Opinion
No. TSR CV04 4000063-S
October 22, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This matter was initiated by a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed July 27, 2004. The pro se petition was amended several times, with the operative complaint, the third amended petition (amended petition), being filed on December 22, 2006. The amended petition alleges a single claim in one count, namely ineffective assistance by trial defense counsel. Respondent's return, filed in response to the second amended petition, denies that petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief.
The matter came before the court in July 2007 for a trial on the merits. Witnesses included petitioner and Michael Isko. The court finds the testimony of Isko to be generally credible and the testimony of petitioner to be generally not credible. The court has reviewed and considered the testimony, the exhibits, petitioner's memorandum of law and the parties' closing arguments. After applying the law to the facts, judgment enters denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Petitioner was the defendant in a criminal case pending in the judicial district of Hartford, Docket Number CR97-0506464-S, in which he was charged with two counts of robbery in the first degree in violation of Gen. Stat. § 53a-134; possession of a sawed-off shotgun in violation of Gen. Stat. § 53a-211; larceny in the first degree in violation of Gen. Stat. § 53a-122; larceny in the sixth degree in violation of Gen. Stat. § 53a-125b; and commission of a class A, B or C felony with a firearm in violation of Gen. Stat. §§ 53-202k. In April 1999, petitioner was tried to the jury on one count of robbery in the first degree and one count of commission of a felony with a firearm and petitioner was convicted.
The facts underlying petitioner's conviction were recounted in the decision of the Appellate Court disposing of his direct appeal: "On May 17, 1997, Peggy Cerniak drove to the Bradlees department store at 1250 Park Street in Hartford. The victim parked her vehicle in the store parking lot and entered the store. Upon completing her shopping, the victim exited the store and walked to her vehicle. While she was attempting to unlock the driver's side door, a vehicle entered the parking lot, circled around her and stopped. The sole occupant of that vehicle, the [petitioner], demanded, "Give me your pocketbook." The victim ignored him and continued to unlock her driver's side door. The [petitioner] then exited his vehicle and approached the victim. He held a sawed-off, single-barreled shotgun to her back and told her that if she screamed he would shoot her in the head. He then repeated his demand for her pocketbook. This time, the victim surrendered her pocketbook, which contained, among other things, two or three credit cards that had been issued to her and $60 in cash. After taking the victim's pocketbook, the [petitioner] began to retreat toward his vehicle. He reconsidered, however, and approached the victim again, demanding the keys to her vehicle. The victim surrendered her keys, and the [petitioner] entered his vehicle and drove off.
"The victim reentered Bradlees, and the police were summoned. The victim described the incident to the police and provided them with a description of the [petitioner]. Two days later, the police arrested the [petitioner] on an unrelated matter. While searching him incident to the arrest, the police found the victim's credit cards." State v. Cooper, 65 Conn.App. 551, 553-54, cert. den. 258 Conn. 949 (2001).
At all relevant times, Attorney Michael Isko represented petitioner in the underlying case. Isko has been employed as an assistant public defender since October 1987 and has tried in excess of thirty criminal cases to verdict. Isko was appointed to represent petitioner on July 15, 1997. Thereafter, Isko reviewed the state's file, conducted an investigation, filed numerous pretrial motions and developed a trial strategy. Isko concluded that the prosecution's strongest evidence of petitioner's culpability arose from petitioner's possession of the victim's credit cards two days after the robbery and that the state's case was weakest on the issue of the victim's identification of the perpetrator in two photo arrays.
Isko met numerous times with petitioner both at the jail and at the courthouse. Petitioner informed Isko that he was not guilty of the charges and that he had an alibi for the time period of the robbery. Isko's investigator interviewed each of the alibi witnesses provided by petitioner. Thereafter Isko reviewed the results of the investigation and concluded that the alibi evidence was not strong and that it would not withstand cross examination. Isko testified that in his experience, a failed alibi defense can be more harmful to a defendant than no alibi defense at all. Consequently Isko abandoned alibi as a defense and focused his trial strategy on suppressing as much of the state's evidence as possible.
