Opinion
CIV-23-992-G
02-05-2024
NORMAN COPLEN, Plaintiff, v. STEPHENS COUNTY JAIL, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AMANDA MAXFIELD GREEN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, a former state pretrial detainee appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docs. 7, 9). United States District Judge Charles Goodwin referred the matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). (Doc. 3). As explained fully below, it is recommended that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Brandy Monahan and the Stephens County Jail and DISMISS the official capacity claims against Defendants Michael Elroy and Matthew Purnell.
I. Overview of Amended Complaint
Plaintiff's claims stem from an alleged incident that took place on October 14, 2023, at which time Plaintiff was incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at the Stephens County Jail in Duncan, Oklahoma. (Doc. 7, at 3, 8); see also District Court of Stephens County, Case No. CF-2023-140. Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he sheriffs and a Duncan police officer” entered his cell upon his request to speak to them about a problem and, without provocation, “grabbed [him] and took [him] to the ground and put [him] in a choke hold” and handcuffed him. (Doc. 7, at 8). He alleges that “while [he] was cuffed and still on his stomach the officer then started hitting [him] with his night stick” and “they then began to ta[s]er [him]” even though he “still was doing nothing to cause this.” (Id.)
https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db'stephens&number=CF-2023-00140 (Docket Sheet) (last visited Feb. 5, 2024). The undersigned takes judicial notice of the docket sheet and related documents in Plaintiff's state criminal proceedings. See United States v. Pursley, 577 F.3d 1204, 1214 n.6 (10th Cir. 2009) (exercising discretion “to take judicial notice of publicly-filed records in [this] court and certain other courts concerning matters that bear directly upon the disposition of the case at hand”) (citation omitted).
In Claim I, Plaintiff alleges this incident violated his Fourteenth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment through police brutality and brings this claim against Defendants Duncan Police Officer Michael Elroy, Stephens County Sherriff Matthew Purnell, Stephens County Booking Supervisor Brandy Monahan, and the Stephens County Jail. (Id. at 5-6). For relief, Plaintiff seeks financial compensation, prosecution of the Defendants, and dismissal of his criminal charges.(Id. at 7).
Plaintiff states Claim I as arising under the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 7, at 6). However, it is “the Fourteenth Amendment [that] governs any claim of excessive force brought by a pretrial detainee-one who has had a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to the extended restraint of his liberty following arrest.” Est. of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 419 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
“Plaintiff's demand seeking to have criminal charges dismissed or to have convictions reversed is in essence a demand for habeas relief.” Coots v. Oklahoma Cnty., No. CIV-16-818-F, 2016 WL 4468122, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 17, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 4468761 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 24, 2016). This relief is not available in a § 1983 action. See Presier v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (holding that “when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is . . . immediate release . . . his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus” and a 1983 action is not an appropriate alternative.).
Plaintiff additionally claims that, following this incident, he was returned to his cell without receiving any medical treatment and “had to request the next morning for them to take photos of where the cop was hitting [him] with his night stick.” (Id. at 8). In Claim II, Plaintiff alleges this conduct violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care and brings this claim against Defendant the Stephens County Jail. (Id. at 7). For relief, Plaintiff seeks financial compensation and prosecution of the jail “for violating their own procedures.” (Id. at 10).
Plaintiff states Claim II as arising under the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 7, at 7). However, it is “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause [that] entitles pretrial detainees to the same standard of medical care that the Eighth Amendment requires for convicted inmates.” Lance v. Morris, 985 F.3d 787, 793 (10th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
II. The Court's Duty to Screen Prisoner Complaints
Federal law mandates the screening of each complaint in a civil action filed by a prisoner seeking redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity and each case in which the plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(a), 1915(e)(2). The court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.
The court's review of a complaint under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) mirrors that required for reviewing a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court must accept Plaintiff's allegations as true and construe them, and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “review[s] the complaint for plausibility; that is, to determine whether the complaint includes enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A complaint fails to state such a claim when it lacks factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citation omitted). Bare legal conclusions in a complaint, however, are not assumed to be true; legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations” to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
“[A] pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that although courts construe pro se pleadings liberally, courts “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint”). Whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to avoid dismissal is context-specific and is determined through a court's application of “judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1184-85 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing Iqbal). “A pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. The court, however, may not serve as Plaintiff's advocate, creating arguments on his behalf. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
III. Analysis
A. The Stephens County Jail Is Not An Entity Subject to Suit Under § 1983.
Plaintiff has named the Stephens County Jail as a defendant in this action. (Doc. 7, at 6-7). Section 1983 “creates a private right of action against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another individual of ‘any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.'” Ripley v. Wyo. Med. Ctr., Inc., 559 F.3d 1119, 1121-22 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). But “[a] county jail in Oklahoma, as a subdivision of the county in which it is located, has no separate legal identity under Oklahoma law” and thus is “not amenable to suit” under § 1983. Hickey v. Oklahoma Cnty. Det. Ctr., 2022 WL 1221645, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 23, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 945319 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 29, 2022). “In Oklahoma, suits against a county are brought against the board of county commissioners.” Reid v. Hamby, 1997 WL 537909 at *6 (10th Cir. Sept. 2, 1997) (unpublished) (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 19, § 4). Thus, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant the Stephens County Jail should be dismissed.
