Summary
noting that issues concerning statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo
Summary of this case from Thompson v. StateOpinion
No. CR 11-107
03-15-2012
VINCENT M. COOPER APPELLANT v. STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE
PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE MILLER
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, CR 2002- 119, HON. KIRK JOHNSON, JUDGE
APPEAL DISMISSED.
PER CURIAM
In 2010, appellant Vincent M. Cooper filed in the trial court a motion for DNA and forensics testing that was a petition under Act 1780 of 2001 Acts of Arkansas, as amended by Act 2250 of 2005 and codified as Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-112-201 to -208 (Repl. 2006). The motion sought testing of certain evidence admitted in conjunction with his 2005 convictions on charges of aggravated robbery and attempted robbery. Appellant also filed a motion for appointment of an expert, requesting that the court appoint an expert or order the Arkansas Crime Lab to perform the DNA and fingerprint tests requested in the motion under Act 1780. The trial court denied the motions, finding that the files and records of the proceedings had conclusively shown that appellant was entitled to no relief under Act 1780, that appellant's remedy had been available to him on direct appeal, and that the petition was not timely.
The trial court correctly determined that the petition was not timely. There was no clear error in the trial court's denial of relief under the Act on that basis, and, because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider appellant's motion under Act 1780, this court does not have jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal. See Justus v. State, 2012 Ark. 91 (where the circuit court lacks jurisdiction this court also lacks jurisdiction). We therefore dismiss the appeal without consideration of any issues other than those raised relating to the trial court's rulings on the jurisdictional question.
The generally applicable standard for review of an order denying postconviction relief dictates that this court does not reverse unless the circuit court's findings are clearly erroneous, although issues concerning statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Echols v. State, 2010 Ark. 417, ___ S.W.3d ___; see also Isom v. State, 2010 Ark. 496, ___ S.W.3d ___ (acknowledging general standard but applying abuse-of-discretion standard where the statute provides for discretion). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Pitts v. State, 2011 Ark. 322 (per curiam).
As appellant acknowledges in his brief, Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-112-202 places certain requirements upon a petition that must be met in order to qualify for relief under the Act. The trial court based its denial of relief in part upon the petition's failure to meet some of the requirements imposed by the statute as interpreted by the court. That failure resulted in the petition's being deemed untimely under the statute.
Appellant raises some due process issues concerning the trial court's conclusions about these requirements in his brief, but he makes no persuasive argument concerning these restrictions on the presentation of claims, and he fails to discuss how those restrictions would be unfair or burdensome. He does not address how dismissing the petition on the basis that the pleadings failed to meet the requirements of the statute would be any more fair if a hearing was held. Instead, he presents arguments that his proposed claim under the Act would have merit and that he has met the requirements in the statute. Although appellant couches his claim as one of denial of due process and cites a number of cases discussing due process, he fails to develop any due process argument concerning the circumstances at hand. Appellant's failure to develop the argument precludes review of the issue. Hendrix v. State, 2011 Ark. 122.
The State asserts that review is precluded because the issue was not developed below. The lack of development of the issue in appellant's brief negates the need to consider that question.
To the extent that appellant has presented an argument on appeal that the trial court erred in its determination that appellant had failed to meet the requirements of the statute, his argument also fails. A circuit court does not have jurisdiction to consider a petition for relief filed under the Act if the petition is outside the thirty-six-month period set in section 16-112- 202(10)(B) that establishes a presumption of untimeliness, and the petition also fails to establish one of the enumerated grounds for rebutting the presumption. Wallace v. State, 2011 Ark. 295 (per curiam). Appellant's petition was filed more than thirty-six months after his conviction. He did not include in his petition any basis to rebut that presumption.
Appellant attempts to argue on appeal that there are new methods of technology with which to test the evidence, but he did not include that claim in the motion that was denied. He did assert in the petition that there had been a confession to the crime by a third party, and he appears to argue on appeal that this alleged identification of a potential suspect was good cause for the delay in requesting testing.
Appellant had, during his second trial, requested that the same evidence be subjected to DNA testing. The trial court denied the request, and the issue was addressed on direct appeal of the judgment. Cooper v. State, CACR 05-818 (Ark. App. 2006) (unpublished). The Arkansas Court of Appeals held that the probative value of the testing then sought was "extremely low." Appellant did not provide any alleged facts in the petition that would substantiate his claim that identifying a specific suspect would have elevated that value. The basis for testing proposed at trial was that the tests might link another suspect to the crime, and the fact that appellant would now allege with more specificity who that suspect might be simply does not, as he would contend, serve to make the requested test results any more probative.
The trial court was not clearly erroneous in determining that appellant had stated no basis to rebut the presumption of untimeliness. Regardless of the merits of appellant's petition, or whether the trial court may have correctly reached any other conclusion concerning appellant's petition, the trial court did correctly determine that appellant's petition was not timely filed.
Appeal dismissed.