At trial Isko also sought to show that the identification procedures were influenced by the Hartford police department's motive to pin the robbery on petitioner in that the victim was the mother of a Hartford police sergeant.
Isko did file motions in limine and to suppress the shotgun, the credit cards, the victim's identification of petitioner from two photographic arrays and any attempt by the state to have the victim make an in-court identification. A hearing on the motions was held out of the presence of the jury in April 1999. Thereafter the court, Maloney, J., held that the police had had probable cause for the arrest of petitioner and it denied the motion to suppress the gun and the credit cards. Additionally the court found that the first photo array was not unnecessarily suggestive and that although the second array was unnecessarily suggestive, the victim's identification of petitioner was nevertheless reliable. Accordingly the court denied the motion to suppress the identification evidence. The court further held that the inadvertent destruction of the credit cards by the police did not violate petitioner's due process rights and that testimony regarding the credit cards would not be hearsay. Thus the court also denied the motion in limine. After the court's decision on the motions, the state made a further offer to petitioner of five years to serve. This offer was lower than the state's previous offer. Isko discussed the offer with petitioner who decided to reject it.
Since the credit cards had been seized incident to petitioner's arrest on May 19 for possession of a sawed-off shotgun, they were inventoried as part of this arrest. See Gen. Stat. § Subsequent to petitioner's acquittal in federal court, the state entered a nolle prosequi to the charge of possession of a sawed-off shotgun. At that time the credit cards were ordered destroyed by the court, Susco, J.
The court's oral decision on the motions was followed by the luncheon recess. When court resumed in the afternoon, a corrections officers requested that the court order petitioner's legs to be shackled. As justification for this request, the officer reported that petitioner was a security risk group member and that during lunch petitioner was agitated and upset about the court's ruling. Two other corrections officers and a judicial marshal in the courtroom supported this request. Isko argued against the request and the court denied it. The court did, however, order that the corrections officers sit behind petitioner. In response, Isko stated that such a procedure was not necessary and the court replied that in the alternative, it would order shackling. Isko indicated that the officers had already been behind petitioner at various times throughout the trial and that he was ready to proceed. At the habeas trial, Isko was unable to recall the amount or the nature of the security during the criminal trial. Aside from the colloquy noted above between Isko and the court, the issue of security including the amount and type of security in the courtroom during the trial was never again addressed.
The criminal trial transcript reflects the following colloquy:
THE COURT: Okay. I think at this point I'll go along with what the defendant says subject to the condition noted. It would be fine with me — in fact, preferable, I think, if the corrections officers would sit right here beside — behind the defendant.
MR. ISKO: Well, you know, that hasn't been necessary thus far.
THE COURT: Well, that's it, Mr. Isko. Sorry. That's what I'm ruling. Unless you would prefer the alternative.
MR. ISKO: I think they've been here on and off sitting behind us anyway, Your Honor. So at this time I'm ready to proceed.
THE COURT: Okay. Criminal Trial Transcript, April 8, 1999, p. 257.
At the habeas trial Isko was unable to recall petitioner's attire during the criminal trial or whether petitioner spoke to Isko about his attire. Isko testified that he does not believe petitioner was tried in prison garb, that the public defender's office has spare clothing for defendants and that he would not have gone forward with the trial if he believed petitioner was not properly attired or groomed.
Isko was unable to recall if he had filed motions for judgment of acquittal at the close of the state's case and again at the close of the defense case. The criminal trial transcript shows that after the state rested, Isko did not move for acquittal, but informed the court that the defense also rested. Thereafter each side presented closing argument, the court charged the jury and petitioner was convicted.
Isko recalls that just before the case went to the jury, the state withdrew the second count, commission of a felony with a firearm. As a result, the court never charged the jury on this count. At sentencing, the court determined, sua sponte, that the state lacked the authority to withdraw this charge. Thereafter Isko moved for acquittal of this charge on the grounds of insufficient evidence but the court denied the motion and enhanced petitioner's sentence on the robbery count by a sentence of five years consecutive.
