Opinion
Civil Action No. 20-1768 Civil Action No. 20-1775
01-05-2021
MICHAEL J. CONIKER, Petitioner, v. FRANK J. SCHERER, Director Allegheny County Probation; and the ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondents.
District Judge William S. Stickman/Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that the Petitions Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (the "Petitions") be dismissed pre-service pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases because each Petition raises claims that are time-barred or procedurally defaulted. It is further recommended that a certificate of appealability be denied.
II. REPORT
Michael J. Coniker ("Petitioner") is a state probationer and seeks to challenge his convictions in two different cases in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. The convictions were entered after Petitioner's guilty plea and resulted in sentences of probation for an aggregate term of three years. Notwithstanding that the sentence was imposed in 2014, Petitioner's probation appears to continue because while still serving his probation sentence, Petitioner was arrested on March 1, 2017, and alleged to have engaged in additional crimes of terroristic threats and disorderly conduct. Com. v. Coniker, CP-02-CR-0014079-2018 (CCP Allegheny County). Petitioner was arrested on that same date for the same crimes and charged in a separate case. Com. v. Coniker, CP-02-CR-0006879-2018 (CCP Allegheny County).
The docket for this criminal case is available at:
https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/CPReport.ashx?docketNumber=CP-02-CR-0014079-2018&dnh=IXeOXJ0t5wPJjcHeAMqAUQ%3d%3d (site last visited 1/4/2021).
The docket for this criminal case is available at:
https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/CPReport.ashx?docketNumber=CP-02-CR-0006879-2018&dnh=QqmH4rvxToTkLyC8IgmUGg%3d%3d (site last visited 1/4/2021).
Through counsel, Petitioner has filed two separate Petitions in this Court challenging his consolidated 2014 convictions. Petitioner first attempted to challenge these convictions by filing a Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") Petition in state court; however the PCRA Petition was denied as untimely filed under Pennsylvania's PCRA statute of limitations. The Petitions pending in this Court claim that the state courts erred in finding his PCRA petition to be untimely filed. Because errors in the course of the PCRA proceedings are not cognizable in a federal habeas petition, the instant Petitions should be dismissed. Alternatively, because the Petitions were not filed in this Court within one year of his convictions becoming final, the Petitions should be dismissed as time-barred or as procedurally defaulted.
A. Factual History
The Court takes judicial notice of the Pennsylvania Superior Court decision and the appellate court's summary of the facts underlying Petitioner's convictions as follows.
The notes of testimony from [Appellant's] guilty plea hearing reflect the following factual history for this case:
Beginning with Case No. [CP-02-CR-0000714-2013] the Commonwealth would call witnesses who would testify that on August 25, 2012, [Appellant] entered the house of his neighbor, Keith Edwards, without permission and he then fled and during the course of the flight he was apprehended by police officers. When he was apprehended by police officers, he informed them he had rigged his house with a propane tank by placing it next to his furnace to blow up first responders to his house. Officers then checked his house and verified that there was a propane ta[nk] hidden next to [Appellant's] furnace. He communicated [this information] to Officers Skillen and then Detective Leach.
With regard to the case at No. [CP-02-CR-0000696-2013], the Commonwealth would call witnesses who would testify that on August 24, 2012, [Appellant] had called Andrew Hrezo on the phone and made
numerous threats to Mr. Hrezo threatening physical harm to him.
Com. v. Coniker, 250 WDA 2018, 2019 WL 2121389, at *1 (Pa. Super. May 14, 2019).
NT, 8/11/14, at 9.
Petitioner's counsel attached a partial copy of the Superior Court's opinion to the Petitions. Because the copies are not complete, the Court cites to the Westlaw version.
B. Procedural History
1. State Court
The Superior Court recounted the procedural history as follows:
[Appellant] was charged, at [CP-02-CR-0000714-2013], with one count of burglary (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(c)(1)); one count of criminal attempt burglary (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a)); one count of criminal trespass (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(ii)); one count of risking a catastrophe (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3302(b)); one count of terroristic threats (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1)); one count of recklessly endangering another person (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705); and one count of disorderly conduct graded as a summary offense (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(1)). At [CP-02-CR-0000696-2013], he was charged with two counts of terroristic threats (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1)).
