TJOFLAT, Chief Judge:

This is an appeal from an order of the district court declaring unconstitutional on fourteenth amendment equal protection grounds a Florida statute, Fla.Stat. § 339.0805 (1989), and the regulations promulgated thereunder, Fla.Admin. Code Ann. ch. 14-78 (1989), that created a setaside and minority business participation program for contracts awarded by Florida's Secretary of Transportation (the Secretary), the head of the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT). In its order, the district court noted that this statute and the regulations had been modeled after a nearly identical federal statute, the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 (STURAA), Pub.L. No. 100-17, § 106(c), 101 Stat. 132, 145, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, 49 C.F.R. §§ 23.61-69 (1989), which require a state to have a set-aside and minority business participation program if it wants to receive federal funds for highway construction projects, and that the federal statute contained no equal protection infirmity under the fifth amendment. Concluding that the Florida statute and regulations are "the end result of, and thus necessarily a part of," a valid federal program, the court upheld the Florida statute to the extent that it serves as a vehicle for obtaining federal highway construction funds. In sum, the district court concluded that Fla.Stat. § 339.0805 and the regulations promulgated thereunder are, at once, both constitutional and unconstitutional on their face — depending on the source of the funds that the Secretary may be using to implement the program created by the statute and regulations.

We vacate the district court's order and direct the district court, on receipt of our mandate, to dismiss the case without prejudice. We do so without reaching the merits because the plaintiffs, all of whom are engaged in the highway construction business in Florida, lack standing to pursue their claims.

We organize the opinion as follows. In part I, we summarize in subpart A the provisions of the federal set-aside and minority business participation program and, in subpart B, its Florida counterpart. In part II, we set forth the plaintiffs' claims, as presented in their amended complaint, and the district court's dispositive order. In part III, we determine that the plaintiffs lack standing.

I. A.

Congress authorized the appropriation of federal funds to aid states in highway construction under STURAA. STURAA and the federal regulations thereunder direct that states that want to receive federal funds for highway construction must have set-aside and minority business participation programs to ensure that minority businesses have the maximum opportunity to compete for the contracts involving federal funds. Section 106(c)(1) of STURAA provides:

Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, not less than 10 per centum of the amounts authorized to be appropriated under [STURAA and the prior highway aid appropriations act, the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982] after the date of the enactment of this Act shall be expended with small businesses owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.

Pub.L. No. 100-17, § 106(c)(1), 101 Stat. at 145 (emphasis added).

A small business owned and controlled by a socially and economically disadvantaged individual, or a disadvantaged business enterprise (DBE), 49 C.F.R. § 23.62, is, almost invariably, a small business owned or controlled by a member of a minority group or a woman. Women, Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian-Pacific Americans, and Asian-Indian Americans are presumptively socially and economically disadvantaged. Id.

This statute and the regulations thereunder impose three requirements on states that want to receive federal highway funds. First, each state must set and meet an annual goal, which the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) of the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) must approve, for DBE participation in highway construction projects funded with federal grants. Id. §§ 23.61, .64, .66. The FHWA always approves a goal of ten percent or more. Id. § 23.66(a). It may approve a goal of less than ten percent if the state justifies the goal by showing that the state is making all appropriate efforts to increase DBE participation in federal aid contracts, and, despite these efforts, a goal of less than ten percent represents a reasonable expectation for DBE participation given the availability of DBEs in the state. Id. § 23.66(b). Florida each year has set and met a DBE goal of ten percent.

Second, each state that wants to receive federal highway funds must agree not to discriminate on the basis of race, sex, color, or national origin in the award of federally assisted contracts, id. §§ 23.7, .41(a), .43(a)(2), while at the same time making every reasonable and necessary effort to insure that minority businesses have the maximum opportunity to compete for and perform contracts, id. §§ 23.1(a), .41(a), .43(a)(1). These requirements become part of every initial financial assistance agreement between the state and the federal government under which the state receives federal funds and every subsequent contract between the state and any contractor that involves the expenditure of federal funds. Id. § 23.43(a).

