Opinion
Case No. 20030407-CA.
Filed March 18, 2004. (Not For Official Publication).
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable Joseph C. Fratto Jr.
Lois A. Baar and H. Douglas Owens, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Roger H. Hoole, Paul M. King, and Heather E. Morrison, Salt Lake City, for Appellees.
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Thorne.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Zions First National Bank (Zions) appeals the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. We reverse.
"We review the trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment for correctness and accord no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law." Parduhn v. Bennett, 2002 UT 93, ¶ 5, 61 P.3d 982 (quotations and citation omitted).
Zions argues that Plaintiffs' remaining breach of contract claims are essentially claims seeking to recover for Gina Cook's (Cook) physical injuries and, therefore, that they are barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act (UWCA). See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1) (2001). Based upon this argument, Zions claims it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and, therefore, that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The UWCA provides the exclusive remedy for an employee or an employee's heirs for "any accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee in the course of or because of or arising out of the employee's employment." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1). "It is well settled that the [UWCA] covers only mental and physical injuries sustained on the job. Accordingly, we have held that the exclusive remedy provision bars common-law tort actions requiring proof of physical or mental injury." Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp., 2000 UT 94, ¶ 19, 16 P.3d 555 (citations omitted). Although claims for breach of contract are generally not barred by the UWCA, see Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 2002 UT 105, ¶ 11 n. 3, 57 P.3d 1084, "the exclusive remedy provision extends far enough to bar what are essentially tort claims masquerading as breach of contract claims."Shattuck-Owen, 2000 UT 94 at ¶ 20. To determine whether the UWCA bars a particular claim, we are required to employ "an injury-oriented analysis," which focuses on "the nature of the injury for which [the] plaintiff makes [the] claim, not the nature of the defendant's act which the plaintiff alleges to have been responsible for that injury" or "the legal theory of the claim." Retherford v. ATT Communications, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 965 n. 8 (Utah 1992) (alterations in original) (quotations and citations omitted). Under this analysis, if proof of physical or mental injury is an "indispensable element" of the plaintiff's claim, the claim is barred by the UWCA. Id. at 964-65.
Plaintiffs assert that their remaining claims seek to recover for breach of contract, rather than, as Zions asserts, for Cook's physical injuries. The fact that Plaintiffs' remaining claims are phrased as breach of contract claims is not relevant, because under the "injury-oriented analysis" we do not focus on "the legal theory of the claim[s]." Id. at 965 n. 8. Instead, we focus on "the nature of the injur[ies] for which [Plaintiffs] make [their] claim[s]." Id. at 965 (quotations and citations omitted). Plaintiffs' complaint reveals that the damages they allege under their remaining claims are based exclusively upon Cook's physical injuries. Although Plaintiffs are correct in their assertion that proof of physical injury is not an "indispensable element" of all breach of contract claims, it is an "indispensable element" of Plaintiffs' remaining breach of contract claims because the damages they allege require proof of Cook's physical injuries. Id. at 964-65. Therefore, Plaintiffs' remaining claims are barred by the UWCA. See id. Plaintiffs' remaining claims "are essentially tort claims masquerading as breach of contract claims."Shattuck-Owen, 2000 UT 94 at ¶ 20.
Plaintiffs' remaining breach of contract claims do not allege contract damages (e.g., unpaid employment benefits).
We find further support for this conclusion in a related case, where Plaintiffs, as representatives of Cook's estate and on behalf of Cook's heirs, brought a wrongful death action against Zions. See Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 2002 UT 105, ¶ 1, 57 P.3d 1084. In Cook, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the UWCA barred Plaintiffs' wrongful death action. See id. at ¶¶ 10-14. In a footnote, the Cook court stated:
Chief Justice Durham rests her dissent, in part, on the assertion that "[c]laims for breach of contract are not covered by the UWCA." This is, of course, generally true. The UWCA does not preclude contractual claims for unpaid salary or benefits, for wrongful termination, or for myriad other breaches.
When a plaintiff seeks damages for personal injury as an alleged element of contractual damages, however, it is another matter. The exclusivity provision of the UWCA focuses not upon the nature of the claim, but upon the nature of the injury for which compensation is sought. It bars claims for injury or death arising out of or in the course of employment.
Here, plaintiffs claim that actions of Cook's employer caused the progression of her cancer and her subsequent death. This is precisely the type of personal injury for which the UWCA provides the exclusive remedy. Under Chief Justice Durham's theory, virtually any tort action could be characterized as a contract action in order to circumvent the UWCA. For instance, an employee could argue that the employer contracted, either explicitly or implicitly, to provide a safe work environment and that any injury sustained as the result of an unsafe condition gives rise to a breach of contract action, thereby circumventing the UWCA. Clearly, this was not the intent of the drafters of the UWCA.
Id. at ¶ 11 n. 3 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Although this language is dicta, it clearly identifies the Utah Supreme Court's position that the UWCA bars breach of contract claims, like Plaintiffs' in the present case, that "seek damages for personal injury as an alleged element of contractual damages." Id.
We conclude that Plaintiffs' remaining claims are barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the UWCA, see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1), and, therefore, that the trial court erred by denying Zions's motion for summary judgment. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this decision.
WE CONCUR: Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge and William A. Thorne Jr., Judge.