Petitioner testified at the habeas trial that he was represented by Isko in the criminal trial. On direct examination, petitioner claimed that Isko rarely spoke with petitioner, that he never explained the strengths and weaknesses of the state's case and that he never discussed any defenses with him. Petitioner also testified that after his arrest on May 19, 1997, he was placed in a room with a one-way mirror at the Hartford police station. Petitioner claims that when he was alone in the room, he turned off the lights in the room and was able to see the victim viewing him through a one-way mirror.
Petitioner further testified that although Isko successfully argued against a corrections officer's request that he be shackled and that he never appeared before the jury in shackles, in his opinion there was "excessive security" during his trial in that there were court marshals and corrections officers around him and in back of him. Petitioner further claims that during the trial he was not properly attired. Petitioner testified that on the first day of trial, he wore a suit. He further testified that on the second day of trial, he refused to wear the same suit because it smelled. As a result Isko obtained clothes for him which consisted of a bluejacket and a cream colored pair of pants, which according to petitioner were ill fitting. Petitioner testified that he wore this second set of clothes throughout the trial. Petitioner also testified that he was not properly groomed during the trial in that he was not allowed to comb his hair, shave his face or brush his teeth before appearing in front of the jury. On cross examination petitioner changed his testimony and admitted that Isko went over the state's evidence with him, but again claimed they never discussed trial strategy. Petitioner further conceded that it was his decision to reject the state's offer of five years and denied that during a hearing in front of the Sentence Review Division, he had admitted committing the robbery.
The trial transcript of the motion to suppress shows that Isko extensively cross examined the state's four witnesses as to the time line and location of each of the police identification procedures. Although Isko never directly asked these witnesses if the victim had ever viewed petitioner one-to-one at the Hartford police station, it is apparent from their testimony that no such procedure took place.
These witnesses included the victim as well as Officer Densil Samuda, Detective Jack Leitao and Detective James Rovella of the Hartford police department.
After his conviction, petitioner filed an application for review of his sentence and a hearing on the application was held before the Sentence Review Division. Thereafter, the Division affirmed petitioner's sentence and in its written opinion found that "The petitioner testified and said he was sorry and he thinks about what he did every day. He wants to make himself into a solid citizen." State v. Cooper, Superior Court, Sentence Review Division, Docket No. CR97-506464 (June 2, 2003, Ianotti, J., Miano, J., Holden, J.) (WL 21332536).
Additional facts will be discussed as necessary.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner makes seven specific allegations that Isko's representation was deficient. First, that Isko failed to file a motion to dismiss the charges against petitioner on the grounds of double jeopardy or collateral estoppel based on a prosecution in federal court in which petitioner was acquitted. Second, that Isko failed to object to jury instructions given in the case. Third, that Isko failed to properly protect petitioner's presumption of innocence. Fourth, that Isko failed to develop an alibi defense. Fifth, that Isko failed to develop facts at suppression hearings concerning the victim identifying petitioner prior to the first photo array and the types of photographs utilized in the array. Sixth, that Isko failed to ensure petitioner was not brought before the jury in shackles or in an otherwise prejudicial manner. And seventh, that Isko failed to move for a judgment of acquittal at the end of the state's case or at the close of all evidence.
"In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, CT Page 17726 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court established that for a petitioner to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of [the] conviction . . . That requires the petitioner to show (1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense . . . Unless a [petitioner] makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable . . .
"The first component, generally referred to as the performance prong, requires that the petitioner show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court held that [j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a [petitioner] to secondguess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable . . . A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsels conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy . . . [C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment . . .
"The second part of the Strickland analysis requires more than a showing that the errors made by counsel may have had some effect on the outcome of the proceeding . . . Rather, [the petitioner] must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different . . . When a [petitioner] challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.