Third, each state that wants to receive federal highway funds must develop a minority business enterprise (MBE) program, which the FHWA must approve before it will grant any highway aid funds, and which becomes part of every financial assistance agreement between the state and the FHWA. Id. §§ 23.41(a)(3)(i), .41(b)(c), .43(b). To receive FHWA approval, the state's MBE program must include, among other features, a set-aside procedure that limits competition for certain contracts to MBE and DBE prime contractors, id. § 23.45(k), and a minority business participation procedure under which the state requires each prime contractor that enters into a contract involving federal funds to meet (or demonstrate a good faith effort to meet) a goal, set by the state, for DBE subcontractor participation in that contract, id. § 23.45(g)(ii).

A state that fails to comply with any of these three requirements may lose all or part of its federal highway funds. Id. § 23.68(b), (e)(1); id. § 23.43(b)-(c); 23 C.F.R. § 1.36 (1990). Two provisions of the federal regulations, however, allow states to escape certain of these requirements and still receive federal funds. First, as discussed above, the FHWA may approve an overall DBE participation goal of less than ten percent if the state justifies the goal. 49 C.F.R. § 23.66(b). Second, in "appropriate circumstances," a state may receive federal funds even if it does not have an MBE program or deviates from the MBE program requirements. Id. § 23.41(f). An additional provision allows individual third parties within the states to challenge the presumption that a member of a minority group or a woman is socially and economically disadvantaged. Id. § 23.69. Theoretically, a state also may avoid the federal requirements by choosing not to apply for federal funds.

Florida law specifically authorizes the Florida Secretary of Transportation to obtain federal highway funds and "to make all contracts and do all things necessary to cooperate with the United States Government in the construction of roads under the provisions of such Acts of Congress and all amendments thereto." Fla.Stat. § 339.05. As the district court noted, the Florida set-aside and minority goal participation program seems to be based on the federal scheme, and most likely was enacted in part to allow Florida to receive federal aid highway funds, although the Florida program never explicitly states that it was instituted in response to the federal scheme. The language of the Florida statute and regulations echoes the federal scheme, and the Florida program contains several references to federal definitions and programs. See, e.g., id. § 339.0805 (reference to DBEs as defined by STURAA).

This summary of the federal DBE program, however, is useful only as background material for a consideration of the Florida program and as evidence of the manner in which Florida's Secretary of Transportation might be expected to act in order to receive federal funds. The merits of the federal program are not before us; the plaintiffs have sued no federal defendant and have alleged no way in which the Florida statute or regulations could be considered "a part of" the federal statutory scheme, as the district court found, so that the constitutional validity of that scheme could save the other when federal aid is being used. We recognize, of course, that if the State of Florida were to lose this federal aid because of its failure to meet the federal DBE and MBE requirements, the consequences would be heavy. In fiscal year 1987-88, the federal highway aid funds received by the FDOT and awarded to contractors were $278.4 million, from a total FDOT highway construction award of $436.2 million. In fiscal year 1988-89, as of March 28, 1989, the Secretary awarded $293.5 million in federal aid in a total award of $377.6 million.

B.

The Florida statute modeled on STURAA, section 339.0805, reads:

(1)(a) Except to the extent that the [Secretary] determines otherwise, not less than 10 percent of the amounts expended from the State Transportation Trust Fund shall be expended with small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals as defined by the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987.

(b) In fulfilling this mandate, the department shall utilize every means available to it, including, but not limited to, goals and set-asides for competitive bidding and contracting only by, between, and among those firms which are certified by the department as socially and economically disadvantaged business enterprises and which are prequalified as may be appropriate. . . .

Fla.Stat. § 339.0805 (emphasis added). This statute governs FDOT highway construction contracts because the Secretary, through the FDOT, is authorized to expend funds from the State Transportation Trust Fund to construct and maintain state highway systems and to match any federal funds granted to state highway systems. Id. § 339.08. The expenditures for the highway construction contracts at issue in this case, however, are only one type of expenditure from the fund among many authorized by the statute, as the fund covers all aspects of the state transportation system.