On August 11, 2014[, Appellant] entered pleas of guilty pursuant to a plea agreement reached with the Commonwealth. That agreement provided for the withdrawal of the burglary and criminal attempt-burglary charges at [CP-02-CR-0000714-2013] and one of the terroristic threat counts at [CP-02-CR-0000696-2013] and the reduction of the criminal trespass charge to a charge of defiant trespass, graded as a misdemeanor of the third degree, and reduction of the risking a catastrophe charge from a felony of the third degree to a misdemeanor of the second degree. [Appellant] entered pleas of guilty to the reduced charges and the remaining charges that were not withdrawn and an agreed upon sentence [of]
three years of probation was imposed at the risking a catastrophe charge at [CP-02-CR-0000696-2013] and at the remaining terroristic threats charge at the other case number, to run concurrently. No further penalty was imposed on the remaining counts. [Appellant], through counsel, filed a motion for leave to withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied by operation of law on December 22, 2014. This appeal followed.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/13/15, at 2-3.
Id. at *1-2 (footnote omitted).
Commonwealth v. Coniker, 133 A.3d 82, 119 WDA 2015 (Pa. Super. filed September 29, 2015) (Non-Precedential Decision at *1-2). After review, this Court affirmed Appellant's judgment of sentence. Id. at 7. On October 15, 2015, Appellant filed a timely petition for allowance of appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Our Supreme Court denied Appellant's petition on March 17, 2016. Commonwealth v. Coniker, 134 A.3d 54, 411 WAL 2015 (Pa. 2016).
On July 25, 2017, Appellant filed a PCRA petition. The PCRA court appointed counsel, and on September 6, 2017, counsel entered his appearance for Appellant. On October 25, 2017, appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw from representing Appellant pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). On November 7, 2017, the PCRA court informed Appellant of its intent to dismiss the PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 907 on the basis that the PCRA petition was untimely. On November 30, 2017, Appellant, through new counsel, Attorney Joseph Hudak, filed a response to the PCRA court's notice of intent to dismiss. On January 17, 2018, the PCRA [court] dismissed Appellant's PCRA petition. On February 15, 2018, Attorney Hudak filed a timely notice of appeal on Appellant's behalf. The record does not reflect that the PCRA court directed Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for this Court's consideration:
1. Did the Court of Common Pleas commit an error of law when it ruled that [Appellant's] PCRA petition was untimely?
2. Was [Appellant's] PCRA issue litigated previously in this Court at No. 1[1]9 WDA 2015?
The Superior Court affirmed the denial of relief in the PCRA proceedings, concluding that the PCRA petition was not timely filed under the PCRA statute of limitations and that Petitioner failed to establish entitlement to tolling under any statutory exception. In reaching this conclusion, the Superior Court rejected Petitioner's contention that his incarceration in the Allegheny County Jail's Mental Health Unit beginning March 1, 2017, constituted governmental interference that tolled the applicable statute of limitations.
The exception Appellant raises is government interference with his claim under Section 9545(b)(1)(i). Appellant's Brief at 9. Appellant argues that the government interfered with his ability to file a timely PCRA petition while he was incarcerated at the ACJ. Id. In order for Appellant to prove that his imprisonment at the ACJ satisfies the governmental interference exception to the PCRA's timeliness requirement, he must establish that the conditions of his incarceration were illegal. Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1095, (Pa. 2010) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i) (governmental interference must violate the laws or constitution of the United States or Pennsylvania). Appellant has not plead or proven that his incarceration at the ACJ was illegal. Accordingly, this claim fails.Id. at *4.
Moreover, Appellant acknowledges that he was not housed at the ACJ until March 1, 2017. PCRA Petition, 7/25/17, at 10. As noted above, Appellant's judgment of sentence became final June 15, 2016. Thus, even if we accept as true Appellant's claim that he was prevented from filing a timely PCRA petition during the time he was detained at the ACJ, Appellant failed to identify any barrier that prevented him from filing a petition prior to this period of incarceration, i.e., between June 15, 2016, and March 1, 2017.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Petitioner's Petition for Allowance of Appeal on October 29, 2019. Com. v. Coniker, 218 A.3d 1200 (Pa. 2019) (Table).