"Because both prongs [of Strickland] must be established for a habeas petitioner to prevail, a court may dismiss a petitioner's claim if he fails to meet either prong . . . Accordingly, a court need not determine the deficiency of counsel's performance if consideration of the prejudice prong will be dispositive of the ineffectiveness claim . . ." (Internal citations omitted.) Crocker v. Commissioner of Correction, 101 Conn.App. 133, 136-37, 921 A.2d 128, cert. denied, 283 Conn. 905, 927 A.2d 916 (2007).
I.
Petitioner's first claim is that Isko failed to file a motion to dismiss the charges against petitioner on the grounds of double jeopardy or collateral estoppel based on a prosecution in federal court in which petitioner was acquitted. At the habeas trial, Isko testified petitioner informed him that he had been indicted in federal court on weapons charges relating to his possession of a shotgun at the time of his arrest on May 19, 1997, and that he was subsequently acquitted. Isko therefore explored moving to dismiss the robbery case on double jeopardy grounds. Isko reviewed the transcripts of the federal court trial, researched the applicable law and concluded that the facts and the law militated against such a result. Accordingly he did not file a motion to dismiss.
On direct appeal, petitioner claimed that the state "was precluded from prosecuting him for the May 17, 1997 robbery because he previously had been acquitted in federal court of charges that, on May 19, 1997, he violated [various sections of the United Stated Code]. In support of his claim, the [petitioner] relie[d] on the double jeopardy clause . . ." (Emphasis added.) State v. Cooper, supra, 65 Conn.App. 554-55.
The federal charges petitioner was acquitted of were possession of firearm by felon, possession of firearm having obliterated serial number and possession of unregistered firearm. State v. Cooper, 65 Conn.App. 551, 555, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 949 (2001).
The Appellate Court applied the standard for such double jeopardy claims and concluded that the state was not precluded from prosecuting petitioner for the robbery. Most importantly, relying on State v. Haskins, 188 Conn. 432, 472 (1982), the Appellate Court noted that it was bound by Connecticut Supreme Court precedent that constitutional protections from double jeopardy violations apply when there is one prosecuting sovereign. State v. Cooper, supra, 65 Conn.App. 555-56. This state, as a sovereign distinct from the federal government, could therefore prosecute petitioner for the May 17, 1997 robbery. Id., at 556.
Given the foregoing, the court finds that petitioner has not shown, and cannot show, either that Isko was somehow deficient in not filing a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy or that he was prejudiced. As to the claim that Isko should have additionally premised such a motion to dismiss on collateral estoppel, petitioner's brief argues that collateral estoppel is given constitutional dimensions by the double jeopardy clause.
"The common-law doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, embodies a judicial policy in favor of judicial economy, the stability of former judgments and finality . . . Collateral estoppel means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.
. . . Issue preclusion arises when an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and that determination is essential to the judgment . . . Collateral estoppel express[es] no more than the fundamental principle that once a matter has been fully and fairly litigated, and finally decided, it comes to rest. Generally, [a]pplication of the doctrine of collateral estoppel is neither statutorily nor constitutionally mandated . . . With respect to criminal cases, however, collateral estoppel is a protection included in the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy . . . The constitution embodies this doctrine [however] only to the extent that it precludes a retrial of a defendant . . ." (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santiago, 275 Conn. 192, 201-02, 881 A.2d 222 (2005).
Given the Supreme Court's holding in Haskins, this court fails to see how collateral estoppel would prevent the State of Connecticut from prosecuting petitioner despite his acquittal on the federal charges. Counsel cannot have rendered deficient performance for not filing a motion to dismiss the charges premised on collateral estoppel, nor has petitioner demonstrated any prejudice.
II.
Petitioner's second claim is that Isko failed to object to jury instructions that lacked instructions on petitioner's violation of General Statutes § 53-202k. On appeal, petitioner raised a claim that the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury on the elements of § 53-202k. State v. Cooper, supra, 65 Conn.App. 572. The Appellate Court concluded that although the trial court did not instruct the jury on § 53-202k, any error arising therefrom was harmless.