Pursuant to the authority granted to him in Fla.Stat. § 334.044(2), the Secretary has promulgated regulations to implement section 339.0805 in Fla.Admin. Code Ann. ch. 14-78. These regulations provide definitions and allow set-asides and minority participation goals in certain circumstances to meet the ten percent goal of section 339.0805. The Florida definition of a small business owned and controlled by a socially and economically disadvantaged individual, or a disadvantaged business enterprise (DBE), is almost identical to the federal definition. A DBE is a small business that is fifty-one percent owned or controlled by a socially and economically disadvantaged individual. Id. r. 14-78.002(2)-(3). Women, Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian-Pacific Americans, and Asian-Indian Americans are rebuttably presumed to be socially and economically disadvantaged. Id. rr. 14-78.002(1), .005(7)(b)(1).

The regulations mandate that the Secretary, through the FDOT, must set an annual overall goal for DBE participation in FDOT expenditures in order to ensure that small businesses owned by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals have the maximum opportunity to participate in FDOT contracts. Id. rr. 14-78.001, .003(1). The Secretary's overall goal for the past several years has been to achieve ten percent DBE participation, although presumably he could set a lower goal under the "except to the extent that the [Secretary] determines otherwise" language of section 339.0805.

To ensure that he meets this overall goal — that is, that enough DBEs participate in contracts he awards — the Secretary may use two procedures: a set-aside or a DBE subcontractor participation goal. Under a set-aside, the Secretary allows only DBE prime contractors to bid on certain contracts, excluding nonDBE firms from the bidding process altogether. Id. r. 14-78.003(2)(a). Under a DBE participation goal, the Secretary requires the prime contractor who wins a specific contract to subcontract a certain percentage of that contract to DBE subcontractors. Id. r. 14-78.003(2)(b). The Secretary, in the specifications of the contract, states that DBE subcontractors must perform a certain percentage of the entire dollar amount of the contract, but does not himself require that certain subcontracts be reserved for DBEs. The choice of which subcontracts will be awarded to DBEs is thus left to each individual prime contractor. Although DBE goals on some projects are set at more than ten percent, many contracts have no requirement of DBE participation. The lowest bidder to meet the DBE goal generally receives the contract, although a low bidder that fails to meet the goal still may get the contract by demonstrating that it has made a good faith effort to include DBEs. Id. r. 14-78.003(2)(b)(3); see infra at p. 1198 note 26.

NonDBE prime contractors may be affected in two ways by the program. They might be excluded from bidding altogether if a contract is set aside for DBEs, or they might be required to meet or demonstrate a good faith effort to meet a DBE subcontractor participation goal if they choose to bid on a contract that includes such a goal in its specifications. In addition, the regulations impose a third requirement on prime contractors: each must develop a DBE program, which the Secretary must approve before he will award any contracts to that contractor. Id. r. 14-78.003(4)(b). A nonDBE subcontractor might be affected by only one aspect of the program: a prime contractor might accept a DBE bid for a subcontract rather than the lower bid of the nonDBE subcontractor in order to meet a DBE goal.

An individual prime or subcontractor that believes that a DBE set-aside or goal is unfair or unwarranted on equal protection grounds and that may be unable to obtain a contract because it cannot meet the program requirements, however, has several administrative or judicial methods, integral to the program, to alert the Secretary to a possible equal protection violation and allow him to apply the program provisions in a constitutional manner by eliminating goals and set-asides that are not lawful remedial responses to past or present racial discrimination in the State of Florida.

First, the regulations provide that any third party, including a prime or subcontractor, may challenge the socially and economically disadvantaged status of any individual who is presumed to be socially and economically disadvantaged because he or she is a member of a minority group or a woman. Id. r. 14-78.007(7). Thus, a contractor presumably could obtain an administrative ruling that Eskimos and Aleuts, for instance, who are presumptively disadvantaged as Native Americans, id. r. 14-78.002(1)(d), are nevertheless not disadvantaged for highway construction contracts awarded in Florida. A subcontractor that feels that it has been discriminated against by the award of a subcontract to a specific DBE firm could use this challenge procedure to cause that firm to lose its DBE status. Similarly, a prime contractor that feels that the award of a set-aside contract to a DBE prime is discriminatory might challenge the disadvantaged status of the minority prime contractor.