B. Plaintiff Has Failed To Allege the Personal Participation of Defendant Monahan, and Plaintiff's Claim Against Her Should Be Dismissed.
Plaintiff has named Stephens County Booking Supervisor Brandy Monahan as a defendant to Claim I. (Doc. 7, at 6). However, he fails to allege anything fact-specific about Defendant Monahan in connection with the alleged violations of his rights. (See id. at 7-9). For a defendant to be liable for any civil rights violation, the defendant must have had direct personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation. See Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1227 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Olson v. Stotts, 9 F.3d 1475, 1477 (10th Cir. 1993)) (affirming district court's dismissal where “plaintiff failed to allege personal participation of the defendants”). In other words, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to demonstrate each defendant personally participated in the alleged violation, see Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976), by “‘identifying] specific actions taken by particular defendants.'” See Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1226 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 532 (10th Cir. 2011)). Because Plaintiff has failed to make any such allegations against Defendant Monahan, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's claim against her.
C. The Court Should Dismiss The Official Capacity Claims Against Defendants Elroy and Purnell.
Plaintiff brings Claim I against remaining Defendants Duncan Police Officer Michael Elroy and Stephens County Sherriff Matthew Purnell in their individual and official capacities. (Doc. 7, at 4, 6). A suit under § 1983 against a local government employee in his or her official capacity is “another way of pleading an action against the county or municipality they represent.” Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1328 (10th Cir. 2010); Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kan., 857 F.2d 690, 695 (10th Cir. 1988) (“[A section 1983] suit against a municipality and a suit against a municipal official acting in his or her official capacity are the same.”) (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985)). Thus, these official capacity claims under § 1983 would impose municipal liability on the City of Duncan, Oklahoma, and on Stephens County, Oklahoma. But Plaintiff has not named the City of Duncan or Stephens County as defendants, nor has he pled any facts sufficient to impose municipal liability on the City or the County.
A municipality or a county can be held liable for constitutional violations committed pursuant to official policy or custom. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (“[I]t is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”); Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1254 (10th Cir. 2015) (applying Monell to a county). To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must first identify an official policy or custom of the municipality, whether enacted or maintained by its legislative body or an authorized decisionmaker. Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 769-70 (10th Cir. 2013). “A challenged practice may be deemed an official policy or custom for § 1983 municipal-liability purposes if it is a formally promulgated policy, a well-settled custom or practice, a final decision by a municipal policymaker, or deliberately indifferent training or supervision.” Id. at 770. After identifying such an official policy or custom, the plaintiff must then establish that the policy or custom either: (1) directly violated a federal right of the plaintiff, or (2) was the “moving force” behind a county employee's violation of a federal right of the plaintiff. Id. Finally, a plaintiff must “show that the policy was enacted or maintained with deliberate indifference to an almost inevitable constitutional injury.” Id. at 769, 770-71. Thus, for each claim of municipal liability, the plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) official policy or custom, (2) causation, and (3) requisite state of mind. Id. at 769.
Here, Plaintiff has not identified an official policy, custom, or practice established by the City or the County that caused the alleged violation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Elroy or Defendant Purnell possess final policymaking authority. As a result, the Court should dismiss the official capacity claims against Defendants Elroy and Purnell. See Chester v. Parsons, No. CIV-19-860-G, 2020 WL 1536547, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 15, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1528179 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 30, 2020) (dismissing official capacity claims against city police officers).
IV. Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object.
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, the undersigned recommends that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Brandy Monahan and the Stephens County Jail and DISMISS the official capacity claims against Defendants Michael Elroy and Matthew Purnell. Accordingly, at this juncture, the undersigned recommends that the Court retain Plaintiff's police-brutality claim (Claim I) against Defendants Elroy and Purnell in their individual capacities.
The undersigned advises Plaintiff of his right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of Court on or before February 26, 2024, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). The undersigned further advises Plaintiff that failure to file a timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives his right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues contained herein. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation does not dispose of all issues currently referred to the undersigned magistrate judge in the captioned matter.