Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. Nos. PR44104, PR44103
Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Alden and Marcelle Bloxham are the parents of three adult daughters. In 2007, two of those daughters, respondent Juliette Bloxham and appellant Michelle Beck, filed competing petitions for the appointment of a probate conservator of the person of each of their parents. The daughters alleged that their parents were unable to provide for personal needs and lacked the capacity to give informed consent for medical treatment. Juliette was ultimately appointed as conservator.
During the course of the conservatorship proceedings, conflict between Juliette and Michelle sometimes spilled over into visits with their parents. In response, the superior court placed increasingly more restrictions on Michelle’s contact with her parents. Ultimately, Michelle and members of her immediate family were restricted to visiting her parents for eight hours every other weekend under the supervision of a third party. Michelle was ordered to pay for the supervised visits, and Juliette was ordered not to be present for the visits. Restrictions were also placed on Michelle’s contact with her parents’ caregivers.
On appeal, Michelle contends that the superior court abused its discretion in limiting her visitation with her parents, acted outside its jurisdiction in restricting visitation by her immediate family members, and improperly relied on evidence from prior hearings.
For reasons that we will explain, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in restricting Michelle’s visitation, Michelle lacks standing to raise issues affecting her family members’ interests, and she fails to demonstrate error with respect to the evidence relied upon by the court. Therefore, we will affirm the order imposing the visitation and caregiver contact restrictions.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Juliette’s Petitions for Appointment of Conservator
On March 7, 2007, Juliette filed petitions seeking to be appointed the probate conservator of the person of her father, Alden (case No. PR44104), and probate conservator of the person of her mother, Marcelle (case No. PR44103). Juliette alleged that her parents lacked the capacity to give consent for medical treatment and were unable to provide for their personal needs for physical health, food, clothing, or shelter. She stated that her parents currently lived in a condominium, and that she had been managing her parents’ “living needs, including finding care-givers,” for the past five years. She explained that there was an “urgent need to have someone available” for 24-hour care, and she believed that Aegis Living “would be the most appropriate” care setting for them. Although her sister, Suzanne Schleck, supported the decision, her other sister, Michelle, opposed the plan to move their parents. Juliette explained that she was not seeking authority over her parents’ finances or financial holdings, as these were held in a trust that was being administered by an independent trustee.
Michelle filed a notice of appeal in each of her parents’ cases, No. PR44104 and No. PR44103. This court ordered the appeals, case No. H032902 and No. H032904, to be considered together for purposes of record preparation, briefing, and decision.
Juliette also filed petitions to be appointed as temporary conservator of her parents pending the hearings on her conservatorship petitions. She requested that her parents’ residence be changed to an Aegis facility in Aptos, California.
Juliette’s Appointment as Temporary Conservator and First Set of Visitation Restrictions
On March 7, 2007, following a hearing, Juliette was appointed as temporary conservator and given authorization to change her parents’ residence. The orders appointing Juliette as temporary conservator of her parents were set to expire in early April 2007. On April 4, 2007, a second set of orders was filed which extended Juliette’s appointment as temporary conservator of Alden and Marcelle until May 14, 2007.
In April 2007, Michelle filed an objection to Juliette’s petitions for appointment as the “permanent conservator” of their parents. (Capitalization omitted.) Michelle contended that Juliette was “unfit and unqualified to act as the permanent conservator,” Juliette was motivated to move their parents in order “to protect her own financial interests,” and their parents should remain in their own home. Michelle asserted that if the court determined that a conservator was appropriate, then a professional, independent conservator should be appointed. In early May 2007, Michelle filed petitions seeking the appointment of Sandra L. Hill, a private professional conservator, as the temporary and/or permanent conservator of her parents.
Following a hearing, by orders filed May 15, 2007, the superior court extended Juliette’s appointment as temporary conservator until June 11, 2007. The court also ordered that (1) Juliette not interfere with visits by Michelle or Michelle’s daughter, Suzanne Nitzkin, with Alden and Marcelle, and (2) Michelle and Michelle’s daughter not discuss “the issues raised in the litigated conservatorship proceedings” with Alden and Marcelle.
Juliette’s Appointment as Conservator and Second Set of Visitation Restrictions
On June 11 and 12, 2007, the superior court held an evidentiary hearing regarding Juliette’s petitions for appointment of a conservator of Alden and Marcelle. The court issued a “Memorandum of Decision” on June 13, 2007, followed by an “AMENDED Memorandum of Decision” on June 14, 2007.
In the June 14, 2007 written decision, the superior court explained that the parties had stipulated that a conservatorship of the person of both Alden and Marcelle was “necessary,” and thus “[t]he sole issue” before the court was who was “the person best suited to serve” as the conservator. The court concluded that Juliette should be appointed as conservator, and denied Michelle’s petition for the appointment of Hill. The court explained that Juliette was “the person best qualified to serve as conservator” because (1) Alden and Marcelle had nominated Juliette to serve as their conservator, if necessary, by their “Durable General Power of Attorney which was executed in calmer times” in June 2004; (2) the testimony of Alden and Marcelle’s personal attorney, “who has no demonstrable bias on the issue,” and the testimony of the court investigator, who conducted an “independent investigation of the competing claims of the parties,” supported Juliette serving as conservator; (3) Juliette had “consistently provided regular attention and care for her parents for many years”; (4) “[t]he chaos associated with Alden and Marcelle’s care in their home... [was] not likely to continue or reoccur now that they have been moved to Aegis”; and (5) it was in the best interests of Alden and Marcelle to “minimize further change and upheaval which would be associated with having a stranger assume the role of conservator.”
In the June 14, 2007 written decision, the superior court also ordered as follows: “Michelle Beck and her immediate family shall be permitted unsupervised visitation with the conservatees at the Aegis facility every other weekend on Saturdays and Sundays, commencing June 23, and 24, 2007, and to continue on alternate weekends thereafter, between the hours of 12 noon and 4:00 p.m. This right of visitation is subject to termination at the... [September 20, 2007] review hearing should the visitations produce conflict or turmoil between the parties. Juliette Bloxham and Suzanne Schleck should not be present during Michelle Beck’s hours of visitation. Michelle Beck must provide at least 48 hours notice to Juliette by e-mail of her intention to exercise the scheduled right to visitation.”
On June 13, 2007, the mandatory Judicial Council form entitled order appointing probate conservator was filed and Juliette was appointed as conservator of her father, Alden. (See Judicial Council Forms, form GC-340.) In the order, the superior court found that Alden “is unable to provide for his... personal needs for physical health, food, clothing, or shelter” and that “[t]here is no form of medical treatment for which [Alden] has the capacity to give an informed consent.” The court granted Juliette the powers to make health care decisions for Alden as set forth in Probate Code section 2355. Letters of conservatorship were issued on June 14, 2007. Juliette was also apparently appointed conservator of her mother, Marcelle.
Probate Code section 2355 states in relevant part: “(a) If the conservatee has been adjudicated to lack the capacity to make health care decisions, the conservator has the exclusive authority to make health care decisions for the conservatee that the conservator in good faith based on medical advice determines to be necessary. The conservator shall make health care decisions for the conservatee in accordance with the conservatee’s individual health care instructions, if any, and other wishes to the extent known to the conservator. Otherwise, the conservator shall make the decision in accordance with the conservator’s determination of the conservatee’s best interest. In determining the conservatee’s best interest, the conservator shall consider the conservatee’s personal values to the extent known to the conservator. The conservator may require the conservatee to receive the health care, whether or not the conservatee objects. In this case, the health care decision of the conservator alone is sufficient and no person is liable because the health care is administered to the conservatee without the conservatee’s consent. For the purposes of this subdivision, ‘health care’ and ‘health care decision’ have the meanings provided in Sections 4615 and 4617, respectively.”
