Opinion
J-S01004-16 No. 3329 EDA 2012
02-03-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, v. MALIK S. YOUNGBLOOD, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 4, 2012 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Criminal Division, No. MC-51-CR-0033090-2012 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MUNDY and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
Malik S. Youngblood ("Youngblood") appeals the judgment of sentence imposed following his conviction of indirect criminal contempt ("ICC") of a Protection From Abuse ("PFA") Order. We affirm.
On May 27, 2012, Ryshawn Gross ("Gross") filed a pro se PFA Petition pursuant to Pennsylvania's Protection from Abuse Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101, et seq., seeking a PFA Order against her ex-boyfriend, Youngblood. On June 4, 2012, following a hearing, the trial court entered a final PFA Order with eviction (no contact) against Youngblood, with an expiration date of June 3, 2015. On August 15, 2012, Youngblood was arrested and charged, at Docket No. MC-51-CR-0033090-2012, with one count each of ICC (in violation of the PFA Order) and terroristic threats, and at Docket No. MC-51- CR-0033091-2012, with one count of ICC (in violation of the PFA Order). After conducting a non-jury trial on September 4, 2012, the trial court found Youngblood guilty of one count of ICC at Docket No. MC-51-CR-0033090-2012, but not guilty of the charge of terroristic threats or the ICC count at Docket No. MC-51-CR-0033091-2012.
Youngblood is the Father of Gross's child.
Youngblood's ICC conviction at Docket No. MC-51-CR-0033090-2012 relates to an incident which occurred on August 1, 2012, outside of the courthouse, after a contempt hearing regarding Youngblood's other alleged ICC violation had been continued. Gross testified that, as she was waiting outside the courthouse for her boyfriend to arrive, Youngblood exited the courthouse and threatened to kill her. N.T., 9/4/12, at 25-30.
The trial court sentenced Youngblood to six months of probation. Youngblood filed a post-sentence Motion, which he later withdrew. Youngblood filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal.
On appeal, Youngblood raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did not the lower court err, abuse its discretion and violate [Youngblood's] federal and state rights to present a defense, due process, confrontation and fair trial, where the court precluded cross-examination of [Youngblood's] proffered evidence of a properly authenticated recorded phone message from [Gross,] which would have revealed [her] clear pecuniary motive to lie[,] and further undermined her credibility with the fact-finder[,] leading to a complete acquittal?
2. Was not the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that [Youngblood]
violated the [PFA O]rder in question where it was proven that [Gross] told numerous falsehoods, the court questioned [Gross's] credibility and was unable to determine more than that "something happened" and that [Youngblood] did not walk away when [Gross] approached him, rather than the elements of the charged crime?Brief for Appellant at 4.
In his first issue, Youngblood contends that the trial court erred by precluding him from (1) questioning Gross about her financial motivation for bringing a false accusation against him; and (2) introducing Gross's voicemail message to Youngblood's new girlfriend, Eboni Ebo ("Ebo"), evidencing such motivation. Id. at 14. Youngblood asserts that, through the precluded cross-examination and voicemail message, he sought to demonstrate that he had previously designated Gross as the payee on his Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") disability checks, and that Gross had threatened to continue to have Youngblood arrested until he, once again, designated her as the payee. Id. at 14-15. Youngblood claims that he requested permission from the trial court to let him play the voicemail, but the trial court refused his requests. Id. at 16. Youngblood argues that, had the voicemail been played for the fact-finder, "a complete defense would have been presented and a complete acquittal the likely result." Id . Youngblood contends that the trial court's errors, in precluding admission of the voicemail and cross-examination of Gross as to her financial motivation, were not harmless, and contributed to his conviction. Id. at 17.
In the Argument section of his brief, Youngblood failed to include any citation to the record, including the places where he requested introduction of the voicemail and the places where the trial court refused such requests. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) (providing that "[i]f reference is made to the ... evidence, ... or order, or any other matter appearing in the record, the argument must set forth, in immediate connection therewith, or in a footnote thereto, a reference to the place in the record where the matter referred to appears."). However, because Youngblood provided this information in his Statement of the Case, we will not find waiver of this issue.