Second, a prime contractor that may be unable to obtain the award of a contract because it cannot meet the DBE goal for that contract may demonstrate to the Secretary at the time it submits its bid that it has made a good faith effort to meet the goal and that the Secretary therefore should consider its bid. If the Secretary is not satisfied that the contractor has made a good faith effort to meet the DBE goal and awards the contract to someone else, the contractor may seek immediate administrative review of the award, Fla.Admin. Code Ann. ch. 14-25 (1986), and may appeal a final agency decision in the Florida courts, see C.H. Barco Contracting Co. v. State Dep't of Transp., 483 So.2d 796 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1986). If the contractor demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Secretary (or the courts) that it has made a good faith effort to obtain DBE participation, its bid will be considered. If its bid is the lowest, it will receive the contract.

Third, a prime contractor who is "adversely affected" by a bid solicitation or award may file a protest, which generally suspends the bid solicitation process or award until a final agency resolution of the matter. Fla.Stat. §§ 120.53(5), 337.11(3)(b); Fla.Admin. Code Ann. ch. 14-25. Although the regulation does not provide a definition of "adversely affected," the Florida courts have held that a contractor may challenge a DBE set-aside or goal on equal protection grounds in an administrative protest to a bid solicitation or award. See Cone Corp. v. State Dep't of Transp., 556 So.2d 530, 531 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1990) (a bidder that had not raised an equal protection challenge to a DBE goal in a bid protest waived its right to challenge the goal on constitutional grounds). See generally Key Haven Associated Enters. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 427 So.2d 153, 157 (Fla. 1982) (a party appealing a final agency action under Fla.Stat. § 120.57 to the Florida courts may raise constitutional challenges to the facial validity of a statute, the facial validity of an agency regulation implementing the statute, or the constitutionality of the agency's application of the statute or regulation). The relief that a contractor that successfully challenges a DBE setaside or goal in an administrative protest procedure will receive is an order that the set-aside or goal not be instituted for the contract or an order that the contract be awarded to the party who brought the challenge.

Fourth, either a prime or a subcontractor may file an equal protection challenge to the solicitation or award of a contract containing a DBE set-aside or goal in a Florida state court. A subcontractor, because it may not file an administrative protest to a solicitation or award, see supra note 27, may go directly to Florida state court and raise all of its claims without exhausting administrative remedies. See Junco v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 390 So.2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1980) ("the principle underlying the exhaustion requirement is inapplicable where adequate remedies do not abide within the administrative sphere"). A prime contractor, on the other hand, must exhaust the administrative procedures before a Florida court will hear its claim, as an appeal from a final agency action. Key Haven, 427 So.2d at 157-58; State Dep't of Transp. v. Hendry Corp., 500 So.2d 218, 221 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1986). Only one exception to this exhaustion requirement exists: if the prime contractor opts to bypass the administrative procedure, it may challenge the facial constitutionality of section 339.0805 in a Florida court without exhausting administrative remedies. Key Haven, 427 So.2d at 157 (citing Gulf Pines Memorial Park, Inc. v. Oakland Memorial Park, Inc., 361 So.2d 695, 699 (Fla. 1978)). If the contractor chooses to file a protest, however, it will be required to exhaust administrative procedures and raise its claim that the statute is facially unconstitutional on judicial appeal from agency action. Id.; Hendry Corp., 500 So.2d at 221 (a contractor that had already completed a protest and filed an appeal therefrom could not challenge the facial constitutionality of section 339.0805 in a Florida trial court, but was limited to raising the claim in an appeal from the agency decision).

Fifth, nothing precludes a prime or subcontractor that wishes to raise an equal protection challenge to a set-aside or goal in a particular contract from filing its challenge directly in federal court when the plans and specifications of the contract are announced. A federal court considering such a constitutional challenge could grant a temporary restraining order preventing the award of the contract until the merits of the challenge are resolved and, if it finds that the claim is merited, order the Secretary not to set aside the contract, to eliminate the goal, or to award the contract to the plaintiff. See Choctaw Mfg. Co. v. United States, 761 F.2d 609, 619 (11th Cir. 1985) (a district court may enjoin the performance of a contract and may order a government contracting officer to award the contract to an unsuccessful bidder if "it is clear that, but for the unlawful conduct of the contracting officer, the contract would have gone to the successful bidder").