In the conservatorship case concerning Marcelle, No. PR044103, the register of actions reflects that in June 2007, an “Order Appointing Probate Conservator” was filed and letters of conservatorship were issued. Copies of these documents are not included in the record on appeal.
September 2007 Status Hearing and Third Set of Visitation Restrictions
On September 17, 2007, three days prior to a status hearing, the superior court investigator, Kathy Tappero, filed a report with the court regarding her visit with Alden and Marcelle at Aegis on September 12, 2007, and her discussions with Aegis staff. Tappero recommended that Michelle’s visits with her parents be supervised by Aegis staff.
Juliette thereafter filed a declaration regarding Michelle’s visits with their parents. Juliette also filed a letter from their sister, Suzanne Schleck, regarding Michelle’s visits. Juliette believed that Michelle’s visits to their parents “should be limited one time somewhere around the holidays of Christmas and Easter (the day [their] parents celebrate their anniversary),” among other restrictions.
On September 20, 2007, the superior court held a status hearing. The court acknowledged receipt of a report from the “Probate Examiner” and observed that, according to the report, Michelle’s visits had been disruptive and had caused agitation. The court ordered visitation days and times to “remain the same, but visitation shall be supervised by staff. [¶] [Michelle] shall continue to refrain from speaking to [Alden and Marcelle] about financial or residential issues.” Because Michelle had recently retained new counsel who needed time to review the case, the court continued the status hearing to October 22, 2007.
October 2007 Status Hearing and Order to Show Cause Regarding Visitation
Prior to the continued status hearing, Juliette filed two letters from Aegis. One letter stated that Aegis did not have “the staff necessary to provide supervision of visitation by family members” and described a dispute between Juliette and Michelle over the installation of a telephone in their parents’ room. The other letter described Michelle’s conduct during visits with her parents, her interaction with Aegis staff, and the negative effect of Michelle’s visits on her mother and on other residents.
The continued status hearing was held on October 22, 2007. On that date, according to the register of actions, the superior court set a hearing for an order to show cause regarding Michelle’s failure to comply with the court’s September 20, 2007 order. Michelle was ordered to appear and show cause as to why visitation rights should not be revoked. The court suspended Michelle’s visitation until the hearing on the order to show cause.
March 2008 Evidentiary Hearing
An evidentiary hearing regarding Michelle’s visitation with her parents was held on March 14 and March 21, 2008. Juliette presented evidence first regarding why the superior court should prohibit Michelle from visiting their parents.
Juliette’s Evidence
Danelia Garcia is the director for Life’s Neighborhood, which is the dementia unit at Aegis where Alden and Marcelle live. On October 17, 2007, Garcia was contacted by staff members during one of Michelle’s visits. Michelle was upset and yelling in the dining room while her parents were present, and it was upsetting other residents. Garcia asked Michelle “to calm down” and to come with her. As they walked down a hallway, Michelle grabbed both of Garcia’s arms and pushed her against the wall. Garcia asked Michelle to let her go. Michelle complied, although not immediately. Michelle was upset that her parents were at Aegis. Garcia did not recall Michelle expressing concern about their physical care.
Garcia had seen bruises on Alden and Marcelle. She testified that it was common for elderly residents to get a bruise “due to a bump while they’re walking,” for example. She denied that her staff abused the residents.
Diane Savard is the director of the Aegis facility in Aptos. Aegis provides residential care for the elderly, but it is “more of a social model assisted living” facility and not a “medical model.” At some point, Michelle went to Aegis’s corporate headquarters in Seattle. Aegis gave a 30-day eviction notice to Alden and Marcelle. Savard testified that one of the reasons for the notice was that Aegis had “had a lot of time consumed in dealing with the family,” giving depositions, and going to court. Another reason was that Alden had a motorized wheelchair and he sometimes ran into other residents.
Savard had seen Marcelle with a cut on her forehead after she fell out of bed. According to Savard, Marcelle “uses a walker to keep her steady.” Savard had not observed a deterioration in Marcelle’s condition since she began living at Aegis.
Megan Lynch, a friend of Juliette’s, testified that she acted on behalf of Juliette at times and was a paid “helper” to Juliette as conservator. Lynch visited Alden and Marcelle at Aegis on August 23, 2007, without Juliette. Michelle was present and videotaped Lynch as she walked into the room. Lynch believed that Michelle had been videotaping Alden and Marcelle. Marcelle “put her finger over her mouth and said, ‘Don’t --.’ ” Lynch interpreted Marcelle’s conduct to mean that Lynch “had to be extremely guarded about what [she] said,” that Marcelle “was uncomfortable, and that hell had broken loose.” Lynch felt that “there was stress in the room.”
Alden testified at the superior court hearing, but Marcelle did not. Alden was informed that the issue at the hearing was whether Michelle’s visits to him and his wife should be restricted in some way. Alden stated, “Why would anybody want to restrict something like that? Why -- I don’t understand why it’s a problem for the Court or me.” When asked whether he wanted visits from Michelle, he replied, “Well, let the Court decide.”
Alden was told that the court wanted to hear his opinion and was asked whether he was bothered by Michelle’s visits, whether Michelle caused problems, or whether he enjoyed her visits. Alden responded: “I don’t recall anything important either way, so I can’t really say that I have an opinion. At least, I don’t have an important one because it could go either way.” Alden was later asked whether there was anything the court should know about Michelle’s visits. Alden responded: “I don’t really have an opinion about that strongly fixed in my head.”
As to whether he wanted to see Michelle, Alden stated: “Well, do I not want to see her? I can’t say it makes any difference either way. I don’t understand why it’s a big -- what you call it, an issue. Why are we fussing with this business?” Alden was told that Juliette did not want Michelle to see him, and he was asked whether he wanted that to happen. He stated, “Well, I guess I could live with it.” He was then asked again, “Do you want it to happen?” He responded, “No, I didn’t say that.”
As to whether Michelle fights with him, Alden stated: “I don’t think so. I don’t know.” When asked whether she yells at him, Alden replied, “Probably.” Alden was questioned regarding whether Marcelle gets upset after Michelle visits them. Alden stated: “Probably. She’s usually upset anyway, so I don’t know if that makes any difference.”
Alden loved Michelle and believed his granddaughter, apparently referring to Michelle’s daughter, is “wonderful.”
When asked whether he enjoyed being at Aegis, Alden responded, “It’s okay with me.” Alden was also asked whether he would like to live at Aegis, or would he like to go home. He stated, “Right now I can’t say why it would make much of a difference. I just don’t understand why we’re doing all this.” He did not think that anyone who had worked at Aegis had ever hit him. He did yell at Aegis staff to “stop” every time they tried to put on his shoes because the staff was hurting him.