2. Federal Court
Petitioner, proceeding by retained counsel, paid two filing fees and filed two separate Petitions on November 12, 2020, more than a year after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his Petition for Allowance of Appeal. The first Petition was filed at Civil Action No. 20-cv-1758 and challenges Petitioner's convictions obtained at CP-02-CR-0000696-2013. The second Petition was filed at Civil Action No. 20-cv-1775 and challenges his convictions obtained at CP-02-CR-0000714-2013.
The docket for this Petitioner's criminal case is available at:
https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/CPReport.ashx?docketNumber=CP-02-CR-0000696-2013&dnh=lLOZHiMxTMMM3l5xggRglg%3d%3d (site last visited 1/4/2021).
The docket for this Petitioner's criminal case is available at:
https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/CPReport.ashx?docketNumber=CP-02-CR-0000714-2013&dnh=p3Vl5bNiRpABmVqbm7w8Ag%3d%3d (site last visited 1/4/2021).
At Ground One, the Petitions raise the identical ground for relief:
Requesting relief from a conviction that became final on June 15, 2016, Petitioner filed a PCRA Petition on July 25, 2017, forty (40) days past the Pennsylvania PCRA one-year filing deadline. The trial court issued a Notice of Intention to Deny the PCRA Petition as untimely. Petitioner filed a response in which he plead[ed] that he was confined in a mental health unit of the Allegheny County Jail and that he had: a) no access to pen or paper; and b) no means to communicate with the outside world including lawyers. On appeal, Petitioner plead[ed] conditions of incarceration that were an illegal denial of a prisoner's right to reasonable access to the courts and equal protection guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.Civ. A. No. 20-cv-1768 (ECF No. 1 at 5); Civ. A. No. 20-cv-1775 (ECF No. 1 at 5). By way of relief, Petitioner seeks to have this court "[v]acate judgment of sentence and direct leave to withdraw guilty plea and proceed to trial." Id. at 15 (in both Petitions).
C. Discussion
1. Rule 4
The Petitions have not yet been served. Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases, this Court may dismiss the Petitions if it plainly appears that the Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief. The Court concludes that it plainly appears from the face of each Petition and the items of which the Court can take judicial notice that Petitioner's claims do not entitle him to federal habeas relief.
Rule 4 provides in relevant part that:
If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.In interpreting Rule 4, the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 4 observe that:
28 U.S.C. § 2243 requires that the writ shall be awarded, or an order to show cause issued, "unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto." Such consideration may properly encompass any exhibits attached to the petition, including, but not limited to, transcripts, sentencing records, and copies of state court opinions. The judge may order any of these items for his consideration if they are not yet included with the petition.In addition to ordering the state court records and/or opinions, this Court takes judicial notice of the records in Petitioner's criminal cases and the decisions of the state courts addressing his appeals.
On review of the record, the Court finds three independent bases for dismissal. First, Petitioner's assertion of error in the course of the PCRA proceedings is not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. Second, the Petitions are time-barred under the controlling statute of limitations. United States v. Bendolph, 409 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that a district court possesses the authority to raise AEDPA's statute of limitations sua sponte during its initial consideration of a petition pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts). Third, Petitioner procedurally defaulted all claims that were raised or could have been raised in the PCRA petition given that the state courts held the PCRA petition was time-barred.