The admission of evidence is solely within the discretion of the trial court, and a trial court's evidentiary rulings will be reversed on appeal only upon an abuse of that discretion. Commonwealth v. Reid , 99 A.3d 470, 493 (Pa. 2014).
Additionally,
[t]he determination of the scope and limits of cross-examination [is] within the discretion of the trial court, and we cannot reverse those findings absent a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law. An abuse of discretion is not a mere error in judgment, but, rather, involves bias, ill will, partiality, prejudice, manifest unreasonableness, or misapplication of law.Commonwealth v. Davis , 17 A.3d 390, 395 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
"Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, an accused has the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination." Commonwealth v. Paddy , 15 A.3d 431, 447-48 (Pa. 2011) (emphasis in original).
We have recognized that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutional[ly] protected right of cross-examination. It does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. On the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, and prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. As the United States Supreme Court has observed, the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.Commonwealth v. Bozyk , 987 A.2d 753, 756-57 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quotation marks and internal citations omitted).
With regard to the cross-examination of Gross, the record reflects that the trial court permitted Youngblood's counsel to elicit testimony from Gross, on re-cross-examination, regarding her status as the payee of Youngblood's disability checks, as follows:
[Defense Counsel]: And I forgot to ask one other question. Since she's back[,] I'm going to ask about [SSI], were you [Youngblood's] payee for his [SSI disability] checks?
[Prosecutor]: Objection.
The Court: Sustained.
[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, it actually goes to motive.
The Court: Well, I'll tell you what, she can answer yes or no. I don't want to hear anything else than that [sic]. If you want to establish some other things[,] then you do it with other witnesses. I might allow some more leeway.N.T., 9/4/12, at 69-70.
[Defense Counsel]: Okay. At what point in time were you the beneficiary of these [SSI disability] checks?
[Gross]: From -
The Court: Just say yes or no, ma'am.
[Gross]: Yes.
The Court: Thank you.
[Defense Counsel]: And you no longer are, isn't that correct?
[Gross]: Yes.
[Defense Counsel]: No further questions, at this time.
Additionally, the prosecutor questioned Gross regarding her status as payee of Youngblood's SSI disability checks, and elicited testimony from Gross that she had not received any of Youngblood's SSI disability checks since September 2011. N.T., 9/4/12, at 73-74.
Regarding the voicemail message that Gross allegedly left for Ebo, the Commonwealth objected to its admission. See N.T., 9/4/12, at 75; see also id. at 78, 85. The trial court gave Youngblood's counsel an opportunity to lay a proper foundation for admission of the voicemail message by questioning Ebo. See id. at 74-75, 78. However, when asked if Gross had stated in the voicemail message that she wanted to be the payee of Youngblood's SSI disability checks, Ebo responded in the negative. Id. at 79. Ebo later changed her testimony regarding the content of the voicemail message, as follows:
[Defense Counsel]: Ebo[], in that [voicemail] message was there any sort of mention by [] Gross about receiving the [SSI disability] check of [Gross]?Id. at 81.
[Ebo]: Yes, not [Gross] but [Youngblood].
[Defense Counsel]: I'm sorry, [Youngblood], I said the wrong word, [Youngblood].
[Ebo]: Yes.
The trial court was troubled by Ebo's inconsistent testimony, but provided Ebo with an opportunity to explain the inconsistency. Id. at 81-83. However, the trial court was not satisfied with Ebo's explanation as to why she initially had denied that Gross, in the voicemail message, said she wanted to be the payee of Youngblood's SSI disability checks. See id. at 82-85 (wherein the trial court noted that Ebo was unable to explain how she misunderstood the initial question regarding the content of the voicemail message, or why her answer to the second question regarding its content was the "truthful" answer). Accordingly, the trial court sustained the Commonwealth's objection to the admission of the voicemail message. Id. at 85.