Juliette testified that her parents were “very excited” to go to Aegis and “got in the car freely,” and that “[a]rriving there was delightful.” Juliette visited her parents every one to three days. Her mother would be “cheerful” before a visit by Michelle. After a visit, her mother would be “[v]ery agitated, angry, fearful” for “days.” Juliette believed that Michelle’s visits caused “significant distress” in their parents.
At some point, a dispute arose between Michelle and Juliette about whether a telephone should be installed in their parents’ room at Aegis. Michelle had ordered service for Alden and Marcelle’s room, and she received the telephone bill. Juliette objected to the telephone for several reasons. First, Aegis staff told Juliette several times that Michelle’s calls had upset their mother, and Juliette could see the changes in her mother’s behavior “when she’s in fear and worry.” Second, because Michelle did not order long distance service, their parents could not “call out” from the telephone. Juliette explained that “[a]ny call, even to Menlo Park, is a long distance call,” and their parents cannot call brothers or sisters or certain other family members. Because Juliette was not able to cancel the service, she removed the telephone from her parents’ room at least twice. At the time of the hearing, the room had a telephone, which Michelle had again installed against Juliette’s wishes. Juliette connected or disconnected the telephone depending on whether her mother was calm or agitated.
Juliette described an incident involving Michelle taking their parents out to dinner. Michelle “was unable to manage” both of their parents. She “left [their] father somewhere and brought [their] mother back....” Juliette believed that the “job” must be “done well” even “[i]f it takes two people,” and you must “be responsible for both of them.”
Juliette acknowledged that she was present at least twice when Michelle went to visit their parents, but claimed that she did not expect Michelle to be there. Every time that Juliette was present during Michelle’s visit, they fought with each other.
Juliette testified that her ability to help her parents was being undermined by Michelle. She stated that Michelle does not want her “to be doing the job,” threatens her, and states that she (Juliette) is “trying to kill” their parents. Michelle also “gets involved in” care issues, such as those involving their parents’ doctors.
Juliette wanted restrictions on Michelle’s visits with their parents. She explained that Michelle “should not be coming in to see [their parents]... with an attitude of wanting to be confrontational or to do anything other than make a happy visit for them.” Although Juliette wanted Michelle to see their parents, she believed that Michelle “has an effect on their life and where they’re living and everything.” She did not think there was any way for Michelle “to understand how to have a positive visit.” Juliette testified that she asked her father several times “what he wanted to do and what he wanted to say,” and he “clearly” stated to her every time that he wanted to come to court and say that Michelle should never see him for the rest of his life.
Juliette also wanted the authority to restrict visits by friends or “surrogates” of Michelle, because those visits “end up with a threatening air in and of themselves.” She explained that during the visits, certain individuals “are video -- are recording in some manner” and this recording creates an “air of discomfort and tension.” Regarding Michelle’s daughter, Juliette testified that she had called Juliette “evil” in front of Alden. Juliette still wanted Michelle’s daughter to visit if she came “with an attitude that was supportive of [Alden and Marcelle’s] environment; so that it improves their lives, because they love her” and they seemed to enjoy her company. Juliette had “no issue” regarding visits by Michelle’s daughter’s husband. Juliette “just [didn’t] like people coming in with telephones and recorders and video cameras intimidating the facility, the staff, and especially” her mother. Juliette stated that although Michelle had been restricted from visiting or calling their parents, Michelle “still... sent in her family with recorders and video recorders.”
Juliette also objected to Michelle having contact with any facility where their parents resided. She believed that Michelle’s visit to Aegis management in Seattle affected their parents’ living situation and that her parents were being evicted from Aegis primarily because Aegis directors “were agitated regarding legal issues being put upon them.” Juliette explained that prior to their parents living at Aegis, she had had “these kinds of circumstances” with Michelle when their parents lived in their own home. Juliette expressed concern that she would continue to have problems at any facility to which her parents moved if Michelle was allowed to visit their parents or talk to people who are in charge of the facility. She explained that “it’s just a waste of time and energy. There’s a whole bunch of things that are just falsehoods that are constantly thrown around. Doctors are called. I have to take them to the hospital -- [¶]... [¶] needlessly.” Juliette stated that she did not have any concern about the care her parents were being given at Aegis and that her parents “have been really happy there.”
Juliette testified that she tries to make sure that Aegis staff is taking good care of her parents, and she looks to see whether her parents have any physical injuries. The Aegis staff will call her if something has happened to her parents, so she “rarely” finds something, such as a bruise, that she was not already aware of.
Juliette did not recall her father ever complaining about being hurt at Aegis. She was aware that it was “hard” to put on his shoes. She explained that her father has edema and has had congestive heart failure. She stated that his feet swell, which makes it “uncomfortable” for him when putting on shoes.
As for her mother, Juliette testified that she broke a finger before she started living at Aegis. The finger was not set by her mother’s doctor or by Aegis after her mother started living at Aegis because “it was not indicated.” Her mother did not complain about the finger hurting, although her mother does take pain killers. Juliette also explained that her mother had bruises on one arm due to needles being inserted while she was in the hospital. Her mother also suffered a cut on her forehead after she fell beside her bed. Juliette stated that her mother was seeing a physical therapist and that she was frail but “much more stable now.”
Michelle’s Evidence
Following the presentation of evidence by Juliette, Michelle’s counsel asked the superior court whether it was necessary for Michelle to present any evidence. Michelle’s counsel stated that the request was for Michelle to have no visitation with her parents, and he did not think Juliette’s evidence supported that request. The court stated that it was “prepared to authorize visitation” and suggested that Michelle direct her evidence or testimony to the issue of whether the visitation should be supervised. Michelle thereafter testified to the following.
Alden and Marcelle moved into Aegis in approximately April 2007. According to Michelle, her parents did not want to go to Aegis and “begged not to” go there. At various times, Michelle tape recorded her visits with them. When asked why, Michelle responded: “Because it was in direct contradiction to what Julie says to everyone. In direct contradiction. So I should start taping everything. And she also said that things about me and my visits, and I had to tape -- start taping. It was the only thing I knew what to do.”
Michelle testified that due to a hand injury that her mother had suffered prior to moving into Aegis, it was her understanding based on written doctor’s instructions that her mother would need to have the hand “set” after the swelling went down in two days. After her mother moved into Aegis, however, the hand was never “set” and her mother “many times” would “put her hand down” and say “ ‘ouch.’ ”
Michelle testified that she observed injuries to her parents on more than one occasion when she visited them at Aegis. For example, she saw bruising on her mother’s arms and legs, and she confronted Aegis staff about it. Her mother’s arms “were bad” every week or every other week. She also saw a “big gash” on her mother’s leg, but she did not talk to the staff about it, explaining that she “finally gave up on that one.” When she saw bruises on her mother in August 2007, she asked her mother what happened. Her mother stated that she “can’t tell [her] why she’s hurt.” According to Michelle, her mother was “really upset” in mid-September 2007, and kept telling Michelle that she wanted to go home.
Michelle described a photograph that she took of her mother in mid-September 2007. When asked why she took the photograph, she stated: “Because my mommy is so afraid there. She’s so afraid. She carries her purses around her neck cause she is afraid that someone is going to steal them....” Michelle stated that her mother does not need a walker and that “[t]here is no reason for [her] to be falling like this, and she does.”