2. Claims of errors in the PCRA proceedings are not cognizable.
Petitioner alleges that the state courts erred in applying the state PCRA statute of limitations. This claim is simply not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. As recently explained by this Court:
Petitioner's challenge as to the PCRA statute of limitations represents an argument that the PCRA process was defective as to him.... [C]hallenges concerning alleged errors in collateral proceedings are clearly outside the scope of federal habeas review. See Abu-Jamal v. Horn, 520 F.3d 272, 297 (3rd Cir. 2008), rev'd on other grounds, Beard v. Abu-Jamal, — U.S. —, — S.Ct. —, — L.Ed.2d —, 2010 WL 154862, (U.S. Jan. 19, 2010) (claim that petitioner was denied due process during post-conviction proceedings is not a cognizable claim under federal habeas review); Lambert, 387 F.3d at 247 (petitioner's claim of evidentiary misconduct by the Commonwealth during a PCRA hearing is not a cognizable claim for purposes of federal habeas review); Hassine, 160 F.3d at 954; Beeman v. Ortiz, 161 F. App'x 767, 769 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding that attack on state post-conviction procedures is not cognizable under § 2254); Roe v. Baker, 316 F.3d 557, 571 (6th Cir. 2002) ("[R]elief may not be granted to a habeas petitioner for alleged deficiencies in a state's post-conviction procedure[.]"). Therefore, it appears that Magistrate Judge Rice correctly found that Petitioner's claim as to the "constitutional infirmity" of the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations is not a viable claim for purposes of federal habeas review.Green v. Capozza, CV 20-172, 2020 WL 1250172, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2020) (quoting Malone v. Coleman, CIV.A. 09-2656, 2010 WL 891031, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2010)), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1248702 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2020). See also Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 954 (3d Cir. 1998) ("the federal role in reviewing an application for habeas corpus is limited to evaluating what occurred in the state or federal proceedings that actually led to the petitioner's conviction; what occurred in the petitioner's collateral proceeding does not enter into the habeas calculation. We have often noted the general proposition that habeas proceedings are "hybrid actions"; they are "independent civil dispositions of completed criminal proceedings."); Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) ("habeas proceedings are not the appropriate forum for Lambert to pursue claims of error at the PCRA proceeding").
Accordingly, the Petitions must be dismissed for this reason alone.
3. The Petitions are time-barred.
In the alternative, the Petitions are clearly time-barred under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, tit. I, §101 (1996). AEDPA requires that state prisoners file their federal habeas petition within one year after their conviction became final. Specifically, AEDPA provides that:
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.
Petitioner correctly notes that his conviction became final as of June 15, 2016, which is 90 days after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his Petition for Allowance of Appeal, and the time permitted for the filing of a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel Highlands, 705 F.3d 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2013) ("On direct review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Jenkins's petition for allowance of appeal on September 28, 2007. . . . Because Jenkins had ninety days to petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, his conviction became final on December 27, 2007. Sup.Ct. R. 13.1. Jenkins did not file his habeas petition until well over a year later on May 7, 2010; thus, it is untimely unless AEDPA's limitation period was tolled." (internal citation omitted)).
As provided by the AEDPA, Petitioner would have had one year after June 15, 2016, i.e., until June 15, 2017, to file his habeas Petitions in federal court attacking deficiencies in his convictions/sentences. Petitioner did not file the instant Petitions until November 12, 2020, more than three years after his convictions became final, and well over a year after his belated PCRA proceedings concluded.
It is true that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the filing of a timely PCRA petition and its pendency tolls the running of the AEDPA statute of limitations. However, in this case, the state courts found that the PCRA petition was not timely filed. Because the state courts found that the PCRA petition was not properly filed, the PCRA petition cannot serve to statutorily toll the AEDPA statute of limitations. Karnes v. Patrick, CIV A 08-495, 2009 WL 1026342, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2009) ("Because untimely filed PCRA petitions do not constitute 'properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), such untimely PCRA petitions cannot toll the AEDPA statute of limitations.") (citing Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2003) ("We hold that an untimely application for state post-conviction relief by a petitioner, who sought but was denied application of a statutory exception to the PCRA's time bar, is not 'properly filed' under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2).").