In summary, for the award of highway construction contracts in Florida, the program works as follows. The Secretary of Transportation sets an overall goal for DBE participation in all monies expended from the State Transportation Trust Fund. Unless the Secretary in his discretion determines that the goal should be less than ten percent, the goal is set at ten percent. The Secretary, through the FDOT, then decides to award a highway construction contract from funds in the State Transportation Trust Fund, using either state funds or a combination of federal aid and state funds. If three qualified DBE prime contractors are available, the Secretary might institute a set-aside, limiting bidding on that contract to DBEs only. If the Secretary does not limit bidding to DBEs, he may set a goal for DBE subcontractor participation in that contract. This goal, which does not specify which areas of the contract DBEs must perform, is included in the specifications of the contract sent to prime contractors. Each prime contractor then decides which portions of the contract to award to DBE subcontractors, and prepares and submits a bid listing its determination of DBE participation. The Secretary awards the contract to the lowest bidder that either meets the DBE goal or demonstrates that it has made good faith efforts to meet that goal.

This process could adversely affect a nonDBE contractor in one of three ways. First, a nonDBE prime contractor may be excluded from bidding altogether on a setaside contract. Second, a nonDBE prime contractor could submit a low bid which does not meet the DBE goal, fail to demonstrate its good faith effort to meet the goal, and lose the contract to a higher bidder that met the goal or demonstrated its good faith efforts to do so. Third, a nonDBE subcontractor might submit a low bid to a prime contractor but lose the subcontract to a DBE solely because of the DBE goal.

A contractor that is aggrieved by this process has many different administrative or judicial opportunities to challenge the program's application on the grounds that such application violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. First, the contractor could file a third party challenge to the presumptively disadvantaged status of any individual who is seeking highway construction work. Second, it could demonstrate to the Secretary that it has made a good faith effort to meet the DBE goal and that its bid should therefore be considered. Third, it could challenge either a set-aside or a DBE goal in contract specifications by protesting a bid solicitation or award. Fourth, it could challenge the solicitation or award of a contract in state court, after exhausting the state administrative remedies available to it. Fifth, it could seek relief in a federal court against the solicitation or award of a contract.

II.

The plaintiffs in this case are eight prime contractors and one specialty subcontractor engaged in the business of highway construction in the State of Florida. All are owned by white males. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the Secretary of Transportation has been implementing the section 339.0805 DBE program in a manner that discriminates against them on account of their race, in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment; as a result, they have been deprived of FDOT highway construction work and, unless the Secretary is permanently enjoined from implementing the DBE program, they will lose more work.

The plaintiffs sought no relief with respect to the construction contracts they have already lost. Presumably, those contracts have been completed, and an order declaring that the Secretary denied the plaintiffs, or any one of them, the equal protection of the laws in awarding those contracts could gain the plaintiffs nothing save a moral victory. Rather, the plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring section 339.0805 and the regulations promulgated thereunder unconstitutional on their face and permanently enjoining the Secretary from implementing the DBE program. As an interim measure, the plaintiffs asked the district court to issue a preliminary injunction directing the Secretary to refrain from setting aside or including goals in contracts pending the entry of final judgment.

The Secretary promptly moved the court to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim for relief or, alternatively, to require the plaintiffs to file a more definite statement. While his motion was pending, the court heard and denied the plaintiffs' application for a preliminary injunction. The court thereafter required the plaintiffs to amend their complaint with a more definite statement. The plaintiffs did so, filing an amended complaint (which, for our purposes, added nothing to the original complaint). The Secretary then answered the amended complaint, denying the plaintiffs' allegations of racial discrimination and challenging their standing to prosecute the suit.

After the parties joined issue, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment; they also renewed their application for a preliminary injunction. The court denied their application, but granted them summary judgment. In its dispositive order, the court declared that, on their face, section 339.0805 and the regulations promulgated thereunder denied the plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws guaranteed them by the fourteenth amendment with respect to FDOT contracts funded solely by the State of Florida. The court reasoned, under the strict scrutiny standard of City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 491-92, 109 S.Ct. 706, 720, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989), that although a state "has the authority to eradicate the effects of private discrimination within its own legislative jurisdiction" if it "identifies that discrimination with the particularity required by the Fourteenth Amendment," the Florida legislature had not identified any prior discrimination within the state of Florida before enacting the DBE program, and therefore the program was invalid. The district court noted, however, that the statute was modeled after an almost identical federal scheme, and concluded that the Florida program was mandated by, or was an extension of, the federal program. Because a very similar federal program had passed constitutional muster in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980), the court concluded that when implemented with federal funds, the Florida program was constitutional.

