Opinion
No. 35295
Decided May 21, 1958.
Pleading — Judicial admission — Allegation of material and competent fact — Charge of unfair labor practices — Allegation that practices affect interstate commerce — Allegation of legal conclusion — Jurisdiction of Ohio courts in injunction action.
1. To operate as a judicial admission, an allegation in a pleading must be an allegation of a material and competent fact and not a mere statement of a legal conclusion.
2. An allegation, in a charge of unfair labor practices filed with the National Labor Relations Board, to the effect that such practices affect interstate commerce is an allegation of a legal conclusion and is not conclusive of the existence of interstate commerce so affected in determining whether an Ohio court has no jurisdiction in an injunction action, particularly where the National Labor Relations Board has refused to assert jurisdiction under the charge as filed and where there is no other evidence relating to the effect of such practices on interstate commerce.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County.
As a result of a campaign conducted by the defendant unions among plaintiff's employees to persuade the latter to designate the unions as collective bargaining agents in negotiating with plaintiff, and when plaintiff refused to negotiate with the unions, a strike was called and peaceably conducted at the site of plaintiff's construction operation.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed with the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board a written document entitled "Charge Against Labor Organization Or Its Agents." Included in that document are the following printed words:
"The above named organizations (s) or its agents [has] (have) engaged in and [is] (are) engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section (8b) Subsection (s) 4( A), 2, 1, other subsections of the National Labor Relations Act, and these unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of the act." (Bracketed words deleted and italicized words added by typewriter.)
The finding of the Regional Director, as set out in the record, is as follows:
"It does not appear that further proceedings are warranted inasmuch as it would not effectuate the policies of the act to assert jurisdiction at this time. I am, therefore, refusing to issue complaint in this matter."
Upon appeal to the General Counsel, he made the following finding and order:
"The General Counsel sustains the ruling of the Regional Director. The General Counsel concludes that the company's operations do not meet the board's current standards for the assertion of jurisdiction."
Thereupon, plaintiff began an action in the Common Pleas Court of Hamilton County for an injunction to restrain picketing, and that court issued the injunction.
Upon appeal on questions of law and fact to the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, the petition of plaintiff was dismissed and the injunction theretofore issued was dissolved for the reason that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter, "jurisdiction being vested exclusively in the National Labor Relations Board pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947."
The cause is before this court on appeal as of right and upon the allowance of plaintiff's motion to certify the record.
Messrs. Taft, Stettinius Hollister, Mr. J. Mack Swigert and Mr. Rob J. Taylor, for appellant.
Mr. Robert A. Wilson and Mr. Francis X. Ward, for appellees.
Despite the temptation to do so, it is not necessary to discuss several questions incidentally presented by this record, such as whether under the constitutions of the defendant unions (exhibits 1 and 2) the purpose of the picketing was to get a closed shop, and whether the so-called "no-man's land" recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1, 1 L.Ed. (2d), 601, 77 S. Ct., 598; Amalgamated Meat Cutters Butchers Workmen of North America, Local No. 427, v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20, 1 L. Ed. (2d), 613, 77 S. Ct., 604; San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26, 1 L. Ed. (2d), 618, 77 S. Ct., 607, requires the judiciary of Ohio to abdicate its responsibility to secure to each citizen the constitutionally guaranteed right to a "remedy by due course of law" for injury done him.
The sole question presented by this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy.
It must be recognized that Section 10 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act operates to exclude jurisdiction of a state court if interstate commerce is involved or affected. It necessarily follows that, where interstate commerce is not affected, or where it has not been proved that interstate commerce has been affected, the Congress of the United States has no authority to control transactions occurring within a particular state.
The question presented here is whether the allegation of plaintiff in the charge it filed with the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board is conclusive of the issue as to interstate commerce. The majority of the Court of Appeals found that it was.
There should be no question that a distinct statement of fact which is material and competent and which is contained in a pleading constitutes a judicial admission. Peckham Iron Co. v. Harper, 41 Ohio St. 100. But it would appear equally sound that such a statement, to be operative as an admission, must be one of "fact" and not merely a statement of a legal conclusion. 31 Corpus Juris Secundum, 1072, Section 301.
In the opinion in Jones v. Youngstown Municipal Ry. Co., 133 Ohio St. 118, 126, 12 N.E.2d 279, Judge Myers said that "an allegation of a conclusion of law is not binding either on the pleader or court." See, also, Continental Supply Co. v. Fisher Oil Co., 150 La. 890, 91 So. 287; 71 Corpus Juris Secundum, 153, Section 59.
In concluding that the allegation of plaintiff is not operative against him by way of estoppel, we approve the following statement of Judge Long, in his dissenting opinion:
"As far as its probative value is concerned, any presumption the allegation might raise is more than rebutted by the Regional Board's statement that: `* * * the company's operations do not meet the board's current standards for the assertion of jurisdiction.'"
The Court of Appeals, in a trial de novo, has general jurisdiction to issue an injunction. If that court is to be ousted of such jurisdiction by the fact that the operations of the plaintiff affect interstate commerce, it is the responsibility of the party seeking such ouster to prove such fact. Until there is such proof, it is our belief that Section 10 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act has no bearing upon the jurisdiction of an Ohio court in a situation such as the present one.
Since the Court of Appeals based its decision solely on the fact that plaintiff had alleged that the practices affected interstate commerce, the cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in accordance herewith.
Judgment reversed.
WEYGANDT, C.J., STEWART, MATTHIAS and HERBERT, JJ., concur.
TAFT, J., concurs in paragraph two of the syllabus and in the judgment.