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granting summary judgment for defendants on discriminatory termination claim where record evidence showed defendant failed to go to work
Summary of this case from Boyle v. HSBC BankOpinion
No. 07-4149-cv.
January 21, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Carol Bagley Amon, Judge).
UPON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is hereby AFFIRMED.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: JERRY CONSTANCE, Brooklyn, NY, pro se. COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: DIANE KREBS, Gordon Rees, LLP, New York, NY
Plaintiff Jerry Constance appeals from a judgment of the District Court, entered on August 27, 2007, following a successful motion for summary judgment filed by defendants, who are plaintiff's former employer and supervisors. Plaintiff alleged that defendants (1) discriminated against him because of his race and his national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"); (2) discriminated against him because of a disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; (3) and retaliated against him for alleging illegal discrimination. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his discrimination and retaliation claims because he presented sufficient evidence of "pretext" under the burden-shifting standard in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973) (outlining "burden shifting" in a workplace discrimination claim brought under Title VII), to permit his case to proceed to a jury. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.
Plaintiff also raised claims under related state and local anti-discrimination laws. As we have previously held, claims brought under the Human Rights Laws of New York State and New York City, including the sections alleged in this lawsuit, are analytically identical to claims brought under Title VII. See, e.g., Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 220 n. 11 (2d Cir. 2004); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 629 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1997); Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708, 714-15 n. 6 (2d Cir. 1996). Therefore, we address here only the Title VII claim.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, construing all facts in favor of the non-moving party. See, e.g., Paneccasio v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc., 532 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is only warranted upon a showing "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting protocol — which we apply to workplace discrimination and retaliation claims, see, e.g., Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying McDonnell Douglas to age discrimination and retaliation claims)"requires a plaintiff to produce some evidence showing the prima facie elements of a discrimination claim, whereupon the "burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination." Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 221 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). If a defendant produces admissible evidence showing legitimate business reasons for terminating plaintiff, "the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate by competent evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate where "the plaintiff has failed to show that there is evidence that would permit a rational factfinder to infer that the employer's proffered rationale is pretext." Id. Of course, "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff's principal discrimination and retaliation claims relate to his termination in March 2003. Assuming arguendo that plaintiff has established the prima facie elements of these claims, defendants have presented evidence showing that plaintiff was terminated for job abandonment after he refused to report for work from March 17 through March 24, 2003, having already exhausted all his vacation time for 2003. With the benefit of counsel in the proceedings before the District Court, plaintiff was unable to identify evidence in the record that defendants' reason for terminating plaintiff was a "pretext." Appearing pro se in this appeal, plaintiff argues essentially that his termination was illegitimate because he was suffering from a total disability at the time and was unable to report to work. However, the record indicates that plaintiff's doctor, who had previously recommended him for total disability in January and February 2003, released him for "light duty" on March 14, 2003. Plaintiff has failed to point to evidence in the record suggesting, much less tending to show, that the reason for his termination was not his failure to show up to work. For this reason, we agree with the District Court's grant of summary judgment.
We have considered all of plaintiff's remaining arguments, including those related to the denials of promotions to warehouse supervisor, and find them to be without merit. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.