The plaintiffs now challenge this decision. They contend that the district court erred in upholding section 339.0805 and the regulations with respect to FDOT contracts funded by the federal government. They also contend that the district court erred in denying them permanent injunctive relief.

We do not reach the merits of plaintiffs' challenges. As the following discussion makes clear, the plaintiffs lack standing to bring this suit; accordingly, the district court, rather than granting the plaintiffs the relief it gave them, should have dismissed the case.

III.

Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to actual cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2. The standing doctrine is an aspect of this case or controversy requirement, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-101, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1949-53, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968), and has its origins in "both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2204, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-56, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 1034-35, 97 L.Ed. 1586 (1953)); O'Hair v. White, 675 F.2d 680, 685 (Former 5th Cir. 1982) (en banc). The constitutional aspect of the standing requirement eliminates claims "in which the plaintiff has failed to make out a case or controversy between himself and the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1607, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979); Lynch v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452, 1455-56 (11th Cir. 1984). The requirement that the individual plaintiff have standing is based on the need "to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).

A plaintiff must meet three requirements to have article III standing. First, if, as here, the plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, he must demonstrate that he is likely to suffer future injury; second, that he is likely to suffer such injury at the hands of the defendant; and third, that the relief the plaintiff seeks will likely prevent such injury from occurring. Whitmore v. Arkansas, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3325, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (citing Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 99, 99 S.Ct. 1608; Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1924-25, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976)). Although each of these concepts may blend into the others, the most important is the injury requirement.

The first prerequisite for standing to seek the equitable relief the plaintiffs asked for in this case is the demonstration of a threatened injury. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152, 90 S.Ct. 827, 829, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970); Marshall Durbin Co. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 788 F.2d 1490, 1492 (11th Cir. 1986). The plaintiff must present "specific, concrete facts" showing that the challenged conduct will result in a "demonstrable, particularized injury" to the plaintiff so that the plaintiff "personally w[ill] benefit in a tangible way" from court action. Warth, 422 U.S. at 508, 95 S.Ct. at 2210. The injury must be "real and immediate," not "conjectural" or "hypothetical." City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1665, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 675, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974); Kerr v. City of W. Palm Beach, 875 F.2d 1546, 1554 (11th Cir. 1989). If the plaintiff is prosecuting a constitutional claim, moreover, the injury must be the deprivation of a constitutional right. Cf. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500, 95 S.Ct. at 2206 ("the standing question . . . is whether the constitutional . . . provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief") O'Hair, 675 F.2d at 686 ("injury may be to rights existing solely by virtue of a . . . constitution").

The second prerequisite for standing, in a case like the one at hand, is that the plaintiff must show that the defendant is likely to cause the anticipated injury — there must be a "fairly traceable" nexus between the threatened deprivation of the constitutional right and the action of the defendant. Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 41-42, 96 S.Ct. at 1924-26; Allen, 468 U.S. at 752, 104 S.Ct. at 3325. "The injury must both be caused by the defendant and be remediable by the defendant." Wehunt v. Ledbetter, 875 F.2d 1558, 1567 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1472, 108 L.Ed.2d 609 (1990).

In sum, a plaintiff seeking declaratory and injunctive relief demonstrates these first two standing requirements only if the plaintiff shows that the defendant is likely to injure the plaintiff. The Supreme Court has acknowledged this in a series of cases. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105-09, 103 S.Ct. at 1667-69 (plaintiff once subject to a police stranglehold had no standing to seek injunctive relief without a showing that "he was likely to suffer future injury" from police brutality); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 331-33 n. 9, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 1215-16 n. 9, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977) (plaintiffs who had been released from prison had no standing to seek injunctive relief when the complaint did not allege "the likelihood, or even the possibility, of future contempt orders"); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372, 96 S.Ct. 598, 605, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976) (plaintiffs seeking injunction barring an alleged policy of police brutality had no standing based on "what one of a small, unnamed minority of policemen might do to them in the future"); O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 495-96, 94 S.Ct. at 676 (plaintiffs challenging alleged discriminatory bail-setting, jury selection, and sentencing had no standing to seek injunction without a showing that they were likely to be arrested and subject to the challenged practices); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108-09, 89 S.Ct. 956, 959-60, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969) (plaintiff who had been convicted for distributing anonymous handbills in past election campaign but whose future conviction was "most unlikely," alleged no controversy deserving declaratory relief for future campaigns). Like the Supreme Court, this circuit also has acknowledged the plaintiff's need to show the likelihood of injury as a prerequisite for standing to obtain equitable relief. See Kerr, 875 F.2d at 1554 (plaintiff bitten by a police dog had no standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief absent a showing that an unlawful seizure is likely to recur); Lynch, 744 F.2d at 1456-57 (plaintiff who was realistically threatened by a repetition of his experience had standing to seek injunction barring state practice of detaining persons awaiting civil commitment in county jails).