It is clear from the case law relied on by the Appellate Court in petitioner's direct appeal that a trial court is required to give the instruction at issue. Similarly, it could be reasoned that reasonably competent criminal defense counsel would request an instruction on a sentence enhancer that, if proven, results in five years consecutive to the sentence imposed for the underlying offense. As the Appellate Court noted, however: "The jury, by virtue of finding the defendant guilty of violating § 53a-134(a)(4), necessarily found, however, that he had committed a class B felony. See General Statutes § 53a-134(b). Therefore, the jury, in effect, made the factual determination with respect to the first element of § 53-202k, which is the commission of a class A, B or C felony, in favor of the state." State v. Cooper, supra, 65 Conn.App. 574.
Based on the foregoing, this court fails to see how, even assuming Isko was deficient for failing to request the § 53-202k instruction, petitioner was prejudiced. The jury made the requisite factual determination necessary for the court to impose the sentence enhancer. Petitioner's claim premised on Isko's alleged failure to request the § 53-202k instruction must be denied.
III.
Petitioner's next claim is that Isko failed to properly protect petitioner's presumption of innocence. More specifically, petitioner asserts that Isko failed to object to petitioner being improperly clothed and groomed for court proceedings and failed to object to excessive courtroom security which was suggestive of petitioner's guilt.
Isko testified he was unable to recall petitioner's attire during the criminal trial or whether petitioner spoke to Isko about his attire. Isko testified that he does not believe petitioner was tried in prison garb, that the public defender's office has spare clothing for defendants and that he would not have gone forward with the trial if he believed petitioner was not properly attired or groomed. Petitioner testified that on the first day of trial, he wore a suit. He further testified that on the second day of trial, he refused to wear the same suit because it smelled. As a result Isko obtained clothes for him which consisted of a bluejacket and a cream colored pair of pants, which according to petitioner were ill fitting. Petitioner testified that he wore this second set of clothes throughout the trial. Petitioner also testified that he was not properly groomed during the trial in that he was not allowed to comb his hair, shave his face or brush his teeth before appearing in front of the jury.
Petitioner also testified that in his opinion there was "excessive security" during his trial in that there were court marshals and corrections officers around him and in back of him. Isko was successful in having petitioner not shackled during the trial although corrections officers with the support of a judicial marshal had requested that petitioner's legs be shackled. Instead, the court ordered that the corrections officers sit behind petitioner. Isko indicated that this additional security measure was unnecessary. The trial court replied that the only alternative to the corrections officers sitting behind petitioner was having his legs shackled. Isko stated that officers had already been behind petitioner at various times throughout the trial and then proceeded.
"[A] defendant's subjective feelings as to his appearance are of no consequence if objectively there is no substance to his claims." State v. DeCaba, 42 Conn.App. 141, 143, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 915 (1996). Here, the credible objective evidence shows that petitioner was not attired in prison garb and was not shackled in the jury's presence. As to how petitioner was groomed and any potential impact this may have had on the jury, petitioner has in no way demonstrated how uncombed hair, an unshaven face and unbrushed teeth were a . . . constant reminder of the accused's condition [of being incarcerated and potentially] . . . affect[ing] a juror's judgment." Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126, reh. denied, 426 U.S. 954, 96 S.Ct. 3182, 49 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1976). Petitioner's claims, therefore, fail because he has not proven the required deficient performance or prejudice.
IV.
The fourth claim made by petitioner is that Isko failed to develop an alibi defense. Petitioner informed Isko that he was not guilty of the charges and that he had an alibi for the time period of the robbery. Isko's investigator interviewed each of the alibi witnesses provided by petitioner. Thereafter Isko reviewed the results of the investigation and concluded that the alibi evidence was not strong and that it would not withstand cross examination. Isko testified that in his experience, a failed alibi defense can be more harmful to a defendant than no alibi defense at all. Consequently Isko abandoned alibi as a defense and focused on suppressing as much of the state's evidence as possible.