Michelle also observed physical injury to her father during his stay at Aegis. In addition to swollen feet, her father had an injury on the top of his foot, which he told her was the result of someone stepping on it. Michelle complained to Aegis staff approximately four times about her father’s physical condition, but the response was that everything was “fine.” Michelle believed that she received this response because her father “wouldn’t ever talk about it” or “back [her] up” in front of Aegis staff.
Michelle took a photograph of her father in September 2007, because he was “itching all over his chest and his back, and he was scratching.” Michelle stated that her father had the body rash for three visits even though “it’s easy to cure.” Michelle testified that Juliette had not been “taking care of it” when her father was living at home, so she had taken her father to a dermatologist. The medicine she obtained for her father had to be hidden at her father’s house because Juliette “would take it out of the room.” She believed that Juliette did not like the cure “because she hates the fact that [Michelle] took him to the doctor” and she was “so jealous” of Michelle. Michelle asked someone at Aegis to get the medication for her father but was told by that person, “I can’t talk with you, you’re fighting with Julie.” Michelle explained that she had “a whole movie of it, of that visit” and that she “was actually taking a picture of [her] mother that day because [her] mother was hallucinating.”
In early January 2008, after an individual visited Alden and Marcelle and told Michelle that her parents “were hurt,” Michelle gave the individual a camera to take pictures. The individual visited her parents, took pictures, and then gave the camera back to Michelle.
When Michelle talked to Juliette about their mother’s injuries, Juliette “smile[d] and laugh[ed]” at Michelle. When Michelle talked about their father’s injuries, Juliette “laugh[ed]” as if Michelle was “saying something preposterous.”
Michelle put a telephone in her parents’ room during the first month that they began living at Aegis. She put the telephone in the room so that all of her father’s “friends and everybody could talk to him, because he’s been so isolated.” The telephone was missing the next time she visited her parents. Over a period of time, Michelle placed a telephone in the room four times. When Michelle spoke to Juliette about the telephone, Juliette said that she “didn’t want [Michelle] to talk” to their parents. According to Michelle, “for years” Juliette has been “jealous” of Michelle talking to their parents.
Michelle testified that she visited her parents every time she was allowed to, and that she notified Juliette before the visits. According to Michelle, Juliette came to four of those visits. Michelle believed that Juliette did not want her telling their parents that Juliette was “the one that put them there,” and that Juliette had been “trying to tell them” that Michelle “did it.” Michelle acknowledged that she and Juliette had a “horrible” argument in front of everybody. Michelle stated that Juliette would follow her around during the visits, wanting to make sure that Michelle was not talking to their father.
Michelle testified that she was her “parents’ advocate” and that she had “protected [her] parents from [Juliette] for the last 20 years.” It was Michelle’s belief that Juliette wanted to keep their parents “isolated from all of us, because they never wanted to be there, and she doesn’t want it found out that she did this.” Michelle also believed that Juliette had a financial interest in excluding people, including her, from visiting their parents.
If her parents are evicted from Aegis, Michelle wanted them to live in a home with 24-hour care. Michelle suggested to the court that a home be rented for them in San Jose because “[t]hey don’t like institutions.” Michelle, who lives in San Francisco, stated that she owns a home in San Diego and has left a bedroom empty because her parents “loved it there.” She believed that as long as Juliette was conservator, Juliette would be afraid that she would take their parents away. Michelle testified that she “won’t do” it, but reiterated that she had left a room empty in her San Diego home.
Superior Court’s Statements at the Conclusion of the March 2008 Hearing
At the conclusion of the March 2008 evidentiary hearing, the superior court made the following statements.
“I think under the best of circumstances, Mr. and Mrs. Bloxham would benefit from visiting with all of their children, and I think they would benefit from visiting with Michelle and with Susan and other people who have been close to them throughout their lives.... I haven’t heard anything which warrants an absolute prohibition of Michelle’s right to visit with her parents.
“However, it is unfortunate, given the family dynamics, that it is inevitable that these visitations produce upset and drama and ultimately ends up being a power struggle. Because my sense is that Michelle is disappointed with the fact that [Juliette] has been appointed conservator, and we’re not going to go back and revisit.
“In the ideal world siblings should act as co-conservators, cooperate with one another and do what’s best for their parents. That’s not going to happen. And I think Michelle will probably never be able to come to terms with whatever decision Juliette makes, and consequently there will always be second guessing. There will always be a belief that Michelle can do it better than Juliette, and it’s just going to produce more problems than it solves to have unfettered visitation.
“And so I’m prepared to authorize and issue an order that Michelle and Suzanne and the immediate family members and Michelle Beck’s family can have visits every other weekend with supervision, at least... until people can demonstrate that they can calm down and interact in a reasonable way, needs to be supervised.
“And my sense is that supervision ought to be provided by a professional. My proposal is Lifespan. And this would be done at Michelle’s expense.
“So the question I have logistically [is] how do we work this out?
“My preference would be that Lifespan would pick... Marcelle and Alden up and transport them to a location nearby in Santa Cruz to conduct the visitations. But given that Michelle lives in San Francisco, it’s probably not practical.” The superior court asked whether anyone knew where the Bloxhams were going to be living. After Juliette’s counsel indicated that it was not yet known, the court stated: “This is a decision that the conservator makes. That’s the appointment that’s been made. And Michelle is going to have a different idea about what that should be. No matter what the decision is it’s going to be upsetting to Michelle, and she’s not going to approve of it. And my concern is that she’s going to agitate and make waves with her parents about the choice.”
Michelle’s attorney stated that “the predicate is that there’s something going on, when the only evidence we have is Michelle and Juliette hate each other and get in fights in front of their parents.”
The superior court responded: “Well, you weren’t participating in the original competing petitions -- [¶]... [¶] -- for the conservatorship. And I’ve had an opportunity now to observe the family and the personalities at work over many hours of testimony. And I’m confident that I’m right in my view of... what’s going on here.”
The superior court continued: “So... I’m mindful of the fact that it’s onerous to impose supervision restrictions.... I haven’t seen anything that’s convinced me that Suzanne is a problem. However, Suzanne is an intermediary for her mother. And it all appears to be a big power control about ultimate acts as to money and assets. It’s really unfortunate. And one person is going to have to be the conservator, and make the decisions, and that’s the decision that was made previously based upon an evaluation of all the circumstances.”
The superior court then held a discussion with counsel concerning the details of the supervised visitation. When Michelle’s counsel expressed concern about Michelle being required to pay for the supervision, the court explained that “as long as she’s incurring the expense there will come a point in time when she will hopefully demonstrate to the providers of the supervision services that their supervision is no longer required because she’s accepting of what’s going on and give[n] up on this power struggle.” Michelle’s counsel subsequently asked the court to order that the telephone stay in Alden and Marcelle’s room and that it not be removed by Juliette. The court decided that a telephone may be installed in the room, so long as it provided Alden and Marcelle with “access to the world of their friends and relatives so that they can call out as opposed to this being a hotline for Michelle to call in and agitate.”
The superior court eventually stated: “I think what we need to do, unfortunately, is to have an order which is specific. So, first of all, I’m prepared to issue a broad order that visitation will be permitted every other weekend on Saturdays and Sundays from 12:00 to 4:00. Visitation should be supervised by Lifespan, or a facility similar to Lifespan; professional, independent agent.” The court requested that both counsel provide “their proposals as to what this order should look like.”