In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that they lost FDOT work because of the DBE program. They alleged no facts, however, to support this allegation; that is, they did not point to any specific contract they lost because the Secretary discriminated against them on account of their race. In short, the plaintiffs' allegations of past racial discrimination at the hands of the Secretary are nothing more than bald conclusions. The plaintiffs' allegations of future injury suffered the same infirmity; the plaintiffs merely concluded that, because of the Secretary's DBE requirements, "they will be injured in their business or property." This conclusory statement was the sole support for their prayer that the district court declare section 339.0805 and the regulations thereunder unconstitutional on their face and enjoin the Secretary from enforcing them.

The plaintiffs provided the district court no facts — either in their amended complaint or in support of their motion for summary judgment — from which the court could predict whether the Secretary would deny them equal protection of the laws in awarding future highway construction contracts. Thus, all the court had before it was the Florida DBE statute, section 339.0805; the regulations promulgated thereunder; the federal DBE statute, STURAA; its implementing regulations; and the Supreme Court's decisions in Fullilove and Croson. From these statutes, regulations, and Supreme Court decisions — and them alone — the court had to predict how the Secretary would probably treat the plaintiffs in the future if he followed the law, and thus whether the plaintiffs were entitled to the relief they sought.

To make its prediction, the court had to look first to the Florida statute. If section 339.0805 required the Secretary to institute set-asides and goals that were not lawful remedial responses to identified past or present racial discrimination in Florida, then the court could conclude that the plaintiffs might suffer a denial of equal protection — in a case where, but for the set-aside or goal, they would have been the successful bidder. If, to the contrary, section 339.0805 allowed the Secretary to use his discretion to institute set-asides and goals only where necessary to remedy identified racial discrimination, then the district court had to look elsewhere — to the Secretary's regulations, or STURAA and its regulations — to predict the Secretary's future conduct. The district court took neither of these steps; it simply bypassed the question of the plaintiffs' standing to sue and concluded that because Florida's DBE program could be implemented in an unconstitutional manner, it was unconstitutional on its face (except when implemented with federal funds). Had the court undertaken the two-step inquiry described above, it would have concluded, first, that section 339.0805 does not mandate a denial of equal protection, and, second, that there is nothing in the Secretary's regulations or the federal DBE program that would produce such a denial.

As we observe in our explanation of Florida's DBE program, there is nothing in section 339.0805 that requires the Secretary to deny the plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws. To be sure, the Secretary is charged with giving DBEs the maximum opportunity to participate in FDOT projects, but, in carrying out this task, he does not have to engage in the sort of racial discrimination the fourteenth amendment proscribes. On the contrary, his oath of office — which requires him to uphold the Constitution and laws of the United States, Fla.Stat. § 876.05 — requires him to avoid such unlawful conduct. Section 339.0805 accommodates his obligation to obey the Constitution by giving him a wide breadth of discretion. Id. § 339.0805 (setting a DBE goal of ten percent "except to the extent that the [Secretary] determines otherwise").

To argue that section 339.0805 requires the Secretary to discriminate in violation of the fourteenth amendment is to conclude that the first several words of the statute, giving the Secretary discretion, are meaningless. The plaintiffs might argue, for instance, that the legislative grant of discretion to the Secretary constituted, in effect, an unlawful delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency. Fla. Const. art. 2, § 3. It is unlikely, however, that a Florida court considering this state law question would agree. Indeed, one Florida court has found that the enactment of section 339.0805 was a lawful delegation of power. See Hendry Corp. v. State Dep't of Transp., 503 So.2d 944, 944 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1987) (the statute is "a valid, reasonable, and constitutional grant of discretion").

