Opinion
Case No. 4:99CV1959
January 4, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant PM Resources, Inc.'s ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment [document #18]. Defendant states that it is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff James T. Conner ("Plaintiff") has failed to make a prima facie case for race discrimination. Defendant alleges that (1) Plaintiff has failed to identify a similarly situated employee outside of his protected class who was treated differently than he was; (2) it has articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions taken regarding Plaintiff's employment, and Plaintiff has failed to show pretext; and (3) Plaintiff has failed to mitigate his damages because he has not applied for employment post-termination.
I. FACTS .
The Plaintiff began working for the Defendant, or its predecessor in interest, in 1970 when he was hired as a laborer. The Defendant operates a chemical plant located on St. Charles Rock Road in Bridgeton, Missouri, where it manufactures insecticides, pesticides, herbicides and other products. Plaintiff, from 1997 until his termination on March 26, 1999, was employed as a Powder Mixer. Plaintiffs employment conditions were governed by a Collective Bargaining Agreement ("Agreement") entered into between the Defendant and the International Longshoremen's Association Local 1765 ("Union"). Under the rules of employment maintained by Defendant, fighting in the work place constitutes an offense for which an employee may be discharged. Plaintiff acknowledged that he read and understood this rule while employed by Defendant.
On or about October 31, 1998, the Agreement between Defendant and the Union expired. During negotiations for a new Agreement, the Agreement was extended until 1999. During the pendency of these negotiations, on February 19, 1999, the Union took the Defendant's employees, including the Plaintiff, out on strike. Plaintiff and other employees picketed outside Defendant's facility from 2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. each day during the strike.
Two weeks after the strike began, Plaintiff, while picketing, was involved in an altercation with Kelvin Love, an African-American. Mr. Love was a temporary employee who had crossed the picket line during the strike in order to work as a replacement employee for the striking workers. Plaintiff states that Mr. Love was told to get off the picket line. Defendant states that Plaintiff bumped into Mr. Love and asked what was wrong with him because he was standing next to the picket line. At the time, Mr. Love was apparently waiting for his wife to pick him up after work. Plaintiff believed that Mr. Love, by crossing the picket line and working as a replacement employee, undermined the goals and objectives of the striking employees.
On or about March 23, 1999, the strike ended and the union employees returned to work. Plaintiff voted to stay on strike and was not in favor of returning to work. On March 23, the first day back to work after the strike, Plaintiff arrived at work at 6:15 a.m. for his 7:00 a.m. shift. Plaintiff dressed into his work uniform and went into the lunchroom to get a cup of coffee. Mr. Love was in the lunchroom at the time. While in the lunchroom, Plaintiff and Mr. Love engaged in a verbal altercation. Specifically, Mr. Love said that if anyone had a problem with the fact that he worked during the strike, that person should take it up with management. Plaintiff asked Mr. Love if he was talking specifically to the Plaintiff. Mr. Love indicated he was speaking to anyone who had a problem with him. Plaintiff then said "don't say nothing to me." Mr. Love persisted in telling Plaintiff to take any problems he had with him to the management. Plaintiff walked out of the lunchroom and into the hallway containing employee lockers. Mr. Love continued to speak with the Plaintiff in the hallway. Once in the hallway, Plaintiff punched Mr. Love several times, pushing him into the lockers. Mr. Love backed away from the Plaintiff, putting his hands over his head to protect himself from Plaintiff's punches. Mr. Love did not attempt to punch Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not stop punching Mr. Love until other employees pulled him off of Mr. Love.
Plaintiff disputes some of these facts. He states that the initial contact between Plaintiff and Mr. Love occurred inside the lunchroom and was initiated by Mr. Love.
Mr. Love reported this incident to Fred Schick, the Plant Manager of the facility. Plaintiff also went to Mr. Schrick's office after the incident. Plaintiff informed Mr. Schrick of the fight, and Mr. Schrick told Plaintiff to get dressed and go home because he was suspended pending an investigation of the incident. During the investigation, the Company interviewed Mr. Love and Stanley McCoy, among others. Both Mr. Love and Mr. McCoy reported to the Company that Plaintiff was the aggressor in the fight and had attacked Mr. Love, punching him several times against the lockers. The Company also reviewed security tape from a security camera which taped the incident as it unfolded in the hallway. This tape corroborated Mr. Love's story regarding the incident in the hallway.
Plaintiff, when asked to give his side of the story, admitted pushing Mr. Love into the lockers, and never denied that he hit Mr. Love. He was terminated for fighting on Company property in violation of Company policy. He admits that this is the reason for his termination. He also admits that he would not have been terminated had he not attacked Mr. Love.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS .
The standards applicable to summary judgment motions are well settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a court may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the information before the court shows "there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has noted that "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed to 'secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Id. At 327 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1).