Juliette’s counsel then raised several issues. First, he requested an order prohibiting Michelle from “interfering with the arrangements” for her parents living situation. The court stated that Michelle was not to “interfere” or “intermeddle” with Juliette’s authority or power to determine if and when their parents were going to leave Aegis and where they would reside thereafter.
Second, Juliette’s counsel raised the issue of Michelle “sending in surrogates to spy and take pictures.” He stated that “Juliette doesn’t want to close off the world of her parents, but she does want the ability to say” that certain people may not visit. The superior court stated that there would be no contact between Michelle and Juliette, and that Michelle and the immediate family members’ right to visitation would be controlled by the order allowing visitation every other weekend. The court further stated that “[t]o the extent any other person wants to have visitation, that visitation will have to be approved by Juliette.”
Third, Juliette’s counsel requested that Michelle’s contact with her parents’ physicians be restricted. The superior court stated that it would “issue an order that Michelle is precluded from access to her parents’ medical records, and... she’s not authorized to obtain medical information from health care providers.”
Michelle’s daughter, Suzanne Nitzkin, expressed displeasure over her visitation being limited to those days and times when her mother was allowed to visit, as well as the possibility of having to pay her mother back for the supervised visits. The superior court suggested that she try to work out a different visitation arrangement with Juliette. The court stated to Juliette that her parents “want to visit with their grandchildren” and that “they enjoy it.” The court encouraged her “to cooperate with someone that appears to be capable of understanding what’s in the best interest of [her] grandparents.”
Ultimately, Juliette’s counsel agreed to prepare a proposed order concerning the superior court’s ruling regarding visitation, and to meet and confer with Michelle’s counsel before submitting the proposed order to the court. The court stated that it would have the court investigator look into Lifespan’s available services and make changes to the final order if necessary.
April 2008 Order Regarding Lifespan Agreement
On April 21, 2008, the superior court issued a written order stating that Michelle’s right “for continued visitation of her parents is conditioned upon her execution of and compliance with” an agreement proposed by Lifespan.
The Lifespan agreement, which Michelle signed, set forth the “parameters” of the visits. Those parameters included visitation being limited to Michelle and her “daughter”; a Lifespan staff person staying with Michelle and her parents “at all times during the visit”; a request that Michelle “not take photos or videos of Aegis, [her] parents or Aegis staff”; Michelle and her daughter being precluded from making “disparaging remarks” about Juliette to, or from discussing the “substantive issues of the conservatorship” with, their parents; and visitation concluding “immediately” if either of Michelle’s parents “becomes agitated and upset.”
Notices of Appeal and May 16, 2008 Order Regarding Visitation
On May 5, 2008, Michelle filed notices of appeal from the order entered on April 21, 2008, in the conservatorship cases concerning Alden (No. PR44104) and Marcelle (No. PR44103).
On May 15, 2008, the superior court consolidated the conservatorship cases concerning Alden (No. PR44104) and Marcelle (No. PR44103).
On May 16, 2008, the superior court filed an “ORDER AFTER HEARING.” The order concerned the evidentiary hearing on March 14 and 21, 2008, “for review of the recommendations of the Probate Investigator for modifications in the visitation of Michelle Beck and members of her immediate family with the conservatees.” The May 16, 2008 order allowed Michelle and members of her immediate family, including Suzanne Nitzkin, to visit Alden and Marcelle on alternate weekends, Saturdays and Sundays from 12:00 noon to 4:00 p.m., “subject to the visits being professionally supervised by Life Span or some similar agency.” Michelle was required to pay for the professional supervisor. Juliette was not to be present during the visit if she was given at least 48 hours’ notice of the visit. Any other visitor was subject to Juliette’s consent.
The May 16, 2008 order also provided that Juliette, Michelle, and Michelle’s immediate family members were not to disparage each other to Alden and Marcelle. Further, Juliette and Michelle were ordered not to discuss “the substantive issues of the conservatorship proceedings” with Alden and Marcelle. In addition, Michelle was prohibited from contacting the management or staff of any facility in which Alden and Marcelle were residing, or the management or staff retained by Juliette if private care was arranged. Michelle and members of her immediate family were precluded from having access to the medical records of Alden and Marcelle or from contacting their physicians or medical caregivers, and Alden’s and Marcelle’s treating physicians were not authorized to provide information about them to Michelle. Only Juliette was allowed to install a telephone for Alden and Marcelle, and any such telephone must have “full long distance capabilities for outgoing calls.”
III. DISCUSSION
Order Being Appealed from by Michelle
As an initial matter, we first identify the order from which Michelle is apparently appealing. In her notices of appeal filed on May 5, 2008, Michelle states that she is appealing from an order entered on April 21, 2008. The superior court’s April 21, 2008 order required Michelle to execute and comply with a visitation agreement proposed by Lifespan as a condition of continued visitation of her parents. It is apparent from Michelle’s opening brief on appeal, however, that her contentions regarding error by the superior court are broader than the substance of the court’s April 21, 2008 order, which required her to execute and comply with the Lifespan agreement. Rather, she is also broadly contesting the visitation restrictions that were imposed by the court as a result of the March 2008 evidentiary hearing.
Regarding those contested visitation restrictions, Michelle in her opening brief refers to the superior court’s statements at the March 2008 evidentiary hearing and the order after hearing that was filed on May 16, 2008. At the March 2008 evidentiary hearing, the court stated its intended ruling concerning visitation restrictions and then directed the preparation of a written order by counsel. The formal written order was ultimately filed by the court on May 16, 2008. We understand Michelle on appeal to be challenging the visitation restrictions that are contained in the May 16, 2008 order, which encompasses the visitation restrictions reflected in the court’s earlier order of April 21, 2008, regarding the Lifespan agreement.
We will liberally construe Michelle’s May 5, 2008 notices of appeal as applying to the May 16, 2008 order and deem the notices of appeal as filed immediately after entry of the order on May 16, 2008. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.100(a)(2), 8.104(d)(2) & (e).) We observe that Juliette, by letter to this court after her respondent’s brief was filed, has explained that certain arguments in her respondent’s brief “apply equally to the May 16, 2008, order.” As Juliette has argued the merits of the appeal and has not sought dismissal, she would not be misled or prejudiced by our interpretation of Michelle’s notices of appeal as applying to the May 16, 2008 order. (See Gu v. BMW of North America, LLC (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 195, 202-203 [notice of appeal from order sustaining demurrer interpreted to apply to subsequent judgment of dismissal, where appellant intended to appeal from judgment and no prejudice would result to respondent].)
Turning to the substance of the appeal, Michelle contends that the superior court abused its discretion in limiting visitation with her parents, acted outside its jurisdiction in restricting visitation by her immediate family members, and improperly relied on evidence from prior hearings. We will address each contention in turn.
Visitation Restrictions on Michelle
Michelle argues that the superior court abused its discretion in requiring that her visits with her parents be supervised and that she pay for the supervision. First, she contends that “missing from the analysis of the trial court is any discussion of the best interests of Alden and Marcelle.” Second, she asserts that the court’s order “was not justified by substantial evidence and was so draconian in scope as to exceed the bounds of a reasoned response to any potential problems.” She maintains that “[t]here is nothing in the record to indicate that visitation was an issue, that Alden or Marcelle were being harmed by [her], that Alden and Marcelle did not wish to see [her] or that there was any reason why the fundamental rights of [Michelle] should have been limited by court order.”
