Opinion
J-S45029-17 No. 3129 EDA 2016
09-19-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. STEPFON L. WILSON Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order September 1, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0002060-1997 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and STRASSBURGER, J. JUDGMENT ORDER BY PANELLA, J.
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
In 1997, a jury convicted Stepfon Wilson of second-degree murder and kidnapping. The trial court imposed a mandatory sentence of life without parole on the murder conviction, plus a consecutive term of four to twenty years of imprisonment on the kidnapping conviction. We affirmed Wilson's judgment of sentence on November 12, 1999. Wilson did not seek review by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
After his first two petitions pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") were denied, he filed the instant petition on August 1, 2016. The PCRA court dismissed his petition as untimely. This pro se appeal followed. On appeal, Wilson argues that pursuant to Alleyne v. United States , 508 U.S. 402 (2013) (holding judicial fact finding that leads to the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence is unconstitutional), Miller v. Alabama , 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) (ruling imposition of mandatory life without parole sentences on juvenile offenders is unconstitutional), and Montgomery v. Louisiana , 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016) (finding the rule announced in Miller to be applied retroactively), he is entitled to resentencing.
There is no doubt Wilson's petition, filed over 16 years after his judgment of sentence became final, is untimely under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Jones , 54 A.3d 14, 16 (Pa. 2012) ("A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be filed within one year of the date the petitioner's judgment of sentence became final[.]") If a PCRA petition is facially untimely, the petitioner must plead and prove the applicability of one of three timeliness exceptions in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Hernandez , 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Here, Wilson makes no attempt in his appellate brief to argue that his petition qualified for one of the three timeliness exceptions. Furthermore, he is due no relief even if we assume he is attempting to argue Montgomery rendered Alleyne retroactive, and therefore his petition qualifies under the "newly recognized Constitutional right" exception contained in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).
Wilson does not argue he was a juvenile at the time he committed these crimes. Indeed, the trial court records indicate he was born on December 15, 1961; thus, he would have been twenty-five years old when he committed these crimes in February of 1997. As a result, he cannot claim the relief provided by Miller and Montgomery.
Presumably, Wilson understood this, which is why he attempts to tie Montgomery to Alleyne instead of Miller. A generous reading of his appellate brief could support an argument that the imposition of a life sentence is the functional equivalent of a mandatory minimum sentence. However, even assuming Montgomery rendered not just Miller but also Alleyne retroactive, there was no judicial fact finding involved. The mandatory life sentence flowed directly from the jury's finding that Wilson had committed second-degree murder. Thus, Alleyne does not apply to Wilson.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held Alleyne is not to be applied retroactively for purposes of the application of the PCRA's timebar. See Commonwealth v. Washington , 142 A.3d 810, 820 (Pa. 2016). --------
As Wilson has failed to establish the PCRA court erred in concluding that the petition was untimely, we affirm the order dismissing Wilson's petition.
Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 9/19/2017