Summary
holding that an employee of a manufacturer, who was injured while loading the manufacturer's parts onto a trucking company's trailer, cannot maintain a negligence action against the trucking company, because the trucking company was engaged in the transportation of parts between the manufacturer's plants, which was an essential element of the manufacturer's business
Summary of this case from Ragland v. Dart Container CorporationOpinion
44820 Record No. 820716
Decided June 14, 1985
Present: All the Justices
Workers' Compensation Act bars personal injury suit against trucking company delivering goods between two plants of employer since trucker was engaged in the trade of employer and not an "other party" within meaning of Code Sec. 65.1-41.
Workers' Compensation — Acts of Strangers (Code Sec. 65.1-41) — Trade or Business of Employer
Plaintiff was employed at an automobile plant in Norfolk. She was injured when she drove a forklift carrying her employer's machinery and parts into a truck trailer for shipment to another plant owned by the employer in New Jersey. The trailer floor collapsed, injuring plaintiff. The employer had contracted with the trucker to deliver the parts and machinery to its New Jersey plant, and the employer contracted to perform the loading and unloading. The trucker is a public carrier operating under an interstate Commerce Commission permit. The employer occasionally uses other trucking contractors to make such shipments.
1. Where it applies, the Workers' Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for injury received in the course of employment.
2. An employee may maintain an action at law against a party who negligently causes injury if the actor is a stranger to the trade, occupation or business of the employer.
3. Whether a third-party is engaged in the business of the employer is a factual issue.
4. Transportation of parts and machinery from one plant to another was an essential element of the employer's business, and the trucker was thus engaged in the employer's trade, business or occupation and not subject to suit.
5. The fact that the trucker here did not participate in the loading operation has no significance.
6. Cases where the third-party merely delivers goods to a job site are distinguishable.
Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. Hon. Edward L. Ryan, Jr., judge presiding.
Affirmed.
Harry J. Hicks for appellant.
Richard A. Saunders (Donnell P. Davis; Furniss, Davis and Rashkind, on brief), for appellees.
Vencenza J. Conlin, an employee of Ford Motor Company (Ford), sued Turner's Express, Inc., and others (collectively, Turner's Express) to recover damages for personal injuries which she alleged were caused by Turner's Express' negligence. Turner's Express defended on the ground that Conlin's exclusive remedy was against her employer, Ford, under the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, Code Sec. 65.1-1, et seq. The trial court agreed and entered judgment for Turner's Express. Thus, the sole question presented in this appeal is whether Turner's Express was engaged in the trade, business, or occupation of Ford at the time Conlin was injured or whether it was an "other party" within the meaning of Code Sec. 65.1-41.
The other defendants were Kim Leasing Company, Inc. (Kim) and Paul Drummond. Drummond operated the tractor-trailer involved in the accident. Turner's Express owned the tractor; Kim owned the trailer which it leased to Turner's Express.
The facts were stipulated. Conlin was employed by Ford at its Norfolk plant. She was injured while operating a forklift used to load Ford machinery and parts onto Turner's Express' trailer. While the forklift was on the trailer's floor, the floor collapsed, which caused the forklift and Conlin to fall. Conlin received workers' compensation from Ford.
Ford contracted with Turner's Express to haul Ford's machinery and parts between its plants. This particular cargo was to be transported to Ford's plant at Mawhwah, New Jersey. Under their agreement, Ford was obligated to load the cargo and to unload it at its destination. Turner's Express is a public motor carrier which operates under an Interstate Commerce Commission permit. Ford occasionally engaged other motor carriers for this service.
[1-3] When an employee and his employer accept the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, the rights and remedies granted thereby "shall exclude all other rights and remedies" of the employee to recover for an injury received during the course of his employment. Code Sec. 65.1-40. If, however, the employee's injury is caused by the negligent act of a party who is a stranger to the trade, occupation, or business of his employer, the employee may maintain an action at law against the "other party." Whalen v. Dean Steel Erection Co., 229 Va. 164, 167, 327 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1985); Stewart v. Bass Constr. Co., 223 Va. 363, 365, 288 S.E.2d 489, 490 (1982). Whether a third party is engaged in the trade, occupation, or business of the employer "depends upon the facts and circumstances in each case, and for that reason the question does not readily yield to categorical or absolute standards." Bassett Furniture v. McReynolds, 216 Va. 897, 902, 224 S.E.2d 323, 326 (1976).
The present case is factually similar to Floyd, Administratrix v. Mitchell, 203 Va. 269, 123 S.E.2d 369 (1962). Floyd was killed in an industrial accident, and his employer, Glamorgan Pipe and Foundry Company, paid workers' compensation to his personal representative. Glamorgan manufactured pipe and sold and shipped it to its customers. R. S. Powell, Inc., was a contract motor carrier engaged by Glamorgan to transport pipe from Glamorgan's plant to its customers. Floyd's job consisted of loading pipe on Powell's trailers. As Powell's driver was backing a trailer to position it for loading, the trailer struck and killed Floyd. Floyd's representative sued Powell and its driver.
We affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the action and ruled that the representative's exclusive remedy was under the Workers' Compensation Act. 203 Va. at 273-74, 123 S.E.2d at 372. We held that if an independent contractor is performing work that is part of the trade, business, or occupation of the employer, the contractor is not an "other party" against whom an action will lie. Id. at 274, 123 S.E.2d at 372. We reasoned that "Glamorgan's trade, business or occupation was manufacturing pipe and selling and shipping it to its customers. Transporting the pipe to the customers was a necessary element of this business." Id. at 273, 123 S.E.2d at 372.
Similarly, in the present case, transporting machinery and parts from one plant to another was an essential element of Ford's business. Therefore, because Turner's Express was engaged in Ford's trade, business, or occupation, Turner's Express was not an "other party" whom Conlin could sue.
There is but one factual distinction between Floyd and the present case. In Floyd, Powell's employee assisted the manufacturer in loading the pipe. In the present case, however, Turner's Express' driver did not assist in the loading operation. We do not believe this distinction is relevant to a determination whether Turner's Express was engaged in Ford's trade, business, or occupation. Thus, the distinction makes no difference.
Conlin relies primarily upon Hipp v. Sadler Materials Corp., 211 Va. 710, 180 S.E.2d 501 (1971), and Burroughs v. Walmont, 210 Va. 98, 168 S.E.2d 107 (1969), to support her position that Turner's Express was an "other party" under the statute. Her reliance is misplaced. In Hipp, a materialman was delivering his products to a building contractor when the builder's employee was injured. The employee sued the materialman. 211 Va. at 710, 180 S.E.2d at 501. In Burroughs, there was a similar delivery, and the materialman's injured employee sued the building contractor. 210 Va. at 99, 168 S.E.2d at 108. We held in both cases that one who merely delivers his materials is not engaged in the trade, business, or occupation of a builder and, therefore, is an "other party" subject to suit. 210 Va. at 100, 168 S.E.2d at 108-09; 211 Va. at 711, 180 S.E.2d at 502.
In the present case, however, Turner's Express was not merely delivering merchandise to a job site but was transporting cargo between Ford's assembly plants, an essential part of Ford's business. Therefore, Turner's Express was not an "other party."
Thus, we hold that Conlin's claim against Turner's Express is barred by Code Sec. 65.1-40. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.