and Tracy.
4. John
Challenging the trial court's conclusion of law that "[t]he causes of action asserted by Plaintiffs against each of the Defendants individually are claims for which they can all be held individually liable," John first argues that he, individually, did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Texas. However, as to John, the trial court found the following:
Plaintiffs and John Corella teamed up to investigate the purchase of certain rural GTE telephone operation assets located in East Texas and West Texas, much of which investigation took place at or by communications to and from the GTE headquarters in Irving, Texas. John Corella purposefully came to Texas on various occasions to meet with GTE representatives and Plaintiffs, performing due diligence on the investment, negotiating his and Texas Plaintiffs Thickett and Magnuson's respective interests in a jointly owned Texas telephone business. . . . John Corella routinely called, emailed, faxed, and otherwise communicated financial, operating, strategic and other information material to the investment decision to Plaintiff Magnuson who was performing due diligence from his office in Nueces County, Texas. . . . Valor issued stock in the name of John Corella. . . . Plaintiffs and John Corella agreed that they would jointly own the Valor shares . . . and . . . created Corella Telecom, LLC . . . to hold their collective and jointly-owned investment in the Valor shares. . . . John Corella served on the board of Valor, entering Texas on numerous occasions to attend meetings as well as engaging in further contact with Valor at its Irving, Texas headquarters by phone, email and correspondence. . . . John Corella unilaterally declined to exercise the option to sell Valor stock. . . .
From our de novo review, we conclude that the trial court's legal conclusion that John could be held individually liable, as drawn from the above facts, is correct. See Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 574. Moreover, based on these findings of fact, we conclude John's contacts were not "solely as a result of . . . the `unilateral activity of another party or a third person,'" and were not "random, isolated, or fortuitous." See Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 785. Furthermore, John did seek some benefit, advantage, or profit by availing himself of the jurisdiction; he became a board member of a Texas-domiciled company that issued him stock. See id. Thus, John has established minimum contacts with Texas by purposefully availing himself of the privileges and benefits inherent in conducting business in Texas. Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575.
Having concluded John established minimum contacts with Texas in an individual capacity, we address John's second assertion that none of the contacts had any substantial connection with appellees' claims. We construe this as a challenge to the trial court's conclusion of law that it had specific jurisdiction over John. In order to assert specific jurisdiction over John there must also be a substantial connection between his contacts, identified above, and the operative facts of the litigation. See Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585.
The operative facts of the litigation in this case involve John's contacts with Texas concerning the GTE telephone operation assets located in East and West Texas, John's stock in Valor, John's appointment to the Valor board, John's communications with Valor and appellees concerning the stock of a Texas-domiciled company, and John's unilateral decision to decline to exercise the option to sell the Valor stock. We conclude, based on these facts, that there is a substantial connection between John's contacts and the operative facts of litigation. See id.
Having concluded that John established minimum contacts with Texas and that those contacts had a substantial connection to the facts of this litigation, we must next consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, the second prong of the personal jurisdiction analysis. See Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316. When making this inquiry we consider, when appropriate, the following: (1) the burden on the nonresident defendant; (2) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering substantive social policies. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 231. John argues that the trial court erred in concluding that he did not meet his burden of establishing "a compelling case of why litigation in Texas would be unduly burdensome." However, "there is no legal requirement that this hardship must be borne instead by the plaintiff whenever the defendant is not found in the state of the plaintiff's residence." Wright v. Sage Eng'g, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 238, 253-54 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). Furthermore, the record does not indicate, and John has provided no evidence, that litigation in Texas would be excessively burdensome or inconvenient to him. Instead, John relies on evidence of the undue burden on Tracy, not himself. He has failed to present a compelling case that would render jurisdiction unreasonable. Therefore, the exercise of specific jurisdiction over John by a Texas court does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Because John has not negated all bases of jurisdiction, see Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 574, we conclude that the trial court properly denied his special appearance. We overrule the second issue as to John.
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, we reverse the trial court's denial of the special appearance as to Sylvia Corella and Tracy A. Weir and render judgment dismissing the case against them for lack of personal jurisdiction. We affirm the trial court's denial of the special appearance as to John Chavez Corella, Jr.