In evaluating Michelle’s contentions, we first consider the pertinent legal principles regarding a conservatorship of the person and the standard of review.
The Probate Code sets forth the circumstances under which a conservator of the person may be appointed and the general powers of the conservator. The superior court may appoint a “conservator of the person” for a person “who is unable to provide properly for his or her personal needs for physical health, food, clothing, or shelter....” (§ 1801, subd. (a).) The conservator may be given power over the “care, custody, and control of, and... charge of the education of,” the conservatee. (§ 2351, subd. (a).) The court may limit those powers (§ 2351, subd. (b)); grant certain other powers, such as the authority to make health care decisions for the conservatee (§§ 1880, 2355); or include in the order appointing the conservator, with the conservator’s consent, “conditions not otherwise obligatory providing for the care, treatment, education, and welfare of the... conservatee” (§ 2358). In addition, the conservator may seek from the court authorization and instruction, or approval and confirmation of the conservator’s acts. (§ 2359, subd. (a).) In enacting the conservatorship statutes, the Legislature intended to “[p]rotect the rights of persons who are placed under conservatorship,” “[p]rovide that the health and psychosocial needs of the proposed conservatee are met,” and “[e]nsure that the conservatee’s basic needs for physical health, food, clothing, and shelter are met.” (§ 1800, subds. (a), (c) & (f).)
In general, the superior court’s decisions are to be guided by the best interests of the conservatee. For example, the court’s discretion in the selection of a conservator generally must “be guided by what appears to be for the best interests of the proposed conservatee.” (§ 1812, subd. (a).) Once appointed, the conservator “is subject to the regulation and control of the court in the performance of the duties of the office” (§ 2102), and the court must consider the best interests of the conservatee during the periodic review of the conservatorship (see §§ 1800, subd. (e), 1850). A conservator may be removed if the court in its discretion determines that it is in the best interests of the conservatee. (§ 2650, subd. (i).)
Although a conservator’s power to place restrictions on visitation with the conservatee is not specifically addressed in the Probate Code, this power is encompassed within the conservator’s broad authority over the “care, custody, and control of” the conservatee as provided by section 2351, subdivision (a). We also observe that a limited conservator may be granted power over a “limited conservatee’s right to control his or her own social and sexual contacts and relationships.” (§ 2351.5, subd. (b)(6).) Because a limited conservator has the “care, custody, and control of the limited conservatee” (§ 2351.5, subd. (a)(1)), and the powers and duties granted to a limited conservator “may not exceed the powers and duties applicable to a conservator” (§ 1830, subd. (b)), we believe that a conservator’s authority over the care, custody, and control of the conservatee must necessarily encompass power over visitation with the conservatee. It thus follows that the superior court generally has the authority to grant or limit visitation with the conservatee. Indeed in this case, the parties do not dispute that the court had the power to limit visitation with the conservatees, Alden and Marcelle.
A “limited conservator of the person... may be appointed for a developmentally disabled adult.” (§ 1801, subd. (d).) “ ‘Developmental disability’ means a disability which originates before an individual attains age 18, continues, or can be expected to continue, indefinitely, and constitutes a substantial handicap for such individual. As defined by the Director of Developmental Services, in consultation with the Superintendent of Public Instruction, this term includes mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, and autism. This term also includes handicapping conditions found to be closely related to mental retardation or to require treatment similar to that required for mentally retarded individuals, but does not include other handicapping conditions that are solely physical in nature.” (§ 1420.)
Relevant here, Juliette, the conservator, wanted to completely restrict Michelle from visiting her parents, whereas Michelle asserted that restrictions were unnecessary. The extent to which the conservator may control visitation with the conservatee, rather than the conservatee retaining control over visitation, is within the discretion of the superior court. (§ 2351, subd. (b); cf. § 2351.5, subd. (c) [whether to grant a limited conservator the power over a limited conservatee’s right to control his or her own social contacts and relationships “is discretionary with the court”]; Guardianship of Reynolds (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 669, 679-680 [in guardianship proceeding decided under former law, appellant, who was minor’s guardian, failed to show that trial court abused its discretion in ordering that maternal grandparents be allowed to visit with minor].)
“Where a trial court has discretion to decide an issue, it will generally be reversed on appeal only where it clearly appears a prejudicial abuse of discretion in fact occurred. [Citation.]” (Conservatorship of Scharles (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1334, 1340 (Scharles).) “ ‘The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’ [Citation.]” (Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 272 (Walker).) “[A] reviewing court will only interfere with a trial court’s exercise of discretion where it finds that under all the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court’s action, no judge could have reasonably reached the challenged result. [Citation.] ‘[A]s long as there exists “a reasonable or even fairly debatable justification, under the law, for the action taken, such action will not be... set aside....” ’ [Citation.] More specifically, a trial court’s exercise of discretion will not be disturbed unless the record establishes it exceeded the bounds of reason or contravened the uncontradicted evidence [citation], failed to follow proper procedure in reaching its decision [citation], or applied the wrong legal standard to the determination [citation].” (Scharles, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1340.)
In this case, we determine that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in placing restrictions on Michelle’s visits with the conservatees, Alden and Marcelle.
First, contrary to Michelle’s assertion on appeal, it is apparent that the court considered the best interests of Alden and Marcelle in determining whether restrictions should be imposed. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the court stated that Alden and Marcelle “would benefit from visiting with all of their children,” including Michelle, and that it had not “heard anything which warrants an absolute prohibition of Michelle’s right to visit with her parents.” The court expressed concern, however, “given the family dynamics, that it is inevitable that these visitations produce upset and drama and ultimately ends up being a power struggle” involving Michelle. The court stated that although “siblings should act as co-conservators, cooperate with one another and do what’s best for their parents,” that was “not going to happen” in this case. The court determined that Michelle would “always be second guessing” Juliette’s decisions as conservator and would always have a belief that she “can do it better than Juliette,” such that “unfettered visitation” by Michelle would “produce more problems than it solves.” In particular, regarding where Alden and Marcelle would live in the future, the court observed that this decision would be made by the conservator, “[a]nd Michelle is going to have a different idea about what that should be. No matter what the decision is it’s going to be upsetting to Michelle, and she’s not going to approve of it.” The court expressed concern that Michelle would “agitate and make waves with her parents about the choice.” The court’s own comments thus indicate that the court carefully considered the best interests of Alden and Marcelle in deciding whether to impose visitation restrictions on Michelle.
Second, contrary to Michelle’s assertion, there was ample evidence to support the superior court’s implicit conclusion that her visits with her parents negatively affected their well-being, including their living arrangements, such that restrictions on her visits were necessary and appropriate. Indeed, the evidentiary hearing provided the superior court with the opportunity to evaluate whether Michelle’s conduct, which was in response to her concerns over her parents’ well-being, was itself creating problems for her parents however well-intentioned. There was undisputed evidence that Michelle had been yelling in front of her parents and upsetting other residents at the Aegis facility where her parents resided. Michelle subsequently grabbed and pushed an Aegis employee who had attempted to calm her down. Michelle also confronted Aegis staff about her parents’ physical condition and visited Aegis headquarters. Aegis eventually notified Alden and Marcelle that they had to move out, partly due to the fact that Aegis had spent a lot of time in “dealing with the family.” There was also testimony from Juliette that Michelle was undermining Juliette’s ability to help their parents and getting involved in care issues that fell within Juliette’s responsibility as conservator. Further, there was undisputed testimony that Michelle recorded visits with her parents, including videotaping them, which created “stress in the room” and appeared to make her mother “uncomfortable.” Further, while Michelle was restricted at times from personally visiting her parents, she sent others to record her parents. Alden’s own testimony suggested he was ambivalent about visits by Michelle, although he did love her. Juliette testified that Michelle’s visits caused “significant distress” in their parents and that their mother was “[v]ery agitated, angry, fearful” for “days” after the visits. From this evidence, the superior court could reasonably conclude that restrictions on Michelle’s visits with her parents were necessary.