The Secretary has exercised this lawfully delegated statutory discretion by promulgating regulations that allow him to administer the DBE program in a constitutional manner. To conclude that section 339.0805 will require the Secretary to injure the plaintiffs means that the fact that the regulations may allow the Secretary to avoid a fourteenth amendment violation is of no moment; the regulations are invalid. In other words, the Secretary gave himself, by regulation, more authority than the statute allowed. For us to find a denial of equal protection under this scenario, we would have to say that the statute plainly requires the Secretary to deny equal protection, that is, a Florida court interpreting Florida law could not reasonably conclude otherwise, and that the regulations — to the extent that they allow the Secretary to exercise discretion — are a nullity. We conclude, on the contrary, that section 339.0805 on its face does not direct the Secretary to violate the fourteenth amendment; consequently, the statute, itself, does not provide proof that the Secretary is likely to deny plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws in letting highway construction contracts. See Kerr, 875 F.2d at 1554 (a general policy that permits but does not require unconstitutional conduct is not facially unconstitutional; therefore, plaintiffs have no standing to seek declaratory or injunctive relief against the continuation of the policy). If such proof exists, therefore, it must be found in the Secretary's regulations or the federal DBE program, which provides an incentive for the Secretary to act in a way that will enable the FDOT to receive federal funds. We find none.

As our outline of the Florida and the federal programs indicates, both programs provide many administrative and judicial escape hatches that allow the Secretary to avoid a violation of the fourteenth amendment. For instance, in the Florida program, DBE goals are set after a consideration of many different factors, good faith waivers are allowed, a contractor presumably might establish that a particular individual or group is not disadvantaged in Florida, and contractors may challenge bid solicitations and awards in administrative and state judicial proceedings on equal protection grounds. See supra at 1197-1200. The federal scheme contains similar escape hatches, including provisions by which the Secretary may avoid unlawful discrimination and still receive federal funds by submitting a goal of less than ten percent or by getting an exemption from the DBE program requirements. See supra at 1192-1194. Moreover, the federal program expressly directs the Secretary, on pain of losing federal funds, not to discriminate unlawfully. See supra at 1193. Although the Florida program contains no similar prohibition, the Secretary's oath of office serves the same function. We conclude, therefore, that nothing in the Florida statute and regulations, and nothing in the federal scheme, shows a likelihood that the Secretary will deprive the plaintiffs of contracts on account of their race in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Having demonstrated no likely injury at the hands of the Secretary, the plaintiffs have no standing to prosecute this action.

IV.

A fundamental principle of constitutional law dictates that a federal court should refuse to decide a constitutional issue unless a constitutional decision is strictly necessary. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-72, 67 S.Ct. 1409, 1419-21, 91 L.Ed. 1666 (1947); Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 777 F.2d 598, 604 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1116, 106 S.Ct. 1973, 90 L.Ed.2d 656 (1986). As the Supreme Court has stated: "If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable." Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105, 65 S.Ct. 152, 154, 89 L.Ed. 101 (1944); Church of Scientology, 777 F.2d at 604.

In the same vein, a federal court should not speculate concerning the existence of standing or "piece together support for the plaintiff." Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, 770 F.2d 1575 exh. at 1582 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (incorporating order of district court); see also Whitmore, ___ U.S. at ___, 110 S.Ct. at 1723 ("[a] federal court is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise deficient allegations of standing"); Sims v. Florida, Dep't of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 862 F.2d 1449, 1467 (11 Cir. 1989) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) ("unadorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal judicial power" (quoting Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 66, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 1705, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1976)). In this case, we decline to imagine an injury sufficient to give the plaintiffs standing when they have demonstrated none. If, at some future date, a DBE set-aside or goal which may not be a lawful remedial response to identified past or present discrimination precludes the plaintiffs from obtaining FDOT highway construction work, the plaintiffs may return to the district court and seek relief.

The judgment of the district court is VACATED and the case is REMANDED with the instruction that it be dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.