To the extent that Petitioner would argue the AEDPA statute of limitations should be calculated from the date a state created impediment was removed per 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B), such a remedy is of no moment. The purported state created impediment, being placed on a mental health unit in the Allegheny County Jail, allegedly deprived Petitioner of all means to file his PCRA Petition or to contact outside help to do so (as argued by Petitioner on appeal to the Superior Court in his PCRA proceedings, of which this Court takes judicial notice). This impediment, however, did not arise until nine months after Petitioner's conviction became final on June 15, 2016. Specifically, Petitioner argued to the Superior Court that:
"For the last several months of the one (1) year filing period for the PCRA Petition, I was incarcerated in the Allegheny County Jail. The lawyer appointed by the Court states in his Turner/Finley No Merit Letter that my incarceration made it "difficult" for me to file the PCRA Petition on time. This is inaccurate. It was not "difficult." It was literally impossible. I was on a mental health pod at the Allegheny County Jail in which inmates: a) have no access to pen or paper; and b) have no means to communicate with the outside world including lawyers. I respectfully request an evidentiary hearing on this issue."Brief for Appellant Com. v. Coniker, No. 250 WDA 2018, 2018 WL 8343803 at *8 (Pa. Super.). AEDPA's statute of limitations, however, does not start to run anew from the date an impediment was removed. See, e.g., Griffin-El v. Diguglielmo, CIV. A. 08-1018, 2009 WL 4348837, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2009) ("Hence, if the State created impediment occurs after the judgement of conviction becomes final, then the state created impediment will not restart the statute of limitations from the date when the impediment is removed but will merely serve to equitably toll the running of the statute of limitations from the time the impediment is put into place until the time it is removed."). To that end, if the Court were to accept Petitioner's state created impediment theory, Petitioner fails to provide a factual basis to recalculate the limitations period pursuant to Section 2244(d)(1)(B) to permit a finding that his pending Petitions are timely. Petitioner fails to explain how the alleged impediments resolved, nor when his access to courts returned. Under these circumstances, the Petitioner does not permit the Court to accurately determine the tolling period nor whether Petitioner acted diligently after any alleged impediment resolved. Moreover, any delay due to the asserted impediment above necessarily must have ended - at the latest - on the day Petitioner filed his PRCA petition. Given his facially untimely PCRA petition, Petitioner's failure to file a petition for habeas relief in this Court immediately upon the cessation of any alleged impediment is dispositive. Finally, there is no basis for this Court to toll the more than one-year delay from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's denial of allocator with respect to the PCRA petition on October 29, 2019, to the filing of the present habeas petition on November 12, 2020. See e.g. Lawrence v. Fla., 549 U.S. 327, 332 (2007) ("The application for state postconviction review is ... not "pending" after the state court's postconviction review is complete, and § 2244(d)(2) does not toll the 1-year limitations period during the pendency of a petition for certiorari.").
Therefore, the Court finds that the instant Petitions are clearly time-barred under the applicable AEDPA statute of limitations as measured from the date Petitioner's convictions became final. His convictions became final on June 15, 2016, but the Petitions were not filed until November 12, 2020, more than four years after the convictions became final.
4. Any issues raised or that could have been raised in the PCRA petition are procedurally defaulted.
Lastly, because the state courts found the PCRA petition was untimely filed, Petitioner procedurally defaulted any claims raised in that PCRA petition or that could have been raised in that PCRA petition. See, e.g., Pagan v. Brooks, CIV.A. 07-CV-4780, 2008 WL 4838353, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2008) ("An issue is waived if a petition[er] fails to raise it and it could have been raised before trial, on appeal, in a habeas corpus proceeding, or in a prior proceeding. 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 9544(b)"); McMullen v. Bush, CV 15-686, 2016 WL 2937016, at *2 (W.D. Pa. May 20, 2016)("If Petitioner fails to file a PCRA Petition as he is now able to do and, if any claims of ineffectiveness that he raises herein could have been raised in such a PCRA Petition, Petitioner is warned that any such claims could be procedurally defaulted."); Banks v. Horn, 49 F. Supp. 2d 400 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's refusal to consider a death sentenced PCRA petitioner's claims because his PCRA petition was untimely, constituted a procedural default, barring federal habeas review and that the PCRA's statute of limitations and its application by the state Courts was independent and adequate).
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Petitions should be dismissed pre-service because they: 1) raise a claim for relief that is not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings; 2) they clearly violate the AEDPA one-year statute of limitations as the Petitions were filed more than four years after the AEDPA statute of limitations ran as calculated from the date his conviction became final; and, 3) Petitioner procedurally defaulted any claims actually raised in the untimely PCRA petition or that could have been raised in the untimely PCRA petition.
D. Certificate of Appealability
Because jurists of reason would not find the foregoing debatable, a certificate of appealability should be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition should be dismissed, and furthermore, a certificate of appealability should be denied.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.
Respectfully submitted, Dated: January 5, 2021
/s/ Maureen P . Kelly
MAUREEN P. KELLY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE cc: The Honorable William S. Stickman
United States District Judge
All counsel of record via CM-ECF