On appeal, Michelle characterizes the evidence as simply reflecting the “personal antipathy” between her and Juliette, which resulted in disputes over the care of their parents and which was “aggravated” by Juliette’s presence, in violation of court orders, during Michelle’s visits. Michelle contends that “any agitation that occurred was not caused by” her, “or did not occur in the presence” of her parents.
Michelle’s assertions reflect her interpretation of the evidence and the inferences that may be drawn from her interpretation. That conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence, however, is not a sufficient basis for reversing the superior court’s order regarding restrictions on Michelle’s visitation. We reiterate that “[w]here a trial court has discretion to decide an issue, it will generally be reversed on appeal only where it clearly appears a prejudicial abuse of discretion in fact occurred. [Citation.]” (Scharles, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1340.) “ ‘When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’ [Citation.]” (Walker, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 272.) “ ‘The burden is on the complaining party to establish abuse of discretion, and the showing on appeal is insufficient if it presents a state of facts which simply affords an opportunity for a difference of opinion. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Conservatorship of Ben C. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 689, 697.)
Michelle also contends that the superior court’s May 16, 2008 order was “excessive as a matter of law,” and the restrictions placed on her and her immediate family “are simply too broad and pervasive so as to indicate a reasoned decision by the trial court.” In particular, Michelle points to the restrictions on her contacting those who provide care for her parents, the limitations on her and her immediate family members from accessing her parents’ medical records or obtaining information about her parents from her parents’ physicians, and the requirement that she pay for the supervision of visits by her immediate family members.
We disagree with Michelle, and we determine that the restrictions were reasonably related to the superior court’s concerns about problems that would result if “unfettered visitation” were allowed. There was evidence that Michelle’s interactions with Aegis not only resulted in physical contact between her and a staff member but were ultimately a factor in Aegis giving notice to her parents to move out. Consequently, the court’s restrictions on Michelle’s contact with employees of any facility where her parents are residing, or with those retained by Juliette for private care, are reasonable. There was also testimony that Michelle was undermining Juliette’s ability to help their parents, getting involved in care issues, causing “needless[]” trips to the hospital, and otherwise affecting Juliette’s ability to carry out her duties as the conservator with authority over her parents’ medical treatment. Hence the limitations on access to her parents’ medical records and information from their physicians are reasonable. Further, as the superior court observed at the end of the evidentiary hearing, if Michelle has concerns about the physical abuse of her parents, she “can report her concerns to Adult Protective Services, and report her concerns to the court investigator.” Regarding the restrictions on Michelle’s immediate family members, including the requirement that Michelle pay for their supervised visits, there was evidence that Michelle directed others to do what she herself had been restricted from doing by court order. For example, when she was restricted from contacting her parents, she sent her family members to visit with recorders. There was also evidence that when she recorded her parents, it caused stress and made her mother uncomfortable. Accordingly, it was reasonable for the court to include Michelle’s immediate family members, over whom Michelle appeared to have direct influence, in some of the same restrictions on contact as Michelle. With respect to the general requirement that Michelle pay for all supervised visits, whether those visits were by her or by immediate family members, the court explained that “as long as [Michelle is] incurring the expense there will come a point in time when she will hopefully demonstrate to the providers of the supervision services that their supervision is no longer required because she’s accepting of what’s going on and give[n] up on this power struggle.” We observe that although Juliette, the conservator, wanted to completely restrict Michelle’s visits with their parents, the court made a less restrictive order and allowed Michelle to continue visiting her parents under specified conditions. The court also indicated that some of those conditions, such as the requirement that the visits be supervised, might be eliminated if Michelle demonstrated an improvement in attitude and/or conduct.
We observe that Michelle has not asserted that she would otherwise be entitled to access the presumably confidential medical information of her parents.
In sum, we conclude, based on the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, that the superior court reasonably tailored the visitation restrictions to permit supervised visits between Michelle and her parents, while leaving open the possibility that the restrictions may be removed if Michelle showed an improvement in attitude and/or behavior.
Visitation Restrictions on Michelle’s Immediate Family Members
The superior court’s May 16, 2008 order permitted Michelle and “members of her immediate family, including but not limited to her daughter Suzanne Nitzkin,” to visit Alden and Marcelle for eight hours on alternate weekends under the supervision of a third party. On appeal, Michelle argues that the order is “overbroad” and that the court acted “outside the scope of its jurisdiction” because it prevented other family members from seeing Marcelle and Alden without supervision. Michelle asserts that a court generally may not issue an order restraining the actions of persons who are not before the court; the court did not provide notice to her daughter or other relatives before issuing the order; and the order violated the fundamental rights of the various family members, including the rights to due process and privacy.
Juliette argues, among other things, that “Michelle has no standing to object to any order to the extent it affects other members of her family.” Michelle did not file a reply brief and provided no response to this argument.
We agree with Juliette that Michelle is not an aggrieved party to the extent she is challenging the effect of the superior court’s order on other members of her family.
An “aggrieved” party has standing to appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 902; County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 736.) A party is considered “aggrieved” if the party’s “rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 737.) In other words, “an appellant must demonstrate error affecting his or her own interests in order to have standing to appeal.” (In re Crystal J. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 186, 189.) The party’s “interest ‘ “must be immediate, pecuniary, and substantial and not nominal or a remote consequence of the judgment.” ’ [Citation.]” (County of Alameda v. Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 737.) A party “lacks standing to raise issues affecting another person’s interests.” (In re Gary P. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 875, 876 [a mother is not an aggrieved party with respect to the severance of the grandmother’s ties with the minors]; see also Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1128 [appellants “may not assert error that injuriously affected only nonappealing coparties”].)
Here, Michelle fails to show how her interests were affected by the purported lack of notice to her daughter or other family members, or how her interests were affected by the purported violation of various family members’ fundamental rights. Because these issues raised by Michelle do not concern her rights, she is not an aggrieved party and may not challenge the order to that extent on her family’s behalf.
In sum, Michelle fails to show that the May 16, 2008 order was overbroad or an abuse of discretion by the court with respect to her own rights or interests.
Evidence from Prior Hearings
The evidentiary hearing regarding Michelle’s visitation of her parents was held on March 14 and March 21, 2008. At the conclusion of the hearing, the superior court indicated that it would impose restrictions on Michelle’s visitation and explained why. On appeal, Michelle claims that “[t]o support its decision the trial court clearly showed that it was not only relying upon the evidence presented at trial, but also upon the initial hearings when the conservatorship was initially ordered.” She contends that the court should not have “relied upon evidence not presented at trial” and that its reliance on prior testimony denied her due process. We are not persuaded by Michelle’s arguments.