Based on our review of the record, it is clear that Youngblood was, in fact, permitted to cross-examine Gross regarding her designation as the payee of his SSI disability checks, and that, at the time of trial, she was no longer the payee. See N.T., 9/4/12, at 69-70. Thus, Youngblood's claim that he was precluded from cross-examining Gross on this issue is without merit. Although such cross-examination may not have been as extensive as Youngblood desired, we conclude that the limits imposed by the trial court were not unreasonable. See Bozyk , 987 A.2d at 756 (stating that trial judges retain wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant).
Similarly, we detect no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court's exclusion of the voicemail message from evidence. See Davis , 17 A.3d at 395. The trial court, as fact-finder, was free to disbelieve Ebo's testimony regarding the contents of the voicemail message, and to doubt her credibility. See Commonwealth v. Johnson , 668 A.2d 97, 101 (Pa. 1995) (stating that the finder of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence, and may determine the credibility of the witnesses); see also Trial Court Opinion, 3/31/15, at 7 (wherein the trial court stated its determination that Ebo did not corroborate Youngblood's theory). Accordingly, we find no merit to Youngblood's first issue.
Moreover, even if the trial court's evidentiary rulings constituted error, such error was not sufficiently significant to merit a new trial for Youngblood. "[A]n error cannot be held to be harmless unless the appellate court determines that the error could not have contributed to the verdict." Commonwealth v. Newman , 555 A.2d 151, 160 (Pa. Super. 1989) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, despite the evidentiary limitations imposed by the trial court, Youngblood's counsel was permitted to discuss Gross's admission that she was previously the payee of Youngblood's SSI disability checks, as well as the contents of the voicemail message, in her closing argument, as follows:
[Defense Counsel]: [] Let me make sure that I am not missing anything, I think that's - also, you didn't listen to the message[,] but you know because [] Ebo said that [] Gross threatened her August 12. You heard that there were threats on that message. And then[,] you also heard that there were [sic] something about the payee business, and you know that [Youngblood] receives [SSI disability], and you know that [] Gross used to be the payee, now she's not. And she's making noise about wanting to be the payee again, and I wish that you had listened to the whole message[,] but that's all that you know from here so.See N.T., 9/4/12, at 110-11. Thus, even if the trial court erred, we conclude that such error was harmless, and did not contribute to the verdict.
[The Court]: Okay.
[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor. I suggest that all of it is made up. It's all made up, all of it. And it's all in revenge because [] Gross is not getting what [she] wants[,] what she thinks she should get from the criminal justice system[,] and you know what[,] she feels she should get some sort of [SSI disability] benefits too[,] I would submit.
In his second issue, Youngblood contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove a violation of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6114 because the evidence did not demonstrate that Youngblood acted with wrongful intent to violate the PFA Order. Brief for Appellant at 18. Youngblood asserts that he had no intent to violate the PFA Order, and that Gross "waited for him and followed him, not the other way around." Id . at 18-19 (emphasis in original). Youngblood claims that the trial court found him in contempt not because it believed that Youngblood did anything violative, but rather because it "believed that 'something happened' and that therefore it had to find him guilty." Id. at 19 (emphasis in original). Youngblood argues that the trial court, as fact-finder, was unable to articulate a "specific act" committed by Youngblood which violated the PFA Order. Id. at 20. Youngblood contends that a mere finding that "something" happened is insufficient to support a conviction, and constitutes a violation of his due process rights. Id. at 20-21. Youngblood asserts that the trial court found that, whatever "confrontation" may have occurred between Youngblood and Gross, Youngblood was not the initiator, but simply failed to go in a different direction. Id. at 21. Youngblood claims that, because there was no proof that he wrongfully intended to disobey the PFA Order, his conviction must be overturned. Id.
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Youngblood's second issue, set forth the relevant law, and determined that it lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/31/15, at 3-4. We concur with the reasoning of the trial court and affirm on this basis as to Youngblood's second issue. See id.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 2/3/2016
Image materials not available for display.