In order to obtain summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate "an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case."Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once the moving party carries this burden, the nonmoving party must "do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The nonmoving party may not rest on allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must "come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 587 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(3)).
In analyzing summary judgment motions, the Court is required to view the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and must give the non-moving party the benefit of any inferences that can logically be drawn from those facts. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 1983). Moreover, this Court is required to resolve all conflicts in favor of the non-moving party.Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chemical Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 210 (8th Cir. 1976). The trial court may not consider the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence. White v. Pence, 961 F.2d 776, 779 (8th Cir. 1992).
III. ANALYSIS .
Plaintiff presents two claims alleging racial discrimination. First, he states that he was terminated wrongfully based on race. Second, he alleges that he was treated differently than others, similarly situated, for the same or similar offense. "Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to 'fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.'"Palesch v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights, 233 F.3d 560, 566 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1)). The essential framework used for Plaintiff's claim is the three stage burden-shifting analysis found in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 441 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this analysis, plaintiff initially bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination which, if established, creates a legal presumption of unlawful discrimination. See Ghane v. West, 148 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-804). If plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, defendant then must show some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. If defendant makes such a showing, then the presumption disappears and the plaintiff must show the reason given by defendant was a pretext for the type of discrimination alleged. Id. In this case, plaintiff has alleged racial discrimination in the form of wrongful termination and disparate treatment. As such, he bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case as to the following four elements: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified to perform his job; (3) he suffered adverse employment action; and (4) some evidence that would allow the inference of improper motivation. See Clearwater v. Independent School District Number 166, 231 F.3d 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 2000). As to the burden for proving disparate treatment, Plaintiff must prove that he was treated "less favorably than similarly situated employees outside the plaintiffs protected class." Palesch, 233 F.3d at 568. The test for proving that other employees were similarly situated to the Plaintiff is a "rigorous one," requiring that the Plaintiff show that the employees were "involved in or accused of the same offense and [were] disciplined in different ways." (quoting Harvey v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1994)).
This Court takes note of the Supreme Court's latest statement on intentional discrimination and the McDonnell Douglas analysis. In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000), the Supreme Court discussed at some length "whether a plaintiffs prima facie case of discrimination . . . combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, is adequate to sustain a finding of liability for intentional discrimination." Reeves, 120 S.Ct.at 2104. In answering this question, the Supreme Court stated that a plaintiff is not required to adduce additional, independent evidence of discrimination once sufficient evidence is in the case to (1) meet the plaintiffs burden in making a prima facie case, and (2) refute a defendant's nondiscriminatory explanation for an employment decision. Id. at 2109. In attempting to adhere to this standard, this Court interprets the McDonnell Douglas analysis to require plaintiff to introduce sufficient evidence to prove the reason pretextual once defendant has injected into the case a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. An additional showing of discrimination will not be required to defeat a defendant's summary judgment motion. See Bogren v. State of Minnesota, ___ F.3d ___, 2000 WL 1868282, at 3 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that Reeves is equally applicable to the Title VII context. The Court stated that "a plaintiffs prima facie case of discrimination, combined with sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could disbelieve an employer's nondiscriminatory explanation and make the ultimate factfinding that illegal discrimination occurred, may form the requisite evidentiary basis upon which to submit to a jury the question of an employer's intentional, unlawful discrimination.").
Plaintiff has completely failed to demonstrate his prima facie case for race discrimination. He has failed to make any showing that he was subject to adverse employment action because of his race, and that there can be any inference of improper motivation. Plaintiff has additionally failed to provide evidence to suggest that similarly situated individuals were treated differently. Furthermore, even if this Court were to stretch to find that Plaintiff was able to present a prima facie case for race discrimination, Plaintiff has failed to show that the reason given for his termination was pretextual. In its Statement of Undisputed Facts, Defendant states:
30. Plaintiff admits that he was terminated as a result of the March 23, 1999 altercation and that the Company did not give him any other reason for his termination.
31. Plaintiff also admits that he would not have been terminated had he not attacked Mr. Love.
See Statement of Undisputed Facts, at 5-6. Plaintiff has not denied the validity of these facts, and as such is without grounds to attack the legitimacy of the reason given for his termination.
Because Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie case of race discrimination as the basis for his wrongful termination claim and disparate treatment claim regarding the discipline he received, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
Because Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing of race discrimination as the basis for his termination and disparate treatment, the Court need not even address the legitimacy of the reason given for his termination. However, as was stated previously, there seems little doubt that the reason given for Plaintiffs termination by Defendant is legitimate, and Plaintiff has provided no evidence of pretext.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant PM Resources, Inc.'s ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment [document #18] is GRANTED.