At the conclusion of the March 2008 evidentiary hearing, the superior court stated that it was prepared to issue an order allowing Michelle and her immediate family members to have supervised visitation with her parents every other weekend. The following exchange then took place between Michelle’s counsel and the court.
“[MICHELLE’S COUNSEL]: The only concern I have is kind of [the] supposed predicate on which the Court is assuming that there’s a need for supervision as to, for example, Suzanne and other family members. There’s no predicate for that. I don’t really support the Court’s jurisdiction. But leaving that aside, the predicate is that there’s something going on, when the only evidence we have is Michelle and Juliette hate each other and get in fights in front of the parents.
“THE COURT: Well, you weren’t participating in the original competing petitions
“[MICHELLE’S COUNSEL]: Perhaps thankfully so.
“THE COURT: -- for the conservatorship. And I’ve had an opportunity now to observe the family and the personalities at work over many hours of testimony. And I’m confident that I’m right in my view of, you know, what’s going on here.
“So, you know, I’m mindful of the fact that it’s onerous to impose supervision restrictions as it may relate to -- I haven’t seen anything that’s convinced me that Suzanne is a problem. However, Suzanne is an intermediary for her mother. And it all appears to be a big power control about ultimate acts as to money and assets. It’s really unfortunate. And one person is going to have to be the conservator, and make the decisions, and that’s the decision that was made previously based upon an evaluation of all the circumstances.”
Later, Michelle’s daughter, Suzanne Nitzkin, expressed concern over being restricted from visiting her grandparents unless her mother was present and paying for the supervised visits. The superior court suggested that Suzanne Nitzkin attempt to make other visitation arrangements with Juliette and encouraged Juliette’s cooperation. Juliette’s counsel indicated that Juliette would attempt to facilitate such visits. The following exchange then took place between Michelle’s counsel, the court, and Suzanne Nitzkin.
“[MICHELLE’S COUNSEL]: And, again, I would remind the Court, I think the Court has overreached on this one.
“THE COURT: Again, you were not here during the initial proceedings.
“[MICHELLE’S COUNSEL]: I just saw
“THE COURT: This is a family out of control on both sides of the equation.
“SUZANNE [NITZKIN]: Tell me how I’ve been out of control.
“THE COURT: It’s a family completely out of control. And the parents are entitled to have some degree of peace by keeping the two sides away from one another.”
“[MICHELLE’S COUNSEL]: But as a supervised visitation, if Juliette is not there, we don’t have a problem, apparently.
“THE COURT: I’m not convinced of that at all. Okay? I’m not at all convinced of that.”
On appeal, Michelle characterizes the issue as “whether the court’s reference to the prior trial is the admission of extra-record evidence that should be prohibited.” Citing Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559 (Western States Petroleum Assn.), and People v. Jackson (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1367 (Jackson), Michelle asserts that “[g]enerally, the trial court may not consider extra-record evidence in the form of prior or collateral proceedings.”
The cases cited by Michelle are inapposite. In Western States Petroleum Assn., the California Supreme Court held that evidence not contained in the administrative record is generally not admissible in a traditional mandamus action to show that a quasi-legislative administrative decision was a “prejudicial abuse of discretion” within the meaning of Public Resources Code section 21168.5, a provision of the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.). (Western States Petroleum Assn., supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 564-565, 573, 576.) Here, the proceedings in the superior court did not involve a petition for traditional mandamus, nor were the proceedings governed by Public Resources Code section 21168.5. In Jackson, the other case cited by Michelle, the Court of Appeal stated the “ ‘elementary principle that the function of an appellate court, in reviewing a trial court judgment on direct appeal, is limited to matters contained in the record of the trial proceedings.’ [Citations.]” (Jackson, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1373.) We agree with Jackson that our review as an appellate court is limited to matters contained in the record of the trial proceedings. Here, however, the proceedings in the superior court involved ongoing conservatorship and visitation issues and did not involve appellate review of a trial court judgment.
Public Resources Code section 21168.5 states: “In any action or proceeding, other than an action or proceeding under Section 21168, to attack, review, set aside, void or annul a determination, finding, or decision of a public agency on the grounds of noncompliance with this division, the inquiry shall extend only to whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence.”
In contrast to the cases cited by Michelle, the issue before the superior court at the March 2008 evidentiary hearing was whether Michelle’s visitation with her parents should be restricted. This was an ongoing issue before the court. Michelle’s contact with her parents had been the subject of several prior court orders, with each order placing further restrictions on her contact with them. By the time of the March 2008 evidentiary hearing, the issue had become whether Michelle should be prohibited from visiting her parents at all. The court and the parties were well aware of the prior proceedings and the orders addressing the limitations on Michelle’s contact. Indeed, both Juliette and Michelle generally referred to the substance of the prior orders during their testimony at the March 2008 evidentiary hearing in the context of whether one or both of them had complied with the prior orders. On appeal, Michelle fails to provide legal authority for the proposition that the superior court was precluded from considering the prior proceedings and the resulting orders regarding visitation restrictions. Given that the court must consider the best interests of the conservatees, Alden and Marcelle, in determining whether further restrictions, if any, should be placed on Michelle’s visitation, we believe that it was proper for the court to take into account the relevant prior proceedings and orders on that same issue.
Even assuming the superior court should have considered only the evidence presented during the March 2008 evidentiary hearing, Michelle fails to demonstrate error. A fundamental rule of appellate review is that an “ ‘order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; Conservatorship of Rand (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 835, 841.)
When Michelle’s current counsel questioned whether visitation restrictions were necessary in view of the evidence presented at the March 2008 evidentiary hearing, the superior court noted that Michelle’s current counsel had not participated in the earlier proceedings on the “competing” conservatorship petitions, as Michelle had been represented by different counsel at the time. The court then stated that it had “had an opportunity now to observe the family and the personalities at work over many hours of testimony” and that it was “confident” that it was “right” in its view of “what’s going on here.” (Italics added.)
We believe that the court’s statements may reasonably be interpreted as indicating that the evidence presented at the most recent evidentiary hearing, which was conducted over the course of two mornings in March 2008, supported the court’s finding that further restrictions on Michelle’s contact with her parents were necessary. Michelle does not direct our attention to anything in the record that suggests that the court actually relied on specific portions of testimony from a prior evidentiary hearing. Indeed, as we have explained, there was ample evidence presented at the March 2008 evidentiary hearing to support the May 16, 2008 order restricting Michelle’s visitation. In the absence of showing that the court actually relied on evidence presented at a prior hearing, Michelle fails to demonstrate error.
We also reject Michelle’s contention that she was denied due process as a result of the court’s purported reliance on prior testimony because Michelle has failed to show that the superior court actually relied on prior testimony. Further, as we have explained, Michelle testified about the prior visitation orders at the March 2008 evidentiary hearing, reflecting her awareness of those orders and their relevance to the pending hearing. As to the prior hearings upon which those orders were based, she makes no argument that she was not given notice of those prior hearings or the opportunity to respond at those prior hearings.
In sum, we conclude that the superior court did not err in restricting Michelle’s visitation with her parents.
IV. DISPOSITION
The May 16, 2008 order is affirmed. Respondent Juliette Bloxham is awarded her costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: Mcadams, J., Duffy, J.
All further statutory references are to the Probate Code unless otherwise indicated.