Opinion
No. 42818.
April 14, 1952.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY, RAY G. COWAN, J.
Ralph Shepard, Kansas City, for appellant.
Sol M. Yarowsky, Kansas City, for respondent.
This is an action by a labor union, Communications Workers of America, Local 6325, a voluntary unincorporated association, to recover a fine which the union has assessed against one of its members, Ruth Brown, for an alleged violation of the union's constitution and by-laws. The suit was instituted in a magistrate's court in Jackson County. Both the magistrate's court and the circuit court, upon appeal, sustained the defendant's motion to quash the constable's return upon the ground that the union, a voluntary unincorporated association, was not a suable entity and, there being no statute authorizing it to maintain a suit, could not institute and maintain this action in its name and capacity as a voluntary unincorporated association.
Upon this appeal by the union, it is urged that the trial courts erred in sustaining the motion to quash the constable's return for the reason that "within certain narrow limits, plaintiff is a corporation within the meaning of the constitution and laws of Missouri." It is claimed that this case "falls within a recognized exception to the general rule that an unincorporated association is not a suable entity; this exception being that a person is estopped to deny the corporate existence or suable entity existence of the association in a suit upon a contract between the person and the association." The appeal is submitted here upon an "Agreed Statement of Case" and the pleadings, motions and record entries are not before us; the record consists of the "agreed case" and the court's judgment sustaining the motion to quash the constable's return. The question is not briefed by the parties but the appellant asserts and the respondent denies that jurisdiction of the appeal is in this court "under applicable, constitutional and statutory provisions because: (a) An interpretation of the Constitution of Missouri as to whether a labor organization, commonly called a union, not formally incorporated, is for some purposes a corporation within the meaning of certain sections of the Constitution of Missouri, is a ground upon which appellant relies for the prosecution of this suit."
This court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in all cases "involving the construction of the Constitution * * * of this state", Const.Mo. Art. V, § 3, V.A.M.S., but is must affirmatively appear that the appeal in fact involves "the construction" of the constitution, if not, the appeal must be transferred to appropriate court of appeals. Mo.R.S. 1949, § 477.080, V.A.M.S.; Gruet Motor Car Co. v. Briner, Mo.Sup., 224 S.W.2d 73. For example, there is no question here of the employees' "right to organize and to bargain collectively", Const. Mo. Art. I, § 29, as there was in City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539, and State ex rel. Allai v. Thatch, Mo.Sup., 234 S.W.2d 1. It is not claimed here that any particular constitutional right has been infringed or invaded and the agreed facts do not necessarily present a case involving the construction of any specific constitutional provision. Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291.
Whether an unincorporated association, a labor union, was a suable entity has been determined by this court in several instances, but in each instance this court had jurisdiction of the appeal by reason of the amount involved, Ruggles v. International Ass'n, etc., Iron Workers, 331 Mo. 20, 52 S.W.2d 860, or by reason of the fact that the constitutionality of a statute was involved. Clark v. Grand Lodge of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 328 Mo. 1084, 43 S.W.2d 404, 88 A.L.R. 150. Mayes v. United Garment Workers of America, 320 Mo. 10, 6 S.W.2d 333. When the appeal did not involve one of these constitutional questions, the courts of appeal have considered the question of whether the labor union was a suable entity. Forest City Mfg. Co. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 233 Mo.App. 935, 111 S.W.2d 934.
The Constitution, Art. XI, § 1, says that "The term `corporation,' as used in this article, shall be construed to include all joint stock companies or associations having any powers or privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships." The court of appeals in an injunction suit, involving the converse of the question presented here, has heretofore considered the meaning of that section. Forest City Mfg. Co. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 233 Mo.App. loc. cit. 944, 111 S.W.2d loc. cit. 939. An appeal may involve the application of the constitution and not its construction; if so, that does not invest this court with jurisdiction in the requisite constitutional sense. Ragsdale v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 229 Mo.App. 545, 555, 80 S.W.2d 272, 278; Austin-Western Road Mach. Co. v. City of New Madrid, Mo.App., 185 S.W.2d 850. It is not necessary to say whether this appeal involves even the application of this section of the Constitution because the essence of the union's claim upon this appeal is that this case falls within the exception to the general rule and that the respondent, by reason of her contract with the union and its constitution and by-laws, "is estopped to deny the corporate existence or suable entity existence of the association." Thus it plainly appears that this appeal does not in fact involve "the construction" of the Constitution of Missouri so as to give this court jurisdiction of this appeal. The amount of the fine does not appear in the record but the suit was instituted in a magistrate's court and unquestionably "the amount in dispute" is not within this court's monetary jurisdiction. Const.Mo., Art. V, § 3; Mo. R.S. 1949, § 482.090, V.A.M.S. For the reasons stated, the appeal is transferred to the Kansas City Court of Appeals.
WESTHUES and BOHLING, CC., concur.
The foregoing opinion by BARRETT, C., is adopted as the opinion of the Court.
All concur.