Isko's decision to forego the alibi defense is precisely the kind of action that is presumed to be sound trial strategy. Petitioner here has in no way rebutted the strong presumption that Isko's decision fell inside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Furthermore, petitioner has presented no evidence that in any way demonstrates Isko failed to exercise reasonable professional judgment. The claim premised on Isko's abandoning the alibi defense fails, therefore.
V. CT Page 17731
Next petitioner asserts that Isko failed to develop facts at suppression hearings concerning the victim identifying petitioner prior to the first photo array and the types of photographs utilized in the array.A.
As this court has already noted, the trial transcript of the motion to suppress shows that Isko extensively cross examined the state's four witnesses in detail as to the time line and location of each of the police identification procedures. Although Isko never directly asked these witnesses if the victim had ever viewed petitioner one-to-one at the Hartford police station, it is apparent from their testimony that no such procedure took place. Similar to other claims, petitioner has not presented any evidence showing what additional facts Isko should have developed. Petitioner has therefore failed to prove either Strickland prong.
B.
Petitioner also claims that at the suppression hearing, Isko failed to develop facts about the types of photographs used in the identification arrays. On direct appeal, petitioner raised a claim that the pretrial identification procedures were unnecessarily suggestive and unreliable. The Appellate Court noted that ". . . the defendant does not challenge any of the court's factual findings. Nonetheless, we have carefully reviewed the record of the hearing and conclude that the court's findings of fact are adequately supported by the evidence. The defendant does, however, challenge as unreasonable the ultimate inferences that the court drew from those findings, namely, that (1) the first photographic array was reliable and was not suggestive, and (2) the second photographic array was reliable. We conclude that the court properly determined that the photographic arrays were reliable because the court's factual findings, including the opportunity that the victim had to observe the defendant during the robbery, reasonably support the inference that during her viewing of each array, there did not exist a very substantial likelihood that the defendant would be misidentified . . . Because the defendant has the burden of showing, inter alia, that the court's determination concerning reliability was improper . . . we conclude that the court properly denied the defendant's motion." (Internal citations omitted.) State v. Cooper, supra, 65 Conn.App. 571-72.
Based on the foregoing, the court finds petitioner has failed to present any credible evidence in support of the claim Isko rendered deficient performance for failing to develop facts at the suppression hearing concerning the types of photographs utilized in the array. Even if this court were to assume petitioner had shown such deficient performance, he has failed to undermine this court's confidence in the outcome of the proceedings and, consequently, has not met the prejudice prong.
VI.
Petitioner's sixth basis for ineffective assistance by Isko is that he failed to ensure petitioner was not brought before the jury in shackles or in an otherwise prejudicial manner. The court has already addressed this claim in the context of its discussion of the claim in section III. For the reasons stated in section III, the claim in VI is also denied.
VII.
Petitioner's final claim is that Isko failed to move at the end of the state's case or at the close of all evidence for a judgment of acquittal based upon insufficient legally admissible evidence. Appellate courts apply the following well-established standard to claims of insufficient evidence: "In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction [courts] apply a two-part test. First, [courts] construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, [courts] determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt . . .
". . . [A] jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt . . . If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt . . .
"Moreover, it does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct . . . It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence . . . In evaluating evidence, the [finder] of fact is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant's innocence . . . The [finder of fact] may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical . . .
"Finally, [a]s [appellate courts] have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the [finder of fact], would have resulted in an acquittal . . . On appeal, [courts] do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. [Courts] ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [finder of fact's] verdict of guilty . . ." (Citations omitted.) State v. Lopez, 280 Conn. 779, 808-09 (2007).
Petitioner has not presented any evidence showing that Isko had a valid basis for seeking a judgment of acquittal based upon insufficient legally admissible evidence. Petitioner would have to affirmatively show that reasonably competent criminal defense counsel would have sought a judgment of acquittal and, to also prove that a trial court would have granted a judgment of acquittal. Petitioner here has done neither.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. Petitioner's counsel is ordered to prepare and file a judgment file within thirty days.