Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-0698-R
January 9, 2004
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendant Sear's [sic] Motion to Dismiss, filed August 21, 2003, and referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for hearing, if necessary, and determination or recommendation pursuant to the District Court's Order of Reference, filed September 11, 2003. No response was filed. Based on the motion, the relevant pleadings, and the applicable law, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant Sear's [sic] Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED
I. BACKGROUND
On April 4, 2002, Ronald Lee Cooper ("Plaintiff'), proceeding pro se, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. ¶ 1983 against Bonnie Sears ("Defendant"), a member of the Pardons and Parole Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice — Institutional Division. (Compl, at 1, 3-5.) When this suit was filed, Plaintiff was a resident of the Wayback House, a halfway house located in Dallas, Texas. See id. On January 31, 2002, Plaintiff was arrested at the Wayback House on allegations that he violated a "house rule" against sexual contact between residents. (Mot. at 1; Compl, at 4; Mag. Questionnaire at 3-6.) Plaintiff complains that there was no sexual contact and that Defendant fabricated the allegations or based them on "hearsay." (Mot. at 1; Compl, at 4.) Plaintiff states that he was incarcerated for fifty — seven days following his arrest, during which time the parole board held two hearings and reinstated his parole. (Mag. Questionnaire at 5.) Plaintiff also complains that he suffered mental/emotional distress upon learning of the death of his brother while incarcerated and that such incarceration was cruel and unusual punishment. (Mag. Questionnaire at 1, 5.) The only relief sought by Plaintiff is $10,000.00. (Compl, at 4.)On August 21, 2003, Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff's case is a prisoner case and that it should be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ¶ 1915. (Mot. at 2.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiff's sole claim for relief — monetary damages — is barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity because Plaintiff's allegations pertain to Defendant's actions as a state official. See id. Defendant further argues that Plaintiff's claims are barred by Heck for failure to challenge the parole decisions at the state level. See id. Finally, Defendant asserts that she is entitled to absolute immunity because Plaintiff's allegations pertain to her official decisions as a member of Texas' s parole board. See id. at 3.
Pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994): "when a state prisoner seeks damages in a ¶ 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiffs action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit." Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
By Order of this Court, filed September 15, 2003, Plaintiff was allowed to file a response to Defendant's motion to dismiss no later than September 29, 2003. As of the date of this decision, Plaintiff has failed to file a response. Defendant's motion to dismiss is now ripe for determination.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's case as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Mot. at 2.) Defendant also moves for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. ¶ 1915, Heck, and absolute immunity. See id. at 2-3. With regard to Eleventh Amendment immunity, Heck, and absolute immunity, Defendant does not specify whether dismissal is sought pursuant to the standards of Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6). However, Eleventh Amendment immunity has a jurisdictional effect. See United States v. Texas Tech University, 171 F.3d 279, 286 n. 9 (5th Cir. 1999) ("While the Supreme Court has left this question open, our court has repeatedly referred to the Eleventh Amendment's restriction in terms of subject matter jurisdiction.") Once a court finds that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies, the barred claims "can be dismissed only under Rule 12(b)(1) and not with prejudice." Warnock v. Pecos County, Tex., 88 F.3d 341, 342-43 (5th Cir. 1996) (remanding grant of summary judgment because "the proper course of action for the district court would have been to treat the motion for summary judgment on the Eleventh Amendment immunity issue as a motion for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."); see also Stokes v. Scott, 2000 WL 343185, at *1 (N.D. Tex. March 31, 2000) (dismissing claim barred by the Eleventh Amendment for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)). Under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), the Court may sua sponte determine if it has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to an Eleventh Amendment immunity argument and dismiss a claim for lack thereof. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), cited in Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1999) (raising the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte in the context of Eleventh Amendment immunity). Finally, jurisdictional challenges should be considered before addressing any attack on the merits. See Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the Court will consider Defendant's Eleventh Amendment immunity argument as a request for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1). See id.Eleventh Amendment immunity bars a suit in federal court by a citizen of a state against his own state or against a state agency or department. See Hughes v. Savell, 902 F.2d 376, 377-78 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 (1984)). Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to suits for monetary damages against state officials in their official capacity. See Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept, of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 609 n. 10 (2001) ("Only States and state officers acting in their official capacity are immune from suits for damages in federal court."). There is, however, an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity that was created by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which permits a suit for prospective injunctive relief against state officials for violations of federal or Constitutional law.
Plaintiff complains that Defendant fabricated the allegations that led to his arrest. (Mot. at 1; Compl, at 4.) Plaintiff also contends that he was incarcerated for fifty — seven days, during which time the parole board held two hearings and reinstated his parole. (Mag. Questionnaire at 5.) Plaintiff further complains that he suffered mental/emotional distress upon learning of the death of his brother while incarcerated and that such incarceration was cruel and unusual punishment. (Mag. Questionnaire at 1, 5.) Based on these allegations, Plaintiff complains that Defendant violated his civil rights. (Compl, at 4.) The only relief sought by Plaintiff is monetary damages in the amount of $10,000.00. See id.
Plaintiff's claims for monetary relief against Defendant arise out of Defendant's official actions as a member of Texas's Pardons and Parole Division. (Mag. Questionnaire at 2.) Eleventh Amendment immunity bars ¶ 1983 claims against a state official in her official capacity for the recovery of monetary damages. See Rogers v. Morales, 975 F. Supp. 856, 857 (N.D. Tex. 1997) ("The Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution grants to the states the bar to a Civil Rights case when the lawsuit is brought against a state agency, or a state official in his official capacity for the recovery of monetary damages"); see also Gaines v. Texas Tech University, 965 F. Supp. 886, 889 n. 4 (N.D. Tex. 1997) ("Suits against state officials in their official capacity are considered to be suits against the individual's office, and so are generally barred as suits against the state itself"). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims for monetary relief against Defendant are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Rogers, 975 F. Supp. at 857; Gaines, 965 F. Supp. at 889; see also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100. Thus, Plaintiff's ¶ 1983 claims against Defendant for monetary relief are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Because Plaintiff asserts ¶ 1983 claims only for monetary relief, not prospective equitable relief, the exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity in Ex parte Young does not apply. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (finding that only claims for prospective equitable relief for violations of federal law survive Eleventh Amendment immunity.) Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(h)(3). See Warnock, 88 F.3d at 342-43 (remanding grant of summary judgment to consider Eleventh Amendment immunity "as a motion for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.").
Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the Court does not reach the merits of Plaintiff s civil rights claims or his claims regarding mental/emotional distress and cruel and unusual punishment. (Compl, at 4.)